Case Summary for November 30, 2005

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Case Summary for November 30, 2005

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, November 30, 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

SC87023
John Stehno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., and AMDOCS, Ltd.
Jackson County
Challenge to tortious interference claim

In September 2001, Modis, Inc., hired John Stehno as a database administrator. Modis is an information technology consulting company that provides temporary technical consultations to its clients. Amdocs, a client of Modis, was engaged in a project with Sprint Spectrum, L.P., to develop and install a new Sprint billing system. Modis assigned Stehno to work at Amdocs, which assigned him to on the Sprint project. Three days after Modis hired Stehno, a Sprint senior manager told Amdocs that, based on work Stehno previously performed for Sprint as a contract worker, she did not recommend his involvement in the Sprint project. Modis removed Stehno from the Sprint assignment two days later. In March 2002, Stehno sued Amdocs and Sprint, alleging tortuous interference with valid business expectancy, breach of contract, prima facie tort, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Only the count of tortuous interference with contract or valid business expectancy was submitted to the jury, which found in favor of Amdocs and Sprint. The trial court held that the verdict in favor of Sprint was against the weight of the evidence and granted Stehno a new trial against Sprint. Sprint appeals.

Sprint argues the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Stehno's tortuous interference claim. Sprint contends that both it and Amdocs had the contractual right to remove Stehno. Sprint asserts it had an economic interest in determining who worked on its systems and projects. Sprint argues the trial court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial. It contends the jury's verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Sprint asserts Stehno failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support his claim of valid business expectancy and had no evidence to demonstrate an absence of justification.

Stehno responds that the trial court properly ruled against Sprint. He argues he presented substantial evidence of each element of tortious interference with valid business expectancy. Stehno contends that Sprint did not dispute that he made a submissible case, that it had knowledge of his business relationship, and that it intentionally interfered in his business relations, thereby inducing a breach of the relationship. Stehno asserts that Sprint did not have an economic interest in his relationship with Amdocs. He argues Sprint was not acting to protect its economic interest when it contacted Amdocs about him. Stehno contends Sprint used improper means in interfering with his business relationship with Amdocs.

SC86987
James Highfill and Dan Highfill v. Mary Hale
Gasconade and Osage counties
Challenge to summary judgment

Mary Hale's property adjoins that of James and Dan Highfill in rural Gasconade County, Missouri. For several years, the neighbors filed complaints against and sued each other over a variety of issues. In September 2001, Hale called the Gasconade County sheriff's office, alleging that she had heard shots fired and that she believed she had been shot. The sheriff's department responded to her call and arrested the Highfills for stalking, although the prosecutor did not file any charges against them. The Highfills filed a lawsuit in Gasconade County that claimed that they were falsely accused, that the sheriff's department used excessive force and that their civil rights were violated. After a change of venue to Osage County, the Highfills amended their petition in December 2002. Hale moved for summary judgment the next month. The trial court ultimately granted summary judgment in Hale's favor, and the Highfills appeal.

The Highfills argue the court erred in granting Hale's motion for summary judgment. They contend that Hale's course of conduct over an extended period of time may provide sufficient evidence that demonstrates she instigated a false arrest. The Highfills assert a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a connection existed between Hale's repeated complaints against them and their arrest.

Hale responds that the trial court did not err in granting her motion for summary judgment. She argues that the actions of the Gasconade County sheriff's department personnel and prosecuting attorney were independent of hers. Hale contends that those independent actions relieve her of any civil liability for any false imprisonment of the Highfills. Hale asserts that no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether there are any connections between her previous conduct and the Highfills' arrest.

SC87032
Kristen Dhyne v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company
Jackson County
Challenge to denial of summary judgment

Paramedic Kristen Dhyne was injured when a car driven by an uninsured motorist hit her as she was exiting an emergency vehicle in February 2001 in Kansas City, Missouri. She sought workers' compensation benefits as a result of her injuries. Dhyne's insurance policy through State Farm Fire and Casualty Company provided $50,000 of uninsured motorist coverage. In January 2002, Dhyne reported the claim to her insurance agent and was informed that the matter needed to be investigated. In February 2002, State Farm confirmed that certain uninsured motorist coverage was applicable. State Farm left a telephone message for Dhyne about the availability of coverage but received no response. Later in the month, Dhyne sued State Farm, alleging that she was entitled to uninsured motorist benefits, that State Farm's conduct was vexatious and, therefore, that she was entitled to damages for vexatious refusal to pay. In May 2002, State Farm tendered a check for the policy amount of $50,000, but Dhyne refused tender because State Farm made the check payable to her, her lawyer and the workers' compensation carrier. In August 2002, State Farm reissued a check for $50,000 to Dhyne and her lawyer, and Dhyne dropped her claim for uninsured motorist coverage. Later in the month, State Farm moved for summary judgment on Dhyne's remaining claim of vexatious refusal to pay. The court overruled the motion, finding there were genuine issues of material fact in dispute. In October 2003, a jury found in Dhyne's favor and awarded her $5,150 in damages and approximately $18,100 in attorney's fees. State Farm subsequently sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict or remittitur to reduce the excessive award. The trial court sustained the motion for remittitur but denied the motion in all other aspects. State Farm appeals.

State Farm argues that when it paid the policy limit, Dhyne dismissed her claim for a loss under her policy. It contends she subsequently failed to allege a cognizable claim for vexatious refusal to pay under section 375.420, RSMo, depriving the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. State Farm asserts the court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. State Farm argues that, as a matter of law, it did not refuse Dhyne's claim and never told her that her claim was denied. State Farm contends its delay in payment was a result of Dhyne's failure to provide proof of the amount of her damages. State Farm asserts that Missouri law requires an actual refusal of an insurance claim to constitute vexatious refusal. State Farm argues it did not persist in a refusal to pay after becoming aware that it did not have a meritorious defense. State Farm contends that Dhyne did not allege it refused her claim and that, because it did not refuse her claim, no genuine issue of fact exists. State Farm asserts that, as a matter of law, its conduct was not willful and without reasonable cause. It argues the trial court erred by instructing the jury on vexatious refusal without including the "willful" element and by refusing to define "willful and without reasonable cause" as persisting in a refusal to pay after becoming aware that there is no meritorious defense. State Farm contends the instruction erroneously eliminated the knowledge element of the claim, thereby relieving Dhyne of her burden of proof.

Dhyne responds that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over the matter. She argues the petition stated a claim for interest, for which relief can be granted. Dhyne contends that the trial court did not err in denying State Farm's motion for summary judgment notwithstanding the verdict. She asserts State Farm refused to pay her uninsured motorist claim because it did not pay her claim for more than seven months after being notified of the claim. Dhyne responds that the evidence demonstrates that State Farm's refusal to pay her was willful and without reasonable cause. She argues the insurer persisted in its refusal to pay her after becoming aware that it did not have a meritorious defense. Dhyne contends the trial court did not err in giving instructions regarding vexatious refusal because State Farm failed to object to the instructions. She asserts that the instruction sufficiently set forth the substantive law by following the wording of the applicable Missouri approved instruction and the statute on which she was relying.

SC86518
State of Missouri v. Earl M. Forrest
Dent and Platte counties
Direct appeal of first-degree murder convictions and death sentences

In December 2002, Earl Forrest arrived at Harriet Smith's house in Dent County, Missouri, after drinking heavily. During an ensuing altercation, Forrest shot and killed Smith's friend, Michael Wells, and shot Smith, injuring her. She left her house but subsequently returned with Forrest. Smith's boyfriend later found Wells' body on the couch and Smith's body slumped in her bedroom. He called the sheriff's department. After learning Forrest had been involved in the shooting, the sheriff and deputy went to Forrest's house. Forrest pointed his gun out the door and began shooting. Both the sheriff and deputy were shot in the gunfire exchange. After more law enforcement officers arrived and more gunfire was exchanged, Forrest realized he had been shot in the face and surrendered. The deputy was transported to the hospital, where she later died from her wounds. In April 2003, the state charged Forrest with three counts of first-degree murder. Following an October 2004 trial in Platte County, Missouri, on a change of venue, the jury found Forrest guilty and recommended the death penalty on all three counts. The trial court sentenced Forrest accordingly, and he appeals.

Forrest argues that the trial court erred and abused its discretion. He contends the court denied him due process in admitting evidence during the penalty phase of his prior drug possession and dealing in California. He asserts the admission of his past misconduct relieved the state of its burden of proof and undermined the reliability of the death sentences. Forrest argues the court failed to limit victim impact evidence and failed to give the jury guidance on how to consider or weigh this evidence in reaching its verdict. He contends the court denied his opportunity to confront, rebut or challenge victim impact evidence by sustaining the state's objection to his argument that the death penalty would cause his family and friends to be distraught. He asserts that the state failed to plead any aggravating factors and that the jury was not instructed that it had to find the existence of aggravating and non-aggravating factors unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. Forrest argues the approved instructions the court gave the jury improperly shifted the burden of proof from the state to him. He contends that the prosecutor's argument against two of Forrest's expert witnesses encouraged the jury to disregard their testimony based on the prosecutor's personal opinion. Forrest contends the jury's verdicts as to one statutory aggravator are improper because no evidence exists to support a finding that Forrest committed one murder "while" also committing another. He asserts that the state improperly removed two potential jurors from the jury pool because they said merely that they could not sign a death verdict, not that they could not consider the death penalty. Forrest argues the verdicts in both phases of the trial were rendered unreliable because. The prosecutor argued facts not in the record, misstated facts, created the false premise that life imprisonment was not punishment and improperly raised the issue of Forrest's future dangerousness. Forrest asserts that the definition of “deliberation” contains mutually inconsistent elements that eliminate the distinction between first and second-degree murder, leaving the jurors free to decide what constitutes deliberation with no legally fixed standards. Forrest argues the language of the jury instructions ordered the jurors not to consider his intoxication in determining his mental state, which he contends improperly shifted the burden of proof from the state to him. Forrest asserts that the jury instructions improperly equate "reasonable doubt" with proof that leaves the jury "firmly convinced," thereby lowering the state's burden of proof. Forrest further argues he was prejudiced when the court allowed the sheriff to testify as to hearsay statements made by others, improperly bolstering the testimony of witnesses who testified in the trial.

The state responds that the court did not err in admitting evidence about Forrest's drug possession in California because it demonstrated his character. The state argues its victim impact evidence was admitted properly because the testimony concerned the murder victims and the impact of the crime on their families. The state contends Forrest’s argument that his family and friends would be distraught if he received the death penalty was properly excluded because it did not demonstrate his character, record or circumstances of his offense. The state asserts that this Court repeatedly has found that penalty phase instructions properly instruct the jury how to determine punishment and the state need not plead statutory aggravators in the indictment. It argues that the jury instructions were constitutional, properly instructed the jury on how to properly determine punishment and did not mislead the jury. The state contends that Forrest failed to show how the jury was misled based on the state's refusal to accept his experts as the court overruled the state's objection. The state asserts that the jury's verdicts were not inconsistent because it chose a different aggravating factor for two of the murder counts. The state argues the evidence sufficiently established that Forrest murdered Smith while murdering Wells by showing that the two murders were just moments apart. The state contends it properly removed for cause two potential jurors who were not qualified to serve because their views about the death penalty would have impaired their performance as jurors. The state responds that Forrest failed to preserve for appellate review many of his claims alleging trial court error in overruling his objections or in failing to intervene throughout the trial. It argues the court properly overruled the statements and arguments to which Forrest objects because they did not amount to manifest injustice. The state contends that all of the facts it presented demonstrated deliberation. It asserts that this Court repeatedly has denied claims there is no distinction between first and second-degree murder. The state argues the voluntary intoxication instruction does not relieve the state of its burden of proof. It asserts the definition of "reasonable doubt" in the instructions was constitutional. The state argues the admission of testimony relaying out-of-court statements did not prejudice Forrest because it was an isolated instance and had no effect on the jury's determination of guilt.