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Case Summary for October 28, 2015

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.


Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.



DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, October 28, 2015
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC94927
State of Missouri v. Derrick L. Carrawell
St. Louis city
Lawfulness of arrest, search and seizure in drug possession case
Listen to the oral argument: SC94927.mp3SC94927.mp3
Carrawell was represented during arguments by Srikant Chigurupati of the public defender’s office in St. Louis; the state was represented by Shaun Mackelprang of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Four St. Louis police officers were speaking to neighborhood residents in April 2012 when one said he observed a driver pull up a vehicle in the street, pause for about 30 seconds while looking at the officers, then park next to the curb. The driver – later identified as Derrick Carrawell –exited the vehicle and yelled or muttered profanities toward the officers; he also retrieved a white plastic bag from the passenger side of the vehicle. The officers approached Carrawell, advising he was under arrest for peace disturbance. Carrawell tried to move away, but one officer grabbed his arm, and other officers handcuffed the driver. The officers directed Carrawell to drop the bag, but he did not; one forcibly removed the bag from Carrawell’s hands. Carrawell continued to curse throughout the process. The officer opened the bag, finding pieces of a ceramic plate and a tan powdered substance later determined to be heroin. The state charged Carrawell, as a prior and persistent drug offender, with felony possession of a controlled substance. Carrawell sought to suppress evidence of the bag and its contents, but the trial court overruled his motion and admitted the evidence. The jury found Carrawell guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to 12 years in prison. Carrawell appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for the Court related to whether police officers violated Carrawell’s state and federal constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they arrested him for a peace disturbance, seized and searched a bag he was carrying, and found heroin. One is whether Carrawell voluntarily abandoned the bag or whether officers forcibly took it from him. Another is whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Carrawell so as to justify their search and seizure. A third is, if the arrest was lawful, whether the officers had lawful authority to search the bag.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation filed a brief as a friend of the Court. It focuses on the peace disturbance ordinance under which Carrawell was charged, arguing it is an unconstitutional content-based restriction on speech and is substantially overbroad. It also argues Carrawell’s expression did not constitute “fighting” words and, therefore, there was no probable cause for the arrest giving rise to the search and seizure.

SC94927_Carrawell_brief.pdfSC94927_Carrawell_brief.pdfSC94927_State_brief.pdfSC94927_State_brief.pdfSC94927_Carrawell_reply_brief.pdf
SC94927_ACLU_amicus_brief.pdfSC94927_ACLU_amicus_brief.pdf



SC94959
State of Missouri v. Adriano Raphael Clark Sr.
Webster County
Sufficiency of evidence to support conviction for drug possession
Listen to the oral argument: SC94959.mp3SC94959.mp3
Clark was represented during arguments by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Andrew Hooper of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

A Marshfield police officer went to a home in February 2013 in response to a hang-up call placed from that residence to 911. A woman who appeared to have been assaulted pointed the officer toward the back of the house, where the officer saw Adriano Raphael Clark Sr. sitting in the east bedroom next to a nightstand. On the nightstand, the officer observed a black velvet pouch with drawstrings. The officer arrested Clark, who asked to retrieve his belongings from the west bedroom, which Clark said was his. The woman who answered the door – and who identified herself as Clark’s girlfriend – gave two other Marshfield police officers consent to search the residence. One officer looked in the black pouch on the east bedroom nightstand and found a substance inside that later was determined to be methamphetamine. The other found what appeared to be men’s shoes in the bedroom as well as paraphernalia, scales and methamphetamine in a brown pouch hanging from the wall above the nightstand. An officer testified Clark had $560 in cash on his person when he was taken into custody. The state charged Clark as a prior and persistent drug offender with felony possession of a controlled substance, and the case was tried before a judge rather than jury in November 2013. At the close of the state’s evidence, Clark moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that nothing in the east bedroom tied him to that room and that the state failed to prove he had any knowledge of or control over drugs found in the house. The trial court overruled his motion and ultimately found Clark guilty as charged and sentenced him to 10 years in prison. Clark appeals.

This appeal presents an issue for the Court as to whether there was sufficient evidence to find Clark guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of possession of a controlled substance. Specifically, the appeal questions whether the evidence is sufficient to prove either that Clark knew about the drugs in the bedroom, which were found in closed pouches, or that he exercised control over them sufficient to show constructive possession.


SC94959_Clark_brief.pdfSC94959_Clark_brief.pdfSC94959_State_brief.pdfSC94959_State_brief.pdfSC94959_Clark_reply_brief.pdfSC94959_Clark_reply_brief.pdf



SC94977
State of Missouri v. Blaec James Lammers
Polk County
Sufficiency of evidence supporting convictions for assault and armed criminal action; admissibility of statements made to police
Listen to the oral argument: SC94977.mp3SC94977.mp3
Lammers was represented during arguments by Donald R. Cooley, an attorney in Springfield; the state was represented by Robert J. (Jeff) Bartholomew of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

In November 2012, Blaec Lammers purchased two rifles and ammunition for both from a Walmart in Bolivar. He had a history of hospitalizations for psychiatric problems and was prescribed medication for depression at the time. Lammers and his girlfriend later took the rifles to a friend’s home. The friend and Lammers then took the rifles to the friend’s grandmother’s farm, where the friend showed Lammers how to load and shoot the rifles. After they finished shooting, the friend took the rifles home; Lammers later left the rifles and ammunition with his girlfriend’s father, who called Lammers’ mother to tell her he was storing guns for her son. The mother later found receipts for the guns. She took the receipts to the sheriff’s department and expressed concern that, because of his mental illness, her son should not possess guns. She asked the sheriff’s office to keep an eye on Lammers, apparently out of fear he had not been taking his medication and would hurt himself. Later, a Bolivar police officer was instructed to check on Lammers. The officer found Lammers with his girlfriend at a Sonic in Bolivar. Lammers told the officer that he was taking his medication and that he had purchased two guns for hunting. A detective drove Lammers to the police station, where Lammers was placed in a room with detectives. The parties dispute whether the detectives properly gave Lammers warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona or whether Lammers understood or voluntarily waived his rights. Lammers ultimately told detectives he had thought of shooting people at a Walmart and then turning himself in to police. The state subsequently charged Lammers with first-degree assault and related armed criminal action as well as making a terroristic threat. Shortly after Lammers’ arrest, the state sought a mental evaluation, and the trial court later ordered a detailed mental evaluation. In January 2014, the court found Lammers competent to proceed, and the case was tried before a judge rather than a jury. Before trial, the court overruled Lammers’ motion to suppress his statements to the detectives. The trial court acquitted Lammers of making a terroristic threat, found him guilty of first-degree assault and the related armed criminal action, and sentenced him to concurrent 15-year prison terms.

This appeal presents two issues for the Court. One is whether there was sufficient evidence to find Lammers guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of first-degree assault or armed criminal action. Related to this issue is the question of whether Lammers’ conduct constituted a substantial step toward committing first-degree assault. The other issue involves related questions of whether the officers acted lawfully in taking Lammers to the police station or whether this constituted an unlawful arrest or detention, as well as whether the statements he subsequently made to detectives violated his constitutional rights.

SC94977_Lammers_brief.pdfSC94977_Lammers_brief.pdfSC94977_State_brief.pdfSC94977_State_brief.pdf



SC95098
In re: Sanford P. Krigel
Jackson County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC95098.mp3SC95098.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel, Alan D. Pratzel of Jefferson City, represented himself; Krigel was represented by Jacqueline Cook of Franke Schulz & Mullen PC in Kansas City.

In 2009, a 23-year-old man found out that his 22-year-old girlfriend was pregnant. Medical tests established an April 2010 due date. The couple discussed options, including abortion, adoption and coparenting, as well as raising the child together. At one point, the man told his girlfriend that he wanted to raise the baby at his parents’ Kansas home, about 15 minutes from where she lived in Missouri with her parents, but he did not wish to marry her. In March 2010, they told their parents about the pregnancy, after which the couple’s relationship was terminated. The expectant mother’s parents took steps to prevent the expectant father from having any contact with the expectant mother, and he was not permitted to attend the expectant mother’s medical appointments. Also in March 2010, the expectant mother hired Kansas City attorney Sanford Krigel to terminate her parental rights and to place the baby for adoption. Around the same time, the expectant father hired a different attorney to discuss his objection to an adoption. Krigel specializes in adoptions; the father’s attorney does not. The father’s counsel contacted Krigel to discuss the situation; the parties dispute whether the father’s counsel stated his client would not consent to adoption as well as whether Krigel said there would be no adoption without the father’s consent. They also discussed the need for the couple to seek counseling away from their parents. Krigel suggested a social worker with whom he already had discussed prospective adoptive parents. When the couple met for counseling, the expectant father was not fully aware that the counselor had been working with the expectant mother to complete a written adoption plan and birth parent home study or that an adoption proceeding would proceed without his consent. During the meeting, the father stated he would oppose adoption. Sometime later, the mother sent the father a message falsely stating her due date had been pushed from April to May. The child was born before the April due date. Krigel initiated an adoption proceeding in April to consent to termination of her parental rights and to transfer custody of the newborn to the adoptive parents. Following a hearing, the circuit court approved the adoption, and the adoptive parents took the infant home. In May 2010, the father learned of the birth following a social media posting and hired new counsel. His new counsel registered the father on Missouri’s putative father registry and then discovered there was an adoption already pending. The father’s counsel filed an answer objecting to the adoption and a related action to establish the father’s paternity. Following a spring 2011 trial, the circuit court declared the father to be the child’s biological father and granted him sole and exclusive custodial and parental rights. At that time, the child was 13 months old.

The chief disciplinary counsel instituted disciplinary proceedings against Krigel in February 2014. Following a December 2014 evidentiary hearing, a disciplinary hearing panel issued its decision in May 2015 concluding that Krigel committed professional misconduct in his representation of the birth mother. Specifically, it found he asked questions of his client during the court hearing designed to elicit answers that misrepresented the facts as he knew them and that misled the court with respect to the true circumstances of the case. The panel found Krigel falsely told the birth father’s attorney that there would be no adoption if the birth father did not consent and made no effort to advise the attorney otherwise. The panel found that Krigel knew that the birth father was not willing to consent to adoption but wished to raise his child and that Krigel’s instructions to the birth mother and her family not to communicate with the birth father or do anything served no purpose but to delay the father’s assertion of his parental rights. The panel further found that Krigel’s overall conduct – including his interaction and failure to interact with the father’s counsel – in implementing his “passive strategy” and during the April 2010 hearing constituted conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. The panel recommended that Krigel’s license be suspended with no leave to apply for reinstatement for six months. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to suspend Krigel’s license accordingly.

The issues before the Court involve whether Krigel violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline is appropriate. Specifically, one question is whether Krigel knowingly offered false evidence to the trial court and failed to take reasonable remedial measures to correct the false evidence, in violation of Rule 4-3.3(a)(3). Another is whether, during his course of representing the birth mother, Krigel made a false statement of material fact to the birth father’s attorney or, alternatively, failed to disclose a material fact necessary to avoid assisting a fraudulent act by his client, in violation of Rule 4-4.1(a). A third question is whether, during the course of his representation, Krigel used means that had no substantial purpose other than to delay or burden the birth father, in violation of Rule 4-4.4(a). A further question is whether Krigel violated Rule 4-8.4(c) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.

SC95098_chief_disciplinary_counsel_brief.pdfSC95098_chief_disciplinary_counsel_brief.pdfSC95098_Krigel_brief.pdfSC95098_Krigel_brief.pdf

SC95098_Law_Professors_Amici_Curiae_brief.pdfSC95098_Law_Professors_Amici_Curiae_brief.pdf


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