The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Wednesday, October 2, 2019
SC97235
Nina Theroff v. Dollar Tree Store Inc. and Janie Harper
Cole County
Challenge to denial of request to compel arbitration
Listen to the oral argument: SC97235 MP3 file
Dollar Tree was represented during arguments by James M. Paul of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart PC in St. Louis; Theroff was represented by Timothy W. VanRonzelen of Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff & Landwehr PC in Jefferson City.
Dollar Tree Stores Inc. hired Nina Theroff – who has been declared legally blind – as a seasonal sales associate at its Jefferson City store, which was managed by Janie Harper. At the time she was hired, Theroff electronically signed certain electronic employment documents, including a document titled “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims.” In part, the agreement provides the store and employee are mutually bound, agree to waive their rights to a court trial by a judge or jury, and agree to binding arbitration of “all claims or controversies … that can be raised under applicable federal, state, or local law, arising out of or related to [the a]ssociate’s employment (or … termination) ….” Approximately one month later, Dollar Tree terminated Theroff’s employment. Theroff sued the store and Harper (collectively, Dollar Tree), asserting a discrimination claim under the state’s human rights act. Dollar Tree filed a motion to stay the lawsuit and to compel arbitration. Theroff opposed the motion, arguing the agreement was not enforceable. Following evidentiary hearings, the circuit court overruled Dollar Tree’s motion to compel arbitration. Dollar Tree appeals.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether an agreement was reached and was mutual, whether the agreement contained a clear delegation provision directing an arbitrator to determine any threshold issues of the agreement’ validity or enforceability; and, if so, whether the circuit court erred in considering and ruling on Theroff’s challenges to the agreement. The other question involves whether the agreement is a valid, contractual delegation provision under state law, whether it covers Theroff’s claims and, if so, whether Theroff could avoid the agreement by naming Harper as an individual defendant.
SC97235_Dollar_Tree_brief SC97235_Theroff_reply_brief
Nina Theroff v. Dollar Tree Store Inc. and Janie Harper
Cole County
Challenge to denial of request to compel arbitration
Listen to the oral argument: SC97235 MP3 file
Dollar Tree was represented during arguments by James M. Paul of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart PC in St. Louis; Theroff was represented by Timothy W. VanRonzelen of Cook, Vetter, Doerhoff & Landwehr PC in Jefferson City.
Dollar Tree Stores Inc. hired Nina Theroff – who has been declared legally blind – as a seasonal sales associate at its Jefferson City store, which was managed by Janie Harper. At the time she was hired, Theroff electronically signed certain electronic employment documents, including a document titled “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims.” In part, the agreement provides the store and employee are mutually bound, agree to waive their rights to a court trial by a judge or jury, and agree to binding arbitration of “all claims or controversies … that can be raised under applicable federal, state, or local law, arising out of or related to [the a]ssociate’s employment (or … termination) ….” Approximately one month later, Dollar Tree terminated Theroff’s employment. Theroff sued the store and Harper (collectively, Dollar Tree), asserting a discrimination claim under the state’s human rights act. Dollar Tree filed a motion to stay the lawsuit and to compel arbitration. Theroff opposed the motion, arguing the agreement was not enforceable. Following evidentiary hearings, the circuit court overruled Dollar Tree’s motion to compel arbitration. Dollar Tree appeals.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether an agreement was reached and was mutual, whether the agreement contained a clear delegation provision directing an arbitrator to determine any threshold issues of the agreement’ validity or enforceability; and, if so, whether the circuit court erred in considering and ruling on Theroff’s challenges to the agreement. The other question involves whether the agreement is a valid, contractual delegation provision under state law, whether it covers Theroff’s claims and, if so, whether Theroff could avoid the agreement by naming Harper as an individual defendant.
SC97235_Dollar_Tree_brief SC97235_Theroff_reply_brief
SC97658
State of Missouri v. Duane Michaud
Greene County
Challenges to jury instructions, limitation on cross-examination in enticement case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97658 MP3 file
Michaud was represented during arguments by William J. Swift of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Daniel McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Duane Michaud with attempted enticement of a child younger than 15 years old, alleging he attempted to persuade a 14-year-old girl to engage in sexual conduct in 2012. At the time, the girl lived in Springfield with her older sister, brother-in-law and Michaud, who was the brother-in-law’s friend. The girl and her sister testified at the trial. During the sister’s testimony, defense counsel sought to cross-examine her about whether the girl had a tendency to exaggerate. The circuit court sustained the state’s objection on the grounds it called on one witness to opine about another witness’s credibility. During the jury instructions conference, Michaud objected to the state’s proposed instructions, which were modeled after the Missouri approved instructions, and proposed alternative instructions that would have required the jury to find he knew the girl was younger than 15 years old. The state and Michaud disputed whether the evidence established Michaud had such knowledge. The circuit court submitted the state’s proposed instructions and rejected Michaud’s proposed alternative instructions. The jury found him guilty as charged and recommended he be sentenced to five years in prison. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly. Michaud appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court violated Michaud’s due process rights in refusing to submit his proposed instructions that would have required the jury to consider whether he knew the child was younger than 15 years old. Related issues include whether the jury was required to find Michaud had such knowledge as either an element of the crime or an affirmative defense. Another question involves whether the circuit court violated Michaud’s constitutional rights to due process rights, to confront witnesses against him and to present a defense when it limited his cross examination of the girl’s sister about whether the girl was prone to exaggeration.
SC97658_Michaud_brief
SC97658_State_brief
SC97658_Michaud_reply_brief
SC97781
David E. Roland v. St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners, Jerry Hunter, Paul Maloney, Benjamin Phillips, Joseph Barbaglia, Marilyn Jobe, Leo G. Stoff and Mary Wheeler-Jones
St. Louis city
Challenges to judgment, costs award in sunshine law case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97781 MP3 file
The board was represented during arguments by James C. Hetlage of Lashley & Baer PC in St. Louis; Roland, an attorney in Mexico, Missouri, represented himself.
David Roland submitted a request under the sunshine law (chapter 610, RSMo) to the St. Louis city board of election commissioners for certain documents, including absentee ballot applications and envelopes related to the August 2016 primary election. The board denied Roland’s requests, stating the absentee ballot applications and envelopes were closed under section 610.021(14). But the board offered to provide Roland a list of absentee ballot applications the Friday before the Tuesday primary election and access to other records at a later date, stating it needed additional time. Roland sued the board, its members and its custodian of records (collectively, the board), seeking a declaratory judgment that they had violated the sunshine law. The circuit court authorized separate trials on his claims, the first for his claim the board violated the law and a deferred trial as to whether any violations were knowing or purposeful. The parties consented to an expedited judgment on the pleadings as to the first claim. The circuit court entered judgment finding the board violated the sunshine law. Although it did not order the board to produce the requested records, the board ultimately did so. The circuit court later conducted a trial regarding the deferred claims and found the violation was not knowing or purposeful. The circuit court awarded costs to the board. The parties cross-appeal.
The board’s appeal presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether its production of the requested documents made its appeal moot and, if so, whether the public interest exception permits this Court’s discretionary review. Another question involves whether the circuit court erred in finding the board violated the sunshine law. Related issues include whether section 115.289, RSMo, protects applications for absentee ballots from public disclosure under section 610.021(14) as well as whether allowing public disclosure to absentee ballot envelopes contravenes the intent behind section 115.493, which provides voted ballots shall not be open to public inspection, and section 115.299, which mandates absentee ballot envelopes and voted ballots be stored in sealed containers.
Roland’s cross-appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court erred in requiring him to pay the board’s costs. Related issues include whether section 610.027 authorized the circuit court to award costs against a citizen plaintiff who proved a violation of the sunshine law (but did not prove the violation was knowing or purposeful) and whether section 514.060, RSMo, authorizes the circuit court to award costs to the board, which prevailed in the trial of the deferred claims.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri argues, as a friend of the Court, that costs cannot be assessed against a member of the public attempting to enforce the sunshine law in a non-frivolous case.
SC97781_Board_of_Election_Commissioners_first_brief
SC7781_Roland_first_brief
SC97781_Board_of_Election_Commissioners_Second_brief
SC97781_Roland_second_brief
SC97781_ACLU_of_Missouri_amicus_brief
State of Missouri v. Duane Michaud
Greene County
Challenges to jury instructions, limitation on cross-examination in enticement case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97658 MP3 file
Michaud was represented during arguments by William J. Swift of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Daniel McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Duane Michaud with attempted enticement of a child younger than 15 years old, alleging he attempted to persuade a 14-year-old girl to engage in sexual conduct in 2012. At the time, the girl lived in Springfield with her older sister, brother-in-law and Michaud, who was the brother-in-law’s friend. The girl and her sister testified at the trial. During the sister’s testimony, defense counsel sought to cross-examine her about whether the girl had a tendency to exaggerate. The circuit court sustained the state’s objection on the grounds it called on one witness to opine about another witness’s credibility. During the jury instructions conference, Michaud objected to the state’s proposed instructions, which were modeled after the Missouri approved instructions, and proposed alternative instructions that would have required the jury to find he knew the girl was younger than 15 years old. The state and Michaud disputed whether the evidence established Michaud had such knowledge. The circuit court submitted the state’s proposed instructions and rejected Michaud’s proposed alternative instructions. The jury found him guilty as charged and recommended he be sentenced to five years in prison. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly. Michaud appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the circuit court violated Michaud’s due process rights in refusing to submit his proposed instructions that would have required the jury to consider whether he knew the child was younger than 15 years old. Related issues include whether the jury was required to find Michaud had such knowledge as either an element of the crime or an affirmative defense. Another question involves whether the circuit court violated Michaud’s constitutional rights to due process rights, to confront witnesses against him and to present a defense when it limited his cross examination of the girl’s sister about whether the girl was prone to exaggeration.
SC97658_Michaud_brief
SC97658_State_brief
SC97658_Michaud_reply_brief
SC97781
David E. Roland v. St. Louis City Board of Election Commissioners, Jerry Hunter, Paul Maloney, Benjamin Phillips, Joseph Barbaglia, Marilyn Jobe, Leo G. Stoff and Mary Wheeler-Jones
St. Louis city
Challenges to judgment, costs award in sunshine law case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97781 MP3 file
The board was represented during arguments by James C. Hetlage of Lashley & Baer PC in St. Louis; Roland, an attorney in Mexico, Missouri, represented himself.
David Roland submitted a request under the sunshine law (chapter 610, RSMo) to the St. Louis city board of election commissioners for certain documents, including absentee ballot applications and envelopes related to the August 2016 primary election. The board denied Roland’s requests, stating the absentee ballot applications and envelopes were closed under section 610.021(14). But the board offered to provide Roland a list of absentee ballot applications the Friday before the Tuesday primary election and access to other records at a later date, stating it needed additional time. Roland sued the board, its members and its custodian of records (collectively, the board), seeking a declaratory judgment that they had violated the sunshine law. The circuit court authorized separate trials on his claims, the first for his claim the board violated the law and a deferred trial as to whether any violations were knowing or purposeful. The parties consented to an expedited judgment on the pleadings as to the first claim. The circuit court entered judgment finding the board violated the sunshine law. Although it did not order the board to produce the requested records, the board ultimately did so. The circuit court later conducted a trial regarding the deferred claims and found the violation was not knowing or purposeful. The circuit court awarded costs to the board. The parties cross-appeal.
The board’s appeal presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether its production of the requested documents made its appeal moot and, if so, whether the public interest exception permits this Court’s discretionary review. Another question involves whether the circuit court erred in finding the board violated the sunshine law. Related issues include whether section 115.289, RSMo, protects applications for absentee ballots from public disclosure under section 610.021(14) as well as whether allowing public disclosure to absentee ballot envelopes contravenes the intent behind section 115.493, which provides voted ballots shall not be open to public inspection, and section 115.299, which mandates absentee ballot envelopes and voted ballots be stored in sealed containers.
Roland’s cross-appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court erred in requiring him to pay the board’s costs. Related issues include whether section 610.027 authorized the circuit court to award costs against a citizen plaintiff who proved a violation of the sunshine law (but did not prove the violation was knowing or purposeful) and whether section 514.060, RSMo, authorizes the circuit court to award costs to the board, which prevailed in the trial of the deferred claims.
The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri argues, as a friend of the Court, that costs cannot be assessed against a member of the public attempting to enforce the sunshine law in a non-frivolous case.
SC97781_Board_of_Election_Commissioners_first_brief
SC7781_Roland_first_brief
SC97781_Board_of_Election_Commissioners_Second_brief
SC97781_Roland_second_brief
SC97781_ACLU_of_Missouri_amicus_brief
SC97910
State of Missouri v. Jeffery A. Waters
Pulaski County
State of Missouri v. Jeffery A. Waters
Pulaski County
Challenges to jury selection, evidentiary issues in molestation case
Listen to the oral argument: SC97910 MP3 file
Waters was represented during arguments by Christian E. Lehmberg of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Garrick Aplin of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Jeffery Waters with first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory sodomy, incest and first-degree attempted statutory sodomy for acts involving his 12-year-old biological daughter. During jury selection, the circuit court denied Waters’ request to ask proposed jurors individual follow-up questions about responses they gave on the jury questionnaire regarding child molestation charges. During trial, the defense sought to challenge the credibility of an officer by presenting evidence about his actions to obtain a permit for a breath alcohol analyzer in a separate case. The circuit court disallowed the evidence. The jury found Waters guilty of statutory sodomy and attempted statutory sodomy, for which the circuit court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 18 years. But the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to statutory rape and incest; the circuit court declared a mistrial as to those counts. Waters appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves the extent, if any, to which the circuit court’s declaration of a mistrial on two of the four counts precludes a final, appealable judgment in the case. Another question involves whether the circuit court violated Waters’ constitutional rights to due process, a fair and impartial jury, and a fair trial when it prohibited him from asking prospective jurors about their responses to the juror questionnaire to determine whether they had biases, prejudices or partialities. The final question involves whether the circuit court violated Waters’ constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and to present a defense when it refused to allow evidence from an unrelated case to challenge the officer’s credibility. Related issues include the relevance of such evidence and whether any error by the court in not allowing the evidence resulted in manifest injustice.
SC97910_Waters_brief
Waters was represented during arguments by Christian E. Lehmberg of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Garrick Aplin of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
The state charged Jeffery Waters with first-degree statutory rape, first-degree statutory sodomy, incest and first-degree attempted statutory sodomy for acts involving his 12-year-old biological daughter. During jury selection, the circuit court denied Waters’ request to ask proposed jurors individual follow-up questions about responses they gave on the jury questionnaire regarding child molestation charges. During trial, the defense sought to challenge the credibility of an officer by presenting evidence about his actions to obtain a permit for a breath alcohol analyzer in a separate case. The circuit court disallowed the evidence. The jury found Waters guilty of statutory sodomy and attempted statutory sodomy, for which the circuit court sentenced him to consecutive prison terms totaling 18 years. But the jury was unable to reach a verdict as to statutory rape and incest; the circuit court declared a mistrial as to those counts. Waters appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves the extent, if any, to which the circuit court’s declaration of a mistrial on two of the four counts precludes a final, appealable judgment in the case. Another question involves whether the circuit court violated Waters’ constitutional rights to due process, a fair and impartial jury, and a fair trial when it prohibited him from asking prospective jurors about their responses to the juror questionnaire to determine whether they had biases, prejudices or partialities. The final question involves whether the circuit court violated Waters’ constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and to present a defense when it refused to allow evidence from an unrelated case to challenge the officer’s credibility. Related issues include the relevance of such evidence and whether any error by the court in not allowing the evidence resulted in manifest injustice.
SC97910_Waters_brief