Case Summary for May 18, 2009

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Case Summary for May 18, 2009

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

10:30 a.m. Monday, May 18, 2009

_________________________________________________________________

SC89010
Committee for Educational Equality, et al., Coalition to Fund Excellent Schools, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al., W. Bevis Schock, Rex Sinquefield and Menlo Smith
Cole County
Constitutional validity of public school funding
Listen to the oral argument:

The committee was represented during argument by Alex Bartlett of Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP of Jefferson City; the coalition was represented by James C. Owen of McCarthy, Leonard & Kaemmerer L.C. of Chesterfield; the state was represented by State Solicitor James Layton of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City; and the intervenors Schock, Sinquefield and Smith were represented by Joshua M. Schindler from The Schindler Law Firm in St. Louis.

The Committee for Educational Equality, Missouri school districts, students, parents and taxpayers (collectively, the committee) filed suit in January 2004 contesting the amount and distribution of state money appropriated to Missouri public schools. The committee alleged that the state violated the Missouri Constitution by the disparities and inadequacies of the school funding formula and imposed new, increased and expanded requirements on schools without providing the schools additional funding in violation of the Hancock Amendment. The committee sued the state and its treasurer, commissioner of administration, board of administration, board of education, department of elementary and secondary education, commissioner of education and attorney general. The Coalition to Fund Excellent Schools, the St. Louis city board of education and others intervened in the suit, supporting the committee's arguments. In November 2006, the trial court permitted Bevis Schock, Rex Sinquefield and Menlo Smith to intervene as interested taxpayers supporting the state. The state moved to dismiss the Hancock Amendment claims. The trial court sustained the motion and, in October 2007, denied the committee relief. The committee appeals.

The committee argues the trial court erred in dismissing its school finance claims because the record established a violation of section 1(a), article IX of the Missouri Constitution. It contends that this section requires the state to maintain a system of free public schools providing for "the general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence," which is necessary to preserve the "rights and liberties of the people," and that the state has not done so. The committee asserts that education is a fundamental right and that the record reflects that school funding in Missouri is disparate, violating students' rights to equal opportunities. It argues the trial court failed to consider and to require the state to fund facilities and early childhood education and to increase funding for school transportation. The committee contends the trial court also erred in dismissing its Hancock Amendment claims because the state reduced financing for existing educational programs and then required schools to provide new programs without providing them additional funding for those programs. The committee asserts the trial court should not have permitted Schock, Sinquefield and Smith to intervene because their only alleged standing is as taxpayers, but only taxpayers alleging they are harmed by the state's actions have standing to join the lawsuit.

The coalition argues the legislature's school funding formula is flawed because the "local effort" portion of the formula violates sections 3, 4 and 14 of article X of the Missouri Constitution. It asserts property tax disparity within the formula exists because property tax assessments fail to be at "true value" in a just, uniform and equitable fashion statewide and because these assessments are not equalized across the state. The coalition contends that because the formal calculates "local effort," the disparities among schools across the state continues, violating the constitution by shifting the tax burden to other property owners in the state, leading to undervaluation of property, which, in turn, affects the adequacy and equity of funding in the state. The coalition further argues some school districts receive more than their share of state funds and others less than their share when the assessed valuations are not equalized across the state. It contends the trial court erred when it found the legislature acted rationally in using only 2004 property tax assessments in its calculations.

The state responds the committee and the school districts lack standing to bring these claims. It contends constitutional rights are guaranteed to individual citizens and, therefore, only individuals − not committees or school districts − can charge the state with violating such rights. The state asserts that the committee presents a non-justiciable political question and that the circuit court properly held the state did not violate article IX of the Missouri Constitution. The state contends that, aside from the 25-percent requirement, article IX contains no requirement that the legislature fund Missouri public schools at any particular level, that Missouri voters are able to − and have − created adequacy standards, and that the framers of the 1945 Constitution intended to allow the legislature broad discretion in how to establish and maintain free public schools. The state asserts the legislature may assign primary responsibility for school facilities, transportation and early childhood education to local districts and, as a policy determination, it is within the legislature's discretion to provide state support in these areas. It argues the trial court properly held that Missouri's school funding system does not violate its constitutional promise of equal protection because Missouri voters expressly have enacted a system that does not require the state to fund each school at the same level and because "adequate" or "equitable" school funding is not a fundamental right. The state contends Missouri's system of public school funding is constitutional because it does not disadvantage a suspect class, the committee's claims cannot be evaluated under strict-scrutiny analysis and Missouri's school funding system rationally is related to a legitimate state objective. The state argues the trial court properly dismissed the committee's Hancock Amendment claims because the committee failed to prove a violation of this amendment and because the increase in state spending the committee sought is not an available remedy. The state contends the trial court properly exercised its discretion in permitting Schock, Sinquefield and Smith to intervene as taxpayers.

The state further responds the coalition lacks standing to bring its tax assessment claims because its school-district members also lack standing. The state asserts the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the coalition failed to join a necessary and indispensable party: the state tax commission. The state argues the coalition did not prove that the assessment levels are improper or, if so, that they negatively impact the amount of state funds the school districts receive. The state asserts the legislature acted rationally when it designed the "local efforts" component of the funding formula.

Citizens for Missouri Children argues, as a friend of the Court, that the constitutional standard for educational adequacy requires high-quality pre-kindergarten programs for low-income children. It asserts many of the state's children are low-income, are at risk of school failure and require high-quality pre-kindergarten programs for the opportunity to avail themselves of a constitutionally adequate education.

The Missouri School Boards Association argues, as a friend of the Court, that proper funding of education is a paramount duty of the state. It contends article IX, section 1(a) of the Missouri Constitution creates a fundamental mandate for state government to provide a system of school funding sufficient to provide all Missouri students with an opportunity to learn that meets quality standards. The association asserts courts in Missouri, like other states, may establish standards and parameters to guide the legislature in enacting appropriate legislation to remedy the constitutional defects.

SC89840
Saint Louis University and Paulo Bicalho, M.D. v. Alice Geary, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Phillip Sgroi
City of St. Louis
Medical negligence
Listen to the oral argument:

The university was represented during argument by Robyn Fox of Moser & Marsalek P.C. of St. Louis, and Geary was represented by Derek Potts of The Potts Law Firm, LLC, in Kansas City.

In 2000, Phillip Sgroi suffered a stroke affecting his left side, and he had to relearn how to walk. In December 2001, Sgroi slipped and fell on his left side, injuring his left arm and knee. In February 2002, when Sgroi was admitted to Saint Louis University Hospital for gastrointestinal problems, he and his wife mentioned to the doctors the increasing pain he had felt in his left knee for the past four months. Dr. Paulo Bicalho, an orthopedic surgeon, consulted Sgroi about his knee pain and ordered an X-ray. Bicalho told Sgroi to continue his therapy, and Sgori was discharged from the hospital. One week later, Sgroi could not straighten his left leg due to pain. In March 2002, an X-ray revealed Sgroi had a two- to four-week-old hip fracture. Bicalho performed hip surgery on Sgroi, giving him a hip prosthesis. In April 2007, after increasing pain in his hip, Sgroi had another hip surgery where it was discovered his hip prosthesis was infected and had infected his hip joint. Sgroi's hip prosthesis and hip joint both were surgically removed. Sgroi and his wife sued the university and Bicalho for medical negligence, arguing Bicalho should have X-rayed Sgroi's hip in February 2002. Sgroi argued if Bicalho had done so, he would have found the hip fracture and Sgroi could have had a minor procedure instead of a hip prosthesis and could avoided the resulting loss of his hip. During the July 2007 trial, two videotapes of Sgroi were played. One was a deposition of Sgroi from May 2007, as he was too ill to attend trial, and the other was a newscast from 2001 about Sgroi's stroke and subsequent recovery. The jury found the university and Bicalho medically negligent for failing to diagnose Sgroi properly, awarding Sgroi and his wife $825,000 in damages. In July 2007, the university and Bicalho moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, and moved to subpoena a juror and for an evidentiary hearing. The trial court sustained the motion to subpoena a juror. At the evidentiary hearing, the juror admitted he was awarded $1,800 in a lawsuit after an automobile accident. He stated he missed the question he was asked during jury selection of whether any potential juror had filed a lawsuit. The juror testified his prior litigation did not play a role in his deliberation the verdict in Sgroi's case. The trial court overruled the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. The university and Bicalho appeal. Sgroi since has died, and his wife, Alice Geary, represents his estate on appeal.

The university and Bicalho argue the trial court erred in admitting the 2001 videotape of the newscast into evidence. They contend it did not assist the jury in understanding the case and served only to inflame the jurors. The university and Bicalho assert the video was hearsay because it contained out-of-court statements not subject to cross-examination of Sgroi's "good" character and did not have a tendency to prove or disprove any matter at issue. They further argue the trial court erred in overruling their motion for mistrial during jury selection, after Sgroi improperly introduced the existence of liability insurance, resulting in an excessive verdict. The university and Bicalho contend they were entitled to a new trial because they were prejudiced because the juror failed to disclose his previous litigation and because it was unreasonable for the juror to have forgotten about the lawsuit during jury selection or otherwise not have heard the question and other jurors' answers about prior litigation.

Geary responds the videotapes assisted the jury in understanding the nature and extent of Sgroi's damages that occurred from 2001 to 2007. She argues the out-of-court statements on the videotape did not constitute hearsay and did not prejudice the university or Bicahlo. Geary contends that the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted and that many of the statements in the videotape were already in evidence through other testimony. She further responds the trial court properly overruled the university and Bicalho's motion for mistrial because Sgroi's counsel followed proper procedure and there was no evidence the university or Bicalho were prejudiced by the question asked when counsel asked whether anyone was an officer, director or shareholder of an insurance company called The Doctor's Company. Geary argues the university and Bicalho were not entitled to a new trial based on juror nondisclosure during jury selection because the juror's nondisclosure was unintentional, as he did not hear the question asked about prior litigation, the litigation occurred six years before Sgroi's case, and the juror did not consider his prior litigation when deliberating this case.

SC88942
State ex rel. John E. Winfield v. Donald P. Roper, Superintendent
St. Louis County
Relief sought from death sentence for "deliberation directive"
Listen to the oral argument:

Winfield was represented during argument by Joe Luby of the Public Interest Litigation Clinic in Kansas City, and the state was represented by Andrew Hassell of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In September 1998, John Winfield was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and was sentenced to death for shooting to death his girlfriend and another person in September 1996 in St. Louis County. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal, State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505 (Mo. banc 1999), and affirmed the denial of postconviction relief, Winfield v. State, 93 S.W.3d 732 (2002). In November 2007, Winfield filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging some of the jurors in his trial recall that they notified the bailiff they were at an impasse and were split as to punishment and that they were told to continue their deliberations. Not all jurors remember receiving a directive, and it is unclear whether the directive came orally from the bailiff or if the bailiff was reading a note from the trial judge. In September 2008, the circuit court, serving as "special master" to conduct a hearing on Winfield's claims, determined there was no credible evidence to support the allegations. Winfield appeals.

Winfield argues the Court should vacate his death sentence and resentence him to life imprisonment. He contends the sentence violated his right to due process of law and to the presence of counsel during a critical stage of trial. He asserts a preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that jurors were given a prejudicial instruction by the bailiff – or by the trial court – to keep deliberating when the jurors were split in their vote and approaching an impasse. Winfield argues the directive to keep deliberating influenced the jury's process of deciding solely for itself whether it could reach a unanimous verdict as required pursuant to section 565.030.4, RSMo, and as described by this Court in State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. banc 1988) (non-unanimous verdict requires life sentence, where the record does not show point at which jurors disagreed). He contends the directive to keep deliberating squelched the jurors' authority to determine for themselves whether to continue deliberating or to pronounce themselves unable to agree on a sentence. Winfield asserts that this error was not harmless and – given this Court's statutory duty to ensure a death sentence is proportional, reliable and not the result of an "arbitrary factor" pursuant to section 565.035.5, RSMo – the Court should resentence him to life imprisonment. Winfield argues the record provides sufficient evidence to undermine his verdict based on the sworn testimony of multiple jurors that the bailiff told the jury to keep deliberating when the jurors were divided.

The state responds that Winfield cannot show cause to overcome his procedural default in failing to raise his claim sooner. It contends that he should have raised this issue on direct appeal or in his postconviction-relief motion and that he has not shown the jurors refused to speak with him at an earlier date. The state asserts that because Winfield does not allege a manifest injustice occurred, he cannot receive review of his claims on their merits. The state contends that the jury did not send a note to the trial court announcing it could not come to a unanimous decision on punishment and that neither the trial judge nor the bailiff gave the jury a directive to continue deliberating. The state argues Winfield is not entitled to relief pursuant to sections 565.035.3, which sets out this Court's duty to analyze the sufficiency and strength of the evidence supporting a death sentence, because there is no challenge here to the evidence of Winfield's guilt. The state asserts the Court is required to inquire into the facts and legal reasons underlying the death sentence before setting an execution date but does not have the power to resentence Winfield.

SC89846
Jason Merriweather v. State of Missouri
St. Louis city
Postconviction relief in forcible sodomy conviction
Listen to the oral argument:

The state was represented during argument by Shaun Mackelprang of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, and Merriweather was represented by Nick Zotos of St. Louis.

In March 2002, Jason Merriweather stopped his vehicle in front of a woman in St. Louis city. He allegedly showed her a gun and told her to get into his vehicle. She complied, and he drove her to another location where he sodomized her. The woman ultimately got away and called 911, giving the police Merriweather's license plate information. In April 2005, the circuit court found Merriweather guilty of forcible sodomy, and the next month, he was sentenced to 10 years in prison. In December 2006, Merriweather sought postconviction relief, arguing the state failed to comply with his pre-trial motion for discovery pursuant to Rule 25.03 in not providing him with the woman's prior criminal history, depriving Merriweather of his right to due process of law. In June 2007, the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing at which the prosecutor said her investigator ran a criminal history check on the woman's name before trial, but the records check did not reveal any criminal history. The prosecutor said the investigator ran the woman's name through a different system in anticipation of the motion hearing, and the new system revealed three misdemeanor convictions in Illinois and three pending misdemeanor charges in St. Louis County. In August 2007, the circuit court sustained Merriweather's motion, vacated his conviction and sentence, and ordered a new trial. It acknowledged the woman's criminal history was not in the state's possession at the time of trial, but the court concluded the state had the duty to discover the woman's Illinois criminal history. The state appeals.

The state argues the circuit court erred in finding the state failed in its discovery obligations pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Rule 25.03. It contends the circuit court improperly extended Brady by placing a duty on the state to disclose information that was not in its possession. The state asserts that Merriweather did not prove that the state failed to disclose material evidence in its possession and that the state did not have the woman's criminal history in its possession at the time of trial. It argues the evidence showed the state exercised due diligence in searching for the woman's criminal history prior to trial.

Merriweather responds the circuit court properly held the state's failure, intentional or inadvertent, to disclose to him the woman's prior convictions and pending misdemeanor charges denied him a fair trial.