

OPINION SUMMARY
MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS EASTERN DISTRICT

MADONNA FARROW,) ED96532
)
Plaintiff/Appellant,) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cape Girardeau County
v.)
)
ST. FRANCIS MEDICAL CENTER) Honorable Benjamin F. Lewis
and DR. CEDRIC C. STRANGE,)
)
Defendants/Respondents.) Filed: June 26, 2012

Madonna Farrow (Appellant) appeals from the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of St. Francis Medical Center (St. Francis) and Dr. Cedric C. Strange (Dr. Strange) (collectively Respondents).

AFFIRMED.

Division Four Holds: (1) Dr. Strange was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellant's public policy wrongful discharge claim because he was not her employer nor did he terminate her employment with St. Francis, and St. Francis was entitled to summary judgment as well on this claim because Appellant failed to establish the existence of a specific statute or clear mandate of public policy that was violated, about which she complained, that led to the termination of her employment; (2) Dr. Strange was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellant's defamation claim against him because the statute of limitations had run on this claim; (3) Dr. Strange was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellant's false light invasion of privacy claim because she failed to establish this tort's requisite elements; (4) Appellant's tortious interference with business expectancy claim against Dr. Strange failed as matter of law based on her failure to establish the lack of justification element; (5) Appellant's claims against Respondents for retaliatory discharge, employment discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliatory discrimination, and unlawful retaliation under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) were barred because she filed the administratively prerequisite initial charges with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (MCHR) beyond the 180-day time limit; (6) Appellant's allegations of post-termination discrimination by St. Francis's allegedly failing and refusing to objectively and properly consider its internal appeal of her discharge cannot be considered because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies; and (7) Respondents were not equitably estopped from, had waived, or were precluded by public policy concerns from raising the untimeliness of Appellant's MHRA claims.

Opinion by: PER CURIAM

Attorneys for Appellant: Charles S. Kramer and Michael P. Wolf
Attorneys for Respondents: Thomas O. McCarthy and Brian M. O'Neal

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