Case Summary for October 6, 2016

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Case Summary for October 6, 2016

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Thursday, October 6, 2016
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC95368
City of Kansas City, Missouri v. Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners, et al., Rev. Samuel E. Mann, et al.
Jackson County
Challenge to removal of proposed local minimum wage ordinance from ballot
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95368.mp3
The committee members were represented during arguments by Taylor Fields of Fields & Brown LLC in Kansas City; the city was represented by Sarah Baxter of the Kansas City attorney’s office in Kansas City.

A committee of petitioners proposed an initiative petition in Kansas City to adopt a local ordinance in the city that would have raised Kansas City’s minimum wage above the rate set by the state’s minimum wage law. Sufficient signatures were collected and certified to engage Kansas City’s charter initiative process. Subsequently, the city enacted a minimum wage ordinance that differed from the ordinance proposed by the initiative petition (although it never took effect) and the state legislature passed House Bill No. 722 (2015), which prohibits local minimum wage laws that exceed the requirements of state or federal law. The governor vetoed HB 722, and in August 2015, the city council granted the committee members’ request to place their proposed ordinance on the November 2015 special election ballot. The city council’s action included language allowing the city to remove the proposed ordinance from the ballot if the legislature overrode the governor’s veto and HB 722 became law. After the legislature overrode the veto in September 2015, the city filed a petition seeking to remove the proposed ordinance from the November 2015 ballot. The circuit court permitted the committee members to intervene as defendants, and the case was expedited. The circuit court granted the city’s motion to remove the ballot question from the November 2015 election. In so doing, the circuit court held that section 67.1571, RSMo, and HB 722 “clearly and unequivocally prohibit [the city] from establishing a minimum wage” and that the committee members’ proposed ordinance is inconsistent with section 67.1571 and HB 722 and, therefore, is unconstitutional on its face. The committee members appeal.

This appeal presents one primary question for the Court – whether the circuit court should have removed the proposed local minimum wage ordinance from the November 2015 ballot. Related issues involve whether the city can enact a local wage ordinance without violating section 67.1571, RSMo, and HB 722 and whether the proposed ordinance is unconstitutional on its face; whether section 67.1571 and HB 722 are unconstitutional and, if so, whether any of the provisions might be saved; and whether the defendants raised their constitutional claims at the earliest opportunity and preserved them for appellate review.

Two groups filed briefs as friends of the Court. A group of elected officials focus their arguments on the constitutional validity of HB 722 and its applicability to the proposed initiative. A group of municipal and labor law professors and organizations focus their arguments on the constitutional power of charter cities to regulate local wages; whether HB 722 expressed a clear enough intent to take away that power; and whether the proposed initiative petition in fact conflicts with the state’s minimum wage law or any other state law.

SC95368_committee_members_brief.pdf

SC95368_City_of_Kansas_City_brief.pdf

SC95368_committee_members_reply_brief.pdf

SC95368_municipal_and_labor_law_professors_and_organizations_amici_brief.pdf

SC95368_elected_officials_amici_brief.pdf

SC95401
Cooperative Home Care Inc., et al. v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al.
St. Louis city
Challenge to finding that local minimum wage ordinance is void
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95401.mp3
The group of employers and organizations was represented during arguments by Jane Dueker of Spencer Fane LLP in St. Louis; the city was represented by John J. Rehmann II of Dowd Bennett LLP in St Louis.

During its 1998 session, the state legislature passed a bill enacted into law at section 67.1571, RSMo, providing that no municipality shall establish a minimum wage that exceeds the state’s minimum wage. In August 2000, voters in St. Louis approved, by initiative petition, a local ordinance requiring a specifically calculated minimum wage. In a 2001 judgment, a St. Louis circuit court enjoined enforcement of the ordinance, declaring it violated state law and the state constitution and, therefore, was invalid. The circuit court also made a finding, not related to the relief granted, that section 67.1571 was unconstitutional. While that case was on appeal, St. Louis enacted a revised ordinance establishing a “living wage” law the city believed to be in compliance with the circuit court’s judgment regarding the prior ordinance. The appeal ultimately was dismissed. During the November 2006 general election, the state’s voters adopted a state minimum wage law, codified at section 290.502.1, RSMo. In May 2015, the legislature passed House Bill No. 722, which prohibits a local minimum wage that exceeds the requirements of federal or state law. By its terms, HB 722 provides that it “shall not preempt any … local minimum wage ordinance requirements in effect on August 28, 2015.” The governor vetoed the bill, but the legislature overrode the veto and the bill became law. On August 28, 2015, the city adopted a new ordinance setting a particular minimum wage with a schedule for future increases. Because the ordinance contained an emergency clause, it became effective immediately – on August 28, 2015. A group of employers and organizations (collectively, the organizations) sued the city and certain city officials (collectively, the city), alleging the 2015 city minimum wage law conflicted with state law and violated the state constitution. Following briefing and oral argument, the circuit court issued its judgment declaring the 2015 ordinance void and of no force and effect. The circuit court found the ordinance conflicts with a state statute and exceeds the city’s constitutional charter authority. This appeal follows.

This appeal raises a number of questions for the Court. One involves the constitutional validity of section 67.1571 and whether it conflicts with or preempts the city’s 2015 ordinance. Another involves the constitutional validity of HB 722. Related issues include whether the 1998 bill that enacted section 67.1571 violates the state constitution’s single subject, clear title and original purpose requirements and whether the prior circuit court judgment regarding the statute controls this issue. Another issue involves whether the city’s challenge to the constitutional validity of the statute was an affirmative defense and whether the city timely raised the challenge. An additional issue involves whether the 2015 ordinance enlarges liabilities of citizens among themselves or creates a private cause of action and, if so, whether it violates article VI, section 19(a) of the state constitution. A further issue involves whether the city’s ordinance improperly delegates legislative powers or violates separation of powers.

One individual and a group of municipal and labor law professors and organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The individual focuses his arguments on the policy and purpose of the city’s minimum wage ordinance; whether the state legislature was acting in the citizens’ best interests when enacting HB 722; whether the federal constitution permits HB 722 to void the city law; and whether section 67.1571 is unconstitutionally vague.

The organizations focus their arguments on the constitutional power of charter cities to regulate local wages; whether Missouri’s minimum wage law expresses a clear enough intent to take away that power; and whether the city’s 2015 ordinance in fact conflicts with the state’s minimum wage law.

SC95401_Cooperative_Home_Care_first_brief.pdf

SC95401_City_of_St_Louis_first_brief.pdf

SC95401_Cooperative_Home_Care_second_brief.pdf

SC95401_City_of_St_Louis_second_brief.pdf

SC95401_Municipal_and_labor_law_professors_and_organizations_amici_brief.pdf

SC95401_Clemens_amicus_brief.pdf

SC93487
State ex rel. Jason Clay Carr v. Ian Wallace, Superintendent
Wright County
Petition for relief from mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile offender
Listen to the oral argument:

SC93487.mp3
Carr was represented during arguments by Craig A. Johnston of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the superintendent was represented by Stephen D. Hawke of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Following a trial, a jury found Jason Carr guilty of three counts of capital murder for killing – in March 1983 when he was 16 years old – his stepmother, his stepsister and his brother. The circuit court sentenced Carr to concurrent prison terms of life in prison without eligibility for probation or parole for 50 years. At the time, this was the only available sentence for capital murder besides death. He has served more than 33 years of his sentence but is not eligible for parole until 2033, when he will be 66 years old. In its 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama, the United States Supreme Court held the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits sentencing schemes that mandate life in prison without the possibility of parole for juvenile homicide offenders. In January 2016, the United States Supreme Court held in Montgomery v. Louisiana that Miller applies retroactively. Carr now seeks relief from his sentence.

This case presents several questions for this Court involving the imposition of Carr’s sentence, whether it violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and whether it is contrary to the sentencing procedures later set out in Miller. A related issue involves the impact of a mandatory sentencing scheme that precluded consideration of Carr’s age or other mitigating circumstances. Another is whether there is a clear national consensus against such a mandatory sentence and the impact, if any, of Missouri’s new statute allowing a juvenile sentenced to life in prison without eligibility for parole to petition for review of the sentence after the juvenile serves 25 years in prison. Further related issues involve whether Carr immediately is eligible for parole and, if so, whether Carr should be released on parole.

SC93487_Carr_brief.pdf

SC93487_State_brief.pdf

SC93487_Carr_reply_brief.pdf

SC95473
State of Missouri v. Ledale Nathan
St. Louis city
Challenge to lengthy consecutive sentences for juvenile offender
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95473.mp3
Nathan was represented during arguments by William J. Swift of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

This case arises out of events occurring in October 2009 in St. Louis. At the time, Ledale Nathan was 16 years old. He was charged with 13 counts – including first-degree murder, first-degree assault, first-degree robbery, first-degree burglary and kidnapping – plus another 13 counts of armed criminal action. Nathan was convicted of all 26 counts, and the circuit court sentenced him. On appeal, this Court reversed Nathan’s sentence of life in prison without parole for the murder conviction as required by the United States Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Miller v. Alabama and remanded (sent back) the case for further sentencing proceedings. The jury subsequently entered a verdict that it was unable to decide unanimously that a sentence of life in prison without parole was appropriate under all the circumstances. Because the jury could not agree on sentencing, the circuit court vacated Nathan’s conviction for first-degree murder and declared him guilty of second-degree murder instead. It then resubmitted the case to the jury for sentencing. The jury assessed life in prison for the murder conviction as well as several armed criminal action convictions. The circuit court entered its judgment, finding that Miller and the United States Supreme Court’s 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida did not foreclose imposing consecutive sentences against a juvenile offender and imposing consecutive sentences against Nathan, who calculates the aggregate of his sentences at 300 years in prison such that he would not be eligible for parole for almost 64 years. Nathan appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court involving the propriety of Nathan’s sentence. One involves whether the circuit court could order all the sentences for the non-homicide offenses to be served consecutively to one another and to the life sentence for the murder offense without violating Nathan’s state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Related to this question is an issue of the extent to which Graham and Miller apply to Nathan’s case. Other related issues involve whether the aggregate prison sentence is the functional equivalent of life in prison without parole or otherwise deprives Nathan from a meaningful opportunity for release during his lifetime. Another question involves whether the circuit court should have granted Nathan’s motion for a new sentencing hearing for certain non-homicide offenses that were not part of this Court’s ordered remand. A related issue involves whether the state failed to disclose to Nathan’s original trial counsel, in violation of the United States Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Brady v. Maryland, a police report documenting sexual abuse against Nathan and whether, had it known of the report, the defense counsel would have waived jury sentencing. A related issue involves whether Nathan waived his claim by not bringing it to the circuit court’s attention until after the jury’s verdict.

SC95473_Nathan_brief.pdf

SC95473_State_brief.pdf

SC95473_Nathan_reply_brief.pdf

SC95395
Timothy S. Willbanks v. Missouri Department of Corrections
Cole County
Challenge to validity of particular type of life sentence for juvenile offender
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95395.mp3
Willbanks was represented during arguments by Craig A. Johnston of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the department was represented by Michael J. Spillane of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

In January 1999, then-17-year-old Timothy Willbanks and two older individuals planned to steal a vehicle. Carrying a shotgun, Willbanks approached a woman in her apartment complex parking lot, ordered her to drive him to an automated teller machine, from which he removed all the money from her account. He ordered her to continue driving but then ordered her to stop. He forced her into the trunk of the vehicle and drove further away. He ultimately told her to turn and walk away, and he shot her four times. He left her, and she survived. Following a trial, a jury found Willbanks guilty of one count of kidnapping, one count of first-degree assault, two counts of first-degree robbery and three counts of armed criminal action. The circuit court sentenced Willbanks to consecutive prison terms totaling life in prison plus 355 years. He will not be eligible for parole until he is 85 years old – a date he alleges exceeds his life expectancy, according to actuarial tables. In 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Graham v. Florida, holding a juvenile convicted of an offense other than homicide cannot be sentenced to life in prison without a meaningful opportunity for release. Willbanks subsequently sought relief from his sentence under Graham. The circuit court denied relief. He now seeks relief from this Court.

This case raises one primary question for the Court – whether a juvenile, who commits a non-homicide offense and is not eligible for parole until after his natural life expectancy ends, is denied a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturation and rehabilitation and, therefore, whether the sentence constitutes unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment. Related issues involve whether such a sentence constitutes a de facto sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole and, if so, whether Willbanks has shown his sentence violates Graham. Other related issues involve whether Graham applies retroactively and its impact, if any, on multiple consecutive sentences for a juvenile offender. Further related issues involve whether Missouri’s parole statute and regulation are unconstitutional as applied to Willbanks.

SC95395_Willbanks_brief.pdf

SC95395_Dept_of_Corrections_brief.pdf

SC95395_Willbanks_reply_brief.pdf