IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT

STATE OF MISSOURI,	)	
	)	
Respondent,	)	
	)	**WD87733**
v.	)	
	)	**OPINION FILED:**
	)	**January 27, 2026**
DALE LAWRENCE WILLIAMSON,	)	
	)	
Appellant.	)	

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri
The Honorable R. Michael Wagner, Judge

Before Division Two: Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge, and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge

Mr. Dale Williamson ("Williamson") appeals the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cass County, Missouri ("trial court"), entered on his convictions for first-degree murder and armed criminal action. On appeal, Williamson asserts claims of evidentiary and sentencing errors by the trial court. Because (1) there is no nexus between Williamson's alleged alternative perpetrator evidence for these crimes and (2) none of Williamson's sentences in the judgment he appeals from were subject to sentence enhancement, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Factual and Procedural History[1]

In July 2021, Victim[2] lived with her mother in the basement of her mother's home. Williamson had previously lived with Victim in this basement area for a few weeks in early 2021. However, Victim and Williamson had not been involved in a romantic relationship for approximately six months prior to July 2021. Victim's phone records showed that Victim called Williamson on July 2 and, between July 4 and July 7, Williamson called Victim fifty-nine times.

Victim's mother last saw Victim on July 5, before Victim's mother left the next morning to spend a few days with her other daughter at the other daughter's home. After not hearing from Victim on the evening of July 7 or the morning of July 8, Victim's mother checked her home security camera in her kitchen. When Victim's mother checked the camera, she noticed that it appeared to have something covering it so that nothing could be seen. When Victim's mother returned to her house on the evening of July 8 to check on Victim, she noticed the house was in disarray and that a towel was covering the camera. Victim was found dead in her bedroom.

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[1] "We state 'the facts and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, and we reject all contrary evidence and inferences.'" *State v. Foster*, 591 S.W.3d 518, 520 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019) (quoting *State v. Liker*, 537 S.W.3d 405, 407 (Mo. App. S.D. 2018)).

[2] Pursuant to the directive of section 509.520.1(4) (Supp. IV 2025), we do not use the names of any victims in this opinion. All statutory references are to THE REVISED STATUTES OF MISSOURI (2016), as supplemented through July 7, 2021, unless otherwise indicated. And, pursuant to Missouri Supreme Court Operating Rule 2.02(c)(3), we do not identify the names of non-party witnesses in our ruling today.

When police officers arrived, they found Victim wrapped in a blanket on her bed with a gunshot wound to the back of her head. The jacket of a projectile was recovered from Victim's scalp. A nine-millimeter bullet casing was found on the floor next to Victim's bed. Other items near Victim's body included lottery tickets and multiple washcloths. The state of Victim's body was consistent with her having died around the middle of the afternoon on July 7.

The basement of the home was disheveled and appeared that someone had ransacked the area looking for something. Victim's mother testified that Victim kept a small safe in the basement that contained a large amount of cash. No safe was ever located by law enforcement or Victim's mother.

Records and surveillance footage from July 8 showed Williamson selling Victim's ring and her watch to a pawn shop. A photograph of Victim wearing the ring and the watch was admitted into evidence to confirm they belonged to Victim. Victim's mother testified that Victim always wore both the ring and the watch at all times.

Surveillance video from a home across the street from Victim's mother's home showed Williamson's white Kia Sorento pulling into the driveway of the home on July 6. The footage showed Victim and Williamson emerging from the vehicle and walking into the home. The surveillance footage showed the Kia Sorento leaving the home and coming back several times over the course of the day. The next day, on July 7, at 2:16 p.m., Williamson and Victim left the home in the Kia Sorento. At 2:54 p.m., the vehicle returned, and Victim and Williamson walked back into the home. Victim was never again seen alive on surveillance video or otherwise.

Sixteen minutes later, however, Williamson came around the side of the house, carrying luggage in his left hand and another item in his right hand, which he put in the back of the Kia Sorento. Williamson then walked back around to the south side of the home and to the entryway leading into the basement. Twenty-eight minutes later, Williamson exited the house, went to his car, went back inside of the house, exited the house again, and then drove away in his vehicle.

Officers reviewed all of the video footage of the home between July 6 and July 8; no vehicles, other than Williamson's Kia Sorento, were seen coming to or going from the house during that time until Victim's mother arrived on the evening of July 8.

Surveillance footage from a gas station on the mornings of July 5 and July 7 show Williamson with Victim and the white Kia Sorento. Surveillance footage from a Hy-Vee on July 7, at around 2:42 p.m., showed Williamson's Kia Sorento approach the store and Victim enter the store to buy lottery tickets while holding a black purse and wearing the clothes she was murdered in. Victim's phone records showed that the last call she made to Williamson was at 2:46 p.m. on July 7, which was consistent with Victim calling Williamson to drive back to the storefront to pick her up.

Williamson's phone records showed that his phone was in the area of Victim's mother's home at the times when his Kia Sorento was parked at the home as shown in the surveillance video.

Williamson was arrested on July 10. At the time of his arrest, Williamson's Kia Sorento was parked in the driveway of the home he was living at. Two nine-millimeter handguns were found on the front passenger seat of the vehicle, along with two

magazines containing multiple live rounds, including those of the same brand as the casing found in Victim's bedroom. A firearms examiner testified that the bullet recovered from Victim's scalp was fired from one of the handguns found in Williamson's Kia Sorento. A DNA analyst testified that the handgun had Williamson's DNA on the trigger. A pair of gloves and some washcloths, that presumptively tested positive for blood, were also found on the driver's side dashboard and in the back of Williamson's vehicle. Victim's black purse was discovered in the trash can on the patio of the residence Williamson was living at.

On September 16, 2021, Williamson was indicted on the following three counts for his alleged involvement in the July 7, 2021 shooting death of Victim: Count 1—first-degree murder; Count 2—armed criminal action; and, Count 3—unlawful possession of a firearm by a dangerous felon. Because of his prior criminal history, the State later filed an amended information to charge Williamson as a persistent offender for sentence-enhancement purposes.

Prior to any persistent offender determination, Williamson filed a motion to sever Count 3 (unlawful possession of a firearm) from any further proceedings involving Counts 1 (first-degree murder) and 2 (armed criminal action). The trial court granted Williamson's motion, creating a new case with a new case number, 23CA-CR00906. Williamson's original case, 21CA-CR00619-01, proceeded to a jury trial on the counts for first-degree murder and armed criminal action, and the jury found Williamson guilty of those two counts.

As ultimately relevant to only the severed charge in case number 23CA-CR00906, the trial court—without a jury—found that Williamson met the statutory criteria to be a persistent offender.

On December 17, 2024, Williamson was sentenced in case number 21CA-CR00619-01 to life in prison without the possibility of parole for his first-degree murder conviction and to a consecutive sentence of thirty years' imprisonment for his armed criminal action conviction.

After the sentence was pronounced in 21CA-CR00619-01, the circuit court scheduled a plea hearing for the severed case, 23CA-CR00906. In that plea hearing, Williamson pleaded guilty to the unlawful-possession-of-a-firearm charge, and the plea court sentenced him to an additional term of ten years' imprisonment to run consecutively with each sentence in 21CA-CR00619-01. The circuit court entered separate judgments for each case, which were then docketed with their respective case numbers.

Williamson filed a timely notice of appeal from the final judgment entered in case number 21CA-CR00619-01. Williamson did not appeal from the final judgment entered in case number 23CA-CR00906.[3] Williamson raises two points on appeal, alleging evidentiary and sentencing errors by the trial court.

[3] A review of the docket for the circuit court case 23CA-CR00906 reveals that no notice of appeal has ever been filed with the circuit court in that case. Given that the judgment in that case was entered on December 17, 2024, and that a notice of appeal must be filed within ten days to be timely, Rule 81.04(a), the deadline to file a timely appeal in that case has passed.

Point I

In his first point on appeal, Williamson argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of an alleged alternative perpetrator of Victim's murder.

Standard of Review

"The trial court is vested with broad discretion to exclude or admit evidence." *State v. Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d 679, 686 (Mo. banc 2011). "We review the trial court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of that broad discretion." *State v. Whirley*, 698 S.W.3d 716, 721 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting *State v. Whittier*, 591 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019)). "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is so against the logic of the circumstances then before it, or so unreasonable and arbitrary, that it shocks one's sense of justice and indicates a lack of careful consideration." *Id.* (quoting *Whittier*, 591 S.W.3d at 23). "Reversal is warranted only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial." *Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d at 686.

Analysis

"Generally, a defendant may introduce evidence tending to show that another person committed the offense, if a proper foundation is laid, unless the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by its costs (such as undue delay, prejudice or confusion)." *Id.* (quoting *State v. Barriner*, 111 S.W.3d 396, 400 (Mo. banc 2003)). "Such evidence may be admissible, provided the defendant can satisfy the so-called 'direct connection rule.'" *Whittier*, 591 S.W.3d at 23 (quoting *State v. McKay*, 459 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Mo. App. E.D. 2014)). "In order to satisfy this rule, the evidence must

be such proof as directly connects the other person with the corpus delicti, and tends clearly to point out someone besides the defendant as the guilty person." *Id.* (citation modified) (quoting *State v. Speaks*, 298 S.W.3d 70, 86 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009)). However, "[w]hen the evidence is merely that another person had opportunity or motive to commit the offense, or the evidence is otherwise disconnected or remote and there is no evidence that the other person committed *an act directly connected to the offense*, the minimal probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its tendency to confuse or misdirect the jury." *Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d at 686 (emphasis added); *see State v. Woodworth*, 941 S.W.2d 679, 690 (Mo. App. W.D. 1997) ("[E]vidence that another person had an opportunity or motive to commit the crime is not admissible just to cast bare suspicion on another person.").

Williamson argues that five "nodes of connection" establish a direct connection between the alleged alternative perpetrator, L.G., and Victim's murder: (1) L.G. and Victim had been in an intimate romantic relationship; (2) L.G. had previously been a suspect in Victim's murder investigated by law enforcement; (3) Victim had complained to police in a domestic violence report filed a couple of days before her murder that L.G. had hit her; (4) during Victim's romantic relationship with L.G., Victim was actively involved in an adult dating website in which she may have been receiving monetary compensation (i.e. prostitution); and (5) there was no "ironclad, dispositive evidence" proving L.G. was *not* near Victim's home on the date of the murder. Williamson contends this evidence is sufficient to "clearly link[]" L.G. to Victim's murder.

We disagree. Although the evidence may establish a connection between L.G. and *Victim*, none of the proffered evidence "directly connects" L.G. to *the murder*. *See Whirley*, 698 S.W.3d at 722 (citing *McKay*, 459 S.W.3d at 458). We discuss each "node" of Williamson's proffered evidence purporting to establish a "direct connection" to Victim's murder in turn.

First, the mere fact that Victim and L.G. had been in an intimate relationship at the time of the murder fails to establish that L.G. "committed an act directly connected to" the murder. *See Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d at 686. At best, the evidence presented would have implied that L.G., as an intimate partner, may have had a motive or an opportunity to commit the murder because of their close relationship. *See Helmig v. State*, 42 S.W.3d 658, 671 (Mo. App. E.D. 2001) ("The fact that Ted Helmig threatened victim and saw victim with another man the night of her death, and the fact that Ted Helmig stood to profit by victim's death goes only to motive, it does not directly connect Ted Helmig to the crime itself."). Evidence that merely suggests another individual had a possible motive or opportunity, without more, is insufficient to establish a direct connection to the crime. *Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d at 688 ("[E]vidence of an opportunity to commit the crime does not establish a direct connection."); *see Whittier*, 591 S.W.3d at 23 ("We find the evidence referred to in the State's motion in limine[] . . . was properly classified by the trial court as inadmissible evidence of a possible motive and opportunity for Hall to have committed the shooting."); *Helmig*, 42 S.W.3d at 671 ("A defendant may not introduce evidence that another person had the motive or opportunity to commit the crime with

which the defendant is charged unless the defendant introduces evidence that the other person committed some act directly connecting him with the crime.").

Second, evidence that L.G. was, at one point, a suspect in Victim's murder is similarly insufficient to establish a direct connection. *See, e.g., Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d at 688 ("As in *Rousan* and *Chaney*, the fact that Kiger was investigated as a suspect and may have had an opportunity to murder Rumfelt does not establish the requisite direct connection to her death." (citing *State v. Rousan*, 961 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc 1998); *State v. Chaney*, 967 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. banc 1998))).

Third, evidence that Victim had made a police report a couple of days before her murder alleging L.G. had hit her does not establish a direct connection between L.G. and Victim's murder. Although the report that was filed a couple of days before the murder establishes temporal proximity between L.G. and the murder, it ultimately fails for the same reasons—it does not tend to prove that L.G. committed an act that was directly connected to Victim's murder. *See Whittier*, 591 S.W.3d at 23-24 ("Appellant wished to introduce Reggie's testimony that Hall was violent towards Victim in the past, possessed a gun, and continued to stalk Victim after they broke up. None of this evidence directly connects Hall with the shooting. . . . Without evidence directly connecting Hall to the shooting itself, evidence he was violent towards Victim in the past, threatened her, or was otherwise abusive and hostile is precisely the sort of evidence Missouri courts consider inadmissible."); *State v. Culpepper*, 505 S.W.3d 819, 829 (Mo. App. S.D. 2016) (holding that evidence that the victim had an active order of protection against the alternative perpetrator, that the alternative perpetrator had been violent with the victim in the past,

and that he had prior convictions for domestic assault and assault was "disconnected and remote," and did not "connect [the alternative perpetrator] to an act connected to the crime."). No evidence in the record suggests the domestic violence incident was connected to Victim's murder.

Fourth, the fact that Victim was involved with other men through an adult online dating website does not establish a direct connection between L.G. and Victim's murder. Detective's testimony established the names of two specific men that Victim had dated on the website, R.W. and E.H., but it did nothing to "directly connect" either of them or, more importantly, L.G. to the murder.[4] *See State v. Stokes*, 638 S.W.2d 715, 723 (Mo. banc 1982); *State v. Ferguson*, 20 S.W.3d 485, 507 (Mo. banc 2000) (holding evidence that "co-defendant Ousley, state's witnesses Hedrick and Thompson, and even [the victim] and her boyfriend, were involved in the area drug scene[] . . . would have been inadmissible because it would not directly connect any of those persons with the *corpus delicti* of the crime and point to someone other than Ferguson as the guilty party."); *Cato v. State*, 581 S.W.3d 696, 701 (Mo. App. E.D. 2019) ("The vague allegation an unknown disgruntled gang member or unknown marijuana customer may have committed the

[4] If anything, evidence that Victim dated R.W. and E.H. online seemed to imply that one of those two men, not L.G., was an alternative perpetrator. But, Williamson does not argue on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence that one of the men Victim dated online was an alternative perpetrator. He only argues that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence of *L.G.* as an alternative perpetrator. Thus, it would appear that what Williamson actually was attempting to do with this evidence is inject character evidence about Victim—that she may have been a prostitute—into the record at trial.

Irrespective, no evidence in the record suggests any individual that Victim met through online dating committed an act in any way related to the murder.

crime is not admissible alternative perpetrator evidence."); *State v. Manzella*, 128 S.W.3d 602, 607 (Mo. App. E.D. 2004) ("Here the evidence Defendant sought to introduce—[Victim]'s indictment [for drug distribution]—failed to connect anyone other than Defendant to the crime. Although the evidence might in some general way suggest an alternative motive for the crime, it did not even cast suspicion on an identifiable person."); *Speaks*, 298 S.W.3d at 86 ("[E]vidence . . . about [the victim's] financial problems and the fact that . . . people had been looking for him . . . pointed to financial problems but not murder, and thus, the disconnected acts . . . did not directly link those unidentified persons to the murders.").[5]

Fifth, Williamson argues that no "ironclad, dispositive" evidence proved L.G. was *not* near the Victim's home at the time of the murder and this absence of irrefutable evidence establishes a direct connection between L.G. and the murder. During Williamson's offer of proof, Detective testified that L.G. was ruled out as a suspect because he had an alibi, which was confirmed by his daughter and by location data obtained through L.G.'s phone records, which established that he was not in the area of Victim's home when Victim was murdered. When asked by defense counsel whether L.G.'s cell phone records were *definitive* proof of L.G.'s *actual* physical location at a

[5] Further, Williamson's offer of proof contains no evidence linking together L.G. and the fact that Victim engaged in online dating through an adult dating website. There is no evidence in the record suggesting L.G. was aware of Victim's online dating or that Victim's online dating was in any way related to her murder. "At most, the evidence only raises a bare suspicion or conjectural inference that another person committed the crimes in this case." *State v. Bowens*, 550 S.W.3d 84, 100 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018).

given time, Detective conceded that a person's actual location may differ from the location of his cell phone.

Not only does Detective's testimony affirmatively indicate the *opposite* of what Williamson is arguing on appeal—that L.G. is *not* the perpetrator of Victim's murder—the slight chance that L.G. could have been in an area different from the location of his phone at the time of the murder does nothing to "directly connect" him to the crime. A direct connection cannot be drawn from the mere fact that it would be impossible to definitively rule out an individual as a potential suspect—a direct connection requires much more. *See State v. Nash*, 339 S.W.3d 500, 514-15 (Mo. banc 2011) (finding no direct connection in the shooting death of the victim where "[the alternative perpetrator's] fingerprints were found on [the victim's] car," the alternative perpetrator "falsely had denied to police that he had met" the victim," "had an Iowa arrest for stalking a woman with the intent to assault her sexually[,]" "was known to carry a shotgun in his vehicle[,]" and "had killed himself in 2008 with a shotgun."); *Bowman*, 337 S.W.3d at 687 (discussing that "hair evidence" establishes a direct connection between an individual and the crime because it is "physical evidence that could indicate another person's interaction with the victims at the crime scene.") (citing *Barriner*, 111 S.W.3d at 400); *State v. Proudie*, 493 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) ("[The alleged alternative perpetrator] was directly connected to the crime by his own admissions that he was present when Victim was shot, cleaned up the blood evidence and disposed of the body."); *Whirley*, 698 S.W.3d at 725 (holding there was a direct connection between the alleged alternative perpetrator, Brother, when he "had possession of a gun that was arguably the same gun

used in the shooting at issue in the current case," "possessed a bag that was arguably the same bag that the murder weapon in the current case was found in," "had clothes consistent with the clothes the shooter in the current case wore," "the same type of ammunition used in the current shooting was used in an unrelated shooting [he] pleaded guilty to[,]" "[he] was in the area when and where the current shooting occurred," and "was in [the defendant's] house when police found the murder weapon there").[6]

In this case, all of the *overwhelming* physical, electronic, and video surveillance evidence directly connects *Williamson*, and no other person, to Victim's murder. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Williamson's proffered evidence purporting to establish L.G. as an alternative perpetrator.

Point II

In Point II, Williamson requests plain error review of the trial court's determination that he is a persistent offender for the purpose of sentence enhancement. Williamson argues that, in light of *Erlinger v. United States*, 602 U.S. 821 (2024), the trial court's determination that he is a persistent offender violated his right to have the facts underlying that sentence-enhancing determination found by a jury. We find no error because any persistent offender determination by the trial court never exposed

[6] Williamson argues the proffered alternative perpetrator evidence in this case resembles the evidence presented in *State v. Whirley*, 698 S.W.3d 716 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024), but we disagree. In *Whirley*, the defendant presented several pieces of evidence that directly tied Brother, the alleged alternative perpetrator, to the murder weapon and that placed Brother in the area of the scene at the time the murder occurred. *Id.* at 725. No such comparable evidence has been presented by Williamson in this case.

Williamson to the possibility of an enhanced sentence in the judgment of the case Williamson has appealed from.

A criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to demand that a jury—not a trial court—find essentially every fact that would increase the defendant's maximum possible sentence: "[O]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." *State v. Andrews*, 329 S.W.3d 369, 372 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). In *Erlinger*, the United States Supreme Court clarified that these facts include whether a defendant's prior criminal convictions occurred at different times. *Erlinger*, 602 U.S. at 834-35.

Missouri's sentence-enhancing statutes authorize a higher maximum sentence for certain crimes committed by "persistent offenders." Section 558.016.3 defines "persistent offender" to include a defendant "who has been found guilty of two or more felonies committed at different times, or one who has been previously found guilty of a dangerous felony . . . ." Section 558.016.7 provides:

> The court shall sentence a person, who has been found to be a persistent offender . . . and is found *guilty of a class B, C, D, or E felony* to the authorized term of imprisonment for the offense that is one class higher than the offense for which the person is found guilty.

(Emphasis added.) Here, the State initially indicted Williamson on three charges: Count 1—first-degree murder, a class A felony; Count 2—armed criminal action, an unclassified felony; and Count 3—unlawful possession of a firearm by a dangerous felon, a class C felony. Of these charges, section 558.016.7 only authorized an enhanced

sentence for the class C felony charged in Count 3. However, Williamson successfully severed this charge from the case appealed here, 21CA-CR00619-01, before his jury trial.

After a jury trial on the remaining two counts, Williamson was convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. Because section 558.016.7 does not authorize an enhanced sentence for either of these convictions, Williamson was never exposed to the possibility of an enhanced sentence resulting from any persistent offender determination by the trial court when sentenced in the case appealed here, 21CA-CR00619-01. Thus, Williamson can point to no enhanced sentence in the judgment appealed from and, accordingly, cannot establish any error in the sentence imposed by the trial court.

What Williamson is attempting to do is to argue error in the sentencing relating to a judgment from a case he did *not* appeal—the judgment in 23CA-CR00906—which disposed of the severed count for the class C felony of unlawful possession of a firearm. In fact, this is the only sentence that Williamson discusses in his argument section relating to Point II. Williamson's argument is misplaced in this appeal.

Rule 30.01(a)[7] provides: "After the rendition of final judgment in a criminal case, every party shall be entitled to any appeal permitted by law. Appeals may be taken as provided in Rule 81.04 and Rule 81.08[8]." Rule 81.04(a) requires that an appellant must

[7] All rule references are to I MISSOURI COURT RULES – STATE 2025.

[8] Rule 81.08 governs the procedure necessary to appeal a trial court judgment directly to the Missouri Supreme Court. *See* Rule 81.08. Because this case does not involve a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, only Rule 81.04 is relevant to this appeal.

file a notice of appeal that *specifies the judgment, decree, or order challenged on the appeal*:

> If an appeal is permitted by law from a trial court, a party may appeal from a judgment, decree, or order by filing with the clerk of the trial court a notice of appeal. No such appeal shall be effective unless the notice of appeal shall be filed not later than ten days after the judgment, decree, or order appealed from becomes final.
>
> The notice of appeal *shall specify* the parties taking the appeal, *the judgment, decree, or order appealed from*, and the court to which the appeal is taken.


(Emphasis added.) An appellate court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a judgment unless the appellant files an *effective* notice of appeal related to that judgment. *See State v. Vandergrift*, 669 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Mo. banc 2023) (noting that a party invokes the right to appeal by filing a notice of appeal); *State v. Forbes*, 708 S.W.3d 468, 474 (Mo. banc 2023) ("Because Forbes failed to timely appeal the circuit court's judgment, this Court does not have appellate jurisdiction.").

Here, the notice of appeal filed by Williamson did not invoke appellate jurisdiction over the judgment entered in the severed case, 23CA-CR00906, because the notice of appeal did not specify that it appealed from that judgment, as Rule 81.04(a) requires. Thus, we lack jurisdiction to review any claim of error related to the conviction and sentence rendered by that judgment.

Point II is denied.

Conclusion

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.



Mark D. Pfeiffer, Judge

Gary D. Witt, Presiding Judge, and Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Judge, concur.