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Case Summary for September 30, 2015

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.


ve been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.



DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, September 30, 2015
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC95053
Kelly J. Blanchette v. Steven M. Blanchette
St. Louis County

This case was removed from the September 30 docket by order dated September 1.



SC95049
In the Interest of: S.C.
St. Louis city
Challenge to requirement that certain juveniles register as sex offenders
Listen to the oral argument: SC95049.mp3SC95049.mp3
S.C. was represented during arguments by Patricia Harrison of the Saint Louis University Law Clinic in St. Louis; the state was represented by Matthew J. Laudano of the attorney generalís office in Jefferson City.

In March 2014, a juvenile officer filed a petition in the circuit courtís juvenile division alleging 14-year-old S.C. had attempted to forcibly rape his 41-year-old adoptive sister. Following a mandatory hearing in April 2014 to determine whether S.C. should be certified to stand trial as an adult, the juvenile division determined S.C. should remain in the juvenile division and not be transferred to adult court for prosecution. Before the juvenile adjudication hearing in August 2014, S.C. filed a motion to declare the sex offender registry unconstitutional as applied to juveniles. The juvenile division took the motion under advisement. Following the presentation of evidence, the juvenile division adjudicated S.C. as a delinquent for first-degree attempted rape. Following a September 2014 disposition hearing, at which additional evidence was presented, the juvenile division ordered S.C. into the care, custody and control of the stateís division of youth services and ordered S.C. to comply with the requirements of section 211.425, RSMo, by registering on the juvenile sex offender registry. The state asserts the juvenile division has not required S.C. to register on the adult sex offender registry, nor has he done so. S.C. appeals.

This appeal raises several questions for the Court. Procedural questions involve whether the juvenile has standing (the legal right) to appeal or whether he raises claims that are ripe (legally ready) for judicial review. Substantive questions involve whether it is unconstitutional to require a juvenile such as S.C. to register on the adult sex offender registry pursuant to sections 211.425 and 589.400.1(6), RSMo, given that S.C. was 14 at the time of his offense and was adjudicated of the sex offense of attempted first-degree rape. Specifically, one issue raised is whether lifetime registration of a juvenile as a sex offender is fundamentally unfair or violates due process by imposing an adult penalty for a juvenile adjudication, conflicting with the purpose of the juvenile code or removing the judgeís discretion during the juvenileís disposition. Another is whether lifetime registration of juveniles adjudicated of sexual delinquent acts constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the state and federal constitutions, is disproportionate to a juvenileís culpability, or is ineffective to achieve the juvenile codeís rehabilitative goals.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation and the Childrenís Law Center filed a brief as friends of the Court. In it, the organizations focus on the juvenile divisionís longtime recognition of the diminished culpability of juvenile offenders and emphasis on treatment and rehabilitation over punishment or other adult consequences. The organizations, in contrast, note the disproportionate punitive effect a public, lifelong criminal sanction would have on children.

SC95049_SC_brief.pdfSC95049_SC_brief.pdfSC95049_MO_Attorney_General_brief.pdfSC95049_SC_reply_brief.pdfSC95049_SC_reply_brief.pdf
SC95049_ACLU_of_MO_Foundation_&_Children's_Law_Center_amici_brief.pdfSC95049_ACLU_of_MO_Foundation_&_Children's_Law_Center_amici_brief.pdf



SC94746
City of DeSoto, a Political Subdivision of the State of Missouri, and James Acres v. Jeremiah W. Nixon, Governor of the State of Missouri, and Chris Koster, Attorney General of the State of Missouri
Cole County
Constitutional validity of legislation affecting annexed property within fire protection districts
Listen to the oral argument: SC94746.mp3SC94746.mp3
DeSoto and Acres were represented during arguments by James M. Kreitler of Wegmann Law Firm in Hillsboro; the governor and attorney general were represented by Solicitor General James R. Layton of the attorney generalís office in Jefferson City.

During its 2013 session, the legislature passed House Bill No. 307, which, in part, modified provisions of chapter 321, RSMo, governing fire protection districts. The governor signed the bill into law; relevant provisions are codified at section 321.322, RSMo. As a result of HB 307, section 321.322.1 describes how payment is made by a city to a fire protection district after the city annexes into the districtís boundaries. By its terms, subsection 1 pertains when property within the boundaries of a fire protection district is annexed into a city that has a population of at least 2,500 but no more than 65,000, that is not wholly within the fire protection district and that maintains a city fire department. By the terms of subsection 4 of the statute, subsection 1 does not apply when the annexing city is a third-class city that has a more than 6,000 but fewer than 7,000 inhabitants; that is located within a county with a charter form of government and with more than 200,000 but fewer than 350,000 inhabitants; that operates a city fire department; and that is surrounded entirely by a single fire protection district. DeSoto is a third-class city with an estimated population of about 6,240 that is located in Jefferson County, a first-class county with a charter form of government and a population of about 218,730. DeSoto has its own city fire department and is surrounded completely by the DeSoto rural fire protection district. DeSoto and one of its citizens (collectively, DeSoto or the city) filed a petition in the Cole County circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment that HB 307 and section 321.322.4 violate the state constitution. Both the city and the state filed motions for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the state. The city appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for the Court. One focuses on whether the state presented undisputed facts sufficient, under Rule 74, to justify the grant of summary judgment to the state but not the city. Another focuses on whether section 321.322.4 constitutes an impermissible special law in violation of article III, section 40 of the state constitution. Specifically, this issue is whether the legislation includes a population classification that is so narrow it that includes only one political subdivision; that excludes other similarly sized political subdivisions; and that has no substantial justification that is naturally, reasonably or rationally related to a legitimate government interest.

SC94746_DeSoto_brief.pdf SC94746_state_brief.pdfSC94746_DeSoto_reply_brief.pdf



SC94974
In re: Bradford C. Emert
St. Louis
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC94974.mp3SC94974.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Shannon L. Briesacher of the chief disciplinary counselís office in Jefferson City; Emert was represented by Sara G. Rittman of Rittman Law LLC in Jefferson City.

In June 2010, in a disciplinary proceeding involving St. Louis-area attorney Bradford Emert, the Supreme Court of Missouri entered an order requiring Emert to certify to the Court, before January 2011, that he had completed all portions of a practice management course. The order notified Emert that the Court then would issue a reprimand in that disciplinary proceeding. Emert completed the coursework but failed to file the certification. In January 2011, the Court suspended Emert for failing to pay taxes. Both before and after Emertís tax suspension, the chief disciplinary counsel continued to receive complaints from Emertís clients and, in January 2015, instituted new disciplinary proceedings against Emert. Specifically, the chief disciplinary counsel alleged that Emert violated Rule 4-1.4(a) by failing to communicate certain information to his clients regarding their wrongful death or malpractice cases or issues he was having with pursuing their cases. The chief disciplinary counsel also alleged that, following his tax suspension, Emert failed to follow proper procedure by failing to tell certain clients he had been suspended from practicing law, failing to return their files and neglecting to withdraw from one clientís case upon his suspension. The chief disciplinary counsel and Emert entered into a joint stipulation in which they agreed as to the facts and legal conclusions and proposed that, upon his reinstatement from his tax suspension, Emert be placed on probation for two years and be reprimanded under the 2010 order. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to discipline Emertís law license.

This appeal presents two related questions for this Court: whether Emert violated the rules of professional responsibility, and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.

SC94974_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief.pdfSC94974_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief.pdfSC94974_Emert_brief.pdfSC94974_Emert_brief.pdf


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