Case Summary for April 5, 2005

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Case Summary for April 5, 2005

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Tuesday, April 5, 2005
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SC86065
State ex rel. Ford Motor Company v. The Honorable Michael W. Manners
Jackson County
Venue

In May 2003, a 2000 Ford Windstar van driven by Terry Baker was involved in a two-vehicle accident in Chariton County, Missouri. Baker and six others were killed in the collision, and minor children Marissa and Megan Herring, who were passengers seated in the third row of Baker's van, were seriously injured. In October 2003, the Herrings' father, Rusty Herring, sued the personal representative of Baker's estate and Ford Motor Company in Jackson County, Missouri, for damages for his daughters' injuries. Delaware corporation Ford has its principal place of business in Dearborn, Michigan, and its registered agent in St. Louis County, Missouri. In November 2003, Ford moved to change venue or to dismiss for insufficient process and/or service of process. In January 2004, the personal representative for the estate, which was situated in Linn County, Missouri, filed a separate motion to change venue, although he withdrew his motion before the court could rule on it and waived any objection to venue in Jackson County. In March 2004, the court asked the parties to brief the question of what effect one defendant's consent to venue has on other defendants' right to change venue. Following briefing on this question, the court in April 2004 overruled Ford's motion to transfer venue. Ford seeks a writ of prohibition from this Court.

Ford argues it is entitled to an order requiring the trial court from taking any further action other than transferring the case. It contends venue in Jackson County is improper under the general venue provisions of section 508.010(2), RSMo, because none of the defendants are Jackson County residents and because the cause of action did not occur in Jackson County. It asserts that, assuming arguendo that section 508.010(1), RSMo, applied, its terms are not met here. Ford further argues the waiver of improper venue by its co-defendant, the personal representative, is not binding on Ford.

The Herrings respond that Ford is not entitled to a change of venue. They argue venue in Jackson County is proper. They contend their allegation of venue is based on section 508.010(1) because there are multiple defendants in the case. The Herrings assert that the terms of this statute were met because both defendants were "found" and served in Jackson County, with Ford being served through an engineer who also serves as a corporate representative. The Herrings respond that venue also is proper in Jackson County because Ford's co-defendant consented to venue there.

SC86417
State of Missouri v. Ronald Hampton, Jr.
St. Louis County
Challenge to jury selection and evidentiary rulings in murder case

In February 2002, when leaving the Wellston, Missouri, home they shared, Daryl Chatman and Domonica Miller saw several people, including Ronald Hampton, Jr., and Sam Williams, gambling outside. Hampton lived across the street from them, and Williams lived down the street. Miller called the police, who broke up the game. Later, when they returned home, Chatman got into an argument with Hampton and several other people. A few hours later, Chatman was shot three times in his home's garage. Chatman died at the scene from a gunshot wound to the chest. In April 2002, police arrested Hampton and Williams. Hampton sent Williams letters while they were incarcerated pending trial. In exchange for a plea bargain, Williams turned over Hampton's letters to the state and agreed to testify against Hampton. The state charged Hampton with first-degree murder and armed criminal action. During jury selection, the state used five of its six peremptory strikes to remove prospective jurors who are African-American. Hampton challenged each strike under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). One of these prospective jurors ultimately was reseated on the jury. Following the May 2003 jury trial, Hampton was convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal action and was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole and life in prison. Hampton appeals.

Hampton argues the court clearly erred in allowing the state to use a peremptory strike against an African-American prospective juror after the court had ruled in favor of his Batson challenge to that strike. He contends that, by allowing the state to use a peremptory strike to remove a Caucasian prospective juror and to not reseat the African-American prospective juror, the racial composition of the jury remained the same. He asserts this violated his equal protection rights. Hampton argues the court should not have permitted Miller to testify about prior acts of vandalism at her home because such acts were not connected to the shooting death of Chatman. He contends the court should not have permitted the state to introduce the letters he wrote to his codefendant, Williams. Hampton asserts that these letters, which contained bad character evidence of his dislike for Caucasians, were irrelevant because the murder was not racially motivated and were prejudicial because the state had struck four of the five African-Americans from the jury. He argues the court abused its discretion in allowing the state to question its witnesses about whether they ever had seen Hampton wear a suit before. Hampton further contends the court abused its discretion in denying his requests for a mistrial. He asserts the court did not minimize or eliminate the prejudicial impact of certain outbursts regarding his mother caused by the prosecutor in the jury's presence. Hampton argues the court's actions prejudiced him by creating an adverse inference that his mother had damaging testimony against him, that his mother was refusing to give such testimony, and that his attorney was doing something improper concerning Hampton's mother.

The state responds that it offered a valid, race-neutral reason for its peremptory strike of one African-American prospective juror and that Hampton did not prove this reason was pretextual. It argues the record supports the court's finding that the state did not violate Batson in striking another African-American prospective juror. It contends that, although the court initially disallowed this strike, the court allowed the state to reconsider its peremptory strikes, and the state struck a Caucasian prospective juror in addition to the African-American prospective juror in question here. The state asserts that the court properly allowed Miller to testify about the acts of vandalism to the home she shared with Chatman. It responds that this evidence was relevant to explain the animosity between Chatman and the people gathered at Hampton's house and that it established a motive for the murder. The state argues the court properly admitted the letters Hampton wrote to Williams after they were incarcerated. It contends the letters were relevant to reveal Hampton's consciousness of guilt and his strategy to try to hide his involvement in the crime by keeping Williams from talking to the police. The state asserts the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing witnesses to testify they never had seen Hampton wearing a suit because this testimony bore on the credibility of their identification of Hampton and his attire the night of the murder. It argues Hampton was not prejudiced by the questions relating to his attire. The state further responds that the court properly overruled Hampton's motion for a mistrial on the ground that the prosecutor "yelled" for Hampton's mother to be removed from the courtroom. The state contends a mistrial is a drastic remedy that was not warranted. It asserts that the record does not reflect that the jury knew the woman was Hampton's mother and that the court found there was nothing biased or prejudicial in the prosecutor's actions.

SC86377
In re: Peggy Hardge-Harris
St. Louis
Attorney discipline

In spring 1994, St. Louis, Missouri, attorney Peggy Hardge-Harris represented Curtis Johnson in a criminal matter. In March 1994, Johnson paid Hardge-Harris a $200 fee, the receipt for which indicated it was a deposition fee. Hardge-Harris never conducted a deposition in his case, and Johnson asked for the return of his fee. Hardge-Harris did not return the fee, and Johnson filed a claim with a fee dispute program. Following a January 2002 telephone hearing in which Hardge-Harris did not participate, the hearing officer concluded that Hardge-Harris should return Johnson's $200 fee, but she did not do so. In March 2002, Shervon Dunn retained Hardge-Harris to seek very quickly an expungement of her arrest record so Dunn could apply for a job with the police department. She paid Hardge-Harris to do the work and signed the necessary form. Hardge-Harris did not file the paperwork. She was ill during April 2002 and, as a result, was not in her office regularly. Near the end of that month, Hardge-Harris returned Dunn's money upon Dunn's request. Both Johnson and Dunn filed complaints with the office of the chief disciplinary counsel. In November 2002, a regional disciplinary committee advised Hardge-Harris to work with a law practice management consultant. She met with the consultant but did not ever work with the consultant because she did not want to spend money on the consultant's services. After the disciplinary committee learned Hardge-Harris had not retained or worked with a law practice management consultant, it held a hearing in her case and, in August 2004, recommended that her license be suspended for six months. The chief disciplinary counsel seeks to discipline Hardge-Harris' law license.

The chief disciplinary counsel argues this Court should suspend Hardge-Harris' license for no fewer than 12 months because lesser sanctions against the attorney have not served to protect the public or preserve the integrity of the profession. The chief disciplinary counsel contends Hardge-Harris violated various rules of professional responsibility, including Rules 4-1.3, 4-1.4, 4-1.16(d), 4-3.2, 4-8.1(b) and 4-8.4(c). She asserts that Hardge-Harris failed to file the expungement form despite telling Dunn she would do so and then failed to communicate with Dunn about her failure to file the form. The chief disciplinary counsel contends Hardge-Harris only put forth the most minimal effort to comply with the disciplinary committee's efforts to remediate her law practice management skills. She asserts that Hardge-Harris improperly provided Johnson with a receipt for $200 "for depositions" but then, when she did not take any depositions, failed to respond to Johnson's requests for reimbursement of the money.

Hardge-Harris responds that this Court should look at all her acts, the complaining witnesses' acts and all attendant circumstances in deciding whether she violated the rules of professional responsibility. She argues a court of competent jurisdiction determined that Johnson did not give her money for a deposition and that this judicial finding bars subsequent litigation regarding the sum in question and the resulting allegations of rule violations. Hardge-Harris further contends her failure to reimburse Johnson's money does not violate the rules.