Case Summary for April 14, 2010

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Case Summary for April 14, 2010

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

1:30 p.m. Wednesday, April 14, 2010

_________________________________________________________________

SC90323
The School District of Kansas City, Missouri, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al., and Missouri Charter Public School Association
Cole and Jackson counties
Constitutional validity of charter schools funding mechanism
Listen to the oral argument:

The school district was represented during argument by Allan V. Hallquist of Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP of Kansas City, and the state was represented by State Solicitor James R. Layton of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In 1998 the people adopted a constitutional amendment to article X, section 11(g), authorizing charter schools in St. Louis and Kansas City as an alternative education system, which was codified in sections 160.400 to 160.420, RSMo. The legislation for the charter schools led to the settlement of an education desegregation lawsuit in Kansas City. The state’s portion of the charter school program in Kansas City was funded by diverting local tax revenue and state funding from the School District of Kansas City and transferring it to the charter schools. Beginning in the 1999-2000 school year, the school district was required to give a certain amount per pupil of state and local tax revenue and pay a portion of its local property tax proceeds to the charter schools pursuant to section 160.415, RSMo. The school district gave to the charter schools until the 2005-2006 school year. In 2006, the charter schools elected to became a local educational agency pursuant to section 160.415. After becoming a local education agency, the state made direct payments to the charter schools and withheld the equivalent amount of state funding the school district would have otherwise received. In 2006-2007, the state paid the charter schools more than $22.4 million and in 2007-2008 more than $26.5 million. The state appropriations bills for those years did not include a separate appropriation for funding charter schools. The school district and three individual tax payers in Jackson County sued the state arguing the charter school funding mechanism was unconstitutional because it directed state funds to the charter school in violation of the provision that allows the school district to maintain a high levy and in violation of the Hancock Amendment by raising taxes to fund state government without a vote by Missourians. The school district alleges that between 1999 and 2007 it lost $142.3 million in local revenue that was directly or indirectly transferred to the charter schools. The circuit court found the school district lacked standing to assert the Hancock Amendment claim and ruled against the school district and the individuals on all the other claims. The school district and the taxpayers appeal.

The school district and the taxpayers argue the charter schools funding mechanism unconstitutionally diverts local tax revenue for uses other than for the school district and to expenditures that are not for purposes of the school district in violation of article X, sections 11(g), 16 and 21 of the Missouri Constitution. They contend the charter schools funding mechanism in section 160.415 violates the Hancock Amendment by requiring the school district to transfer local tax revenues to charter schools, constituting a new state-mandated activity, without providing for a separate appropriation to fund the newly-created charter school program. They argue the Hancock Amendment creates a shield to protect taxpayers from government tax increases and the charter schools act results in increased costs to the school districts by taking away its funding. The school district and the taxpayers further argue the trial court erred in determining the charter schools funding mechanism in section 160.415 does not reduce the ratio of state funding for the school district’s existing programs. They contend the evidence at trial proved the percentage of state funding for the school district’s existing mandated programs has substantially decreased as a result of the charter school funding mechanism.

The state responds the legislature has the authority to allocate state funds to make payments to charter schools serving students who are entitled to an education in the Kansas City public schools. It contends the Hancock Amendment does not bar the legislature from redirecting state funds to ensure students who attend charter schools receive support comparable to students who attend schools operated by the school district. The state asserts the charter school laws did not add to the school district’s obligation to make a free public education available to all children within its boundaries, and the school district cannot establish a violation of the Hancock Amendment. It further responds the individual tax- payers seek relief that is not available under article X, section 21 of the Missouri Constitution.

The Missouri Charter Public School Association as an intervenor (an interested party that enters a lawsuit as a third party) responds the charter school funding mechanism does not violate article X, section 11(g) of the Missouri Constitution. It contends there is no transfer of local school money from the school district to the charter schools pursuant to section 160.415.4, given the plain language of the statute. The association asserts the charter schools funding mechanism does not create an unfunded mandate in violation of the Hancock Amendment. It argues the school district was not required to do any new or increased activity by the charter school electing to become a local education agency to receive their money directly from the state, was not burdened with any added or expanded service, receiving less state aid is not a “new or increased activity or service” and the school district failed to prove increased costs. The association further responds the charter school law does not reduce the ratio of state funding for the school district and the school district’s expert’s testimony and opinions to this were not credible and its evidence was flawed because it did not exclude discretionary spending.

SC90583
State of Missouri v. Ryan Seeler
St. Louis County
Constitutional validity of involuntary manslaughter statute
Listen to the oral argument:

Seeler was represented during argument by Richard H. Sindel of Sindel, Sindel & Noble, PC, of Clayton, and the state was represented by Terrance Messonnier of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In July 2007, Gavin Donohue worked for a construction company responsible for repaving highway 40 in St. Louis. At 3 a.m. Donohue was re-striping a portion of the newly paved highway when he was struck by Ryan Seeler’s vehicle and died. Seeler had been driving his vehicle west on highway 40 towards Chesterfield to go home after attending a baseball game and meeting his wife and others at a restaurant. Two lanes of highway 40 were closed for construction and only the far right lane and shoulder were open. Construction cones were set up in a way that sometimes forced drivers onto the shoulder. Seeler alleges at one point it was unclear which lane he was supposed to be driving in and he believed the middle lane was open. As Seeler pulled into the center lane, he struck Donohue. Seeler was arrested and taken to a hospital where his blood was drawn to test for alcohol. The tests indicated his blood alcohol level was .16 percent. Seeler’s indictment charged him with causing the death of Donohue by striking him with a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, while driving in a closed construction zone leaving the highway’s right of way. In October 2008, at the beginning of his trial, Seeler moved to dismiss the indictment because the statute was unconstitutionally vague as to whether “leaving a highway or a highway’s right-of-way” was an element of the offense charged. The circuit court overruled the motion. At the close of the state’s evidence, Seeler moved to dismiss the indictment and for the judgment of acquittal for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for directed verdict. He argued no evidence was produced that he ever left the “right-of-way” and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the state failed to prove that element of the offense. The state requested leave to amend the indictment to exclude the allegation Seeler left the “right-of-way.” That language was replaced with an allegation Seeler “drove into a lane closed to traffic.” Seeler argued allowing the amendment was prejudicial, but the circuit court allowed the state to amend the indictment and the court overruled Seeler’s motion to dismiss and motion for directed verdict. Seeler testified he drank four beers between 6:30 p.m. and 1:45 a.m. and his expert witness testified Seeler’s behavior after the accident was inconsistent with a person who had a .16 percent blood alcohol content. The expert argued if the blood was not properly drawn, the blood alcohol test results could be incorrect. The circuit court excluded the evidence on whether the construction zone conformed to national standards as irrelevant because it did not prove or disprove whether the area was a closed construction zone, but allowed testimony that Seeler was speeding. In November 2008, Seeler was convicted of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree pursuant to section 565.024.1, RSMo. He was sentenced to seven years in prison. Seeler appeals.

Seeler argues section 565.024.1(3) is unconstitutionally vague in violation of his right to due process as guaranteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. He contends the statute requires the state to prove “leaving a highway ... or highway’s right-of-way” in that the phrase “defendant’s vehicle leaving the highway ... or the highway’s right-of-way” is ambiguous and must be construed liberally for the defendant. Seeler asserts section 565.024.1(3) can be read in several contradictory ways and thereby does not give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited, and the statute could be applied in discriminatory or arbitrary application. Seeler further argues the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution’s request to substitute an information in lieu of the original indictment that he left the right of way after the close of the state’s evidence. He contends such substitutions prejudiced his substantial rights in that it made his defenses that he never left the right-of-way as defined by the statute inapplicable by removing any “right-of-way” related issue. Seeler asserts the trial court erred in prohibiting evidence on the construction zone’s conformance with the national manual on uniform traffic control devices. He contends the evidence was relevant and material and the exclusion violated his rights to due process and a fair trial by depriving him of a viable defense. Seeler argues the excluded evidence tended to show that a reasonable person would have been confused and unable to determine what part of the highway was a construction zone and which lanes were closed to traffic because the distance between the cones was almost twice what was considered reasonable pursuant to the national standards. He further argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the state’s evidence regarding the speed Seeler was driving his vehicle. Seeler contends this evidence was irrelevant, unreliable and its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. He asserts the indictment did not allege speeding was a contributing factor or an act of negligence, nor was it an element of the offense charged and the witness could not identify Seeler’s van as the vehicle he saw speeding.

The state responds Seeler failed to state a real and substantive claim that section 564.024.1(3)(a) was unconstitutional. It contends the statute provides guidance as to what conduct is covered by its terms and any ambiguity can be rectified by this Court construing those terms to give sufficiently clear guidance. The state argues the clear meaning and intent of section 565.024.1(3)(a) is to permit additional punishment for intoxicated individuals who kill pedestrians or individuals in or on other vehicles. It further responds the trial court did not abuse its discretion or prejudice Seller in permitting the state to file an information in lieu of indictment to conform the charge to the evidence. The state asserts Seller knew the state’s theory and any changes to the wording of the instruction did not prevent Seeler from preparing a defense that Seeler was not intoxicated and criminally negligent when he went into the closed portion of the construction zone. The state argues the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence from the manual on uniform traffic control devices because such evidence was collateral to the issues at trial. It contends the issue before the jury was whether Seeler was criminally negligent in driving into a closed lane, not whether the design of that closed lane fully complied with the professional standards of road maintenance work. The state asserts there was no prejudice from the exclusion of the manual because Seeler admitted seeing cones and recognized that a lane was closed. Finally, the state argues, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting testimony from a witness who said he was passed by a minivan similar to Seeler’s that was speeding because such evidence was relevant and admissible. It contends the evidence tends to establish a motive for why Seeler drove into the construction zone because he appeared to be in a hurry. To the extent Seeler claims this evidence was not sufficiently probative on that issue, the same arguments preclude a finding of prejudice from the admission of that evidence and go to weight not admissibility.

SC90613
Ann Spradling, et al. v. SSM Health Care St. Louis, et al.
St. Louis County
Constitutional validity of requirement in medical malpractice claim
Listen to the oral argument:

Spradling was represented during argument by Joan M. Lockwood of Gray, Ritter & Graham, P.C. of St. Louis; and the medical group was represented by Jeffery T. McPherson of Armstrong Teasdale LLP of St. Louis.

In 2005, the Missouri General Assembly amended section 538.225, RSMo, to require an affidavit by a health care provider to be submitted in support of a medical malpractice claim. The health care provider was required to be in the same profession and practicing substantially the same specialty as the defendant. In March 2008, Ann Spradling fell and was diagnosed with compression fractures in her lower back. The next month she had a vertebroplasty, a procedure that stabilizes fracture sites in vertebrae. The procedure was performed by Dr. William Sprich, a neurosurgeon, at St. Mary’s Health Center. After the procedure, Spradling was permanently injured and paralyzed. In February 2009, Spradling sued St. Mary’s Health Center (SSM Healthcare St. Louis) and SSM Medical Group for medical negligence and asserted section 538.225, RSMo, violated the constitution. SSM Medical Group and SSM Healthcare St. Louis moved to strike the constitutional challenge. In July 2009, Spradling filed an affidavit she had a written opinion from Dr. John Mathis stating Sprich failed to use reasonably prudent care under the circumstances and Sprich’s alleged failure caused or contributed to Spradling’s injury and damages. Mathis is not a neurosurgeon but is an expert in vertebroplasty. In August 2009, SSM Medical Group moved to dismiss arguing Spradling failed to comply with statutory requirements because the written opinion from Mathis was not from a “legally qualified health care provider” as defined by section 538.255.2 because Sprich is a neurosurgeon and Mathis, a radiologist, does not practice in substantially the same specialty as Sprich. The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss without prejudice. SSM Health Care also moved to dismiss for failure to file a compliant health care affidavit. In October 2009, the trial court also sustained SSM Health Care’s motion and dismissed Spradling’s medical negligence claims without prejudice. Spradling appeals.

Spradling argues section 538.225, RSMo, is unconstitutional, and the trial court’s interpretation of the statute violates her right to trial by jury, access to the courts, the principle of separation of powers and the due process and equal protection of the laws under the Missouri and United States’ constitutions. She contends Mathis is a legally qualified health care provider and the trial court misinterpreted section 538.225 as requiring a legally qualified health care provider to have credentials beyond those required of an expert to make a submissible case of medical negligence. Spradling argues section 538.225 is also unconstitutional because it stems from House Bill 393 which violated article III, section 23, of the Missouri Constitution because the bill did not contain a single subject clearly expressed in its title and is void for vagueness.

The medical group responds this appeal should be dismissed for lack of a final judgment and because Spradling failed to comply with Rule 84.04. It contends the trial court properly dismissed Spradling’s claims without prejudice for failure to comply with section 538.225 because the written opinion from a health care provider must have substantially the same specialty. The medical group argues it was the legislature’s intent to change the law to modify who was a legally qualified health care provider. It further responds Spradling did not preserve any constitutional issues for appellate review because the trial court did not rule on those issues. The medical group argues section 538.225 is constitutional and the amendment to it was the legislature’s response to public concern over the increased cost of health care and the continued integrity of the health care system. It asserts House Bill 393 did not violate the clear-title and single-subject provisions of the Missouri Constitution and Spradling’s challenge to HB 393 is untimely because section 516.500, RSMo, requires a challenge to an alleged procedural defect to be asserted before the adjournment of the next legislative session.

Saint Louis University Medical Center argues, as a friend of the Court, that the trial court properly dismissed Spradling’s cause of action because the legislative intent and the plain language of section 538.225 requires a legally qualified health care provider to have practiced in the same specialty as the defendant.

SC90628
Edith C. Deck v. Delmar Teasley
Greene County
Constitutional validity of statute regarding value of medical treatment
Listen to the oral argument:

Deck was represented during argument by Jeff Bauer of Strong-Garner-Bauer, P.C.; and Teasley represented by M. Sean McGinnis and Jason Coatney of Keck & Austin, L.L.C.

In May 2003, Delmar Teasley was driving his vehicle in Springfield on the Kansas Expressway when he realized traffic was stopped. He rear-ended a vehicle that then rear-ended Edith Deck’s vehicle. Due to the impact, Deck’s vehicle also hit the vehicle in front of her. Deck sustained injuries to both arms, her shoulder and her chest. She underwent surgery, physical therapy and follow-up care. Her medical expenses cost more than $27,900. Most of her medical bills were paid by Medicare. In 2005 the Missouri General Assembly amended section 490.715, RSMo, which allows evidence of the value of medical treatment rendered to a party before the jury and creates a rebuttable presumption that the amount necessary to satisfy the financial obligation to the health care provider represents the value of the medical treatment rendered. In December 2006, Deck sued Teasley for his negligence in causing the collision, seeking to recover past and future medical expenses. Prior to trial, Teasley moved to determine the value of medical treatment rendered pursuant to section 490.715. Deck filed her suggestions in opposition. At the evidentiary hearing on the motion the health care professionals provided testimony that Medicare reimbursed the hospital for treatment provided to Deck for less than the total amount of the bills. The trial court determined the value of the past damages for medical bills paid by Deck was the amount actually paid by Medicare, $9,904.28, and the trial court precluded Deck from offering evidence of the amount of medical bills she incurred to treat her injuries. At trial Deck requested the court allow the jury to consider the amount of medical expenses and offered proof from her expert that her medical bills of more than $27,900 was fair, reasonable and necessary. The court again refused and limited the amount to what had been paid by Medicare, supplemental insurance, or amounts that were outstanding. In March 2009, the jury returned a verdict of $42,500 for Deck. Deck appeals.

Deck argues the trial court erred in ruling her claim for past medical expenses was limited to the amount paid for the medical treatment she received. She contends she rebutted the presumption in section 490.715 that the dollar amount necessary to satisfy the obligation to her health care providers constitutes the value of her medical treatment rendered. Deck asserts she presented evidence that the reasonable value of her medical treatment was the amount billed for said the treatment, rather than the amount actually paid. She argues section 490.715 is unconstitutional and violates her right to trial by jury as guaranteed in article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution by permitting the trial court to make factual determinations as to damages, which are determinations reserved for the jury. Deck contends section 490.715 is also unconstitutional because it stems from a legislative bill that violates article III, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution, which requires every bill to contain a single subject clearly expressed in its title. She asserts the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony pertaining to her possible future medical condition and treatment because such evidence is admissible under Missouri law, in that it assists the trier of fact in evaluating the nature and extent of her injuries.

Teasley responds the trial court did not err in ruling Deck’s claim for past medical expenses was the amount actually paid for medical treatment rendered. He contends Deck failed to rebut the presumption in section 490.715 that the dollar amount necessary to satisfy the financial obligations to healthcare providers constitutes the value of medical treatment rendered. Tesley asserts the trial court admitted and considered evidence as to the value of medical treatment rendered in accordance with section 490.715.5(2). He argues section 490.715 does not violate Deck’s right to a trial by jury in that the determination of the value of medical treatment rendered is a proper function of the trial court. Teasley contends House Bill 393 contained a single subject related to claims for damages that was clearly expressed in its title. He asserts the trial court did not err in excluding expert testimony pertaining to Deck’s possible future medical condition and treatment from the jury because such evidence was admitted to the trial court for evaluating the nature and extent of Deck’s injuries.