Case Summary for November 9, 2004

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Case Summary for November 9, 2004

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Tuesday, November 9, 2004
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SC86190
State of Missouri v. James A. Beine
St. Louis City
Validity of sexual misconduct law; challenge to conviction

James Beine, a former Archdiocesan priest, was employed as a school counselor at an elementary school in St. Louis, Missouri. In March 2000, the circuit attorney charged Beine with three counts of sexual misconduct involving a child by indecent exposure for allegedly exposing himself to two fourth-grade students in the boys' restroom. St. Louis detectives went to Beine's home in Illinois to arrest him, although they did not have a warrant or other legal process issued in Illinois. After news of the arrest was broadcast through local media, a third child came forward, alleging that Beine had exposed himself to this child as well. As a result, the circuit attorney filed a fourth count of sexual misconduct involving a minor by indecent exposure against Beine. In June 2002, he was indicted on all four charges. Beine moved to dismiss the charges or for a more definite statement of when the incidents allegedly occurred. He renewed the motion before trial and again at the close of the prosecution's evidence. Each time the court overruled the motion. While awaiting trial, Beine was convicted in federal court of possession of child pornography and sentenced, although this conviction later was overturned and the charges dismissed. The same week Beine was tried on the state charges, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops held a weeklong meeting in St. Louis to discuss the priest sexual abuse scandal, which received extensive media coverage. Beine sought a change of venue, moved to continue the trial, moved to sequester the jurors and sought a mistrial due to the ongoing media coverage. The court overruled all his motions, and, following a June 2003 trial, the jury ultimately found Beine guilty of all four counts of sexual misconduct involving a child by indecent exposure. In September 2003, the court sentenced Beine to four years in prison on each count, with three of the sentences to run consecutively and the fourth to run concurrently. Beine appeals.

Beine argues the court should have dismissed the charges against him. He contends the statute under which he was charged, section 566.083(1), RSMo, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its face and as applied to him. He asserts that it penalizes innocent conduct, contains no requirement of specific intent, is not sufficiently definite to warn a reasonable person of what is prohibited, and allows the arbitrary and selective prosecution of persons engaged in harmless conduct that prosecuting authorities later find offensive. Beine argues there was insufficient evidence by which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable adult would find his conduct in using a urinal was likely to cause affront to a child younger than 14 years of age. He contends there was no evidence that his necessary exposure in order to urinate was done in any manner likely to cause affront or alarm to a child younger than 14 years of age. He asserts that there also was no evidence that any children present actually were affronted or alarmed and that there was no evidence of any sexual misconduct on Beine's part. Beine argues the court denied his fundamental right to trial by a fair and impartial jury in overruling his motions for change of venue, for continuance, for jury sequestration, for a mistrial and for failing to remove from the jury panel a clearly biased juror. He contends the media coverage of his federal conviction for possessing child pornography, of the national bishops' conference regarding priest abuse and of references to him as a "defrocked" priest denied him his right to a fair and impartial trial. Beine asserts that the court should not have admitted testimony from certain police officers about the circumstances of his arrest. He argues the testimony was irrelevant and constituted character and reputation evidence calculated to inflame the jury.

The state responds that Beine failed to preserve for appellate review his claim that the statute under which he was charged is unconstitutional. It argues Beine waited to raise it until he moved for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial and then he did not specify the constitutional provisions he believed the statute violated. The state contends section 566.083.1(1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad or unconstitutionally vague. It asserts that the record contains sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that Beine exposed himself in a manner that would cause a reasonable adult to believe that such conduct was likely to cause affront or alarm to a child younger than 14 years old. The state argues Beine entered the boys' bathroom and, while children were present, exposed himself, urinating from three to five feet from the urinal. The state contends the record does not support Beine's claims that any publicity surrounding the trial warranted sequestering the jury. It asserts that Beine's motion for a change of venue was untimely and that such a change was unnecessary because the jury pool was not so tainted that the trial had to be moved. The state responds that Beine was not prejudiced by not getting a continuance because the witness ultimately was able to testify. It argues that Beine fails to show any reason in the record why the juror should have been struck and that the juror stated during jury selection that she could be fair and impartial. The state further contends the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence concerning the circumstances of Beine's arrest because he did not answer the door and, when the police obtained a search warrant and entered his home, they found him in a walk-in closet.

SC85934
State of Missouri v. Mohsin Baghazal
St. Louis County
Challenge to child molestation convictions

In April 2001, authorities were told that elementary teacher Mohsin Baghazal had sodomized two fourth-grade boys in a computer lab at their school. He subsequently was charged with five counts of first-degree child molestation. During jury selection, the state used five of its six peremptory challenges to remove all five African-Americans from the jury pool. Following an April 2003 trial, Baghazal was acquitted of two counts and convicted of three counts of first-degree child molestation involving two children. He was sentenced to serve three consecutive terms of 15 years each. He appeals.

Baghazal argues the court violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law in permitting the state to use its peremptory strikes to remove all five African-Americans from the jury pool. He contends that the strikes were racially motivated and that the reasons given were pretextual. He asserts that the state fabricated testimony as to one potential juror to make its strike appear race-neutral. Baghazal argues the court should have granted a mistrial after the state communicated with a key witness, in violation of the court's order, during a short recess in cross-examination. He contends a victim's advocate employed by the prosecutor's office instructed the witness to answer "I don't know" or "I don't remember" to questions by the defense counsel. He asserts that, after the break, the witness became unresponsive to questions and generally appeared to have forgotten matters about which he previously had testified with no trouble. Baghazal argues the court's error irrevocably prejudiced him, effectively sanctioned the state's impermissible coaching and deprived him of his due process rights to confront witnesses against him. Baghazal contends the court erred in allowing the state to comment about his silence after his arrest, when he refused to answer questions without his attorney present. He asserts that this violated his constitutional rights to remain silent and implied to the jury that he had fabricated his defense. Baghazal argues the court should have submitted two instructions that would have allowed the jury to consider the lesser-included offense of sexual misconduct involving a child by indecent exposure. He contends there was a factual basis for acquittal of the crimes charged and for the submission of the lesser-included offense. He asserts that the court erred in allowing the state to introduce, over objection, hearsay testimony of five witnesses concerning statements the alleged victims made. Baghazal argues this testimony lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, could not be corroborated independently and violates the confrontation clause of the constitution. He contends the court should have allowed him to testify about the time frames originally charged in the indictment. He asserts that, five days before trial, the state amended the indictment, broadening the time frames during which the crimes allegedly occurred, to exclude the period of time for which he had provided an alibi.

The state responds that this Court should not review Baghazal's challenges to the state's peremptory strikes because he failed to preserve it for appellate review and because he cannot show he suffered manifest injustice. The state argues Baghazal did not prove the strikes were racially motivated or that the reasons given for the strikes were pretextual. It contends Baghazal failed to challenge, at trial, the reasons the state gave for the strikes. The state asserts that the court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial. It responds that the prosecutor's office did not act in bad faith and that Baghazal was not prejudiced by the victim's advocate's brief conversation with the witness. It argues that the advocate merely told the witness to tell the truth and that defense counsel was able to cross-examine the witness about the conversation. The state contends the court properly admitted evidence about Baghazal's statements to the police. It asserts that his invocation of his right to remain silent was not admitted into evidence and that he waived his right to remain silent when he made his statement to the police on the way to the police station. The state responds that this Court should refuse to review Baghazal's claims of instructional error because he failed to include them in his brief filed in the court of appeals. The state argues Baghazal could not submit his proposed instructions because sexual misconduct involving a child by indecent exposure is not a lesser-included offense of first-degree child molestation and because there was no evidentiary basis for the jury to acquit of child molestation and convict of sexual misconduct. The state contends Baghazal waived his claims about the hearsay testimony because he failed to object at trial to the alleged hearsay. It asserts that these statements were admissible because the victims testified at trial and the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability. The state responds that the corroboration rule was not applicable to this case and that Baghazal's constitutional claim lacks merit. It further argues that Baghazal could not have suffered prejudice from the state broadening the time range for two of the counts because the jury acquitted him of both of these counts.

SC85945
John Igoe v. The Department of Labor and Industrial Relations of the State of Missouri, et al.
St. Louis City
Venue; sufficiency of evidence; challenge to equitable remedy

In 1997, the department of labor and industrial relations' division of workers' compensation sought to fill four positions in St. Louis city – two administrative law judge positions and two legal advisor positions. Attorney John Igoe applied for both positions. He was 63 at the time. The department director said she consulted with the governor's staff in considering the applicants and in filling the positions. The successful applicants all were female, ranging in age from 32 to 42, and each had significant legal experience, enthusiasm and initiative. Igoe subsequently filed a complaint, alleging age and gender discrimination, with the equal employment opportunity commission (EEOC) and the Missouri commission on human rights (MCHR). In 1999, the division sought to fill several newly created legal advisor and administrative law judge positions around the state. Igoe again applied. Even though his application was submitted after the deadline, it still was considered. The department director said the governor's staff again guided her in considering the applicants and making the hiring decisions. The successful applicants ranged in age from 30 to 55. Igoe filed new complaints with the EEOC and MCHR, then sued the department in St. Louis city, alleging gender and age discrimination and retaliation. In July 2000, the department moved to change venue to Cole County. The court overruled the motion, and, following a jury trial, the jury entered a verdict in Igoe's favor on the age discrimination and retaliation claims but ruled for the department on Igoe's gender discrimination claim. The jury awarded him more than $323,000 in lost wages and benefits and $10,000 in compensatory damages on his age discrimination claim and $183,600 in lost wages and benefits on his retaliation claim. In October 2002, the court granted judgment in Igoe's favor on all claims, awarding an additional $50,400 as lost wages from the date of the verdict through the date of its judgment. It also ordered that he be placed in an administrative law judge position. The department appeals.

The department argues the court should have transferred venue to Cole County. It contends venue was not proper in St. Louis city because state, not federal, venue law applies. It asserts, therefore, that venue only is proper in Cole County, where the defendants are found and where the employment decisions about Igoe were made. The department argues the court improperly entered judgment in Igoe's favor on his gender discrimination claims. It contends Igoe was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, nor did he move for it. It asserts the jury found the claims in favor of the department, the jury's verdict was supported by the weight of the evidence, the verdict was final and the court should have entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict instead of entering judgment contrary to the verdict. The department argues the weight of the evidence was that it did not discriminate against Igoe on the basis of his age when it did not select him for an administrative law judge or legal advisor position. It contends the evidence Igoe presented did not address the role of the governor's staff in making the selections and did not suggest that age was a factor in the decision. The department asserts that it did not retaliate against Igoe for filing charges with the EEOC or MCHR and that the evidence Igoe submitted on this point was insubstantial. The department argues the court erred in giving Igoe an administrative law judge position in St. Louis city. It contends Igoe was not entitled to equitable relief because there was no vacancy and removing an incumbent was impossible. It asserts the court's order appointing an administrative law judge invaded the governor's prerogative, violating separation of powers.

Igoe responds that venue was proper in St. Louis city and that the department failed to prove venue was improper. He argues the department waived its venue claim by changing their basis for challenging venue from their claim below and by submitting to the court's jurisdiction. Igoe contends any error by the court in inadvertently granting him judgment on the gender discrimination claim in addition to the age discrimination and retaliation claims was harmless because the amount of the award is the same. He asserts that the court properly found that substantial evidence supported his age discrimination claim because ample evidence was admitted to support each element of this claim. He responds that he belonged to a protected class of employees older than 40, that he was qualified for the positions, that he was not hired despite his qualification, and that the department hired sufficiently younger persons to permit an inference of age discrimination. Igoe argues that the evidence contradicts the department's alleged reasons for not hiring him and that the department has changed its explanation for its hiring decisions. He contends that ample evidence was admitted to support an inference of retaliation. Igoe asserts that the court properly granted him equitable relief by placing him in an administrative law judge position. He responds that the department failed to prove he would not have been hired absent discrimination and that instatement is appropriate regardless of whether an actual vacancy exists at the time of the court order. Igoe argues that separation of powers does not preclude an order instating him to an administrative law judge position. He contends he is entitled to instatement, back pay, front pay and any other equitable relief calculated to make him whole. He asserts that, to adopt the department's position, then the MCHR would have no effect on the executive branch and that the hiring of administrative law judges and legal advisors is a decision of the division, not directly of the governor.

SC86060
Jason Shuler v. Premium Standard Farms, Inc.
Daviess County
Challenge to wrongful discharge judgment

Jason Shuler began working for Premium Standard Farms, Inc., in July 1994. In March 2000, he held the position of land application supervisor, which involved soil sampling in accordance with state regulations. That month, his superior told him to take a sample from a field, which was not where the effluent was to be applied, and falsely represent it as being taken from the subject field. He told his superior's supervisor, and Shuler subsequently was fired. The company told him in a service letter that it terminated him for violating company policy by allowing irrigation equipment to apply effluent without an approved work order. He sued the company for wrongful discharge and for issuing a false service letter, alleging he was not even on-site when the effluent was applied. The jury entered a verdict in Shuler's favor on the issue of the service letter, awarding him $1 in damages, but was unable to decide the other claim. The court granted judgment to Premium Standard on the wrongful discharge claim, and Shuler appeals.

Shuler argues the court erred in granting a directed verdict to Premium Standard on the wrongful discharge claim. He contends he offered sufficient evidence to make a submissible case on that issue. He asserts that the orders he was given violated state law and the terms of the permit under which the company was operating and that he was fired for not complying with the illegal order. Shuler argues the court determined that the other reason given for his discharge – that he applied effluent without a work order – was not true. He contends the court should have submitted to the jury his proffered instruction because there was sufficient evidence to support it. Shuler asserts that he proved Premium Standard's act of terminating his employment was outrageous and the result of evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of others, justifying punitive damages.

Premium Standard responds that the court properly sustained its motion for a directed verdict. It argues Shuler failed to plead his wrongful discharge claim properly and that he failed to prove his termination was connected causally to his allegation that he was a whistleblower. It contends this Court should clarify the exclusive causation requirement for Missouri public policy discharge cases. Premium Standard asserts that the court properly refused to give the instruction Shuler offered. It responds that the proposed instruction misstated the law, would have confused the jury and was not supported by substantial evidence. Similarly, it argues the court properly refused to give the punitive damages instruction because, after the jury deadlocked, the court concluded that Shuler failed to make a submissible case on the underlying wrongful discharge claim let alone on punitive damages for that claim.