Case Summary for May 25, 2006 -- 2 p.m. docket

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Case Summary for May 25, 2006 -- 2 p.m. docket

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

2 p.m. Thursday, May 25, 2006
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SC87369
Mark Spiece v. Melody Garland
Jackson County
Challenge to grant of new trial in personal injury case

Mark Spiece filed a personal injury lawsuit against Melody Garland after he sustained injuries in a collision between the motorcycle he was riding and the vehicle Garland was driving. A jury entered its verdict in Spiece's favor and awarded him $75,000 in damages, and the trial court entered its judgment accordingly. Spiece subsequently moved for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that one juror failed to disclose that she was a plaintiff in a slip-and-fall case. On June 28, 2004, the court entered an order granting Spiece's motion for a new trial. On July 2, 2004, the court entered its judgment/order granting the motion for a new trial and indicating that it sustained the motion because of juror misconduct. Garland challenges the grant of a new trial.

Garland argues the trial court erred in sustaining Spiece's motion for a new trial. She contends Spiece's motion failed to specify any ground for the new trial. She asserts that the trial court's June 28 order, which she argues is the applicable order for this Court to review, stated only that the motion was sustained "for good cause shown" without further explanation. Garland contends this Court should review the case under Rule 84.05, which provides, in part, that when a trial court grants a new trial without specifying the ground(s) on which the new trial is granted, the presumption is that the trial court erroneously granted the motion for a new trial. She asserts that Rule 84.05 is not absurd, unjust or unconstitutional and should not be rewritten. Garland argues Rule 84.05 also precludes this Court from reviewing the trial court's granting of a new trial on discretionary grounds because it did not state it was acting on discretionary grounds. She contends the record does not support Spiece's argument that a juror intentionally failed to disclose that she was involved in a personal injury lawsuit. Garland further asserts that Spiece has failed to carry his burden of proof that he is entitled to a new trial.

Spiece responds that the court properly sustained his motion for a new trial. Spiece argues that the June 28 "order" sustaining his motion for a new trial, which did not set forth reasons, is not an appealable "judgment" and that the proper judgment for this Court's review is the July 2 order, which did state the court was sustaining the motion for a new trial because of juror misconduct. He contends that even if the June 28 order is deemed appealable, the ground on which the court sustained his motion is clear from the record. Alternatively, Spiece asserts that this Court should not follow case law interpreting Rule 84.05 because doing so leads to an absurd and unjust result and because the rule violates the state constitution and fails to fulfill its intended purposes. Spiece responds that one juror intentionally and improperly failed to disclose her involvement in prior civil litigation. He argues that his attorney asked, "Is there anybody on the jury who you or a family member has ever been a plaintiff in a lawsuit for personal injury?" and that there was no reasonable inability for any prospective jurors to comprehend this question. Spiece contends one juror nonetheless failed to respond to the question even though she remembered being involved in a slip-and-fall case. Spiece further asserts that if this Court finds that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's judgment, then this Court should remand the case to the trial court for a new trial.

SC86689
State of Missouri v. Johnny A. Johnson
St. Louis County
Direct appeal of first-degree murder conviction and death sentence

After Johnny Johnson stayed with friends one night in July 2002 at their home in Valley Park, the friends' six-year-old daughter disappeared. A witness saw Johnson walking that morning, carrying a little girl on his back. Although Johnson initially told the girl's mother that he did not know where the child was, he later surrendered himself to police and agreed to go to the police station. Later in the day, Johnson told police he had killed the girl by accident, that her body was in an old glass factory, and where she could be found. After police recovered the girl's body, they told Johnson it did not look like an accident. He then told them that he had exposed himself to her, and when she refused his advances, he hit her in the head with a brick and threw a boulder onto her, killing her. He told police he then covered her body with rocks and debris. The state charged Johnson with one count each of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, kidnapping and attempted forcible rape. While he was in jail awaiting trial, doctors treated Johnson for anxiety, depression and symptoms of psychosis. Following trial, the jury found Johnson guilty of each count and recommended the death penalty. The court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of death for the murder conviction and life in prison for the remaining convictions. Johnson appeals.

Johnson argues the court erred in overruling his objection, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), to the state's peremptory strikes (challenges removing potential jurors without offering reasons) of a black male potential juror and an Asian female potential juror because they did not have children. He contends the state's reason was a pretext concealing a racially discriminatory purpose, as the state did not strike similarly situated childless jurors. He asserts the trial court failed to give him an opportunity to prove pretext before it ruled on his Batson challenges. Johnson argues the court should have permitted him to ask potential jurors whether they could consider a sentence of life imprisonment without probation or parole even knowing that first-degree murder requires cool reflection and deliberation. He contends the court improperly allowed the state to elicit evidence that Johnson had committed uncharged crimes of "stalking" children in the days before the murder. He asserts he was prejudiced by this evidence that was used to show he had a propensity to commit crimes against children, leading the jury to believe he also planned and deliberated in killing Casey. Johnson argues the trial court erred in submitting to the jury an instruction about voluntary intoxication. He contends the evidence did not support the instruction and misled the jury into thinking that his defense was that he should be excused from the crime because he was in an intoxicated or drugged condition at the time. Johnson asserts that the court erred in admitting into evidence statements he made while he was being evaluated by a nurse for admission into the jail's psychiatric unit. He argues these statements were unreliable and involuntary and show the risk that they were coerced. Johnson contends he should not have been sentenced to death because the statutory aggravating factor the jury found was unconstitutionally vague. He asserts that his death sentence is excessive, unreliable and disproportionate because he has had severe mental illness and mental disabilities since childhood and because other defendants charged with first-degree murder of a child have not been sentenced to death. Johnson argues the court erred in giving to the jury certain instructions during the penalty phase of the trial that he contends fail to require the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating factors are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating factors the jury found. He asserts that the court plainly erred in requiring jurors to be unanimous in finding that mitigators outweigh aggravators. He argues such unanimity is not required by section 565.030.4(3), RSMo. Johnson contends the court should have quashed the information or precluded him from being sentenced to death because the information did not plead any statutory aggravating factors. He further asserts that the court failed to admonish the prosecutor and give a corrective instruction to the jury when the prosecutor argued that the jury should find Johnson guilty of first-degree murder based on prior misconduct and "for once" to hold him responsible for it. Johnson argues this argument improperly was based on evidence of whether Johnson had the ability to deliberate, not substantive evidence of guilt.

The state responds that its reasons for striking the two potential jurors were legitimate and race-neutral and were applied to similarly situated white potential jurors. It argues the prosecutor did not use available strikes to strike all the minority potential jurors from the jury panel. The state contends the court properly prevented Johnson from asking the jury pool hypothetical questions about different kinds of murder in an effort to define "deliberation." It asserts the court allowed potential jurors to be asked whether they could consider a life sentence under the actual circumstances of the case. The state responds that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence that Johnson followed two other young girls two days before the murder. It argues this evidence did not connect Johnson clearly to any specific uncharged crime and was relevant to show Johnson's intent and motive. The state contends the court did not plainly err in submitting the voluntary intoxication instruction to the jury because witnesses testified that Johnson had been using methamphetamine in the days before the murder and that any psychological symptoms Johnson was experiencing at the time of the murder were caused by voluntary methamphetamine intoxication and not mental illness. The state asserts that the court properly admitted Johnson's statements because there was sufficient evidence that they were made voluntarily. It responds that the court did not err in submitting the "depravity of mind" statutory aggravating circumstance instruction, which it argues was not vague or otherwise unconstitutional. The state contends this Court, in its independent statutory review, should affirm Johnson's death sentence. It asserts that the sentence was not imposed under passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor; that the jury's finding of statutory aggravators is supported by the evidence; and the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate. The state responds that the trial court did not err in submitting the mitigating evidence and jury mechanics instructions. It argues that Missouri's capital sentencing scheme does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt and that the instructions properly advised the jury how to evaluate mitigating and aggravating circumstances without misleading them or misstating the law. The state contends that it is not required to plead statutory aggravating circumstances in the information and that the evidence was sufficient to advise Johnson that he was facing the death penalty so he could prepare his defense. The state further responds that this Court should refuse to review Johnson's claim that the trial court should have interfered, on its own motion, during the prosecutor's closing argument. The state asserts that the evidence supported the inference that Johnson previously had used his mental illness to get out of trouble or to minimize the consequences of his actions.