Case Summary for December 2, 2009

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Case Summary for December 2, 2009

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, December 2, 2009

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SC90013
Gay Taylor, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Larry Gene Taylor, Deceased v. Fire Insurance Exchange, Napoleon Roybal, and APEX Environmental Consultants, Inc.
Barry County

The case voluntarily was dismissed Nov. 30 upon Gay Taylor's motion.

SC90164
State of Missouri v. Charles A. Raynor
Audrain County
Constitutional validity of sex offender statute
Listen to the oral argument:

The state was represented during argument by Jacob W. Shellabarger of Audrain County prosecutor's office in Mexico, and Raynor was represented by Ellen H. Flottman of the public defender's office in Columbia.

Charles Raynor was convicted of a sex offence in 1988 in Washington. He moved to Missouri and registered as a sex offender. In August 2008, section 589.426, RSMo, went into effect to restrict the activities of registered sex offenders on Halloween night to avoid all Halloween-related contact with children. The restrictions included remaining inside between 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m. unless required to be somewhere else, turning off outside residential lighting, posting a sign that states "no candy or treats at this residence," and prohibiting travel during the specified hours except for work or emergencies. On Halloween night, 2008, a detective with Mexico public safety checked on Raynor's residence and observed a female giving candy to children. The detective spoke to the woman and learned Raynor was in the home and there was no sign posted saying "no candy or treats at this residence" as required by the new statute. In November 2008, Raynor was charged with a class A misdemeanor of failure to comply with Halloween-related restrictions for sex offenders pursuant to section 589.426. Raynor moved to dismiss in February 2009. The trial court determined the statute was retrospective and, therefore, invalid. The state appeals.

The state argues the trial court erred in granting Raynor's motion to dismiss because section 589.426 properly imposes Halloween restrictions on registered sex offenders in that the statute is not retrospective because it is a constitutional provision enacted for the purpose of protecting children, a compelling government interest; does not punish behavior on Halloween nights before the statute was enacted and does not violate the constitutional bar on ex post facto laws.

Raynor responds section 589.426 is unconstitutional because it violates art. I, sec. 13 of the Missouri Constitution. He argues this statute created a new obligation, imposed a new duty and attached a new disability with respect to prior convictions since it required convicted sex offenders to avoid all Halloween-related contact with children, remain inside their homes on Halloween night, post a special sign in front of their homes, and turn off their porch lights between 5 p.m. and 10:30 p.m.

The ACLU, as a friend of the Court, argues there is no unusual rate of sex offenses or significant increase in risk for child sexual abuse associated with Halloween and section 589.426, RSMo, violates the United State Constitution. It contends the statute violates the ex post facto clause in that confinement to one's home has historically been viewed as punishment, confinement imposes an affirmative disability and restraint and has no rational connection to a non-punitive purpose. It contends the statute is an unconstitutional restriction on the right to interstate and intrastate travel. The ACLU further argues the statute is unconstitutional because it requires persons regarded as sex offenders to provide incriminating evidence against themselves and is unconstitutionally vague.

SC89895
State of Missouri v. Terrance L. Anderson
Cape Girardeau County
Death penalty
Listen to the oral argument:

Anderson was represented during argument by Deborah B. Wafer of the public defender's office in St. Louis, and the state was represented by Jamie P. Rasmussen of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Terrance Anderson moved in with his pregnant girlfriend and her parents in 1996. He was 21 years old and she was 16 years old. Anderson and his girlfriend temporarily ended their relationship and Anderson moved out; they continued dating off and on. Anderson believed race, he is black and his girlfriend's parents were white, was a negative factor in his relationship with his girlfriend's parents. The girlfriend had their baby in April 1997, and Anderson maintained a relationship with the child. In July 1997, the girlfriend got a restraining order against Anderson. That night, Anderson shot the girlfriend's parents. He was convicted of murder in 2001, and, in accordance with the jury's verdict, the trial court sentenced Anderson to death for the mother's murder and to life imprisonment without probation or parole for the father's murder. This Court reversed the death sentence for the mother's murder and remanded for another penalty phase in Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28 (Mo. banc 2006). On retrial, in December 2008, the jury again recommended the death penalty and the trial court sentenced Anderson to death. Anderson appeals.

Anderson's argument

Anderson argues his retrial violated double jeopardy. Anderson asserts the trial court lacked authority and jurisdiction to retry the penalty phase of the trial and to sentence him to death. He contends no statutory aggravating circumstances were pleaded in the information charging him with the mother's murder, so he was only charged with, and convicted of, unaggravated first-degree murder punishable only by life imprisonment.

Anderson asserts the trial court violated his rights in overruling his objections to evidence from the father's autopsy because it such evidence was irrelevant to any issue at the sentencing retrial for the mother's murder. He contends the trial court took judicial notice of his conviction of the father's murder, the autopsy evidence did not prove any other statutory aggravator pertaining to the mother's murder and the evidence only inflamed the jury's passions and prejudiced Anderson.

He argues the trial court violated his rights to fundamental fairness, due process, jury trial and reliable sentencing when it overruled his objections to certain jury instructions. Anderson contends the jury instructions failed to require the state to prove, and the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt all facts required to enhance the punishment for first-degree murder from life imprisonment to death. He asserts jury instruction 10 omitted language about mitigating evidence, preventing the jury from considering the mitigating evidence in determining Anderson's sentence. Anderson argues the sentencing verdict director prejudiced Anderson by failing to include required language instructing the jury that if it decided the mitigating evidence outweighed the aggravation evidence, the verdict must be life imprisonment. He contends under State v. Clark, 197 S.W.3d 598 (Mo. banc 2006), the state had the burden of proving non-statutory aggravating evidence by a preponderance of the evidence, and instruction 7 and 8 said nothing about the state's burden of proof.

Anderson argues the trial court violated his rights when it in overruled his objections pursuant to section 565.030.4(3), RSMo, and the jury instructions. He contends pursuant to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 500 U.S. 466 (2000), the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt all sentence-enhancing facts for first degree murder, but, in State v. McLaughlin, 265 S.W.3d 257 (Mo. banc 2008), this Court held that section 565.030.4(3), provides for a life sentence if the defendant proves to the jury the mitigating evidence outweighs the aggravating evidence. He asserts he was prejudiced because the jury instructions did not place the burden of proof of the sentencing-enhancing fact on the state.

Anderson further argues the county's jury selection procedures "systematically" excluded potential jurors who were black resulting in no black jurors in his trial, violating his right to due process, equal protection, trial by jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community, and subjected him to arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death sentence.

Anderson argues the trial court erred in overruling his objections and request for a mistrial when the prosecutor made improper arguments to the jury. He contends the prosecutor's arguments were contrary to the law and facts of record and misled the jury.

State's argument

The state responds the trial court properly overruled Anderson's motion to dismiss based on allegations of a faulty charging document and double jeopardy. It asserts it was not required to plead the statutory aggravators in the information and the jury convicted Anderson of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death in his first trial. The state argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence from the father's autopsy because the evidence was relevant to demonstrate the nature and circumstances of the crime and assisted the jury in understanding the wounds Anderson inflicted and, thus, the heinous nature of his plan to murder the parents. It further responds Anderson was not prejudiced by the jury instructions because the instructions, when read as a whole, properly informed the jury how to consider mitigating evidence, complied with the applicable Missouri approved criminal instructions and properly stated the law regarding the burden of proof in a capital sentencing proceedings. It contends the trial court properly overruled Anderson's motion to quash the jury panel because Anderson failed to present prima facie proof that the county's jury selection procedures systematically excluded jurors who were black. The state contends the trial court did not err in overruling Anderson's objections to the prosecutor's closing arguments because those arguments were proper.