Case Summary for March 5, 2013

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Case Summary for March 5, 2013

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, March 5, 2013

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC92648
State of Missouri v. Joseph N. Holmes
Christian County
Challenge to criminal nonsupport conviction

Listen to the oral argument:

Holmes was represented during arguments by James Burt, a solo practitioner in Ozark, (417) 581-4554, and the state was represented by Jonathan Osborne of the Springfield regional prosecutors' child support office in Springfield, (417) 868-4126.

The state in December 2010 entered an administrative order requiring John Holmes to pay child support for his minor son. Holmes did not pay child support in March, April and May 2011 and was charged with a misdemeanor for failure to pay child support. After the presentation of evidence, Holmes moved for a judgment of acquittal, alleging section 568.040, RSMo, regarding knowingly failing to pay support, violates federal due process. The trial court overruled the motion and found Holmes guilty for failure to pay child support. Holmes appeals.

Holmes argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion for acquittal of the charges. He contends section 568.040 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to him to prove his inability to pay. Holmes asserts a defendant should not carry the burden of proving an essential element of the crime, in this case, the ability to pay. He argues the state did not prove he had the ability to pay support for those three months.

The state responds the trial court correctly overruled Holmes’ motion. It argues Holmes failed to preserve properly or timely his constitutional challenge to section 568.040. The state contends section 568.040 does not shift the burden of proof improperly to Holmes to prove an essential element of the crime. It asserts it met the burden of proving each essential element of the crime and Holmes merely failed to present an affirmative defense that he had good cause not to pay.

SC92717
State ex rel. Velma P. Jackson and Alicia D. Seabaugh, co-trustees of the Lyle James Lambert a/k/a James Lyle Lambert and Jessie P. Lambert Family Trust dated October 27, 2010 v. The Honorable David A. Dolan
Scott County
Eminent domain

Listen to the oral argument:

The trustees were represented during arguments by Mark Arnold of Husch Blackwell LLP in St. Louis, (314) 480-1500, and the port authority was represented by James Hux of Hux & Hux in Sikeston, (573) 471-1737.

The Lambert family trust owns particular land in Scott County. The local port authority sought to acquire the land through eminent domain to lease a portion to an unnamed corporation. The corporation plans to build a tank farm for holding liquid products in between shipments. The company has agreed to fund improvements and extensions to the local rail lines run by the port authority. The port authority filed a petition in the circuit court to condemn the trustees’ property. The trustees moved to dismiss the condemnation proceedings, alleging that the purpose of the taking is solely for economic development and that section 523.271, RSMo, regarding eminent domain, prevents such use. The circuit court overruled the motion to dismiss and issued an order of condemnation, finding that port authorities generally serve a public purpose, that any benefit to a private company was incidental and that the taking was for more than economic development. The trustees seek this Court’s writ (order) prohibiting condemnation.

The trustees argue they are entitled to a writ prohibiting entry of an order of condemnation against the trust’s property. They contend the port authority had no power to condemn the property under section 523.271 because the proposed use of the property was solely for economic development. The trustees assert the port authority also did not have power to condemn the property under article I, section 28 of the state constitution because the proposed use of the property is private, not public, use.

The port authority responds the trustees are not entitled to an order prohibiting an order of condemnation against the property. It argues it had the power to condemn the property under section 523.271 because the proposed use of the property was not solely for economic development. The port authority contends it also had the power to condemn the property under article I, section 28 of the state constitution because the proposed use of the property is public.

SC92851
The Humane Society of the United States, Dogwood Animal Shelter, Inc., and Stray Rescue of St. Louis, Inc. v. State of Missouri and the Missouri Department of Agriculture
Cole County
Constitutional validity of legislative act affecting animal care facilities

Listen to the oral argument:

The animal shelters were represented during arguments by David Cosgrove of the Cosgrove Law Group LLC in St. Louis, (314) 563-2490, and the state was represented by Jessica Blome of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.

Senate Bill No. 795 was introduced during the 2010 legislative session as an act to repeal section 319.306, RSMo, and enact a new statute regarding blasting safety, including an exception for certain agricultural purposes. When the bill was considered in the house of representatives, it was amended to include changes to other statutes. One of these changes was to section 273.327, RSMo – known as the state’s animal care facilities act – amended to remove animal shelters from an exemption from paying a license fee. During its next annual session, the legislature passed Senate Bill No. 161, again repealing and reenacting section 273.327 and increasing the maximum licensing fee for animal shelters from $500 to $2,500. Several animal shelter or rescue organizations filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment (determination of rights) that SB 795 violates article III, section 21 of the state constitution. The trial court denied relief, finding section 273.327 constitutional and declaring the animal shelters’ claim moot because SB 161 again repealed and reenacted section 273.327. The animal shelters appeal.

The animal shelters argue the trial court erred in overruling its request for declaratory judgment. It contends its challenge to the constitutional validity of SB 795 is not moot because the subsequent repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 by SB 161 did not eliminate the prior constitutional defects. The animal shelters assert the final version of SB 795 deviates from and conflicts with the bill’s original purpose as it was introduced and, therefore, violates article III, section 21. The animal shelters further argue the changes to section 273.327 will reduce the resources they can spend on the care of animals and will place a greater burden on other entities or the government.

The state and its department of agriculture respond the trial court correctly overruled the animal shelters’ request for declaratory judgment. They argue the challenge to the constitutional validity of SB 795 is moot because section 273.327 subsequently was repealed and reenacted again. The state and department contend that, even if section 273.327 is appropriate for judicial review, it does not violate article III, section 21. They assert the bill never was limited solely to the purpose of amending the state’s blasting safety act, so the addition of other changes to statutes involving agriculture does not affect the constitutional validity of the bill.

Excelsior Springs Friends of Animals, Autumn Acres Rescue and Five Acres Animal Shelter argue, as friends of the Court, that the trial court erred in overruling the animal shelters’ request for declaratory judgment. They contend SB 795 created a constitutional defect in section 273.327 when it was enacted. These animal organizations assert the legislative process in passing SB 795 violated the original purpose clause of article III, section 21 of the state constitution. They argue an actual controversy still exists because the repeal and reenactment of section 273.327 did not eliminate the prior constitutional defect.

SC92653
Gina Breitenfeld v. School District of Clayton, et al., State of Missouri and Chris Koster
St. Louis County
Transfer plans for school districts

Listen to the oral argument:

The state was represented during arguments by Solicitor General James Layton of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321; Breitenfeld was represented by Elkin Kistner of Bick & Kistner PC in St. Louis, (314) 571-6823; the transitional school district was represented by Rick Walsh of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh LC in St. Louis, (314) 444-7600; and the Clayton school district and taxpayers were represented by Mark Bremer of Kohn, Shands, Elbert, Gianoulakis & Giljum LLP in St. Louis, (314) 241-3963.

Gina Breitenfeld and her two children are residents of St. Louis city within the boundaries of the St. Louis public school district. Due to poor performance by the St. Louis public school district, Breitenfeld enrolled her children in public schools in the Clayton school district under a contract tuition agreement. In 2007, the St. Louis public school district lost its accreditation. Breitenfeld asked the Clayton school district to prepare tuition bills for payment by the St. Louis public school district instead of seeking payment from Breitenfeld pursuant to the tuition agreement. Clayton refused and stated it would not participate in the transfer plans referenced in section 167.131, RSMo, which requires an unaccredited school district to pay tuition and transportation costs to an accredited school district where the unaccredited district’s resident students are enrolled. Breitenfeld sued the Clayton school district, St. Louis city board of education and the transitional school district to require the Clayton school district to bill the St. Louis school district for tuition and transportation costs. Four taxpayers filed to intervene in the action, naming the state as defendant, claiming an interest in the effect that application of section 167.131 might have on taxation. The trial court permitted the intervention. The trial court granted the Clayton school district’s motion to dismiss, finding section 167.131 was not applicable. Breitenfeld appealed, and this Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded (sent the case back) to the circuit court for trial. At trial, the Clayton school district asserted that it was impossible to comply with section 167.131 and that the statute violated the Hancock amendment because it constituted an unfunded mandate. The Clayton district filed a counter-claim for tuition damages from Breitenfeld. The trial court ruled in the Clayton school district’s favor, finding that compliance with section 167.131 was impossible and unenforceable because it violated the Hancock amendment. It also awarded the Clayton district damages and attorney fees. Breitenfeld appeals.

Breitenfeld argues the trial court erred in finding section 167.131 could not be enforced against the school district. She contends the school district was entitled to damages because it misapplied the law. Breitenfeld asserts the school district did not submit substantial evidence to prove damages. She argues the school district was required to comply with section 167.131 because its claimed defense of impossibility does not excuse its noncompliance with a statutory mandate. Breitenfeld contends the school district failed to prove it was impossible to comply with the statute. She asserts the trial court should not have allowed certain taxpayers to intervene because they did not meet the criteria for intervention. Breitenfeld argues the school district’s constitutional challenge to section 167.131 should not have been permitted because it was not presented at the proper time and, therefore, was waived. She contends that the school district will not experience increased costs or activity by complying with section 167.131 and that the state would not have to appropriate funds for the district to comply.

The state argues the trial court erred in finding that section 167.131 was unenforceable against the school district and that the district and the taxpayers were entitled to damages. It contends tuition is not a new activity or service because the district always has been required to educate all resident students and tuition is merely an extension of that requirement. The state asserts there actually will be savings to the taxpayers under this method of tuition. It argues there is insufficient evidence of increased activity or costs by requiring the school district to transport students to its schools or to neighboring school districts. The state contends that St. Louis school district had not designated any district for transportation and that there is insufficient evidence to prove transportation to a different school district increases costs. It asserts the question of transportation also is moot (no longer a legal issue necessary of being addressed). The state argues the taxpayers submitted insufficient evidence to prove that the increase in state funding will not cover the costs of compliance with section 167.131 and that the Hancock amendment was violated. It contends the trial court should not have relieved the school district completely of compliance with section 167.131 because the Hancock amendment only excuses compliance to the extent duties or activities are unfunded. The state asserts there is no impossibility rule that excuses compliance with a statutory mandate. It argues the award of attorneys fees to the taxpayers was unreasonable.

The school district and taxpayers respond the trial court correctly found that section 167.131 is unenforceable against them. They argue there was substantial evidence to prove the statute violates the Hancock amendment of the constitution by being unfunded. The school district and taxpayers contend that there will be increased costs to comply and that expert testimony at trial outlined the costs. They assert Breitenfeld used unfounded legal arguments to defend the constitutional validity of section 167.131. The school district and taxpayers argue they are not required to show the costs were passed on to the taxpayers as the state argued. They contend the taxpayers correctly were allowed to intervene. The school district and taxpayers assert they presented substantial evidence to prove it is impossible to comply with section 167.131. They argue they also presented substantial evidence to support the amount of damages for unpaid tuition from Breitenfeld.

The transitional school district responds the trial court correctly found section 167.131 violates the Hancock amendment. It argues the statute imposes new mandated activitieson the school districts without funding. The district contends there is sufficient evidence to support additional activity and costs as a result of compliance with the statute. It asserts compliance with the statute is impossible because the school district would be unable to meet its obligations to its remaining students if it is forced to pay tuition and transportation costs. The district argues the taxpayers correctly were permitted to intervene because they had claims related to the subject matter and rights affected by the present case. It contends the award of attorney fees was reasonable.

Three parents of school-age children living in the St. Louis public school district argue, as friends of the Court, that the trial court erred in relying on a study regarding education in St. Louis. It contends the report was unfounded and lacked scholarly resources. The parents assert section 167.131 does not violate the Hancock amendment because the amendment was designed to protect taxpayers and should not be used by government agencies to avoid statutory mandates. They argue it is not impossible for the school districts to comply with section 167.131.

The cooperating school district of greater St. Louis argues, as a friend of the Court, that the trial court correctly found section 167.131 violates the Hancock amendment. It contends compliance with section 167.131 is impossible for the school districts. The district asserts this matter is not moot merely because the St. Louis public schools have been accredited again.