Case Summary for December 6, 2016

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Case Summary for December 6, 2016

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, December 6, 2016
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC95816
State of Missouri v. Torris Caston
St. Louis city
Challenges to evidentiary, instructional issues in statutory rape and sodomy case
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95816.mp3
Caston was represented during arguments by Richard Sindel of Sindel, Sindel & Noble PC in Clayton; the state was represented by Rachel Flaster of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

The state charged Torris Caston in January 2011 with two counts of second-degree statutory sodomy and one count of second-degree statutory rape for acts involving a female student at the dance academy Caston and his wife operated in Webster Groves. Caston also taught dance and gym classes at McKinley Elementary School. The student – who was born in October 1988 – began taking dance lessons at McKinley in 2002, began classes at the Castons’ academy in the summer of 2003 and ultimately stopped attending the academy in August 2005. She made a police report in the summer of 2010. At trial, the student testified that Caston began making advances toward her in 2003, when she was 15 years old; that she engaged in oral sex with Caston in the spring or summer of 2004, when she was 15 years old; that she had sexual intercourse with Caston in 2005, when she was 16 years old; that she had sexual intercourse with him again when she was either 16 or 17 years old; and that she ended her relationship with Caston during her first semester of college in 2006. Caston testified in his own defense, denying all of the student’s allegations. The jury found Caston guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced Caston to a total of 10 years in prison. Caston appeals.

This appeal raises several questions for this Court. One is whether the jury instructions required jurors to agree that Caston had committed a specific act of misconduct or permitted individual jurors to find he had committed misconduct but not agree unanimously as to any specific act of misconduct. Another question involves whether the state committed prosecutorial misconduct in not disclosing certain photographs of Caston and whether such photographs were exculpatory (would have exonerated or tended to exonerate Caston). An additional question is whether the state presented sufficient evidence to support a conviction for statutory rape. Another question involves whether the circuit court improperly injected itself into the proceedings by criticizing the way Caston’s counsel examined witnesses and presented evidence or by making objections or rulings on its own motion, rather than at the objection of either party, and whether any such action by the circuit court potentially biased the jury against Caston. Further questions involve whether the circuit court should have permitted Caston to present certain evidence.

SC95816_Caston_brief.pdf

SC95816_State_brief.pdf

SC95816_Caston_reply_brief.pdf

SC95818
State of Missouri v. Randy E. Twitty
St. Charles County
Sufficiency of evidence supporting possession conviction
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95818.mp3
Twitty was represented during arguments by Emmett Queener of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Evan Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

The state charged Randy Twitty with felony possession of a chemical with the intent to create a controlled substance, alleging that, in August 2013, he knowingly possessed pseudoephedrine with the intent to process it to create methamphetamine. The case was tried before a judge rather than a jury. At trial, a police detective testified that he noticed a suspicious purchase of pseudoephedrine by a woman – her fourth such purchase in 38 days. He went with two other detectives to the woman’s apartment, where a man later determined to be Twitty answered the door. A detective standing outside the sliding glass door of the apartment observed Twitty tearing up some pill boxes and blister packs, then putting them in the trash can under other trash. Twitty signed a written consent for the detectives to search the apartment, where he was living. The search revealed pill boxes for pills containing pseudoephedrine and receipts for the purchase of such boxes, but no pseudoephedrine pills. Twitty told the detectives that he and the woman had purchased the boxes of pseudoephedrine, that he had traded them to another person in exchange for $50 and methamphetamine, and that he smoked the methamphetamine in a park. The detectives found neither methamphetamine nor $50 in their search. The circuit court found Twitty guilty as charged and sentenced him to 25 years in prison. Twitty appeals.

This appeal presents one primary question for this Court – whether the evidence in the record was sufficient to support Twitty’s conviction for possession of pseudoephedrine. A related issue is whether the search had to reveal the presence of pseudoephedrine pills or whether Twitty’s statement about purchasing the pills and then trading them for methamphetamine, along with the items found in the search, was sufficient to support the possession conviction.

SC95818_Twitty_brief.pdf

SC95818_State_brief.pdf

SC95818_Twitty_reply_brief.pdf

SC95562
In re: Douglas A. Walker Jr.
St. Louis
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95562.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Sam Phillips of the chief disciplinary counsel’s office in Jefferson City; Walker, an attorney in St. Louis, represented himself.

St. Louis attorney Douglas Walker Jr. was admonished three times previously; was suspended from the practice of law from March to December 2012 for unpaid taxes; was admonished for the unauthorized practice of law while suspended; and was suspended again from January to June 2014 for unpaid taxes. He currently is suspended from the practice of law for failing to comply with his continuing legal education obligations. The chief disciplinary counsel alleges that, while suspended in 2014, Walker continued to practice law by filing pleadings in two separate matters pending in a federal bankruptcy court, meeting with another client and preparing bankruptcy pleadings, and filing those pleadings using his law partner’s bar number and electronic signature rather than his own. Walker admitted to the allegations during a May 2015 hearing. The regional disciplinary hearing panel concluded that Walker violated rules of professional conduct by knowingly providing attorney services while suspended. The panel recommended that Walker be suspended with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months. Walker asserts he has ceased practicing law and is undergoing treatment. He asks the Court to consider the time he already has been suspended. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to suspend Walker’s law license as the panel recommended.

This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Walker violated rules of professional conduct and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.

SC95562_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief.pdf

SC95562_Walker_brief.pdf

SC95602
In the Interest of: J.P.B., a Minor Child under Seventeen Years of Age
Greene County
Challenge to termination of incarcerated father’s parental rights
Listen to the oral argument:

SC95602.mp3
The natural father was represented during arguments by Kris Barefield of the Law Offices of Kristoffer Barefield LLC in Springfield; the juvenile officer was represented by Paul Shackelford of the Greene County juvenile office in Springfield.

A man previously convicted of other crimes pleaded guilty in January 2014 to new crimes, based on July 2013 events, and was sentenced to prison. He has been incarcerated since July 2013. In February 2014, the man’s son was born. Two months later, the child was taken into the protective custody of the juvenile division as a result of a hotline complaint about the child. In June 2014, the circuit court declared the child to be an abandoned infant and ultimately terminated the mother’s parental rights. During a November 2014 hearing, the circuit court declared the incarcerated man to be the child’s biological father and ordered an incarcerated treatment plan requiring the father to communicate with his case manager, sign releases of information, take advantage of services in prison and stay in contact with the child. In July 2015, a petition was filed to terminate the father’s parental rights. Two months later, the father asked the child to be placed with the child’s paternal grandmother. Following evidentiary hearings, the circuit court found such placement was not in the child’s best interests. A trial subsequently was held regarding the termination petition, and the father – who asked to appear in person – was permitted to appear by videoconference. The father requested that the child be placed with the paternal grandmother. Before evidence was presented, the father alleged that application of section 211.447.5(6)(a), RSMo, in his termination proceeding was unconstitutionally vague and violated his constitutional rights to due process. During the trial, evidence was presented that the father had kept in contact with the case worker, had taken certain classes in prison, was attending weekly meetings of Narcotics Anonymous/Alcoholics Anonymous, was current in his child support obligations, and had written letters to his son but had been unable to visit with his son in person. The child’s foster mother testified that she and her husband had bonded with and wished to adopt the child, for whom they had provided a foster home since May 2014. The circuit court issued its judgment and order terminating parental rights in February 2016, finding the father an unfit parent. The father appeals.

This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One question involves whether the circuit court should have allowed the father to appear in person, rather than by videoconference, at the trial and whether appearing by videoconference gave the father meaningful access to the court or violated his constitutional rights to due process or effective assistance of counsel or prevented him from communicating confidentially with counsel. Another question involves whether section 211.447.5(6)(a) is unconstitutionally vague as applied in this case and whether the father’s incarceration was the sole ground on which the circuit court terminated his parental rights. An additional question involves whether the circuit court’s conclusion, under section 211.447.5(6)(a), that the father is an unfit parent is supported by substantial evidence. A related issue involves whether it was sufficient for the juvenile officer to present evidence that conditions would render the father unable, for the reasonably foreseeable future, to care for his child. Additional questions involve whether the circuit court’s conclusions regarding the statutory grounds under which it terminated the father’s parental rights are supported by substantial evidence or are against the weight of the evidence. A further question is whether termination of the father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.

SC95602_Natural_Father_brief.pdf

SC95602_Juvenile_Office_brief.pdf

SC95602_Natural_Father_reply_brief.pdf