Case Summary for January 10, 2006

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Case Summary for January 10, 2006

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Tuesday, January 10, 2006

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SC86737
Dale Dobbins v. State of Missouri
Saline County
Postconviction relief from sentence for drug conviction

In September 2000, a Slater, Missouri, police officer pulled over Dale Dobbins and arrested him for speeding, driving with a suspended driver's license and failure to maintain financial responsibility. When he inspected Dobbins' vehicle, the officer found three large trash bags and a large Ziplock of a leafy green substance. Dobbins rejected the state's initial offer during plea negotiations. Dobbins pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute and driving while intoxicated in June 2001, and, two months later, the court sentenced him to 18 years in prison. Dobbins subsequently sought postconviction relief, which the motion court denied. He appeals.

Dobbins argues the motion court clearly erred in refusing to grant him a new sentencing proceeding. He contends the trial court denied him his due process and equal protection rights when it refused to consider sentencing him to long-term drug treatment under section 217.362, RSMo 2000, because of his age. He asserts that the motion court erred in denying postconviction relief. Dobbins argues his counsel misadvised him about the consequences of a guilty plea that left open the issue of sentencing. He contends he would not have pleaded guilty had he not erroneously believed that his sentence could be reduced under section 558.046, RSMo. He asserts that the motion court should have set aside his guilty plea because the trial court accepted his guilty plea without determining that the plea was supported by a factual basis. Dobbins argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the trial court finding him guilty without a factual basis for his guilty plea. He contends there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would not have accepted his guilty plea had counsel made an objection.

The state responds that the court did not clearly err by refusing to place Dobbins in a long-term treatment program. The state argues that the trial court did not violate Dobbins' equal protection rights because its decision to refuse to place him in the treatment program was not based on age. The state contends that any consideration of Dobbins' age was rationally related to a legitimate state interest and that Dobbins failed to prove any consideration of his age prejudiced him. The state asserts that the motion court did not err in denying Dobbins postconviction relief motion. The state responds that Dobbins failed to prove his counsel's advice was constitutionally unreasonable because the sentence reduction statute does not explicitly exclude prior drug offenders from petitioning for early release. The state argues there was not a reasonable probability that Dobbins would have gone to trial instead of pleading guilty based on a hope of a sentence reduction at some later time. The state contends there was a sufficient factual basis that Dobbins intended to distribute marijuana and, therefore, for Dobbins to plead guilty. The state asserts that counsel was not inefficient for failing to make a meritless objection to the court's acceptance of Dobbins' guilty plea.

SC86573
Jane Doe I, et al. v. Thomas Phillips et al.
Jackson County
Constitutional challenge to sexual offender registration act

Missouri's sexual offender registration act, codified beginning at section 589.400, RSMo, requires specified sex offenders to register with the chief law enforcement official of the county in which the offender resides within 10 days of conviction, release from incarceration or placement on probation. A person who is required to register but fails to meet all the registration requirements may be charged with a class A misdemeanor for a first registration violation or a class D felony for any subsequent violation. The act applies to individuals who, since July 1, 1979, have been convicted, have been found guilty or who have pleaded guilty to certain offenses under chapters 565, 566 and 568, RSMo. The registration requirements apply even if the offender received a suspended imposition of sentence or a suspended execution of sentence. Once they register and for the rest of their lives, offenders must report to designated law enforcement officials at specified intervals of either 90 days or 12 months, depending on certain factors. Missouri does not regulate public access to the facts of a sexual offender registration based on the assessed dangerousness of any given offender. Three female registered sex offenders and eight male registered sex offenders (the Does) sued the sheriff and prosecuting attorney of Jackson County, Missouri, and the superintendent of the Missouri state highway patrol. The Does challenged the constitutional validity of the sexual offender registration act and sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Following an August 2004 evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition, the circuit court in January 2005 denied the relief requested. The Does appeal.

The Does argue the court erred in denying declaratory relief because the sexual offender registration act violates the state constitution. They contend the act violates substantive due process rights and equal protection rights because it infringes on fundamental liberty rights, imposes a lifetime stigma, has no express purpose and, even if it serves a compelling interest, is not narrowly tailored or rationally related to that interest. They assert that, if the act is deemed to be criminal in nature, it violates the prohibition against ex post facto laws because it imposes an additional punishment, thereby altering the consequences for a crime for which they already have been sentenced. In the alternative, they assert that, if the act is deemed to be civil in nature, it violates the prohibition against retrospective laws because it imposes a new obligation regarding a past transaction or takes away or impairs a substantial right. The Does argue the act violates the prohibition against bills of attainder because it singles out a specifically designated group and inflicts punishment on members of that group. They further contend that the act is an unconstitutional special law because it excludes many violent offenders at equal risk of re-offending to the Does and because it creates closed-ended classifications without any reasonable basis and that any legitimate purposes it has could be accomplished by general laws.

The county sheriff and prosecutor respond that the court properly denied the declaratory and injunctive relief requested. They argue the sexual offender registration act does not violate substantive due process because it does not involve a fundamental liberty right and is rationally related to the legitimate state interest of public safety. The county officials contend the act does not constitute an impermissible ex post facto or retrospective law because it is a civil regulatory law that is not punitive in nature. They assert that the act does not violate equal protection rights because, under the act, all members of the applicable classification are situated similarly as registrants and all are treated the same. The sheriff and prosecutor respond that application of the act to the Does does not violate the prohibition against bills of attainder because, as a nonpunitive civil regulatory scheme, it cannot impose punishment on anyone. They further argue that application of the act to the Does does not constitute a special law because it requires registration by the entire class of persons who pleaded guilty to or were found guilty of an enumerated sex offense.

The highway patrol superintendent responds that the sex offender registration act does not violate either the substantive due process rights or the equal protection rights of persons who must register under the act. He argues the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the public from sex offenses and the act reasonably furthers that interest by providing information to law enforcement officers to assist them in investigating future crimes and to members of the public so they can take steps to protect themselves and their children. He contends the act is not an impermissible ex post facto law because its registration requirements are regulatory and are not punitive. He asserts that the act is not an impermissible retrospective law because it is remedial, does not impair any vested rights and, because it governs only those actions that occur after its enactment, does not prejudice any person for past transactions. The patrol superintendent responds that the act does not violate the prohibition against bills of attainder because the obligations it imposes are not punitive. He argues these obligations do not fall within the historic meaning of punishment, the obligations are not excessive in light of the act's regulatory purpose, and there is no evident legislative intent behind the act to punish registrants. He further contends the act does not violate the prohibition against special laws because the general assembly had a rational basis for establishing the particular boundaries of the class of persons subject to the act's registration requirements.

SC87012
State ex rel. Mahir Mohammad v. The Honorable Joan L. Moriarty
City of St. Louis
Challenge to guilty plea resulting in deportation order

In April 2002, Mahir Mohammad, a lawful permanent resident from Afghanistan, was charged with attempting to buy a controlled substance. In November 2002, on the advice of his counsel, Mohammad pleaded guilty and received a suspended imposition of sentence and five years probation. As a result of the guilty plea and sentence, Immigration and Customs Enforcement moved to remove Mohammad from the United States. In March 2003, an immigration judge ordered Mohammad removed from the United States to Afghanistan. Mohammad moved the state trial court for permission to withdraw his guilty plea. The court overruled his motion. Mohammad now seeks relief from this Court.

Mohammad argues this Court should issue a writ of mandamus ordering the trial court to vacate his guilty plea and sentence. He contends the trial court erred in refusing to correct a manifest injustice by permitting him to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserts his plea was rendered involuntary because his counsel misinformed him of the direct and dire immigration consequences of such a plea. Mohammad argues he would not have pleaded guilty if he had known that such a plea would result in his deportation. He further contends that deportation is a direct consequence to a conviction of an aggravated felony, not a collateral consequence.

The state responds that a writ of mandamus is not appropriate because it only can compel a court to exercise a legal right and not a discretionary act. The state argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mohammad's request to withdraw his guilty plea. It contends there is no factual basis to grant the plea withdrawal because Mohammad voluntarily and knowingly made the plea. It asserts Mohammad has not proven manifest injustice resulted from the trial court's acceptance of his guilty plea. The state responds that possible deportation is a collateral matter and that counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to give advice about collateral matters. The state argues that Mohammad presented no evidence to support his claim that counsel affirmatively represented to him that he would not be deported as a result of his guilty plea. The state contends that even if counsel did incorrectly advise Mohammad that he would not be deported, there is no evidence that counsel's advice was erroneous at the time of the plea.

SC86956
Harold Scott v. State of Missouri
City of St. Louis
Postconviction challenge to counsel's failure to raise Batson challenges

In April 1997, Harold Scott twice acted in concert with others to rob a Taco Bell in the city of St. Louis. Following an August 1998 jury trial, Scott was found guilty of two counts of first-degree robbery, three counts of armed criminal action and one count of first-degree assault. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Scott, 9 S.W.3d 624 (Mo. App. 1999). Scott was sentenced as a persistent offender to five concurrent 30-year prison terms. He subsequently sought postconviction relief, which the motion court denied without an evidentiary hearing. Scott appeals.

Scott argues the motion court clearly erred, violating his constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and equal protection of law, in denying his motion without an evidentiary hearing. He contends he established a prima facie case of race-based discrimination because his counsel failed to raise Batson challenges to the state's use of five of its six peremptory strikes to remove black potential jurors from the jury pool. He asserts that the record showed there was a reasonable probability that the trial court would have sustained counsel's objection to one or more of the strikes.

The state responds that the motion court did not clearly err in denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Scott's postconviction claim that his counsel was ineffective. The state argues that Scott failed to plead that the state had no race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes, that any race-neutral reason the state would have had for the strikes would have been pretextual and that that there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. The state further contends that Scott failed to allege that any of the people who served on his jury were biased against him.