Case Summary for February 21, 2007

Your Missouri Courts - Supreme Court

Home

Case Summary for February 21, 2007

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, February 21, 2007
____________________________________________________________________________________________

SC88075
St. Louis University v. The Masonic Temple Association of St. Louis, et al
City of St. Louis
Whether tax increment financing ordinances violate separation of church and state

Saint Louis University initiated design and construction plans for an arena. To finance part of the arena, the university sought the benefit of tax increment financing (TIF) under section 99.800, RSMo. The city of St. Louis enacted ordinances providing TIF assistance for the university's arena. Relying on the ordinances, the university spent several million dollars on planning the project, purchasing land for the arena and beginning construction. The Masonic Temple Association of St. Louis subsequently sued the city and others – but not the university – in federal court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the TIF ordinances violated the state and federal constitutional establishment clauses (requiring separation of church and state). The university then sued the temple and others in state circuit court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the TIF ordinances were constitutional. The temple added the university as a defendant in the federal case and moved to stay the state court proceeding on the grounds that the federal case was filed first and should take precedence. The motion was denied. The federal court subsequently dismissed the temple's case without prejudice, permitting the state court case to proceed first. The temple then filed a counterclaim in the state court, seeking a declaration that the TIF ordinances were unconstitutional by violating the establishment clause. The city moved for summary judgment on the temple's counterclaim regarding the constitutional issues. The university also moved for summary judgment and to dismiss the temple's counterclaim. The temple also sought summary judgment. The trial court sustained the motions of both the university and the city, declaring the TIF ordinances to be valid under the constitutions. The temple appeals.

The temple argues the trial court should not have granted the university and the city summary judgment because, it contends, the TIF ordinances violate the establishment clauses of both the state and federal constitutions. It asserts that the university's bylaws and testimony from the university's president established that the university is under the control of a religious doctrine or creed. The temple argues that by granting the university TIF assistance under the ordinances, the city is using public funds to benefit a religious organization in violation of both constitutions. The temple further contends that the court erred in the way it applied the state and federal constitutional provisions. It asserts the state trial court erred in using the federal standard instead of the Missouri standard for determining whether there was a violation of the Missouri Constitution. The temple argues that financial benefit to religious institutions alone violates the state constitution. It asserts it pleaded facts showing there was excessive entanglement between a taxing power (the city) and a religiously controlled institution and that the university and the city did not challenge these issues or provide evidence to prove otherwise. The temple argues, therefore, that the record affirmatively shows that the ordinances violated both the state and federal establishment clauses. It asserts that it had sufficient evidence that raised genuine issues of fact concerning the constitutional violations.

The university responds that the trial court properly granted it summary judgment. It contends that the TIF ordinances do not violate the constitution because they will not be used for a religious purpose. The university argues it is not controlled by the Roman Catholic Church or any other religious organization. It contends the university's Catholic values and Jesuit tradition do not disqualify it as a recipient of public funds under article I, section 7, and article IX, section 8 of the state constitution. Furthermore, the university argues, the record supports a finding that there was no excessive entanglement between the church and state and that religion was not so pervasive at the university that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in its religious mission.

The city responds that the trial court also properly granted it summary judgment. It argues the TIF ordinances were valid and enforceable. The city argues the temple did not meet its burden of proving the ordinances were unconstitutional on their face. It contends the record established that the university was operated by an independent board of trustees and that, as a matter of law, there was no aid to the university "under control of a religious creed, church or sectarian denomination." The city asserts the ordinances did not violate the federal establishment clause. It contends the record established facts showing that the ordinances did not entangle the state excessively in church affairs. It further contends the record does not show that religion is so pervasive at the university that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission.

American Civil Liberties Union argues, as a friend of the Court, that the Missouri Constitution requires a strict separation of church and state, particularly in the area of education. The ACLU contends the trial court, in granting summary judgment, improperly granted public funds to a religious university. It argues that a trial court is required to consider all the facts and circumstances in determining whether the nature of an educational institution is religious or secular and that here, there were numerous facts tending to show the university is religious.

Americans United for Separation of Church and State argues, as a friend of the Court, that the trial court failed to give full constitutional analysis to the governmental aid granted through the TIF ordinances and only based its judgment on article IX, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution. It asserts the court ignored both the federal establishment clause and other state constitutional provisions. The organization argues the ordinances violate the establishment clause, which requires safeguards to ensure government aid is not diverted to religious uses, because no such safeguards are in place here. It asserts, therefore, that the ordinances are unconstitutional.

Center for Law and Religious Freedom argues, as a friend of the Court, that the establishment clause permits generally applicable programs that fund organizations, including religious organizations, so long as the aid is not diverted to religious indoctrination. It contends the free exercise clause of the constitution prohibits the government from enforcing a restriction that purposefully discriminates against religion or religious practice, or against an individual or organization on account of religion. The center asserts article IX, section 8 of the Missouri Constitution, states that no money may be appropriated from any public fund to aid a school controlled by any religious creed. It argues that section should be read as consistent with the requirements of article I, section 7, which states that no money shall be taken from the government to aid a church. The center contends the First Amendment prohibits the government from discriminating against a person or entity based on religion. It argues there is no constitutional violation because the money from the TIF ordinances was to be used for a secular purpose.

SC87980
Independence-National Education Association, et al. v. Independence School District
Jackson County
Availability of collective bargaining for public school employees

In the Independence School District, transportation employees are represented by the Independence-Transportation Employees Association, custodial workers are represented by the Independence-Educational Support Personnel union, and paraprofessionals and teachers largely are represented by the Independence-National Education Association. These unions are the exclusive collective bargaining representative of their respective members pursuant to section 105.500, RSMo. In April 2002, the district's board of education unilaterally adopted a policy permitting multiple employee groups represented on a single team to discuss employment issues. Before the policy was adopted, however, the board met with the transportation and custodial employees' respective unions about their members' salaries and conditions of employment, and they reached memorandums of understanding that the board approved. After it adopted the policy, the board rescinded both memorandums of understanding and refused to engage in collective bargaining discussions with association group members. In March 2003, all three unions and their members sued the district, challenging its refusal to recognize and bargain with the unions as the representatives of the four groups of employees. The trial court sustained the district's motion for summary judgment, finding that this Court's decisions in City of Springfield v.Clouse, 206 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1947), and Sumpter v. City of Moberly, 645 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1982), permitted the district to rescind the memorandums of understanding unilaterally and to refuse to bargain with the employee unions. The unions and their members (collectively "unions") appeal.

The unions argue their memorandums of understanding with the district's board constituted collective bargaining agreements that the district subsequently violated in contravention of the state constitution. They urge this Court to reconsider Clouse, which they contend rests on the discredited "non-delegation" doctrine that permitting political subdivisions and their public employees to negotiate a labor agreement constituted an improper delegation of legislative authority and, therefore, a violation of the constitutional provision requiring that the powers of the three governmental branches be kept separate. The unions assert Clouse incorrectly held that article I, section 29 of the state constitution, which declares that "employees shall have the right to organize and to bargain collectively," does not apply to public employees. They assert that because the language of this constitutional provision does not explicitly exclude such employees, they too should be included in its terms. The unions further urge this Court to reconsider Sumpter, which they argue misreads Clouse as prohibiting enforcement of labor agreements that have been authorized by the public employer's governing body. The unions contend Sumpter is inconsistent with the legislature's adoption of the public sector labor law and with other states' recognition of the binding nature of agreements authorized by analogous "meet and confer" statutes. The unions assert Sumpter's refusal to enforce public employee labor agreements is inconsistent with Missouri courts' enforcement of other legislatively approved agreements.

The district responds that Clouse precludes Missouri public employees from entering binding collective bargaining contracts because doing so is not in the best interest of the people of Missouri. The district contends education should not become the subject of collective bargaining because educating Missouri children is of paramount importance. It argues the purpose of Missouri's public school system is to educate children, not provide employment under conditions demanded by employees. The district asserts collective bargaining contracts stifle improvements in education, benefit employees at the expense of students, thwart the government's ability to provide education, drain schools' limited financial resources at the expense of children, and hinder compliance with the No Child Left Behind act. It notes that Missouri has established a statutory system for local control of education through a local governing body elected by the people. The district argues Clouse was based in large part on the fundamental policy of Missouri's government that elected bodies are in the best position to represent the people because they are directly accountable to the people. It contends, therefore, that important policy decisions such as the terms and conditions of public employment should not be delegated to private parties or groups. The district asserts that such a delegation through collective bargaining would be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The district contends that its board was authorized to rescind memorandums of understanding under Missouri law. It asserts it is a basic principle of our government is that legislative bodies maintain full discretion to amend, repudiate or rescind policies and agreements regarding terms or conditions of employment. The district further responds that individuals give up the right to enter into collective bargaining contracts by becoming public employees. It argues Sumpter is an accurate and appropriate statement of the law and correctly recognizes that Missouri public sector labor law streamlines the process by which public employees may exercise their First Amendment rights to voice grievances and proposals regarding terms or conditions of employment.

American Federation of Teachers-Missouri, as a friend of the Court, argues the plain language of article I, section 29 of the Missouri Constitution creates collective bargaining rights for public employees. It contends the Court in Clouse based its decision to create an implied exception to article I, section 29's plain language on the non-delegation doctrine. The federation argues Sumpter was decided wrongly and should be overruled. It contends, instead, that collective bargaining for public employers is a good policy as numerous studies have identified a positive correlation between public sector bargaining and a quality educational system.

Missouri School Boards' Association and Missouri Municipal League argue, as friends of the Court, that the trial court properly granted judgment to the school district. They contend that, under Clouse, the initiation of public sector collective bargaining in Missouri would not be a delegation of legislative authority by governmental entities. They argue it instead would be a decision mandated by courts on governmental entities that would give an unfair advantage to public employees over other interested taxpayers, thereby circumventing the legislative process. They contend Clouse and Sumpter are supported by the Missouri public because the governance of public employee working conditions is regulated actively and effectively through the legislative process. The association and municipal league assert the trial court recognized the strong public policy against collective bargaining in the public sector, which they contend would be harmful to public entities. They argue the court correctly relied on Sumpter, noting that the holding in Clouse is irrelevant if meet and confer agreements are binding upon the district. They further contend the public sector labor law still serves a valuable purpose by providing an organized conversation between public entities and their employees.

Missouri State Teachers Association and Missouri Counsel of School Administrators argue, as friends of the Court, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the school district because the unions failed to present a proper claim for which relief may be granted. They assert the issues in the case are not likely to evade review in a future controversy. They contend the authorization of public sector collective bargaining would constitute poor public policy because it would be bad for the students, teachers, taxpayers, voters and education. They argue the decision to adopt public sector collective bargaining instead lies with the Missouri legislature.

SC88023
Rodney D. Gibbons v. J. Nuckolls, Inc., D/B/A Fenton Auto Sales
St. Charles and St. Louis counties
Ability of ultimate consumer to sue wholesaler under merchandising practice act

J. Nuckolls, Inc., doing business as Fenton Auto Sales, sold a 2003 Honda at wholesale to Ed Napleton Honda, a St. Peters dealership. The vehicle had been in a collision before Fenton sold it to Napleton Honda, but Fenton did not inform the dealership of the accident. In December 2004, Rodney Gibbons went to Napleton Honda and expressed interest in purchasing the 2003 Honda. When Gibbons asked a sales representative if the vehicle ever had been in an accident, the representative told him "no." Gibbons purchased the vehicle and later discovered it had been in an accident. Gibbons sued Fenton Auto Sales under the state's merchandising practices act for failing to disclose the car's accident history to Napleton Honda. Fenton moved to dismiss Gibbons' claim, asserting that because it did not owe any duty to Gibbons, he had no legal cause of action. The trial court sustained Fenton's motion. Gibbons appeals.

Gibbons argues his claim was not barred because, although it was Napleton Honda that had the direct relationship with Fenton, he can maintain a claim against Fenton. He contends sections 407.020 and 407.025, RSMo, of the merchandising practices act contain no requirement that a plaintiff prove privity, or succession in interest supporting a claim. He asserts the intent of the statutes was to protect consumers such as him. Gibbons argues Fenton violated these statutes because it willfully "concealed, suppressed, or omitted a material fact" when it sold Napleton the Honda without disclosing existing accident damage to the vehicle. He contends Fenton knew or should have known about the damage and knew or should have known, therefore, that Napleton was not likely to disclose the damage to a consumer prior to sale. Gibbons further contends Missouri courts do not recognize "lack of privity" as a defense to claims based on theories such as common law fraud, negligence, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under the uniform commercial code, or in circumstances based on breach of contract.

Fenton Auto Sales responds that the merchandising practices act only allows Gibbons to sue when a defendant violates the act as part of a retail transaction. It argues it was a remote seller without a transactional nexus (connection) to the sale that allegedly injured Gibbons. Fenton contends that it was Napleton Honda, not Fenton, that sold the car to Gibbons and, therefore, that Gibbons failed to state a proper claim against Fenton.

The attorney general argues, as a friend of the Court, that there is a split of opinion between the eastern and western districts of the Court of Appeals. He contends the Eastern District's holding in Gibbons' appeal of the trial court's judgment against him – from which this Court granted transfer – improperly limits the attorney general's ability to enforce the merchandising practices act. He asserts that court incorrectly held that the act was intended to provide recourse for sellers and lessors – not for wholesalers such as Fenton. The attorney general further argues this holding is inconsistent with and misapplies the plain language of the act.

The Missouri Automobile Dealers' Association argues, as a friend of the Court, that Gibbons' claim to expand the act to include wholesalers or other third parties, with whom the ultimate consumer has no transactional nexus, would create a substantial, unwarranted and unreasonable financial and legal hardship for all Missouri motor vehicle dealers. It argues that dealers frequently purchase automobiles from auctions "as is" and that requiring full disclosure would interrupt the system under which that industry has operated for decades. The association asserts that Gibbons' claim would subject an unlimited number of parties to liability as a result of any retail transaction and would create an unlimited scope of liability that would make it impossible for a wholesaler to act in a manner that complies with such a broad standard.

Adesa Missouri, Inc., argues, as a friend of the Court, that the eastern district's holding is irrelevant to the attorney general's ability to enforce the merchandising practices act. It asserts Fenton's criticism of Gibbons' claim is an improper attempt to manipulate the statutory interpretation of the act with rumor, hearsay, innuendo and speculation. Adesa contends the act supplements common law fraud and permits vehicle purchasers to sue everyone in the chain of title. It argues that there is no persuasive authority contrary to the appellate court's decision and that the absence of a privity requirement for other causes of action is not relevant to the interpretation of section 407.025.

SC87934
Jackson County Sports Complex Authority v. State of Missouri, et al.
Cole County
Constitutional validity of competitive bidding law for county sports complex authorities

In 2005 the legislature enacted House Bill No. 58 and Senate Bill No. 210. These bills, codified at section 64.940.3, RSMo, provide the procedure for establishing a county sports complex authority. The statute provides that a complex authority must competitively bid any expenditure, including professional service contracts, that will exceed $5,000, when the complex is located in a county with a charter form of government and with between 600,000 and 700,000 inhabitants. The Jackson County Sports Complex Authority filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that the statute violates article III, sections 21 and 23, of the Missouri Constitution, which require, respectively, that bills should be limited to a single subject and that amendments should not change a bill's original purpose. It also alleged both bills' titles were too vague. The trial court found that the challenged bills violated article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution. The state appeals.

The state argues that the court misapplied article III, section 21; that neither bill violates article III, section 23; and that both titles were adequately clear. It contends HB 58 met the procedural requirements of article III, section 23 because the amendments to it were germane to the bill's original purpose. It asserts the title "relating to subdivisions" is not so vague that it does not meaningfully express the bill's subject of regulating political subdivisions. The state asserts that SB 210 met the procedural requirements of article III, sections 21 and 23, because its imposition of a competitive bidding requirement on a political subdivision of the state falls within the core subject of regulating political subdivisions. The state further argues the bills' titles were adequately clear.

The complex authority responds that HB 58 and SB 210 violated article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution. It argues the law as enacted was not germane to the original purpose of either bill. It contends that the title of the bills, "relating to political subdivisions," was so vague as to constitute an unclear title. The complex authority further contends the title failed to meaningfully express the bills' respective subjects.