The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
Wednesday, September 9, 2020
August 7 update: Due
to concerns regarding the
coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), oral arguments scheduled for
September 2020 will be conducted remotely, unless the parties request
their cases
be submitted on briefs.
Scheduled for 9 a.m. – SC98454
State ex rel. VVP Services LLC v. The Honorable John M. Torrence
Jackson County
SC98454_VVP_Services_brief
SC98454_Shriver_and_Miller_brief
SC98454_VVP_Services_reply_brief
Scheduled for 10 a.m. – SC98494
State ex rel. The Raizada Group v. The Honorable John M. Torrence
Jackson County
SC98494_Raizada_Group_brief
SC98494_Shriver_and_Miller_brief
Scheduled for 11 a.m. – SC97692
James Hicklin a/k/a Jessica Hicklin v. Eric Schmitt, et al.
Cole County
SC97692_Hicklin_brief
SC97692_State_brief
SC97692_Hicklin_reply_brief
SC97692_MacArthur_Justice_Center_amicus_brief
SC97692_Dandurand_amicus_brief
SC97692_law_faculty_experts_amici_brief
Scheduled for noon – SC98376
State of Missouri v. James Christopher Bales
Pulaski County
SC98376_State_brief
Scheduled for 9 a.m. – SC98454
State ex rel. VVP Services LLC v. The Honorable John M. Torrence
Jackson County
Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant
Listen to the oral argument: SC98454 MP3 file
VVP Services was represented during arguments by James M. Humphrey IV of Berkowitz Oliver LLP in Kansas City; Shriver and Miller were represented by Daniel E. Blegen of Spencer Fane LLP in Kansas City. Judge Gary M. Gaertner Jr. – a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – participated in this case by special designation in place of Judge Laura Denvir Stith.
VVP Services was represented during arguments by James M. Humphrey IV of Berkowitz Oliver LLP in Kansas City; Shriver and Miller were represented by Daniel E. Blegen of Spencer Fane LLP in Kansas City. Judge Gary M. Gaertner Jr. – a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – participated in this case by special designation in place of Judge Laura Denvir Stith.
Sandy Miller and Susan Shriver filed an action in the Jackson County circuit court against Amit Raizada, Richart Ruddie, VVP Services LLC, The Raizada Group LLLP, Haley Hey and SEO Profile Defender Network LLC (collectively, the defendants) alleging the defendants made false and defamatory blog posts about them in a conspiracy to influence the jury pool in a 2017 lawsuit pending in Jackson County and prevent the matter from going to trial. Miller and Shriver alleged they suffered reputational injury and other damages as a result of the blogs. VVP Services subsequently moved to dismiss, claiming the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction. In its motion, VVP Services alleged it is a foreign company organized under Florida law with its principal place of business in California. It further alleged it conducted no business in, has no employees in, does not advertise in and sends no tangible product to Missouri. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, finding Missouri has a significant interest in the dispute because the alleged defamatory actions allegedly targeted Missouri, its residents and persons involved in a lawsuit pending in that very judicial circuit. VVP Services sought a writ of prohibition from this Court and now asks this Court to make permanent its preliminary writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any further action other than sustaining the company’s motion to dismiss.
This case presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over VVP Services. Related issues include whether Miller and Shriver made conclusory allegations insufficient to establish their claims arise out of VVP Services’ contacts with Missouri; whether they alleged sufficient facts to establish tortious conduct in the state to invoke Missouri’s long arm statute; and whether exercising personal jurisdiction over VVP Services would violate due process because VVP Services lacks sufficient minimum contacts with Missouri.
SC98454_Shriver_and_Miller_brief
SC98454_VVP_Services_reply_brief
Scheduled for 10 a.m. – SC98494
State ex rel. The Raizada Group v. The Honorable John M. Torrence
Jackson County
Personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant
Listen to the oral argument: SC98494 MP3 file
The Raizada Group was represented during arguments by Linda C. McFee of AiM Law Group PC in Foothill Ranch, California; Shriver and Miller were represented by Daniel E. Blegen of Spencer Fane LLP in Kansas City. Judge Gary M. Gaertner Jr. – a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – participated in this case by special designation in place of Judge Laura Denvir Stith.
The Raizada Group was represented during arguments by Linda C. McFee of AiM Law Group PC in Foothill Ranch, California; Shriver and Miller were represented by Daniel E. Blegen of Spencer Fane LLP in Kansas City. Judge Gary M. Gaertner Jr. – a judge of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District – participated in this case by special designation in place of Judge Laura Denvir Stith.
This case arises from the same facts as those in SC98454, above. Like VVP Services in that case, Raizada Group moved to dismiss, claiming the circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction. Raziada Group alleged it is a foreign limited liability partnership organized under Florida law whose business and investments are managed by its general partner in California. Raizada Group further alleged it has not transacted any business in Missouri since 2013 and its only subsequent contact with Missouri was the 2017 litigation to which it was a party. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss, finding Missouri has a significant interest in the dispute because the alleged defamatory actions allegedly targeted Missouri, its residents, and persons involved in a lawsuit pending in that very judicial circuit. Raizada Group sought a writ of prohibition from this Court and now asks this Court to make permanent its preliminary writ prohibiting the circuit court from taking any further action other than sustaining the company’s motion to dismiss.
This case presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court lacks specific personal jurisdiction over Raizada Group. Related issues include whether Miller and Shriver made insufficient, conclusory allegations that relieved them of their burden to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction; whether there is insufficient evidence to establish Raizada Group’s conduct falls within Missouri’s long-arm statute; whether exercising personal jurisdiction over Raziada Group would violate due process because Raizada Group lacks sufficient minimum contacts with the state; and whether the circuit court misapplied United States Supreme Court precedent in finding it had personal jurisdiction because Raziada Group targeted Missouri with the alleged defamatory statements.
SC98494_Shriver_and_Miller_brief
Scheduled for 11 a.m. – SC97692
James Hicklin a/k/a Jessica Hicklin v. Eric Schmitt, et al.
Cole County
Constitutional validity of a juvenile life sentence without eligibility for parole
Listen to the oral argument: SC97692 MP3 file
Hicklin was represented during arguments by Anthony E. Rothert of the ACLU of Missouri in St. Louis; the state was represented by Andrew J. Crane of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Hicklin was represented during arguments by Anthony E. Rothert of the ACLU of Missouri in St. Louis; the state was represented by Andrew J. Crane of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
In 1995, at the age of 16, Jessica Hicklin shot and killed a man, for which she was found guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action and sentenced to life in prison without eligibility for probation or parole pursuant to section 565.020.2, RSMo. In 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Miller v. Alabama, holding mandatory life sentences for juveniles without the possibility for parole violate the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments. Hicklin then filed a petition for declaratory judgment in the Cole County circuit court asserting her mandatory life sentence was unconstitutional. The legislature subsequently enacted Senate Bill No. 590, modifying section 565.020.2 and enacting section 558.047, RSMo, which permits offenders sentenced to a mandatory life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole to seek a sentence review from the parole board after serving 25 years. The circuit court found SB 590 rendered Hicklin’s claims moot and directed her to file an amended petition. In her amended petition, Hicklin alleged section 558.047 did not remedy her unconstitutional sentence. The state filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which the circuit court sustained. Hicklin appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether Hicklin’s sentence of life without eligibility for parole under section 565.020.2 is unconstitutional because there was no individualized consideration of her circumstances at the time of her sentencing. Related issues include whether SB 590’s enactment cures Hicklin’s sentence under 565.020.2 from being unconstitutional as applied to her; whether she is entitled to resentencing because her sentence is void; and, alternatively, if her sentence is not void as a matter of law, whether she is entitled to a hearing to determine if her sentence is void and resentence her. Another question involves whether application of section 558.047 changes Hicklin’s sentence and, if so, whether that cures the constitutional defect. Related issues include whether applying section 558.047 would constitute an impermissible, retroactive change to her sentence; whether section 558.047 makes Hicklin parole eligible; whether section 558.047 replaces one harsh, mandatory sentence – life without the possibility of parole – for another – a life sentence with the possibility to petition for parole after 25 years; and whether section 558.047 deprives Hickling of the right to jury sentencing. An additional question involves whether section 558.047 violates the separation of powers by permitting the parole board – rather than a judge or jury – to make the final application of the Miller factors. A further question involves whether Hicklin could not challenge the statutes’ validity in a declaratory judgment action but rather was required to do so in a postconviction motion or habeas action.
The Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center, Joseph P. Dandurand, and law faculty experts in the areas of criminal, juvenile, civil rights and parole law filed briefs as friends of the Court. The MacArthur Justice Center argues the closed nature of the parole review limits an inmate’s access to information, is a breeding ground for misconduct, and denies inmates a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release, as established by the current track of such reviews. Dandurand, who presided over Hicklin’s trial and sentencing and now is the executive director for Legal Aid of Western Missouri, argues Hicklin’s sentence is unconstitutional and void as a matter of law under Miller and the law requires she be resentenced in a court of law. The law faculty argue the parole review established in section 558.047 is problematic as a matter of law, policy and precedent and urge this Court to afford all Miller-impacted inmates the right to sentencing hearings in courts of law.
SC97692_State_brief
SC97692_Hicklin_reply_brief
SC97692_MacArthur_Justice_Center_amicus_brief
SC97692_Dandurand_amicus_brief
SC97692_law_faculty_experts_amici_brief
Scheduled for noon – SC98376
State of Missouri v. James Christopher Bales
Pulaski County
Validity of a search warrant
Listen to the oral argument: SC98376MP3 file
The state was represented during arguments by Sherrie Hamner of the Pulaski County prosecutor’s office in Waynesville; Bales was represented by Erica Mynarich of Carver Cantin Mynarich LLC in Springfield.
The state was represented during arguments by Sherrie Hamner of the Pulaski County prosecutor’s office in Waynesville; Bales was represented by Erica Mynarich of Carver Cantin Mynarich LLC in Springfield.
A grand jury indicted James Christopher Bales for first-degree domestic assault, two counts of abuse of a child and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. The charges arose after a child in Bales’ care presented at the hospital with symptoms of shaken baby syndrome. Bales filed a motion to quash the search warrant and to order return of his cellular telephone and all items obtained, received or copied from it. His motion alleged the search warrant lacked particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized. The first search warrant described the item to be seized as a black Samsung cellular telephone with black case located at Bales’ home address. The application for the search warrant contained the same description but also included the telephone number and that it belonged to Bales. The circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing at which a detective testified he applied for the search warrant after Bales stated he had a video of the child banging the child’s head. The detective seized the phone from Bales when he came in for questioning. On the telephone, investigators found additional evidence of possible criminal activity and applied for a second search warrant for the newly discovered evidence. The circuit court sustained Bales’ motion and ordered all evidence seized pursuant to both search warrants be suppressed. In its order, the circuit court found the telephone was not described with sufficient particularity and the search warrant was so deficient the executing officers could not reasonably presume it to be valid. The state appeals.
This appeal presents two questions for this Court. One involves whether the search warrant was facially valid because it was issued by a judge after a probable cause finding and, by describing a black Samsung cellular telephone with a black case that was described further in the application and affidavit, the warrant adequately described the particular item to be seized with sufficient precision. If the warrant was deficient, another question involves whether it was reasonable for the detective to presume the warrant was valid such that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule should apply.