The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9 a.m. Tuesday, May 14, 2019
SC97689
Meadowfresh Solutions USA LLC, et al. v. Maple Groves Farms LLC, Leon Rinehart, Ted Dahlstrom, Carol Dahlstrom, Curtis Hall, Lisa Hall and Kyle Bounous
Greene County
Challenge to appointment of receiver for dairy farm
Listen to the oral argument: SC97689 MP3 file
Maple Grove was represented during arguments by Kate Millington of Millington, Glass, Love & Young in Springfield; Meadowfresh was represented by Jacob Sappington of Sanders Warren Russell & Scheer LLP in Springfield.
Majority members John and Sue Fulton joined with Ted and Carol Dahlstrom and Kyle Bounous to form Maple Grove Farms LLC to own and operate a dairy farm. The Fultons also joined with Leon Rinehart, Curtis and Lisa Hall, and the Dahlstroms to form Meadowfresh Solutions USA LLC to own a majority interest in Maple Grove Farms. The Fultons and Meadowfresh Solutions (collectively, Meadowfresh) subsequently sued Maple Grove Farms, the Dahlstroms, the Halls, Rinehart and Bounous (collectively, Maple Grove), alleging they unlawfully attempted to remove Meadowfresh Solutions as a majority member and John Fulton as manager of Maple Grove Farms. Prior to trial, Meadowfresh twice moved for appointment of a receiver over Maple Grove Farms. The circuit court sustained the second motion, directing the parties to submit a proposed order naming a receiver and the parameters of appointment or, if the parties could not agree, then to schedule a further hearing regarding the matter. A receiver was not appointed. The case proceeded to a jury trial on some claims; Meadowfresh elected not to present its claims for dissolution and accounting and receivership to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in Meadowfresh’s favor, awarding it more than $7.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages, and the circuit court entered judgment accordingly. Meadowfresh then moved to sever its dissolution claim; the parties dispute whether Meadowfresh’s action also included requests to sever its accounting and receivership claims. The circuit court entered its amended judgment noting Meadowfresh had reserved for determination its claims for dissolution and accounting and its motion to appoint a receiver. Meadowfresh then filed a second lawsuit against Maple Grove, seeking dissolution and accounting. Maple Grove moved for appointment of a receiver based on the receivership in the prior litigation, which Maple Grove alleged Meadowfresh abandoned by not resolving the receivership prior to trial. About a week later, Meadowfresh dismissed its claims for accounting and dissolution in the first lawsuit, Maple Grove moved to dismiss the second lawsuit, and Meadowfresh voluntarily dismissed its dissolution and accounting claims from the second lawsuit. The circuit court held a hearing and entered an interlocutory order appointing a receiver. Three days later, Maple Grove filed a motion to revoke or, alternatively, to modify the interlocutory order. The circuit court overruled the motion. Maple Grove appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court’s order refusing to revoke or modify its interlocutory order appointing a receiver is statutorily appealable or whether it must be denominated a “judgment” under Rule 74.01(a) to be appealable. Another issue involves whether severing Meadowfresh’s claims for dissolution and accounting into the second lawsuit constituted an impermissible splitting of a cause of action and whether new bases for appointing a receiver arose after the circuit court entered its amended judgment in the first lawsuit. Additional issues involve whether the circuit court was precluded from relying on its order sustaining the motion to appoint a receiver in the first lawsuit, whether new grounds arose for appointing a receiver in the second lawsuit, and whether the circuit court’s appointment of a receiver was supported by evidence.
SC97689_Maple_Grove_Farms_brief
SC97689_Meadowfresh_Solutions_brief
SC97689_Maple_Grove_Farms_reply_brief
SC97599
Loren Macke, Pamela Eden v. Austin Patton
St. Louis city
Challenge to wrongful death apportionment hearing, amount
Listen to the oral argument: SC97599 MP3 file
Eden was represented during arguments by Shaun M. Falvey of Goldblatt + Singer in St. Louis; Macke was represented by Edward M. Roth of The Bruning Law Firm LLC in St. Louis.
Pamela Eden and Loren Macke had one son. They divorced when he was a toddler, and the son lived with Macke. The son died at age 25 in a motor vehicle collision involving Austin Patton. Under Missouri’s wrongful death statute, Eden and Macke are the only persons entitled to recover damages. Macke filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Patton, who agreed to settle the suit for the limits of his insurance policy. Macke sent notice of a hearing to Eden, who was living in Alabama. Eden alleges she did not learn the nature of the hearing until hours before it was to begin. She contacted the circuit court by telephone and requested a continuance. The circuit court continued the hearing for one week. Eden appeared with counsel and requested another continuance, which the circuit court denied. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court approved the wrongful death settlement and asked the parties to submit briefs regarding apportionment. It subsequently entered its judgment apportioning 98 percent of the settlement funds to Macke and 2 percent to Eden. Eden appeals.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court – whether the circuit court should have granted Eden a second continuance to conduct discovery and whether the evidence supports the circuit court’s apportionment of the settlement proceeds.
SC97599_Eden_brief
Meadowfresh Solutions USA LLC, et al. v. Maple Groves Farms LLC, Leon Rinehart, Ted Dahlstrom, Carol Dahlstrom, Curtis Hall, Lisa Hall and Kyle Bounous
Greene County
Challenge to appointment of receiver for dairy farm
Listen to the oral argument: SC97689 MP3 file
Maple Grove was represented during arguments by Kate Millington of Millington, Glass, Love & Young in Springfield; Meadowfresh was represented by Jacob Sappington of Sanders Warren Russell & Scheer LLP in Springfield.
Majority members John and Sue Fulton joined with Ted and Carol Dahlstrom and Kyle Bounous to form Maple Grove Farms LLC to own and operate a dairy farm. The Fultons also joined with Leon Rinehart, Curtis and Lisa Hall, and the Dahlstroms to form Meadowfresh Solutions USA LLC to own a majority interest in Maple Grove Farms. The Fultons and Meadowfresh Solutions (collectively, Meadowfresh) subsequently sued Maple Grove Farms, the Dahlstroms, the Halls, Rinehart and Bounous (collectively, Maple Grove), alleging they unlawfully attempted to remove Meadowfresh Solutions as a majority member and John Fulton as manager of Maple Grove Farms. Prior to trial, Meadowfresh twice moved for appointment of a receiver over Maple Grove Farms. The circuit court sustained the second motion, directing the parties to submit a proposed order naming a receiver and the parameters of appointment or, if the parties could not agree, then to schedule a further hearing regarding the matter. A receiver was not appointed. The case proceeded to a jury trial on some claims; Meadowfresh elected not to present its claims for dissolution and accounting and receivership to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in Meadowfresh’s favor, awarding it more than $7.3 million in compensatory and punitive damages, and the circuit court entered judgment accordingly. Meadowfresh then moved to sever its dissolution claim; the parties dispute whether Meadowfresh’s action also included requests to sever its accounting and receivership claims. The circuit court entered its amended judgment noting Meadowfresh had reserved for determination its claims for dissolution and accounting and its motion to appoint a receiver. Meadowfresh then filed a second lawsuit against Maple Grove, seeking dissolution and accounting. Maple Grove moved for appointment of a receiver based on the receivership in the prior litigation, which Maple Grove alleged Meadowfresh abandoned by not resolving the receivership prior to trial. About a week later, Meadowfresh dismissed its claims for accounting and dissolution in the first lawsuit, Maple Grove moved to dismiss the second lawsuit, and Meadowfresh voluntarily dismissed its dissolution and accounting claims from the second lawsuit. The circuit court held a hearing and entered an interlocutory order appointing a receiver. Three days later, Maple Grove filed a motion to revoke or, alternatively, to modify the interlocutory order. The circuit court overruled the motion. Maple Grove appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court’s order refusing to revoke or modify its interlocutory order appointing a receiver is statutorily appealable or whether it must be denominated a “judgment” under Rule 74.01(a) to be appealable. Another issue involves whether severing Meadowfresh’s claims for dissolution and accounting into the second lawsuit constituted an impermissible splitting of a cause of action and whether new bases for appointing a receiver arose after the circuit court entered its amended judgment in the first lawsuit. Additional issues involve whether the circuit court was precluded from relying on its order sustaining the motion to appoint a receiver in the first lawsuit, whether new grounds arose for appointing a receiver in the second lawsuit, and whether the circuit court’s appointment of a receiver was supported by evidence.
SC97689_Maple_Grove_Farms_brief
SC97689_Meadowfresh_Solutions_brief
SC97689_Maple_Grove_Farms_reply_brief
SC97599
Loren Macke, Pamela Eden v. Austin Patton
St. Louis city
Challenge to wrongful death apportionment hearing, amount
Listen to the oral argument: SC97599 MP3 file
Eden was represented during arguments by Shaun M. Falvey of Goldblatt + Singer in St. Louis; Macke was represented by Edward M. Roth of The Bruning Law Firm LLC in St. Louis.
Pamela Eden and Loren Macke had one son. They divorced when he was a toddler, and the son lived with Macke. The son died at age 25 in a motor vehicle collision involving Austin Patton. Under Missouri’s wrongful death statute, Eden and Macke are the only persons entitled to recover damages. Macke filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Patton, who agreed to settle the suit for the limits of his insurance policy. Macke sent notice of a hearing to Eden, who was living in Alabama. Eden alleges she did not learn the nature of the hearing until hours before it was to begin. She contacted the circuit court by telephone and requested a continuance. The circuit court continued the hearing for one week. Eden appeared with counsel and requested another continuance, which the circuit court denied. Following an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court approved the wrongful death settlement and asked the parties to submit briefs regarding apportionment. It subsequently entered its judgment apportioning 98 percent of the settlement funds to Macke and 2 percent to Eden. Eden appeals.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court – whether the circuit court should have granted Eden a second continuance to conduct discovery and whether the evidence supports the circuit court’s apportionment of the settlement proceeds.
SC97599_Eden_brief
SC97544
James J. Wilson, et al. v. City of St. Louis, et al.,Tishaura O. Jones
City of St. Louis v. State of Missouri
St. Louis County
Challenges to constitutional validity of state statutes regulating parking in St. Louis and to challengers’ standing
Challenges to constitutional validity of state statutes regulating parking in St. Louis and to challengers’ standing
Listen to the oral argument: SC97544 MP3 file
The treasurer was represented during arguments by Charles W. Hatfield of Stinson LLP in Jefferson City; the state was represented by Denise G. McElvein of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis; the city was represented by Erin K. McGowan of the city counselor’s office in St. Louis; and the challengers were represented by Elkin Kistner of Bick & Kistner PC in St. Louis.
Under article VI, section 31 of the state constitution and section 1.080, RSMo, St. Louis – a charter city – is a city and a county with both municipal and county officers. Sections 82.485 and 82.487, RSMo, empower the St. Louis treasurer to administer the city’s parking meter fund and to serve as chair of the city’s parking commission, which section 82.485 provides also includes certain city officials. The parties dispute whether the treasurer is a county or municipal officer. St. Louis enacted ordinances regulating various aspects of parking, and its charter creates a parking commission almost identical to the one established by state law. Two St. Louis residents filed a declaratory judgment action against the city, the state, the treasurer and several city officials, challenging the constitutional validity of the state parking statutes and seeking injunctive relief. The city filed a cross-claim against the state, also challenging the statutes’ constitutional validity. A city alderman intervened. The city moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), as did the residents and alderman (collectively, the challengers). The circuit court sustained both motions, declaring the state parking statutes unconstitutional. It also entered judgment enjoining the parties from enforcing the state statutes. The circuit court certified its prior judgments as final for purposes of appeal, finding there was no just reason for delay. The treasurer and the state appeal.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the challengers had standing (legal authority to sue). Another question involves whether article VI, section 19(a) of the state constitution permits the legislature to enact statutes limiting or denying the exercise of a city’s charter power; whether article VI, section 22 negates statutes that apply to charter cities or prohibits the legislature from enacting parking statutes creating or imposing additional duties on county offices; and whether the legislature constitutionally can assign duties to a charter city’s municipal officials. Additional questions involve whether the circuit court should have severed the provisions applying to the parking commission or arguably applying to municipal officers rather than declaring the state parking statutes wholly unconstitutional.
SC97544_Jones_brief
SC97544_State_brief
SC97544_St._Louis_amended_brief
SC97544_challengers_brief
The treasurer was represented during arguments by Charles W. Hatfield of Stinson LLP in Jefferson City; the state was represented by Denise G. McElvein of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis; the city was represented by Erin K. McGowan of the city counselor’s office in St. Louis; and the challengers were represented by Elkin Kistner of Bick & Kistner PC in St. Louis.
Under article VI, section 31 of the state constitution and section 1.080, RSMo, St. Louis – a charter city – is a city and a county with both municipal and county officers. Sections 82.485 and 82.487, RSMo, empower the St. Louis treasurer to administer the city’s parking meter fund and to serve as chair of the city’s parking commission, which section 82.485 provides also includes certain city officials. The parties dispute whether the treasurer is a county or municipal officer. St. Louis enacted ordinances regulating various aspects of parking, and its charter creates a parking commission almost identical to the one established by state law. Two St. Louis residents filed a declaratory judgment action against the city, the state, the treasurer and several city officials, challenging the constitutional validity of the state parking statutes and seeking injunctive relief. The city filed a cross-claim against the state, also challenging the statutes’ constitutional validity. A city alderman intervened. The city moved for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), as did the residents and alderman (collectively, the challengers). The circuit court sustained both motions, declaring the state parking statutes unconstitutional. It also entered judgment enjoining the parties from enforcing the state statutes. The circuit court certified its prior judgments as final for purposes of appeal, finding there was no just reason for delay. The treasurer and the state appeal.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the challengers had standing (legal authority to sue). Another question involves whether article VI, section 19(a) of the state constitution permits the legislature to enact statutes limiting or denying the exercise of a city’s charter power; whether article VI, section 22 negates statutes that apply to charter cities or prohibits the legislature from enacting parking statutes creating or imposing additional duties on county offices; and whether the legislature constitutionally can assign duties to a charter city’s municipal officials. Additional questions involve whether the circuit court should have severed the provisions applying to the parking commission or arguably applying to municipal officers rather than declaring the state parking statutes wholly unconstitutional.
SC97544_Jones_brief
SC97544_State_brief
SC97544_St._Louis_amended_brief
SC97544_challengers_brief
SC97592
In re: Richard J. Magee
St. Louis County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC97592 MP3 file
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Shevon L. Harris, special representative of the regional disciplinary committee in St. Louis; Magee, an attorney in Clayton, represented himself.
A man hired Clayton attorney Richard Magee to represent him in a racial discrimination and retaliation case against St. Louis County. Magee filed the case but never pursued discovery. The circuit court twice dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. Magee successfully had the case reinstated after the first dismissal, but after the second dismissal, the circuit court overruled his motions to set the dismissal aside because he failed to appear. He never advised his client about the dismissals or his decision not to appeal. As a result, the client now is precluded from pursuing his employment discrimination claims under either state or federal law. The chief disciplinary counsel instigated disciplinary proceedings. The parties filed a partial joint stipulation of facts, joint proposed conclusions of law and joint recommendation as to discipline. Following a hearing, the disciplinary hearing panel found Magee violated Rule 1-1.1 for failing to provide competent representation; Rule 4-1.3 for failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness; and Rule 4-1.4 for failing to keep his client reasonably informed about the status of the case and failing to consult with his client before deciding not to appeal the dismissal. The disciplinary hearing panel recommended that Magee’s law license be suspended with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months, that the suspension be stayed and that he be placed on probation for one year. Both the chief disciplinary counsel and Magee accepted the panel’s recommendation. This proceeding follows.
This proceeding presents two questions for this Court – whether Magee violated the rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
SC97592_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC97592_Magee_brief