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Case Summary for October 4, 2006

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.


Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, October 4, 2006

_____________________________________________________________________________

Please note:
The documents posted here from the voter ID cases
may not reflect all the filings in the case
and are provided for the user's convenience.

SC88038 & SC88039 Order 09-21-06.pdfSC88038 order letter 09-26-06.pdfSC88039 order letter 09-26-06.pdf


NOTE: The two voter ID cases are being argued together.

SC88038
Jackson County, Missouri, et al. v. State of Missouri, Dale Morris and Senator Delbert Scott
Cole County
Validity of voter identification provisions under Hancock amendment to state constitution

The general assembly passed Senate Bill No. 1014 during its 2006 legislative session. The bill amends section 115.427, RSMo, to require that, before voting in any election held after August 2006, a person must present certain listed forms of photographic identification. It provides that individuals wanting to obtain a nondriver's license for the purpose of voting may do at no charge. It also provides that any voter who arrives at the polls without a proper photo ID may cast a provisional ballot by executing an affidavit either as to his or her identity or giving reasons why the voter could not obtain a current and valid photo ID. For the latter affidavit, the voter must state that he or she is the person listed in the precinct register but is unable to obtain such a photo ID due to a physical or mental disability or because of a sincerely held religious belief against such forms of personal identification. In addition, the bill amends section 115.430, RSMo, by providing that a provisional ballot is to be considered a "full" ballot containing all federal, state and local candidates and issues rather than containing just federal and statewide candidates and issues. The bill also requires local election authorities to verify an individual's identity by comparing the voter's signature with that on file with the election authority and to determine that the voter is eligible to cast a ballot at the polling place where the ballot was cast. The governor signed the bill into law in June 2006, and the act took effect August 28, 2006. Certain taxpayers – Jackson County Executive Katheryn J. Shields, St. Louis County Executive Charlie A. Dooley and St. Louis Mayor Francis G. Slay – subsequently sued the state of Missouri and its secretary of state. They alleged that the act violates article X, section 21 of the state constitution (the Hancock amendment) by imposing unfunded mandates on local election authorities. Missouri voter Dale Morris and the bill's sponsor, Sen. Delbert Scott, R-Lowry City, later were permitted to intervene as defendants in the suit. In September 2006, the trial court determined that the portion of the act providing for provisional ballots to be cast violates the Hancock amendment but denied the statewide injunction the taxpayers had requested. The state appeals.

The state argues the trial court erred in declaring the portion of the act regarding the provisional ballots violate the Hancock amendment. It contends this provision is not a new state mandate on local election authorities. It asserts that provisional balloting is permitted under existing election laws and that any increased use of this option will be caused by individual voters, not the state. As such, the state argues the provisions is not a state mandate within the meaning of the Hancock amendment. The state contends that the trial court did not declare specifically which provisions of SB 1014 violated the Hancock amendment and that there was no substantial evidence of increased costs of the bill's provisional balloting provision. It asserts that there was no substantial evidence that a significant number of provisional ballots would be cast. The state argues the new act does not mandate either additional election judges, poll workers or other personnel or additional training for such personnel. It contends the new act does not mandate that local election authorities purchase additional computers, telephones or other equipment or that new poll challenger instructions be printed. The state further asserts that there was no substantial evidence that any of the act's peripheral provisions – such as affidavits, signs, photocopying or notification cards – involve more than de minimis costs.

The taxpayers initially respond that this Court lacks jurisdiction. They argue that, under Rule 81.05, the trial court's decision in this case will not become final until October 16, 2006. They note that they have asked this Court to dismiss the appeal or hold it in abeyance until it is timely. They further contend the state lacks standing to appeal. They assert that the state is not an aggrieved party, as is required by section 512.020, RSMo, because the trial court's judgment does not grant them any relief whatsoever. They note that, although the trial court found evidence that the provisional balloting would lead to increased costs, it did not enjoin enforcement of any part of the bill in any county based on a Hancock violation and, ultimately, entered judgment in the state's favor and against the taxpayers. Assuming, arguendo, that the state is an aggrieved party and this Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal, the taxpayers respond to the substantive arguments raised in this case. They argue the trial court properly found that the changes the act made to existing election laws regarding provisional balloting violated the Hancock amendment. They contend there was sufficient evidence that the provisional balloting procedures will require local election authorities to perform new or increased activities. They further respond that there also was sufficient evidence that the act requires local election authorities to perform new and increased activities at a substantial cost.

SC88038 Notice of Appeal by State of Missouri.pdfSC88038 Notice of Appeal by Intervenors Dale Morris and Sen Delbert Scott.pdfSC88038 and SC88039_Transcript_on_Appeal _VOLUME_1.pdfSC88038 and SC88039_Transcript_on_Appeal _VOLUME_2.pdf
SC88038_Jackson_County_supplemental_transcript_from_08-28-06.pdfSC88038_Jackson_County_supplemental_transcript_from_09-06-06.pdf
SC88038_State_of_Missouri_brief.pdfSC88038_Jackson_County_brief.pdf


SC88039
Kathleen Weinschenk, et al. v. State of Missouri, Robin Carnahan, Secretary of State, Dale Morris and Senator Delbert Scott
Cole County
Validity of voter identification provisions under open election, due process and equal protection clauses of state constitution

This appeal also involves provisions of Senate Bill No. 1014, passed during the 2006 legislative session. Please see the summary of SC88038, also set for argument this day, for details regarding the bill's passage and specific provisions. A group of taxpayers – Kathleen Weinschenk, William Kottmeyer, Robert Pund, Amanda Mullaney, Richard von Glahn and Maudie Mae Hughes – sued the state of Missouri and its secretary of state in what they sought to describe as a statewide class action. They alleged the amended provisions of section 115.427, RSMo, violate their constitutional rights of suffrage, due process and equal protection, as well as article X, section 21 (the Hancock amendment). St. Louis County voter Ms. Dale Morris and the bill's sponsor, Sen. Delbert Scott, R-Lowry City, were permitted to intervene as defendants. In September 2006, the trial court held the act violates article VIII, section 2 qualifications to vote; interfered with the article I, section 25 provisions providing for the free exercise of the right of suffrage and requiring that all elections be free and open; violated article I, section 2 by requiring the payment of money to vote; and violated the due process and equal protection rights of voters, guaranteed by article I, sections 2 and 10, respectively, by imposing an undue burden on the right to vote. The trial court enjoined the amended section 115.427. It denied relief on the Hancock issue, finding it did not have the authority to certify this challenge as a statewide class action. The state appeals, as do Morris and Scott.

The state argues the trial court erred in finding that section 115.427 creates unconstitutional additional qualifications to vote and violates equal protection and due process by creating an undue burden on the right to vote. Rather, the state contends that it may attempt to prevent election fraud and that it is permitted to require a person, before casting a provisional ballot, to provide documentation that the person possesses the constitutional qualifications to vote. The state asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the new section 115.427 violates equal protection by creating a "poll tax" requiring the payment of money to vote. Rather, the state argues this section merely requires voters not possessing proper identification to obtain such identification or to cast an absentee or provisional ballot. The state contends the trial court erred in finding that section 115.427 violates the constitutional right of suffrage and the guarantee that all elections shall be free and open. It asserts that this section does not infringe on the right of qualified voters to vote and does not alter the form of elections held in Missouri. The state reiterates that it is permitted to require a person, before casting a ballot, to provide documentation that the person possesses the constitutional qualifications to vote. The state further argues the trial court erred in concluding that the portion of the act allowing provisional ballots to be cast violates the Hancock amendment. The state's specific contentions are identical to those raised in its arguments in SC88038, also argued this day.

Morris and Scott argue the trial court applied the wrong standard of review. They contend the act's provisions are not subject to strict scrutiny and should be found lawful because they impose reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions that further important state regulatory interests. They assert that applying strict scrutiny is inconsistent with a long line of Missouri election-law decisions as well as federal law. They argue the state need not identify past cases of actual fraud, nor is it required to address all possible sources of voter fraud in the same legislative enactment. Morris and Scott contend the trial court erred in entering its declaratory judgment that section 115.427 and its photo ID requirement are unconstitutional and in entering a permanent injunction restraining Missouri and its secretary of state from implementing and enforcing the statute. They assert that the statute does not impose additional voter qualifications in violation of article VIII, section 2 of the state constitution. Morris and Scott argue it merely establishes procedures for conducting Missouri elections and for verifying a particular voter's qualification to vote. They contend these procedures support the exercise of the general assembly's recognized police power to regulate Missouri elections by ensuring honesty and integrity in the electoral process. They assert these procedures do not establish any substantive qualification or criteria conditioning the right to vote. Morris and Scott argue section 115.427 does not interfere with the exercise of the right to vote under article I, section 25 of the state constitution or constitute an undue burden on the right to vote in violation of article I, sections 2 and 10 of the state constitution. They contend the statute constitutes a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation of the right to vote in furtherance of the state's important regulatory interests in ensuring that Missouri elections are – and are perceived to be – fair, honest and free of fraud as well as in fostering public confidence in the electoral process. They note that Missouri has had instances of voter fraud in the past and that the state's voter rolls currently contain the names of duplicate, dead and ineligible voters, making the state's elections more susceptible to vote fraud. Morris and Scott assert that the statute does not make payment of a fee an electoral standard in violation of article I, sections 2 and 10. They argue the statute does not impose any mandatory, direct fee or cost on voters as a necessary condition of their exercise of their right to vote. They note that the law gives Missourians two years in which to obtain free photo identification. They further note that, even if there was a Hancock violation to be remedied, the federal equal protection clause prohibits Missouri courts from implementing a remedy that would have the effect of implementing different voter identification requirements in different counties.

Weinschenk responds that the trial court properly held that the photo identification requirement constitutes an additional qualification to vote under article VIII, section 2 of the state constitution. She argues this section sets forth the exclusive list of voting qualifications and disqualifications and also sets forth the single issue on which the general assembly may make a determination about qualifications to vote. Weinschenk contends that, as a matter of construing the constitution, the general assembly cannot add qualifications or disqualifications not specifically listed in the constitution. She asserts that, in imposing the photo ID requirement, the general assembly violated the constitution by adding a new qualification and disqualification not listed in the constitution. Weinschenk responds that a recent ruling by a Georgia court invalidating a similar Georgia photo identification requirement as an impermissible additional qualification to vote under a similar Georgia constitutional provision is instructive in this case. She argues the state's arguments and authorities are misdirected, do not involve similar constitutional provisions, and are factually inapposite. Weinschenk contends the state is exaggerating, in a fanciful way, when it states that the trial court's ruling would prevent election regulation by the state. She asserts that Morris and Scott's arguments ignore the trial court's factual findings and that their authorities are all federal cases interpreting the federal constitution and statutory provisions that are totally unlike article VIII, section 2 of the state constitution. Weinschenk responds that the photo ID requirement interferes with the free exercise of the right of suffrage in violation of article I, section 25. She argues that this section expressly prohibits the general assembly from taking any action to interfere with the right of suffrage and that the general assembly, in imposing the requirement, in fact interfered with this right. She contends the arguments of the state, Morris and Scott ignore the trial court's factual findings and the plain meaning of section 25. She asserts that none of the cases they cite involve state regulation that interferes with the right to vote. Weinschenk responds that Morris and Scott mischaracterize the trial court's ruling, ignoring the carefully articulated basis for and language of that judgment. She argues the photo ID requirement makes the payment of a fee into an electoral standard, thereby violating the due process and equal protection clauses of the state constitution. She contends the trial court expressly found that the photo ID requirement unconstitutionally requires Missouri citizens without such identification to pay money to vote. She asserts that the trial court properly rejected the argument of the state, Morris and Scott that the state can do indirectly what it cannot do directly. She responds that the United States Supreme Court also rejected this argument. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Weinschenk argues Morris and Scott's argument that the state constitutionally may require a fee to vote if the fee is paid in connection with obtaining a license also has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court and by the trial court in this case. Id. at 668. She contends federal court decisions from Georgia and Indiana provide no support for the arguments of the state, Morris and Scott that the state can require the payment of money to vote. She asserts that the federal cases involving disclosure of social security numbers do not address the payment of money to vote and, therefore, are inapplicable. Weinschenk responds that, whether called a "poll tax" or a fee, the photo ID requirement unconstitutionally requires those without such an identification to pay money to vote. She argues the photo ID requirement violates due process and equal protection because it constitutes an undue burden on the fundamental right to vote that is not tailored narrowly to meet a compelling state interest. She contends that, under settled Missouri law, the identification requirement must be subject to strict scrutiny because it impinges on a fundamental right. She asserts that, to the extent federal precedent interpreting the federal constitution is considered, strict scrutiny still must be applied. Weinschenk responds that the act's photo identification requirement in this case cannot survive strict scrutiny because it is not necessary to accomplish any compelling state interest, it is overbroad, and it is not tailored narrowly to address the state's interest in preventing voter fraud. Weinschenk further argues the availability of provisional ballots in certain elections for narrow categories of voters in certain defined circumstances does not cure the constitutional invalidity of the photo identification requirement.

The secretary of state incorporates the arguments Weinschenk raises. In addition, the secretary of state responds that the trial court did not err in finding that the photo ID requirement in SB 1014 violates the equal protection clause of the state constitution. She argues this requirement impinges on the fundamental right to vote of as many as 240,000 registered voters in Missouri. The secretary of state contends the photo ID requirement is not necessary to promote any compelling state interest. The secretary of state further asserts that there are no reported instances of voter impersonation fraud in Missouri, which she argues is the only type of fraud the photo ID could prevent.

Five organizations – Women's Voices Raised for Social Justice, AARP, Missouri Women's Coalition, Jewish Community Relations Council, and Missouri NOW – argue, as friends of the Court, that the trial court correctly held that the new voter protection act violates article VIII, section 2 of the state constitution. They contend this section provides the exclusive list of Missouri voting qualifications and disqualifications. They assert the act unconstitutionally creates additional qualifications and disqualifications that disproportionately hinder the voting rights of women, older people and people with disabilities. The organizations argue the trial court correctly held that the new voter protection act violates article I, section 25 of the state constitution. They contend the photo identification requirement interferes with the free exercise of the right of suffrage by requiring payment of money to vote, by imposing onerous and time-consuming burdens to receive a ballot, and otherwise making it impossible for qualified individuals to vote. The organizations assert that the trial court correctly held that the act violates equal protection. They argue the act's photo identification requirements disadvantage some voters and infringe on fundamental rights protected by the constitution. They further contend these requirements are not necessary to accomplish a compelling state interest.

Ten other organizations –National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc.; Missouri Citizens Education Fund; Grass Roots Organizing; The Whole Person; Disabled Citizens Alliance for Independence; Southwest Center for Independent Living; Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law; The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, Inc.; People for the American Way Foundation; and Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund – argue, as friends of the Court, that the Missouri voter photo identification act is subject to strict scrutiny because it impinges on the fundamental constitutional right to vote. They contend the act imposes severe and undue burdens on Missouri citizens' rights to vote. They assert that the act would not survive strict scrutiny analysis under precedent of cases from the United States Supreme Court.

SC88039 Notice of Appeal by State of Missouri.pdfSC88039 Notice of Appeal by Intervenors Dale Morris and Sen Delbert Scott.pdfSC88038 and SC88039_Transcript_on_Appeal _VOLUME_1.pdfSC88038 and SC88039_Transcript_on_Appeal _VOLUME_2.pdfSC88039 order letter 09-26-06.pdf
SC88039_State_of_Missouri_brief.pdfSC88039_Scott_brief.pdfSC88039_Weinschenk_brief.pdfSC88039_Carnahan_brief.pdfSC88039_Scott_reply_brief.pdf
SC88039_Women's Voices_AARP_et_al_amici_brief.pdfSC88039_NAACP_ACLU_et_al_amici_brief.pdf


SC88018
Committee for a Healthy Future, Inc., et al. v. Robin Carnahan, Missouri Secretary of State, et al., Louis Smither, et al.
Cole County
Challenge to decision that tobacco tax initiative petition did not qualify for November ballot

The Committee for a Healthy Future, Inc., proposed an initiative petition that would amend the state constitution by increasing the state cigarette tax by 80 cents per package and by increasing the state tax on other tobacco products by 20 percent. In February 2006, the secretary of state approved the form of the petition and certified its ballot title for circulation. In May 2006, the Committee filed the initiative petition and its signatures with the secretary of state's office. Upon the secretary of state's request, three local election authorities reviewed the petition pages. These local election authorities certified that the petition included a total of 25,133 signatures of registered voters from the 5th Congressional District. In August 2006, the secretary of state issued a certificate of insufficiency rejecting the initiative petition, declaring it was 274 valid signatures short of what was required for the Fifth Congressional District. She did not count 1,880 signatures collected by circulators who failed to register to circulate the tobacco tax initiative petition. The Committee subsequently sued the secretary of state, challenging her decision that it did not submit the requisite number of legal voters' signatures on its initiative petition. Missourians Against Tax Abuse, Louis Smither, Hal Swaney, Chris Kemph and Newell T. "Chip" Baker Jr. (taxpayers who opposed the petition) were permitted to intervene as defendants. They filed cross-claims alleging that the initiative petition appropriated existing state revenues by amendment and lacked a single, identifiable purpose. They also alleged that certain voters who signed the initiative petition listed addresses different from those they had identified to local election authorities and that the collected signatures were invalid due to errors and inaccuracies in the voter rolls. In its September 2006 final judgment, the trial court ordered the secretary of state to certify the tobacco tax initiative petition for placement on the November 7, 2006, general election ballot, determining that the initiative petition was signed by a sufficient number of legal voters. Certain taxpayers appeal, and the Committee for a Health Future, Inc., cross-appeals.

The taxpayers argue the trial court erred in declaring there were a sufficient number of legal voters' signatures on the petition. They contend the signatures of certain registered voters who signed the petition with a different address than that on their voter registrations are not valid. They assert that only signatures where the two addresses match are deemed signatures of legal voters under section 116.130.1, RSMo Supp. 2005, and article III, section 50 of the state constitution. The taxpayers argue the signatures of voters who omitted their congressional districts are invalid because sections 116.040 and 116.030.3, RSMo, mandate that a voter complete a congressional district designation on the signature line for the signature to be valid. The taxpayers contend the names and addresses of voters who signed the petition that did not match the physical voter registration records on file with local election authorities are invalid. They assert that section 116.130.1 only allows the local election authorities to use the voter registration records they have on file – not the secretary of state's statewide electronic voter database – to verify names and addresses. The taxpayers argue that signature lines with incomplete names, addresses and dates should not have been counted. They contend such signatures are invalid under section 116.130. The taxpayers assert that signatures on a petition page without a complete circulator's affidavit should not be counted. They argue such signatures do not comply with the requirements of section 116.040, RSMo, that initiative petition circulators complete an affidavit containing their notarized signatures. The taxpayers contend the proposed tobacco tax amendment violates article III, section 50 of the state constitution. They assert that it improperly appropriates existing state revenues for the amendment's purposes in excess of the revenues the proposed tobacco tax would generate. They argue it mandates additional government expenditures to administer programs without funding such programs and fixes existing appropriations for certain programs. The taxpayers contend the proposed tobacco tax amendment also unconstitutionally contains multiple subjects by adding tobacco issues, expanding the Medicaid program and alters the state auditor's duties.

The Committee responds that the trial court properly determined that signatures of certain registered voters must be counted as valid pursuant to 15 CSR 30-15.010 and -15.020. It argues these regulations are valid because the petition signers were registered voters when they signed the initiative petition. It contends the taxpayers have not preserved their challenge to the validity of the regulations permitting minor name and address variations. The Committee asserts that the trial court properly determined that the signatures of voters who did not list a congressional district designation must be counted as valid pursuant to section 116.130.3 and 15 CSR 30-15.010 and -15.020. It responds that both the general assembly and the secretary of state have determined expressly that the designation, or lack thereof, of a correct congressional district is not a required element of a valid signature. The Committee argues the trial court properly found signatures to be valid when the signature matched the record on file with local election authorities and the address matched what the local election authorities had entered into the statewide voter registration system. The Committee contends that the trial court properly determined that the taxpayers did not disprove the validity of signatures on the initiative petition. It asserts that the taxpayers did not offer evidence that the individuals signing the petition were not legal voters. It responds that, at most, the taxpayers' evidence only showed discrepancies in the completion of the signature lines and did not establish either that the signatures were not genuine or that the people signing the petition were not registered voters. The Committee argues the trial court properly determined the signatures on petition pages with alleged irregularities in notarization or circulator affidavits must be counted as valid pursuant to section 116.130.1 and 15 CSR 30-15.010 and -15.020. It contends such irregularities do not affect the validity of signatures that have been verified by local election authorities or otherwise. The Committee asserts that the trial court properly found that the initiative petition complied with article III, section 51 of the state constitution. It responds that the petition generates new revenue and properly appropriates that new revenue. The Committee further argues the trial court properly determined the proposed amendment contains only one subject because its every provision relates to the imposition, collection and disbursement of increased tobacco tax.

The secretary of state responds that she lawfully accepted certain signatures of registered voters who listed a different address on the petition. She argues that such addresses were within the counties of the voters' registrations and that local election authorities verified such signatures. She contends a signature on a petition is counted properly even if the voter omitted his or her congressional district from the signature line. She asserts that local election authorities may verify information against the statewide voter registration system, which is the official voter registration list for the conduct of all elections in Missouri. The secretary of state responds that verified signatures are counted properly even if minor or inconsequential variations from the voter registration records exist. She argues signatures that local election authorities verify are not disqualified by irregularities with the notarization of petition pages or circulator affidavits. She contends such irregularities are not fatal. She asserts that the petition does not appropriate by initiative, in an unconstitutional manner, because it only appropriates money raised in the initiative. The secretary of state responds that the tobacco tax initiative petition does not contain multiple subjects in violation of the state constitution. She argues the initiative only imposes a new tax and establishes how the funds from that tax shall be used.

In its cross-appeal, the Committee argues the trial court erred in holding that petition circulators who registered with the secretary of state but who did not provide all the information required by section 116.080.2, RSMo, were not properly registered. It contends the circulators complied or substantially complied with this section's registration requirement by providing their names and contact information to the secretary of state. It asserts that strict compliance with an ambiguous statute should not be required. The Committee argues the trial court erred in holding that sections 116.080 and 116.120 are constitutionally valid. It contends these statutes conflict with sections 49, 50 and 53 of article III of the state constitution. It asserts these statutes improperly condition the validity of legal voters' signatures on whether petition circulators properly register. The Committee further argues the trial court erred in holding these statutes are valid under the federal constitution's First Amendment. It contends they improperly restrict core political speech, are not substantially related to an important state interest, and require disclosure of the names of paid petition circulators when other statutes meet the state's interest.

In response to the secretary of state's arguments, the taxpayers argue the trial court properly determined that the secretary of state correctly disqualified signatures submitted by circulators who were not registered. They contend that section 116.080 requires initiative petition circulators to register and submit certain information to the secretary of state and that section 116.120 requires the secretary of state not to count signatures collected by circulators who fail to provide the information mandated by section 116.180. They assert that section 116.080 is not ambiguous and that the circulators failed to provide the required information. They respond that the circulators failed to comply with section 116.080.2 when they did not identify the name of the petitions they were circulating. The taxpayers argue these two statutes are constitutional and their purpose is to provide openness and accountability in the initiative process. They further contend the trial court correctly determined that these statutes are constitutional under the First Amendment because they are necessary to carry out the state's reasonable interest in ensuring efficiency, veracity and clarity in circulating initiative petitions.

In response to the Committee's cross-appeal, the taxpayers argue that the Committee offers no justification for its failure to adhere to the constitutional and statutory requirements applicable to its tobacco tax initiative petition and points to no mitigating circumstances rendering its compliance with such requirements unnecessary. It contends the requirements regarding verification of signatures, identification information for signers and notarization of circulator petitions are reasoned determinations of what should be done to implement properly the extra-legislative power of the initiative process and to implement the state's interest in ensuring the integrity of that process. The taxpayers assert the secretary of state correctly disqualified signatures submitted by circulators who were not registered properly or did not provide the information required pursuant to section 116.080. They respond that this statute is not ambiguous but that the circulators nonetheless failed to provide the required information, including the identity of the names of the petitions they were circulating. The taxpayers argue sections 116.080 and 116.120 are constitutional under the state constitution and the First Amendment. They contend the purpose of these sections is to provide openness and accountability in the initiative process. The taxpayers further respond that these sections are necessary to carry out the state's reasonable interest in ensuring efficiency, veracity and clarity in the circulation of initiative petitions.

In response to the Committee's cross-appeal, the secretary of state argues that the statutory language of sections 116.080 and 116.120 prohibits her from counting, as valid, signatures submitted by unregistered or improperly registered circulators. She contends the statutory scheme of these sections is clear and ambiguous and that the Committee attempts to create ambiguity where none exists. She asserts that substantial compliance is not enough to satisfy this statutory scheme. The secretary of state responds that Missouri's circulator registration requirements are valid under the state constitution, which she argues provides the general assembly with express authority to regulate the initiative process. She contends the circulator registration requirements also are valid under the First Amendment. She asserts that the state has important interests that these requirements further and that the requirements serve the state's interests without greatly inhibiting First Amendment activity.

Certain legislators – Rep. Carl Bearden, R-St. Charles, who serves as Missouri's speaker pro tem; Rep. Allen Icet, R-Wildwood, who serves as chairman of the House budget committee; and Sen. Charles Gross, R-St. Charles, who serves as chairman of the Senate appropriations committee – argue, as friends of this Court, that the proposed tobacco tax initiative petition violates the state constitution. They contend it will appropriate existing state revenues to pay for services whose costs will exceed the amount of revenue the initiative will generate. They assert it will mandate incurring administrative costs without providing the revenue to pay for them.

SC88018_Smither_and_Missourians_Against_Tax_Abuse_first_brief.pdfSC88018_Carnahan_first_brief.pdfSC88018_Committee_For_A_Healthy_Future_brief.pdfSC88018_Smither_and_Missourians_Against_Tax_Abuse_second_brief.pdfSC88018_Carnahan_second_brief.pdfSC88018_Committee_For_A_Healthy_Future_second_brief.pdfSC88018_Legislators_amici_brief.pdf

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