This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.

Opinion
Supreme Court of Missouri

Case Style:  James Trout, Appellant/Cross-Respondent v. State of Missouri, et al., Respondents/Cross-Appellants.

Case Number:  SC88476

Handdown Date:  07/19/2007

Appeal From:  Circuit Court of Cole County, Hon. Richard G. Callahan

Counsel for Appellant:  Charles W. Hatfield, Jane E. Dueker and Gretchen Garrison

Counsel for Respondent:  Alana M. Barragan-Scott

Opinion Summary:  

This summary is not part of the opinion of the Court. It has been prepared by the Communications Counsel for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the Supreme Court and should not be quoted or cited. The opinion of the Court, which may be quoted, follows the summary.
NOTE: The Supreme Court issued a supplemental opinion in this case on August 27, 2007.

	In February 2006, House Bill No. 1900 -- the so-called campaign finance reform bill -- was introduced and read for the first time. As originally introduced, it was titled as an act repealing and enacting in lieu thereof seven statutory sections "relating to campaign finance." The bill was amended in the senate and sent to a conference committee to reconcile the differences. The final version that the house and senate adopted on May 11, 2006, was titled as an act repealing 12 sections and enacting 16 new sections "relating to ethics." The governor signed the bill, which became effective January 1, 2007. James Trout subsequently filed a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, alleging that HB 1900 violated the clear title, single subject and original purpose requirements of article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution; that section 130.032 violated the free speech guarantee under the First Amendment; and, therefore, that HB 1900 should be struck down in its entirety. Based on facts stipulated by the parties, the circuit court held: that HB 1900 did not violate the clear title requirement of article III, section 23; that the addition of sections 115.342 and 114.350, RSMo, dealing with candidate disqualification, violated the original purpose and single subject requirements of article III, sections 21 and 23, respectively; and that the section 130.032.2, RSMo, ban on campaign contributions during the legislative session violated the First Amendment. The circuit court severed these three sections from HB 1900 and upheld the validity of the remainder of the bill. The parties cross-appeal the circuit court's judgment, but respondents did not appeal the invalidation of the section 130.032.2 ban on campaign contributions during the legislative session.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
Court en banc holds: (1) The circuit court correctly denied Trout's clear title challenge. The title of HB 1900 – relating to ethics – is the same kind of broad, umbrella category this Court has approved in Jackson County Sports Complex Authority v. State of Missouri, ___ S.W.3d ___, (Mo. banc 2007)(No. SC87934, decided June 26, 2007); Missouri State Med. Ass'n v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 39 S.W.2d 837 (Mo. banc 2001); and Corvera Abatement Tech. v. Air Conservation Comm'n, 973 S.W.2d 851 (Mo. banc 1998). 
(2) The circuit court erred in sustaining Trout's original purpose challenge. Original purpose analysis emphasizes the bill's general, overarching purpose. "Ethics" fairly can be said to be the original purpose of HB 1900 because the regulation of the ethical conduct of lobbyists, public officials and candidates is indeed the general or overarching purpose of the campaign finance provisions that were set out in the original version of the bill. The purpose of the bill, in other words, was not limited narrowly to the text of those original provisions. Furthermore, the section 115.342 and 115.350 amendments that gave rise to the original purpose challenge -- disqualifying persons from running for office who are delinquent on certain taxes and who are felons -- are germane to the original purpose of ethics as they go to the very essence of ethics regulation. 
(3) The circuit court erred in sustaining Trout's challenge that the amendments adding sections 115.342 and 115.350 violate the article III, section 23 prohibition against bills containing more than a single subject. There is no single subject violation. Single subject analysis turns on the general core purpose of proposed legislation such that all matters in the bill must fall within or reasonably relate to that general core purpose. The test of whether a bill -- as it is finally passed -- violates the single subject rule is whether the challenged provision fairly relates to the subject described in the bill's title, has a natural connection to the subject or is a means to accomplish the law's purpose. Under this Court's precedents in City of St. Charles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 149 (Mo. banc 2005), Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576 (Mo. banc 2006), and Missouri Medical Association, it is clear that the single subject of HB 1900 is the general, core subject of ethics -- not the narrow subject of campaign finance as the circuit court determined. Furthermore, the candidate disqualification amendments of sections 115.342 and 115.350 fit well within the core subject of ethics.
(4) The circuit court erred in failing to invalidate the repeal and reenactment of section 130.032 in its entirety. Under section 1.140, RSMo, the black-out period for fundraising set out in subsection 2 of section 130.032 cannot be severed from the repeal of the campaign contribution limits in the seven other subsections of section 130.032. This is made clear by the course of HB 1900 through the legislative process. The issue of severability is simply whether the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions within section 130.032 without enacting subsection 2 of that section. Ideally, the resolution of this and other severance issues, consistent with section 1.140, and true to legislative intent, is by reference to the drafting history of the bill. Here, before HB 1900 was enacted, section 130.032 contained seven subsections that generally limited the amount of campaign contributions that could be made or accepted by candidates for public office. HB 1900 went from the house to the senate with no change in section 130.032 and with the monetary contribution limits intact. In the senate, however, a floor amendment was offered and adopted amending section 130.032 by eliminating the campaign contribution limits but instituting a "black-out" period -- set out in subsection 2 -- so that no contributions to statewide candidates could be made or accepted during the legislative session. Another floor amendment then was offered -- but rejected -- that would have allowed unlimited contributions throughout the year. Ultimately, the house adopted the senate version of the bill. The course of this legislation makes clear that the campaign contribution limits would not have been repealed without the concurrent enactment of the black-out period. That the two provisions were connected inseparably and were dependent on each other is proven conclusively by the fact that the senate amendment to decouple the provisions failed. Under section 1.040, therefore, because the black-out period was declared invalid, and no party appealed that part of the circuit court's judgment, the repeal of the campaign contribution limits also is invalid. The result is that section 130.032 as it was constituted before HB 1900 remains the same.
(5) An order accompanies the issuance of this opinion that directs the parties and any other interested persons to submit letter briefs by August 3, 2007, addressing the effect of the invalidity of section 130.032, RSMo Supp. 2006, on campaign contributions collected in reliance on that section as well as whether such effect is retrospective or prospective only.

Citation:  

Opinion Author:  Stephen N. Limbaugh, Jr., Judge

Opinion Vote:  AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.  All concur. 

Opinion:

This slip opinion is subject to modification until the Court has ruled on the parties' motions for rehearing, if any, and will become final only after the Court issues its mandate. To see when the Court issues its mandate, please check the docket entries for the case on Case.net.

NOTE: The Supreme Court issued a supplemental opinion in this case on August 27, 2007.
	This case involves procedural challenges to the validity of H.B. 1900 – the so-called campaign finance reform bill enacted in 2006 – on the basis of alleged violations of the clear title, single subject and original purpose requirements of article III, sections 21 and 23 of the Missouri Constitution.  The trial court invalidated two statutes within the bill, section 115.342, RSMo Supp. 2006, (disqualifying persons who are delinquent on certain taxes from running for office) and section 115.350, RSMo Supp. 2006, (disqualifying felons from running for office), and severed those statutes from the bill.  In addition, the trial court invalidated and severed section 130.032.2, RSMo 2006 – which banned statewide candidates from accepting contributions during the legislative session – on separate First Amendment grounds.  Appellant Trout appeals the trial court's judgment to the extent it does not invalidate the entire bill.  Respondents appeal the court's invalidation and severance of sections 115.342 and 115.350, but they do not appeal the invalidation and severance of section 130.032.2.  This Court has jurisdiction.  Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 3.  Affirmed in part and reversed in part.(FN1)
	The facts are straightforward and undisputed:  H.B.1900 was introduced and read the first time on February 28, 2006.   As originally introduced, H.B.1900 was titled, "An Act to repeal [seven statutory sections] and to enact in lieu thereof seven new sections relating to campaign finance."   Thereafter, the full House took up and adopted a House committee substitute that contained virtually the same title as the original bill except to reflect that only six sections instead of seven were being repealed and reenacted.  A Senate substitute was then introduced with multiple amendments, and the title of the bill was changed to "An Act to repeal [thirteen sections] and enact in lieu thereof sixteen new sections relating to ethics, with an effective date."  After more amendments were made on the Senate floor, the bill was adopted and sent to a conference committee to reconcile the differences.  The House and Senate adopted a final version on May 11, 2006, that contained essentially the same title as the Senate substitute but repealed twelve sections and enacted sixteen new sections.  The bill was signed by the Governor and became effective January 1, 2007.    
	Plaintiff then filed his petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief asserting that H.B.1900 must be struck down in its entirety.   Based on the stipulated facts, the trial court held that H.B.1900 did not violate the clear title requirement of article III, section 23 but that the addition of sections 115.342 and 115.350 dealing with candidate disqualification constituted a change in the original purpose of H.B.1900 and introduced an additional subject in violation of article III, sections 21 and 23, respectively.  That original purpose and subject, the court explained, related solely to campaign finances, not to the broader topic of "ethics," as in the bill finally passed.  As noted, the court also held that the section 130.032.2 ban on campaign contributions during the legislative session violated the First Amendment.  The court then severed these three sections from the bill and upheld the validity of the remainder.  This appeal followed.
	This Court's disposition of the procedural challenges to H.B.1900 is informed by a closely analogous case decided just last month, Jackson County Sports Complex Authority v. State of Missouri, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Mo. banc 2007), 2007 WL 1816868 (No. 87934, decided June 26, 2007), though neither the parties nor the trial court had the benefit of that precedent.  In that case, the Sports Complex Authority brought suit to invalidate a statute mandating competitive bids for certain expenditures made by a county sports complex authority because the statute was a part of two bills enacted in violation of the constitution's original purpose and clear title requirements.  The precise basis for the original purpose challenge was that amendments to the bills had changed their original purpose from a narrow purpose (one bill "affected the duties of county commissions in procuring supplies and permitted [certain] water supply districts . . . to recover from an occupant of real estate sums due for services provided," and the other bill "related to salaries of county officials, annual assessments by county assessors and salaries for county public administrators") to the new, different and larger purpose of "relating to political subdivisions."  Id. at *2.  With respect to the clear title challenge, the argument was that the title "relating to political subdivisions" was impermissibly overbroad and too amorphous to clearly identify the contents of the bill. 
At the outset, this Court restated the standard of review, applicable here as well, which is that: 
laws enacted by the legislature and approved by the governor have a strong presumption of constitutionality. . . .  [T]he use of procedural limitations to attack the constitutionality of statutes is not favored. . . . [T]his Court 'interprets procedural limitations liberally and will uphold the constitutionality of a statute against such an attack unless the act clearly and undoubtedly violates the constitutional limitation . . . [and] the burden of proof rests on the statute's challenger.  

Id. at *3 (citations omitted).  
In denying plaintiff's challenge on the merits, this Court first reiterated the well-established rules pertaining to original purpose jurisprudence:
	Article III, section 21, prohibits any bill from being "so amended in its passage through either house as to change its original purpose."  This Court has long held that the original purpose prohibition does not restrict legislators from making "[a]lterations that bring about an extension or limitation of the scope of [a] bill," and "even new matter is not excluded if germane."  Rather, the prohibition is against amendments that are clearly and undoubtedly not "germane"; that is, they are not "[r]elevant to or closely allied" with a bill's original purpose.  "As the cases illustrate, the general purpose is often interpreted as an overarching purpose, not necessarily limited by specific statutes referred to in the bill's original title or text."  Moreover, a bill's original purpose is not limited to what is stated in the bill's original title, which can be changed without violating article III, section 21.  

Id. (citations omitted).  Applying these rules, this Court then held that "the general, or overarching purpose of [both bills] as originally introduced can fairly be said to be the regulation of political subdivisions" and that "[t]he purpose was not so narrowly limited, as the trial court held, to the subject matter of the specific statutes referenced in the original text."  Id. at *4.  
	Regarding the clear title claim, this Court again reiterated the well-established rules, as follows:
Article III, section 23 states that "[n]o bill shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title."  This provision contains two distinct but related procedural limitations – a single subject rule and a clear title requirement.  The clear title requirement is intended to keep "legislators and the public fairly apprised of the subject matter of pending laws."  To do this, the title need only "indicate in a general way the kind of legislation that was being enacted." . . . Only if the title is (1) underinclusive or (2) too broad and amorphous to be meaningful is the clear title requirement infringed.  Furthermore, for bills that have "multiple and diverse topics" within a single, overarching subject, that subject may be "clearly expressed by . . . stating some broad umbrella category that includes all the topics within its cover."   

Id. (citations omitted).  
	In holding that there was no clear title violation, this Court stated, "The term, 'political subdivision' in the larger sense, is a broad umbrella category that includes all of the differing definitions of 'political subdivisions' under its cover."  Id. at *5.  The import, then, was that the title of the bill "relating to political subdivisions" was not an impermissibly overbroad category, and the statute requiring competitive bidding by the Sports Complex Authority was simply a statute pertaining to a particular kind of political subdivision in a bill pertaining to several kinds of political subdivisions.   
	Drawing on our analysis in Sports Authority Complex, this Court holds that the trial court in this case correctly denied plaintiff's clear title challenge but erred in sustaining the original purpose challenge.  The title, "relating to ethics," is the same kind of broad, umbrella category this Court has approved not only in Sports Authority Complex but in other relatively recent cases as well.  See, e.g., Missouri State Med. Ass'n. v. Missouri Dept. of Health, 39 S.W.3d 837, 841(Mo. banc 2001) (no clear title violation in bill entitled "relating to health services"); Corvera Abatement Tech. v. Air Conservation Comm'n 973 S.W.2d 851, 861-62 (Mo. banc 1998) (no violation in bill entitled "relating to environmental control").  Ultimately, the title "relating to ethics" is not so broad and amorphous that it describes "most, if not all, legislation passed by the General Assembly;" rather, the title fairly identifies the contents of the bill.  That said, this title, like that in Sports Authority Complex, "may well represent the outer limit permitted."  Sports Authority Complex, 2007 WL 181668, at *5.  
	In much the same way, "ethics" can fairly be said to be the original purpose of H.B.1900 because the regulation of the ethical conduct of lobbyists, public officials and candidates is indeed the general or overarching purpose of the campaign finance provisions that were set out in the original version of the bill.  The purpose of the bill, in other words, was not narrowly limited to the text of those original provisions.  Id. at *4.  See also, Missouri State Medical Ass'n, 39 S.W.3d at 839-40 (holding that a bill that "would have enacted a new section of law requiring that health insurers cover . . . pelvic, prostate, and colorectal examinations and other cancer screenings" had an original purpose in the larger sense of "mandat[ing] health services for serious illnesses, including cancer"); C.C. Dillon Co. v. City of Eureka, 12 S.W.3d 322, 325-26 (Mo. banc 2000) (holding that a bill that "related to transportation" did not lose its original purpose by an amendment adding a provision giving cities and counties the authority to adopt outdoor advertising regulations for highway billboards); Stroh Brewery Co. v. State, 954 S.W.2d 323, 325-26 (Mo. banc 1997) (holding that a bill providing for the auction of vintage wine had an original purpose of amending the State's liquor control law and that an amendment adding malt liquor labeling requirements was permissible).  Furthermore, the section 115.342 and 115.350 candidate disqualification amendments that gave rise to the original purpose challenge are germane to the original purpose of ethics.  Certainly the disqualification of persons from running for office who are delinquent on certain taxes, sec. 115.342, or who are felons, sec. 115.350, goes to the very essence of ethics regulation.  
	The trial court also erred in sustaining plaintiff's challenge that the amendments adding sections 115.342 and 115.350 violated the article III, section 23 prohibition against bills that contain more than a single subject.   Although Sports Complex Authority did not present a single subject challenge, single subject analysis is similar to original purpose analysis.  Like the emphasis on a general, overarching purpose in original purpose analysis, single subject analysis turns on the "general core purpose of the proposed legislation."  More specifically, article III, section 23 dictates that the subject of a bill include "all matters that fall within or reasonably relate to [that] general core purpose."  City of St. Charles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Mo. banc 2005).  To determine, then, whether a bill violates the single-subject rule, the test is "not whether individual provisions of a bill relate to each other . . . [but] whether [the challenged provision] fairly relates to the subject described in the title of the bill, has a natural connection to the subject, or is a means to accomplish the law's purpose."  Id.  Further, "[w]hether a bill violates the single-subject requirement is a determination made as to the bill as finally passed."  Stroh Brewery Co., 954 S.W.2d at 327.  
	For instance, in Missouri Medical Association, a bill that contained provisions relating to health insurance, medical records, pre-operative information on breast implants, HIV confidentiality, and insurance for treatment of mental illness and chemical dependency contained only a single subject because the provisions were "(at least) incidents or means to" the purpose or subject of the bill as expressed in the title, i.e., "health services."  Missouri Medical Ass'n, 39 S.W.3d at 840-41.  An even more permissive example is City of St. Charles, in which this Court held that a bill relating to the core subject of emergency services contained a single subject even though it also included a provision that prohibited tax-increment financing districts in flood plains.  City of St. Charles, 165 S.W.2d at 151-52.  Though at first glance the provision appeared nonrelated, prohibiting TIFs in flood plains was fairly related to discouraging development in flood plains, thereby decreasing the need to provide emergency services in those areas.  Id.  In contrast, this Court found a single subject violation in Rizzo v. State, 189 S.W.3d 576, 579-80 (Mo. banc 2006), where a provision that related to candidacy for statewide elective office was found to be beyond the core subject of the bill, which was titled "relating to political subdivisions."  Statewide offices, the Court determined, had no relation to political subdivisions within the state.  Id.
	Under these precedents, it is clear that the single subject of H.B.1900 is the general, core subject of ethics, rather than the narrow subject of campaign finance as determined by the trial court.  Furthermore, just as in the original purpose analysis, the section 115.342 and section 115.350 candidate disqualification amendments fit well within the core subject of ethics.  Accordingly, there is no single subject violation.  
	Having determined that the trial court erred in finding original purpose and single subject violations, the question of whether the invalidation of sections 115.342 and 115.350 required invalidation of H.B. 1900 in its entirety or whether those sections can properly be severed is moot.
The question remains, however, whether the trial court's invalidation of section 130.032.2 – the provision that banned campaign contributions during the legislative session – requires that the seven other subsections of section 130.032 be invalidated as well, or whether subsection 2 may properly be severed from the statute as the trial court held.  Plaintiff makes no claim that the invalidation of section 130.032.2 alone requires invalidation of the entire bill.
	Section 1.140 sets out the rules for severability, which begin with the presumption that provisions of a bill that are invalidated shall be severed from the remainder of the bill.  That section states:  
The provisions of every statute are severable.  If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent.

Despite the presumption of severability, plaintiff contends that "the void provision banning campaign contributions is inseparably connected with other provisions of H.B. 1900 which repeal and reenact Section 130.032 in its entirety . . . that the other provisions of the bill which repealed and reenacted Section 130.032.2, standing alone, are incomplete and incapable of being executed in accordance with legislative intent . . . [and that] as such, the repeal and reenactment of all of Section 130.032 is void."  Ultimately, though, the issue is simply whether the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions within section 130.032 without enacting subsection 130.032.2.  Ideally, the resolution of this and other severance issues, consistent with section 1.140, and true to legislative intent, is by reference to the substantive legislative history, or drafting history, of the bill.  See Martha J. Dragich, State Constitutional Restrictions on Legislative Procedure:  Rethinking the Analysis of Original Purpose, Single Subject, and Clear Title Challenges, 38 Harv. J. on Legis. 103, 157 (2001).
	In that regard, it is necessary to track H.B. 1900 as it pertained to section 130.032 through the legislative process.  Before the enactment of H.B.1900, section 130.032 contained seven subsections dealing with campaign contributions that, in general, limited the amount of campaign contributions that could be made or accepted by candidates for public office.  H.B.1900 went from the House to the Senate without any change in section 130.032 and with the monetary contribution limits intact.  In the Senate, however, a floor amendment was offered and adopted amending section 130.032 by eliminating the campaign contribution limits, but instituting a "black-out" period, as set out in subsection 130.032.2, so that no contributions to statewide candidates could be made or accepted during the legislative session.  Another amendment was then offered on the Senate floor to strike the black-out period in subsection 130.032.2, the result of which would have been to allow unlimited contributions throughout the year, but that amendment failed. Thereafter, the bill was sent to a conference committee, and ultimately the House adopted the Senate version of the bill.  
	The course of this legislation makes clear that the campaign contribution limits would not have been repealed without the coterminous enactment of the black-out period.  That the two provisions were inseparably connected and dependent upon each other is conclusively proven by the fact that the Senate amendment to decouple the provisions failed.  Conversely, the failure of that amendment conclusively disproves respondents' allegation that the General Assembly would have abolished campaign contribution limits even in the absence of the unconstitutional black-out period.  Thus, under section 1.140, the subsection 130.032.2 black-out period cannot be severed from the repeal of the campaign contribution limits in the other provisions of section 130.032, and because the black-out period was declared invalid (and no appeal followed from that part of the trial court's judgment), the repeal of the campaign contribution limits is also invalid. See Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Dir. of Revenue, 918 S.W.2d 780, 785 (Mo. banc 1996) (unconstitutional applications of "use tax" statute not severable where remaining applications would have imposed "patchwork tax scheme" that General Assembly had previously rejected). The result is that section 130.032 as it was constituted before H.B.1900 remains the same.  State v. Neill, 78 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Mo. banc 2002).
	In sum, the judgment of the trial court is reversed to the extent that 1) it invalidated and severed sections 115.342 and 115.350 of H.B.1900 and 2) it failed to invalidate the repeal and reenactment of section 130.032 in its entirety.  In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.  
All concur.

Footnotes:

	FN1.	The Missouri Republican State Committee and the Missouri Society of Governmental Consultants filed briefs as amicus curiae.

Separate Opinion:

This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.