Case Summary for December 4, 2001

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Case Summary for December 4, 2001

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Tuesday, December 4, 2001
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SC83820
Sprint Communications Company, L.P. v. Director of Revenue
Cole County
Standing to seek sales and use tax refunds

In April 1998, Sprint began to pursue refunds of Missouri sales and use taxes it had paid to 105 of 831 vendors from which it had purchased equipment that may qualify for an exemption under Missouri law. Acting on suggestions from representatives of the director of revenue, Sprint sent letters to the 105 vendors that included partially completed refund applications and power of attorney forms. In January 2000, Sprint filed Missouri sales and use tax refund claims on its own behalf for six vendors that had refused, were unable, were unwilling or otherwise had failed to file the refunds on Sprint's behalf. The director declined to process the refund claims because a properly executed power of attorney form was not received with the refund requests. Sprint appealed, and the administrative hearing commission granted the director's motion for summary determination. The commission found that Sprint lacked standing to claim a refund for taxes remitted by another organization and did not reach the merits of any of the refund claims.

Sprint appeals, arguing the commission's determination that it lacked standing to file the refund claims on its own behalf is contrary to federal and state case law regarding standing. It argues that because the vendors shifted the burden of paying taxes to Sprint, Sprint is the real party in interest and should be permitted to seek the refunds. Sprint also argues the commission's decision violates the due process and equal protection laws of the federal and state constitutions.

The director responds that the commission's decision was correct. She argues Sprint does not have standing to seek the refunds under section 144.190, RSMo, because the vendors remitted the tax, not Sprint, and because the vendors did not authorize Sprint to seek the refunds. The director further responds that the statute does not deny Sprint due process or equal protection.

SC83692
SSM Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital, f/k/a Cardinal Glennon Children's Hospital, et al. v. State of Missouri, et al.
Cole County and St. Louis City
Constitutionality of 1999 bill amending hospital lien law

Prior to 1999, Missouri law allowed hospitals to file liens against patients and participate in a patient's personal injury suit recovery so the hospital would receive payment for its treatment of the patient. Hospitals were entitled to recover as much of their lien as could be satisfied out of 50 percent of the money due the patient under any final judgment, compromise or settlement agreement after paying the attorneys' liens, federal and state workers' compensation liens and any other prior liens. If the full amount of the lien was not satisfied within a year after the date of the judgment or settlement, a hospital could sue the person or entity held liable for the damages for payment of its unpaid charges.

During the 1999 legislative session, three bills were introduced that would have amended the hospital lien law, but all three failed to pass. House Bill 343, however, which originally addressed only the division of professional registration, was changed to address professional licensing. It subsequently was amended to include language expanding the hospital lien law to grant certain clinics, health care practitioners and other institutions the same personal injury rights as hospitals. It also permitted them to share in the 50 percent of a patient's personal injury recovery, based on a new calculation of the patient's net proceeds. In addition, the amended bill, as passed and signed into law, included measures addressing construction and design contracts, eye care providers wishing to enroll in health carrier networks, emergency patient transportation in vehicles other than ambulances, and the sale and storage of fireworks. Cardinal Glennon and four other hospitals challenged the constitutionality of House Bill 343. The hospitals and the state jointly stipulated as to the facts, and the court granted summary judgment to the state.

Cardinal Glennon and the other hospitals appeal, arguing the court should not have granted summary judgment to the state because the bill is unconstitutional. They argue the bill must be considered in its entirity and that, when so considered, it contains multiple subjects in violation of article III, section 23 of the Missouri constitution. They contend the title of the bill also violates the constitution because it does not clearly refer to the contents of the bill. They further argue the amendments to the bill changed its original purpose in violation of article III, section 21 of the state constitution.

The state responds that summary judgment was granted properly as the bill is constitutional. It argues the court's review of House Bill 343 properly was limited to those portions of the bill regarding the hospital lien law, and those changes are not unconstitutional. The state contends that even if the court should have reviewed the entire bill, including those provisions that did not relate to the hospital lien law, the bill still is constitutional. The state responds that the entire bill has a single purpose, that this purpose did not change during its enactment and that it has a clear title.

SC83782
State of Missouri v. Larna Lue Edwards
Caldwell County
Battered woman syndrome; manslaughter appeal

Larna Sue Edwards married her husband when she was still in high school. He began abusing her the night before they eloped and the abuse continued for the more than four decades of their marriage. He also physically abused their children and sexually abused their daughter. In July 1996, after verbally agreeing to buy a truck, Edwards and her husband argued, and he shoved and slapped her. The next morning, he hit her hard enough to stop her watch and knock off her glasses. Later in the morning, they went to a store they owned and operated, and her husband renewed the argument. He hit her in the arm so hard she thought he had broken it. Edwards said she believed her husband would kill her, and she said she snapped. She took the .38 caliber handgun they kept behind the counter and shot her husband four times, killing him. Following an October 1997 trial, Edwards was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to five years in prison.

Edwards appeals, arguing the court violated her constitutional rights to due process and to present a defense in instructing the jury regarding self-defense. She argues the court should have modified the instruction, allowing the jury to consider her defense that she suffered from battered spouse syndrome. Edwards also contends the court erred in refusing to give the jury her proposed instruction submitting the lesser-included offense of involuntary manslaughter. In addition, she argues the court should have told the jury to disregard certain portions of the prosecutor's closing argument she argues were improper. Edwards further contends her statement to the police should have been suppressed because she argues it was made in violation of her right to an attorney.

The state responds that the court did not err in submitting the self-defense instruction because it explicitly told the jury to consider evidence related to battered woman syndrome in determining who the initial aggressor was and whether Edwards reasonably believed she was in imminent danger of harm from her husband. The state contends that an involuntary manslaughter instruction would not have been proper because the evidence would not have supported it. It also argues this Court should not review Edwards' claim that the trial court, on its own motion, should have told the jury to disregard portions of the prosecutor's closing arguments. In addition, the state responds that Edwards' statement to the police did not violate her constitutional rights because she waived her right to have counsel.

SC83830
State ex rel. Ronda A. Bost and Brian Glen Bost v. The Honorable Justine E. del Muro
Jackson County
Discovery dispute

In October 1997, while Ronda Bost was a patient of Dr. Gordon B. Clark, her baby died. In July 1999, Bost and her husband, Brian Bost, filed a medical malpractice suit against Dr. Clark; Health Midwest Development, which does business as Lafayette Regional Medical Center; and other Health Midwest employees. The Bosts believed that Dr. Clark was a Health Midwest employee at the time he treated Ronda, although he apparently left that employment more than two months before her baby died. They filed claims for wrongful death, personal injury and loss of consortium. In March 2001, Health Midwest moved for summary judgment. Because the Bosts did not receive this motion, the court's judgment granting summary judgment was set aside. In April 2001, the Bosts asked that Health Midwest produce certain documents. Health Midwest objected, and in May, the Bosts asked that it be ordered to produce the documents and that they be given additional time to respond to the summary judgment motion so they could review the documents they sought to have produced. The court granted additional time for their response but denied their motion to compel production of the documents.

The Bosts now seek a writ requiring the court below either to prohibit the court from enforcing its order or to grant both their motion to compel and motion for an extension of time to respond to Health Midwest's motion for summary judgment. They argue they are entitled to such an order because the documents they are seeking is relevant to their claims and is likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. They also argue Health Midwest failed to provide a factual basis or legal authority for precluding such discovery. In addition, the Bosts contend the court's denial of their motion to compel, while at the same time forcing them to go ahead with discovery, violates their due process rights to a meaningful hearing and any meaningful opportunity to respond to Health Midwest's motion.

Health Midwest responds that the Bosts are not entitled to the relief they request because they failed to show good cause under Rule 74.04 to justify a continuance to obtain additional discovery. It argues the discovery sought by the Bosts is irrelevant and immaterial to the issues raised in its motion for summary judgment. Health Midwest further responds that the Bosts are not entitled to an order prohibiting a ruling on the summary judgment motion for 30 days after they have received the requested documents because they are not entitled to the additional discovery.