MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT

TERRELL A. INGRAM, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, Respondent.

DOCKET NUMBER WD87973

DATE: NOVEMBER 10, 2026

Appeal From:

Jackson County Circuit Court
The Honorable Cory L. Atkins, Judge

Appellate Judges:

Division Four Judges: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Gary D. Witt, Judge

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Attorneys:

Damien S.B. DeLoyla, Kansas City, MO, for Appellant,

Shaun J. Mackelprang, Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent

MISSOURI APPELLATE COURT OPINION SUMMARY

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS
WESTERN DISTRICT

TERRELL A. INGRAM, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF MISSOURI, RESPONDENT.

WD87973 Jackson County

Before Division Four Judges: Edward R. Ardini, Jr., Chief Judge, Presiding, Lisa White Hardwick, Judge, and Gary D. Witt, Judge

Terrell Ingram appeals from the denial of his Rule 29.15 motion after he was convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal action. He contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine two witnesses and question one witness; failing to submit a self-defense instruction advising the jury he had no duty to retreat; and failing to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction under an imperfect self-defense theory. Ingram also argues the motion court erred in refusing to admit evidence of other cases in which trial counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

AFFIRMED.

Division Four holds:

1. The motion court did not err in denying Ingram's claim his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine B.M., an eyewitness to the shooting, about her prior statement to police. B.M.'s prior statement contradicted Ingram's testimony and the defense theory; therefore, Ingram failed to overcome the presumption that counsel's decision not to impeach B.M. with her prior statement was reasonable trial strategy.

2. The motion court did not err in denying Ingram's claim his counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately cross-examine T.F., an eyewitness to the shooting, about five prior statements he made to police. One of the five prior statements was consistent with T.F.'s trial testimony, and the remaining four prior statements were either immaterial or contradicted Ingram's testimony and the defense theory. Ingram failed to overcome the presumption that counsel's decision not to impeach T.F. with his prior statements was reasonable trial strategy.

3. The motion court did not err in denying Ingram's claim his counsel was ineffective for not questioning a witness, C.S., about information allegedly contained in a police report. Because the police report indicates only what C.S. testified to at trial, further questions about the report would not have improved C.S.'s testimony or aided the defense.

4. The motion court did not err in denying Ingram's claim his counsel was ineffective for failing to submit a self-defense instruction advising the jury he had no duty to retreat before shooting Victim. Although the motion court's reasoning was erroneous, the denial is sustainable on other grounds. Because the circumstances of the case are such that there is no reason to believe a jury would think Ingram was required to retreat before defending himself, counsel's decision not to ask for the no duty to retreat language was objectively reasonable. Moreover, Ingram makes no argument that, if the no duty to retreat language had been included, the jury would have acquitted him or convicted him of a lesser offense.

5. The motion court did not err in denying Ingram's claim his counsel was ineffective for failing to request an involuntary manslaughter instruction and to argue the imperfect self-defense theory to the jury. Trial counsel will not be found ineffective for pursuing one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another. Because arguing that Ingram used unreasonable force in defending himself would have conflicted with Ingram's testimony, counsel's pursuit of an outright acquittal based on self-defense was objectively reasonable.

6. The motion court did not err in refusing to admit evidence from two prior cases in which Ingram's counsel was found to have provided ineffective assistance. Because the reasonableness of counsel's conduct is to be judged objectively within the confines of the specific case, trial counsel's conduct in unrelated prior cases was irrelevant to determining whether counsel was ineffective in Ingram's case.

Opinion by: Lisa White Hardwick, Judge November 10, 2026

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