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Case Summary for November 30, 2016

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.


Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.



DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, November 30, 2016
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC95758
State of Missouri ex rel. Tivol Plaza Inc. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights, et al.
Cole County
Challenge to right-to-sue letter issued by state’s human rights commission
Listen to the oral argument: SC95758.mp3SC95758.mp3
Tivol was represented during arguments by Michael Blumenthal of Seyferth Blumenthal & Harris LLC in Kansas City; the commission was represented by Solicitor General James Layton of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; and Norton was represented by Phillip Murphy II, a solo practitioner in Overland Park, Kansas.

Retail jeweler Tivol Plaza Inc. hired Karen Norton in July 2011 as a sales associate in its store in North Kansas City. After Tivol closed that store in January 2013, it transferred Norton to its store on Kansas City’s Country Club Plaza. Tivol alleges Norton failed to meet her sales objectives at both locations and terminated her employment in November 2013. The next month, Norton filed a charge of discrimination against Tivol with the state’s human rights commission. In response, Tivol asked the commission to make specific factual findings about the timeliness of Norton’s claims and to dismiss any claims that occurred more than 180 days before she filed her charge. In June 2014, the commission granted Norton’s request to terminate its proceedings and issued a right-to-sue letter stating that the administrative process had not been completed. Tivol then challenged the commission’s issuance of the letter by seeking a writ from the circuit court. The commission moved to dismiss the writ petition. In February 2015, the circuit court dismissed Tivol’s petition for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. Tivol appeals.

This case presents several questions for this Court. A procedural question involves whether section 536.150, RSMo, permits parties to file petitions for common-law writs against agencies or creates its own civil cause of action against agencies in which writs are available remedies. Another question involves the propriety of Tivol’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Related issues involve whether the commission had a clear ministerial duty to determine its jurisdiction before issuing a right-to-sue letter or whether its duty was to issue the letter once the statutory requirements for doing so were met.

The Kansas City chapter of the National Employment Lawyers Association filed a brief as a friend of the Court. It focuses its arguments on whether a writ of mandamus was an appropriate legal remedy and whether the commission was required to issue the right-to-sue letter under the circumstances of Norton’s case.

SC95758_Tivol_Plaza_brief.pdfSC95758_Tivol_Plaza_brief.pdfSC95758_human_rights_comm'n_brief.pdfSC95758_human_rights_comm'n_brief.pdfSC95758_Norton_brief.pdfSC95758_Norton_brief.pdfSC95758_Tivol_Plaza_reply_brief.pdfSC95758_Tivol_Plaza_reply_brief.pdf

SC95758_Nat'l_Employment_Lawyers_Assoc._KC_chapter_amicus_brief.pdfSC95758_Nat'l_Employment_Lawyers_Assoc._KC_chapter_amicus_brief.pdf

Note: The Court ordered supplemental briefing in this case:

SC95758_amended_supplemental_briefing_order_02-08-2017.pdfSC95758_amended_supplemental_briefing_order_02-08-2017.pdf


Here are the parties' supplemental briefs filed pursuant to that order:

SC95758_Tivol_Plaza_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95758_Tivol_Plaza_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95758_human_rights_comm'n_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95758_human_rights_comm'n_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95758_Norton_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95758_Norton_supplemental_brief.pdf


SC95759
State of Missouri ex rel. Caesars Entertainment Operating Co. Inc., et al. v. Missouri Commission on Human Rights
Cole County
Challenge to right-to-sue letter issued by state’s human rights commission
Listen to the oral argument: SC95759.mp3SC95759.mp3
Harrah’s was represented during arguments by S. Jane Preuss of Littler Mendelson PC in Kansas City; the commission was represented by Solicitor General James Layton of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Harrah’s North Kansas City LLC hired Rebecca Gleason as a sales manager at its North Kansas City casino in October 2009. In July 2012, Gleason’s employer became Caesars Entertainment Operating Company Inc. (collectively, Harrah’s). Harrah’s terminated Gleason’s employment in November 2012, alleging she submitted a false request for reimbursement and lied about her conduct during the resulting investigation. In November 2013, Gleason filed a charge of discrimination against Harrah’s with the state’s human rights commission. In response, Harrah’s objected to the commission’s jurisdiction over any of Gleason’s claims arising more than 180 days before she filed her charge, objected to the commission issuing a right-to-sue notice related to untimely claims and asked the commission to close the matter administratively with respect to any untimely claims. In June 2014, the commission issued Gleason a right-to-sue notice making no determination as to its jurisdiction or the timeliness of her claims and making no finding of probable cause for Gleason to sue. Harrah’s then challenged the commission’s issuance of the letter by seeking a writ from the circuit court. The commission moved to dismiss the writ petition. In April 2015, the circuit court dismissed Harrah’s petition. Harran’s appeals.

This case presents this Court with questions that are substantially similar to those presented in Case No. SC95758, above.

SC95759_Caesars_Entertainment_et_al_brief.pdfSC95759_Caesars_Entertainment_et_al_brief.pdfSC95759_human_rights_comm'n_brief.pdfSC95759_human_rights_comm'n_brief.pdf

Note: The Court ordered supplemental briefing in this case:

SC95759_amended_supplemental_briefing_order_02-08-2017.pdfSC95759_amended_supplemental_briefing_order_02-08-2017.pdf


Here are the parties' supplemental briefs filed pursuant to that order:

SC95759_Caesars_Entertainment_et_al_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95759_Caesars_Entertainment_et_al_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95759_human_rights_comm'n_supplemental_brief.pdfSC95759_human_rights_comm'n_supplemental_brief.pdf


SC95629
State of Missouri v. Phillip Lamont Ransburg
Henry County
Challenge to assault and armed criminal action convictions
Listen to the oral argument: SC95629.mp3SC95629.mp3
Ransburg was represented during arguments by Nancy McKerrow of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Colette Neuner of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Phillip Ransburg lived with a woman in Clinton for part of the time they dated. The woman obtained an order of protection against Ransburg after he became violent with her in September 2013. In March 2014 – while the protection order still was in effect – Ransburg attempted to enter the woman’s home, where she was sitting with her fiancé and daughter. Ransburg entered the home, holding a stick similar to a broom stick, and charged at the fiancé, who ran with the daughter into a bedroom, closing the door behind them. Ransburg then grabbed at the woman’s wrist and struck her. Ransburg ultimately left the home, and the daughter called the police. The police arrested Ransburg the next day. The state charged him with first-degree burglary, second-degree assault, second-degree domestic assault, armed criminal action and violating a protection order. Ransburg waived his right to a jury trial. The case was tried before a judge rather than a jury. The circuit court found Ransburg guilty as charged and sentenced him, as a prior felony offender, to concurrent terms in prison. Ransburg appeals.

This appeal presents questions for this Court involving whether the circuit court violated Ransburg’s constitutional rights when it entered judgment against him with respect to the second-degree assault charge and the related armed criminal action charge. Related issues involve whether there was sufficient evidence from which the circuit court could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ransburg attempted to cause physical injury to the fiancé by means of a dangerous instrument.

SC95629_Ransburg_brief.pdfSC95629_Ransburg_brief.pdfSC95629_State_brief.pdfSC95629_State_brief.pdf



SC95847
State of Missouri v. Orlando Martinez Naylor
Ste. Genevieve County
Challenge to burglary conviction, introduction of certain evidence
Listen to the oral argument: SC95847.mp3SC95847.mp3
Naylor was represented during arguments by Casey Taylor of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Dora Fichter of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Before leaving work one evening in May 2014, the owner of a Ste. Genevieve County restaurant found that money had been taken from her purse, which she had left in the office area that was not open to the public. She also found a side door near the office that normally was locked by a deadbolt had been unlocked. Security video from a neighboring truck stop showed an individual exiting the restaurant through the side door; another security camera showed an individual pulling into the truck stop, exiting his vehicle, vanishing from view and then returning to the vehicle. The restaurant owner reported the incident to local law enforcement. Later that month, a sheriff’s department officer pulled over a vehicle driven by Orlando Naylor. The vehicle matched the description of the one from the security video outside the restaurant on the day of the theft. Naylor gave officers consent to search his vehicle, and they discovered $675 in cash. Officers arrested Naylor for driving with a revoked license. Several days later, he was arrested for theft. The state charged him with first-degree burglary and misdemeanor stealing for the theft from the restaurant as well as driving with a revoked license. Before trial, the state filed a motion seeking permission to present evidence that Naylor had stolen from one store in Illinois and had attempted to steal from another the day before the theft at the restaurant. The prosecutor argued this evidence was admissible to establish identity, intent and absence of mistake. The circuit court granted the motion. Following trial, a jury found Naylor guilty as charged. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly and sentenced him to concurrent terms in prison. Naylor appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court. Two involve whether the judgment against Naylor with respect to the burglary charge violates his constitutional rights. A related issue is whether there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Naylor knowingly entered the restaurant’s office area unlawfully. Another issue is whether the state presented sufficient evidence that, at the time Naylor entered the restaurant and took money from the purse, anyone else was present, as well as whether the state was required to prove another’s presence in the office area or merely the building. An additional question is whether the circuit court abused its discretion or violated Naylor’s constitutional rights in allowing the state to present evidence of the Illinois burglary and attempted burglary.

SC95847_Naylor_brief.pdfSC95847_Naylor_brief.pdfSC95847_State_brief.pdfSC95847_State_brief.pdfSC95847_Naylor_reply_brief.pdfSC95847_Naylor_reply_brief.pdf



SC95946
Faustino Lopez-Matias v. State of Missouri
Camden County
Request for bail
Listen to the oral argument: SC95946.mp3SC95946.mp3
Lopez-Matias was represented during arguments by Fawzy Simon of The Cisar Law Firm PC in Lake Ozark; the state was represented by Heather Miller of the Camden County prosecutor’s office in Camdenton.

The state charged Faustino Lopez-Matias with the class C felony of forgery by possessing a fraudulent social security card, and the circuit court issued a warrant for his arrest. A Linn Creek police sergeant arrested Lopez-Matias in September 2016. The circuit court denied his request for bail, concluding that section 544.470.2, RSMo, prohibits bail for defendants the court believes are in the United States unlawfully. Lopez-Matias now applies to this Court for bail pursuant to Rule 33.09.

This case presents several questions for the Court involving the validity of section 544.470.2’s presumption that no condition of a pretrial release will reasonably assure the appearance in court of a person the court believes is in the United States unlawfully. A related issue involves whether the statutory presumption conflicts with the state constitution’s requirement – in article I, section 20 – that all persons not charged with capital offenses (i.e. first-degree murder) are entitled to bail. Other related issues involve whether the presumption is precluded by federal immigration regulations, results in impermissible punishment prior to trial or otherwise deprives Lopez-Matias of due process of law.

SC95946_Lopez-Matias_brief.pdfSC95946_Lopez-Matias_brief.pdfSC95946_State_brief.pdfSC95946_State_brief.pdfSC95946_Lopez-Matias_reply_brief.pdfSC95946_Lopez-Matias_reply_brief.pdf


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