Case Summary for November 18, 2008

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Case Summary for November 18, 2008

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, November 18, 2008

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SC89139
Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, et al. v. The Missouri State Board of Education, et al.
Cole County and city of St. Louis
Constitutional validity of accreditation of schools statute
Listen to the oral argument:

The city's board of education was represented during argument by Kenneth C. Broston of Lashly & Baer, P.C., of St. Louis; the state was represented by Paul C. Wilson of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, and the special administriatve board was represented by John R. Munich of Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP, of St. Louis.

The Missouri General Assembly passed Senate Bill No. 781 in 1998 to increase school funding for the St. Louis City School District to facilitate settlement of a long-running desegregation lawsuit. This bill created section 162.1100, RSMo, and amended other statutes, including section 162.621, RSMo, creating the Transitional School District. This new district was to co-exist with the city's school district, but the statute provided that if the city's school district lost its accreditation from the State Board of Education, then the authority and control over the city's school district would transfer from the city's board of education to the newly created special administrative board, the governing body of the transitional district. In March 2007, the state board of education declared the city's school district "unaccredited." The city's board of education sought to vacate the state board of education's decision or to have section 162.1100 declared unconstitutional. The circuit court held that the state board of education's decision was supported by substantial and competent evidence and was not arbitrary or capricious. The city's school district lost its accreditation in June 2007, and the special advisory board assumed powers, duties and authority. The city's board of education appeals.

The city's board of education argues the transitional school district and appointment of the special administrative board impinged upon St. Louis voter's rights. It contends the transfer of powers to run the city's school district from elected officials to appointed officials removes the elected officials from office and amounts to nullifying the votes cast by the city's voters, violating their right to vote. The city's board of education contends that voting rights supersede the general assembly's legislative power to remove the powers of elected officials. The city's board of education argues its elected board members were denied procedural due process because they effectively were removed from their elected positions – in which they have a property interest – without being provided adequate notice or an opportunity to be heard. It asserts section 162.1100 constitutes special legislation in violation of article III, section 40 of the Missouri Constitution. The city's board of education further argues that the state's board of education's accreditation decision was arbitrary and capricious because it was based on an unpublished rule and that such decisions of an administrative agency are void and unenforceable. It argues the state's standards are also too vague to inform a school district what is required for accreditation. The city's board of education asserts St. Louis voters granted it the authority to collect and expend the desegregation sales tax and the existing debt service levy after August 28, 1998, and the circuit court erred in ruling that the only powers retained by the elected board after the transfer of powers to the transitional school district are the powers of auditing and public reporting.

The state responds that the circuit court properly rejected the voters' rights claim because the legislature determines the powers of a school board and may change those powers as it deems appropriate. It argues every voter since 1998 is deemed to have known, in casting votes for the city's board of education members, that the powers exercised by the board could be transferred to the transitional school district if the city's school district lost its accreditation. The state asserts that a school board member does not have a "property interest" in his or her elected office and that the city's board of education's members did not lose their offices. It contends that the members have no individual property interest in powers vested with the city's board of education as a whole and that whatever right they acquired by election was taken subject to the "change of control" provisions enacted in 1998 in SB 781. The state further responds section 162.1100 does not violate the Missouri constitutional prohibition against "special laws" because of the unique nature of St. Louis and the political subdivisions there and because, even if no general exception exists for the use of that phrase, its use in section 162.1100 was open-ended and reasonable under the circumstances. It asserts the state board of education's decision to classify the city's district as unaccredited was based on valid criteria and objective information, including the Department of Elementary and Secondary Education's evaluation of the district's performance. The state further responds that the school district understood the state's board of education's performance standards and that the city's board of education does not offer a basis for believing the decision by the state's board of education was incorrect. The state contends the circuit court properly decided that when the city's district lost its accreditation, all the city board's powers with respect to the district vested solely in the special administrative board pursuant to sections 162.621 and 162.1100.

The special administrative board argues, as a friend of the Court, that the circuit court properly ruled that the only powers retained by the city's board of education after the transfer of powers to the special administrative board, pursuant to the plain language of sections 162.621 and 162.1100, are the joint powers of auditing and public reporting.

SC89390
State of Missouri v. Jamie Avery
Hickory and Webster counties
Instructions and evidence
Listen to the oral argument:

Avery was represented during argument by Craig Johnston of the public defender's office in Columbia; and the state was represented by Shawn J. Mackelprang of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Jamie Avery moved in with her boyfriend John Hamilton in September 2000 in Hickory County. Soon after moving in with Hamilton, Avery and Bruce Paris had a sexual encounter. Avery, Paris and a mutual friend subsequently made plans to go to Chicago, but Paris cancelled the plans after rekindling his relationship with an ex-girlfriend. In December 2000 – while Hamilton was out of town – Paris met up with Avery and their mutual friend, driving around in an automobile while consuming alcohol and marijuana. Eventually Paris and Avery went into Avery and Hamilton's home. Paris left the house at some point but returned after making a call on a pay telephone. Avery then shot Paris, called the sheriff's department and reported that she "shot an intruder." When the police arrived, Paris was dead in Avery's house. In June 2005, Avery was charged with first-degree murder. At trial, Avery wanted to admit evidence Paris was a registered sex offender to demonstrate that he was an initial aggressor. The trial court ruled the evidence was not admissible under State v. Gonzales, 153 S.W.3d 311 (Mo. banc 2005). She was convicted of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and armed criminal action and was sentenced to concurrent prison sentences of 15 years and 35 years, respectively. Avery appeals.

Avery argues the trial court violated her rights to due process and a properly instructed jury because it gave the state's voluntary intoxication instruction over her objection. She contends that the instruction lacked evidentiary support she was intoxicated, that giving the instruction prejudiced her because it likely misled the jury to believe she admitted to some wrongdoing and was attempting to escape liability based on intoxication, and that the instruction negatively would affect her credibility – the key issue at trial. Avery asserts the trial court denied her rights to due process, to a fair trial and to present a defense. She argues the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence Paris was a registered sex offender because her theory of defense, presented through instructions for self-defense and defense of premises, was that she was defending herself from an attack by Paris. The fact that Paris was a registered sex offender, she contends, was relevant evidence to establish whether Paris was the aggressor and whether he was attempting to assault Avery sexually when he attacked her. Avery asserts the state "opened the door" to such evidence when one of its witnesses testified that Paris was a "good guy."

The state responds the trial court did not err in submitting the voluntary intoxication instruction because there was substantial evidence to support an inference that Avery was voluntarily intoxicated. It argues the trial court did not plainly err in refusing to admit evidence Paris was a registered sex offender because Avery’s offer of proof was insufficient and she made no argument to rebut the state's good character evidence about Paris at trial and, therefore, did not preserve the error for appeal.

SC89501
State of Missouri v. Michael Teer
St. Charles County
Postconviction relief from manslaughter, assault convictions
Listen to the oral argument:

Teer was represented during argument by Lisa M. Stroup of the public defender's office in St. Louis; and the state was represented by Karen L. Kramer of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Michael Teer was driving under the influence of alcohol when he was in a vehicle collision, causing injury of one person and deaths of four people in July 1994. In July 1996, Teer was found guilty of four counts of involuntary manslaughter and one count of second-degree assault. The jury recommended 48 months in the St. Charles County jail, but the circuit court sentenced him as a prior offender to a term of 20 years in prison. Teer moved for a resentencing to follow the jury's recommendation or reverse the sentences and judgment and remand for a new trial. In January 2007, the circuit court sustained Teer's motion to correct judgment and sentence and request for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Rule 29.15. In February 2007, the circuit court sentenced Teer to the same 20 years in prison. Teer appeals.

Teer argues the circuit court violated his rights to due process, equal protection of the law, trial by jury, fair and reliable sentencing and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. He contends the circuit court erred in allowing the state to amend its information to charge him as a prior and persistent offender after the jury began deliberations in light of section 558.021.2, RSMo. Teer asserts that statute requires that the state plead all essential facts warranting a finding of a prior offender before the case is submitted to the jury. He argues the trial court's error prejudiced him because the trial court found him to be a prior offender and ordered sentences five times longer than the maximum incarceration assessed by the jury.

The state responds the trial court did not err in allowing it to file an amended information charging Teer as a prior offender after the jury had begun deliberations. It argues an amended information was permissible under Supreme Court Rule 23.08 because the amended information did not charge a new offense and did not affect Teer's rights.