Case Summary for February 27, 2002

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Case Summary for February 27, 2002

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

ATTACHED TO THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE ELECTRONIC COPIES OF THE BRIEF(S) FILED BY THE PARTY OR PARTIES. THESE ELECTRONIC BRIEFS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO PDF BY THE COURT'S STAFF TO ACCOMMODATE VARIOUS WORD PROCESSORS. (If you do not already have the Acrobat reader, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website.) THE ATTACHMENTS MAY NOT REFLECT ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT, THE COMPLETE ELECTRONIC FILING, OR THE FORMAT OF THE ORGINAL FILING. GENERALLY, ONLY THE APPELLANT'S SUBSTITUTE, RELATOR'S, AND RESPONDENT'S SUBSTITUTE BRIEFS WILL BE POSTED; IF AVAILABLE, REPLY BRIEFS ALSO WILL BE POSTED. BRIEFS FROM THE COURT BELOW, APPENDICES, AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS WILL GENERALLY NOT BE POSTED HERE. (To determine whether or which briefs have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.) POSTING OF THE BRIEFS DOES NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE FORMAT OF THE BRIEFS OR THE MERITS OF A CASE. THESE POSTINGS ARE NOT OFFICIAL COURT RECORDS. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Wednesday, February 27, 2002
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SC83941
State ex rel. Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, v. The Honorable Ralph Jaynes, Circuit Judge, Randolph County, and Norma Prange, Circuit Clerk, Randolph County
Randolph and Nodaway counties
Appropriateness of habeas relief

The Randolph County Circuit Court granted Moberly Correctional Center inmate Eric B. Wise a writ of habeas corpus after finding that he was not advised he had the right to counsel at his probation revocation hearing. The court also vacated its judgment revoking Wise's probation and remanded his case to the Nodaway County Circuit Court. The state seeks to have that writ quashed, arguing that Wise waived his right to counsel after being duly advised and that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in granting habeas relief. Wise has not filed a response.

This case is ordered submitted on the briefs on this date.

Note: Respondent Wise did not file a brief in this proceeding.

SC83906
State of Missouri v. Thomas J. Norsworthy
Newton County
Voluntariness of guilty plea and constitutionality of statute

In October 1997, Thomas Norsworthy pleaded guilty to two counts of first-degree property damage and one count of assault. He received two consecutive terms of five years' imprisonment on the property damage charges and another consecutive term of four years in prison on the assault charge. Norsworthy later claimed that, at the time he entered his guilty plea, he was under the belief that the state's board of probation and parole would convert his sentence to concurrent terms under section 558.019, RSMo. In November 2000, the board notified Norsworthy that its procedure for making such a conversion had not been approved and that it accordingly could not convert his consecutive terms to concurrent terms of imprisonment. In May 2001, Norsworthy sought to withdraw his guilty plea, but the court denied his motion.

Norsworthy appeals, arguing the court clearly erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He contends that section 558.019 is void because it is unconstitutionally vague and that because he entered his plea as a result of that vagueness, his plea was involuntary and he is being confined illegally. Norsworthy argues the associate division that denied his motion lacked jurisdiction over the felony charges for which he had been sentenced. He further contends that even if the court believed his motion was barred procedurally, it had a duty to issue a writ of habeas corpus under section 532.070, RSMo, and that by failing to issue such a writ, the court violated the separation of powers provision of the state constitution.

The state responds that this Court should decline to review Norsworthy's claims because his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not filed in a timely manner. The state argues that Norsworthy is not entitled to relief because any belief he may have had that his consecutive sentences would be converted to concurrent sentences was unreasonable. It argues that the record shows that Norsworthy understood the terms of his plea agreement and sentence, and no mention was made during his plea hearing of section 558.019 or the possibility of parole. The state further responds that this statute is not unconstitutionally vague because it provides definite and explicit standards for enforcement.

Note: Because Appellant Norsworthy is a pro se inmate, he was not required to file his briefs electronically.

SC84035
State of Missouri v. Cornealious M. Anderson
St. Charles County
Admissibility of evidence

Cornealious Anderson was accused of the August 1999 robbery at gunpoint of a fast food restaurant assistant manager who was attempting to deposit the day's proceeds at a bank's night deposit box. At Anderson's March 2000 jury trial, the prosecutor offered into evidence a Beretta semi-automatic handgun brochure that the police seized from Anderson's apartment. The court overruled Anderson's objection to the brochure, and it was admitted into evidence. The jury convicted Anderson of first-degree robbery and armed criminal action. Following the jury's recommendation, the court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 10 and three years, respectively.

Anderson appeals, arguing the court erred in admitting the brochure into evidence. He contends it was irrelevant and highly prejudicial because it contained no evidence that any gun even remotely resembling those advertised in the brochure was used in the robbery. He argues that the brochure was intended to contradict testimony suggesting that his step-brother had a gun, not him. He contends the brochure implied to the jury that the gun used in the robbery was a semi-automatic handgun when there was no admissible evidence supporting such a hypothesis. Anderson also argues the brochure was used to mislead the jury to believe that he had intended to commit the robbery.

The state responds that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the brochure into evidence. The state argues the brochure was relevant to prove Anderson was guilty of both first-degree robbery and armed criminal action because it was found during a search of Anderson's residence and impeached Anderson's testimony that he did not have a gun during the robbery. The state contends the brochure also corroborated the victim's testimony that both robbers used guns during the robbery and that the type of guns used had clips that went into the gun handle. The state further responds that the brochure's admission was not prejudicial because Anderson did not prove that it inflamed the jury or diverted the jury's attention from the issues to be resolved.

Note: Appellant Anderson did not file a substitute appellant's brief in this Court.

SC83863
Home Builders Association of Greater St. Louis v. State of Missouri, et al.
Cole County
Constitutionality of a 2000 senate bill

On the last day of its 2000 session, the general assembly truly agreed to and finally passed an amended version of Senate Bill No. 894, titled as "relating to property ownership." When it began, it proposed changes to 13 sections. Upon passage, the bill contained changes to 70 sections. In December 2000, Home Builders Association of Greater St. Louis filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the bill on the grounds that the bill's purpose was changed after it was introduced, that the bill improperly contained multiple subjects and that the bill's title was not clear. In June 2001, the court found in favor of Home Builders, whose members purchase title insurance in the course of buying, subdividing, developing and selling property, and voided the entire SB 894.

The state appeals, arguing that the bill is not unconstitutional. The state contends that Home Builders has standing to challenge only those parts of the bill that pertain to title insurance and that the inclusion of those provisions in the bill is not unconstitutional. The state argues the title of the bill, "relating to property ownership," is clear because all the provisions in the bill relate to the ownership, regulation or disposition of real property. The state further contends that the purpose of the bill did not change in violation of the state constitution because from the time it was introduced to the time it was passed, it remained a bill relating to the ownership, regulation or disposition of real property.

Home Builders responds that Senate Bill 894, as passed, is unconstitutional and that the organization has standing to challenge the bill as a whole and not just a single amendment in the bill. It argues that the bill violates the constitution's multiple subject prohibition because the multiple amendments to the bill addressed diverse subjects that do not directly relate to the bill's central purpose, which deals with delinquent taxes in first-class counties and St. Louis city. Home Builders contends that the bill's title is not clear because the title "relating to property ownership" is overly broad and relates to everything that can or may be owned, which it argues is not a permissible legislative subject. Home Builders further responds that the multiple amendments unconstitutionally changed the bill's original purpose from addressing only chapter 141 of the revised statutes to a bill affecting statutes in 15 different chapters and encompassing at least 13 different subjects.

SC83459
Rufus James Ervin v. State of Missouri
Phelps and Reynolds counties
Postconviction relief

In March 1997, on a change of venue from Reynolds County to Phelps County, a jury found Rufus Ervin guilty of one count of first-degree murder for beating to death his friend, Leland White. The evidence at trial showed that Ervin beat White in the head with a brick and then threw his body onto a fire that started in White's trailer when a Kerosene lamp was knocked over in an apparent scuffle between Ervin and White. The trial court sentenced Ervin to death after the jury was unable to decide the sentence, and Ervin appealed. In November 1998, this Court affirmed Ervin's conviction and sentence. He subsequently filed a Rule 29.15 motion for postconviction relief, which the court overruled after an evidentiary hearing.

Ervin appeals, arguing his attorney was ineffective and that this ineffectiveness impacted his conviction and sentence. He contends his attorney failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence from certain family members, from his family physician, from a counselor who treated him prior to the murder and from a psychiatrist he believes would have testified that he was not competent to stand trial. He argues his attorney failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence that that he did not assault or threaten his cellmate and that he had good conduct in jail. He claims he was medicated improperly before and during his trial and that this medication had mood-altering side effects on him. He also argues that his attorney failed to investigate and present mitigating evidence that he was intoxicated the night of the crime and that he had learning disabilities and a disadvantaged childhood. Ervin contends his attorney unreasonably failed to investigate the victim's mental problems and paranoid, reclusive and suicidal behavior. He claims his attorney failed to object to certain arguments made by the prosecutor. He also claims he was prejudiced because a study has shown that jurors do not understand the penalty instructions and because his attorney failed to object to those instructions in his trial. In addition, Ervin argues the court violated his constitutional rights because the court, rather than the jury, found a statutory aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends this Court's proportionality review violates his due process rights because it does not apply a de novo review and does not comply with section 565.035. Ervin also claims that Missouri's clemency proceedings violate his due process rights because a governor granted one inmate clemency based on the Pope's request rather than the merits of the case.

The state responds that Ervin's attorney was not ineffective because many of the issues about which Ervin challenges here involve reasonable trial strategy or situations in which Ervin himself failed to make his attorney aware of certain facts, particularly those relating to his family and his childhood background. The state argues that the attorney had no duty to investigate whether Ervin was intoxicated the night of the murder because Ervin had made statements that he was not drinking that night. The state contends that there is no evidence that Ervin's attorney knew he was being medicated while in jail or that these medications were having any adverse side effects on him. The state responds that Ervin's attorney did present evidence about Ervin's medical history, his seizure disorder, and his cognitive delays, and that any additional testimony regarding these issues would have been cumulative. The state argues that evidence of the victim's history of mental problems, from the late 1960s and early 1970s, was not admissible because Ervin did not claim he was acting in self-defense and this evidence would no bearing on Ervin's character or the circumstances of the crime. The state also responds that this Court should not consider Ervin's claims regarding his cellmate, his counselor, the trial court's finding of a statutory aggravating factor, or challenges to this Court's proportionality review because he never raised this issues before the motion court. The state argues this Court should not consider Ervin's claims regarding his competency, the prosecutor's arguments, and whether his sentence is proportional because this Court already decided those issues on Ervin's direct appeal of his conviction and sentence. As to the jury study, the state responds that this Court repeatedly has discounted the study and has confirmed the constitutionality of the jury instructions used in this case. The state also responds that because Ervin has not sought clemency, he has no standing to challenge Missouri's clemency procedure and that such a claim is not proper in a post-conviction proceeding because it has nothing to do with the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence.