Case Summary for November 3, 2009

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Case Summary for November 3, 2009

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, November 3, 2009

_________________________________________________________________

SC89882
State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission, J. Marty Robinson, and Wayne Williams v. The Honorable Kenneth W. Pratte
St. Francois County
Standard of indigency in appointing public defender
Listen to the oral argument:

The commission was represented during argument by Dan Gralike of the public defender's office in Columbia, and the prosecutor's office was represented by Patrick King of the St. Francois County prosecutor's office in Farmington.

In March 2007, Steven Roloff was charged with first-degree assault and child abuse. Roloff paid a private attorney $9,000 to represent him. In October 2008, the private attorney moved to withdraw from representing Roloff, allegedly when Roloff decided he wanted to go to trial. The trial court granted the private attorney's motion and appointed a public defender to represent Roloff. The public defender commission objected based on its regulation that a public defender will not represent indigent defendants who have, at any time during the pendency of their case, retained private counsel. The trial court overruled the commission's objection. The commission sought relief from this Court, which issued its preliminary writ. The public defender seeks to make the writ permanent.

The commission argues the trial court exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in appointing a public defender to represent Roloff. It contends, pursuant to section 600.086.1, RSMo, and 18 CSR 10-2.010, that Roloff is ineligible for a public defender because he had the means to – and did – obtain private counsel. The commission further argues the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily and against the logic of the circumstances in allowing the private attorney to withdraw just before the trial. It asserts the attorney had been paid $9,000 in attorney's fees, did not show unreasonable financial hardship and cannot withdraw because Roloff chose to go to trial. It notes that the decision to proceed to trial belongs to the client and that disagreement with the attorney does not constitute a real conflict of interest. The commission contends irreparable harm will result to the public defender, its existing clients and taxpayers if a permanent writ does not issue because the public defender will face further case overload and the taxpayers will bear the full cost of the representation.

The prosecutor responds that the trial court did not exceed its authority in appointing a public defender because the trial court determined Roloff was indigent within the meaning of Missouri law. He contends that, following the hearing, the trial court determined that although Roloff's friends and family once were able to collect $9,000 for a private attorney, Roloff could not afford counsel, and being able to hire private counsel at one point does not preclude a finding Roloff is now indigent and should have a public defender.

SC90195
State ex rel. Missouri Public Defender Commission, J. Marty Robinson, and Kevin O'Brien v. The Honorable Gene Hamilton, and the Honorable Gary Oxenhandler
Boone County
Appointment of public defender in probation revocation cases
Listen to the oral argument:

The commission was represented during argument by Antwaun L. Smith of Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. in Kansas City, and the prosecutor's office was represented by Stephanie Morrell of the Boone County prosecutor's office in Columbia.

The director of the public defender's office determined that Boone County's public defender office exceed the maximum caseload and, in October 2008, notified the circuit court that the local public defender's office would not accept new probation revocation cases in which a suspended execution of sentence had been imposed. In November 2008, two individuals in Boone County violated terms of their probations. Both were represented by public defenders in the underlying cases and both were placed on probation after suspended execution of their sentences. The public defender determined that both individuals were indigent but would not accept their cases because they had suspended execution of sentences. The trial court appointed a public defender to represent both individuals. In one case, the appointment was in the public defender's official capacity; in the other case, it was in the public defender's personal capacity. The public defender commission seeks this Court's writ prohibiting the circuit court from appointing public defenders in both cases.

The commission argues it is entitled to a writ because the trial court lacked jurisdiction, exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in appointing a public defender. It contends such appointment was not authorized while the local public defender's office was certified as having limited availability pursuant to 18 CSR 10-4.010. The commission asserts the rule properly was promulgated and adopted and is binding Missouri law. The commission contends the rule does not conflict with or attempt to modify sections 600.042.3 and 600.042.4, RSMo, and is a statutorily authorized guideline to prevent and cure conflicts of interest created by excessive caseloads. The commission asserts the public defender's office and its existing clients will be harmed irreparably if a writ does not issue because the public defender will face additional case overload. In addition, the commission argues, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in appointing a public defender in his personal capacity. The commission asserts section 600.021.2, RSMo, prohibits public defenders from appointment in their personal capacity.

The prosecutor responds that the circuit court had jurisdiction to appoint a public defender to represent criminal defendants facing probation violations as required by section 600.042.4. He argues the circuit court has jurisdiction to appoint a public defender in his private capacity as a member of The Missouri Bar to represent a criminal defendant facing a probation violation as well as a member of the public defender's office.

SC90236
Jane Turner, et al. v. School District of Clayton, et al.
St. Louis County
Challenge to interpretation of statute
Listen to the oral argument:

Turner was represented during argument by Elkin Kistner of St. Louis, Clayton School District was represented by Mark J. Bremer of Kohn, Shands, Elbert, Gianoulakis & Giljum, LLP of St. Louis; and the transitional school district was represented by Rick Walsh of Lewis, Rice & Fingersh, L.C. of St. Louis.

Jane Turner and her children live in the city of St. Louis, but her children attend school in the Clayton school district. Turner pays Clayton tuition pursuant to a tuition agreement. In 2007, the St. Louis public school district lost its accreditation and now is managed by the transitional school district. Turner asked the Clayton school district to prepare special tuition bills and to give the bill to the transitional school district to pay her children's tuition pursuant to section 167.131, RSMo. The Clayton school district indicated it would not participate in a transfer plan and would not have permitted a student to attend unless the student's parents signed personal tuition contacts. Turner sued the Clayton school district and sought a declaratory judgment that Clayton must prepare special tuition bills and that the transitional school district must pay the tuition. Turner also sought to recover the tuition payments she made to Clayton after it refused to prepare the special tuition bills. Both school districts moved for summary judgment. In November 2008, the trial court sustained their motions and dismissed Turner's claims. Turner appeals.

Turner argues the transitional school district must pay her children's tuition to the Clayton school district pursuant to section 167.131. She contends her children reside within the unaccredited St. Louis school district and attend an accredited school in Clayton, thereby obligating Clayton to prepare special tuition bills for her children and requiring the transitional school district to pay those bills under section 167.131. Turner asserts the trial court erred in finding that Senate Bill No. 781 (a desegregation bill) preempted section 167.131. She argues that no conflict exists between the bill and the statute and that the two should be harmonized because SB781 attempts to rectify past segregation and section 167.131 enables students residing in an unaccredited district to attend an accredited school. Turner further argues section 167.151, RSMo, does not limit parents' rights under section 167.131. She contends the school's discretion in admitting students under section 167.151 is revoked as to students seeking admittance pursuant to section 167.131. She further argues the tuition agreement with Clayton is not inconsistent with Clayton's statutory obligation to comply with section 167.131.

The Clayton school district responds that Turner signed a tuition agreement requiring her to pay her children's tuition. It contends Turner's argument that the tuition agreement is void must fail because that argument is outside the scope of her pleadings and is waived by her failure to raise it at any time below. Clayton argues section 167.131 does not apply in this case because the students transferred from the transitional school district specifically are governed by the subsequent provisions of SB781 and the state's 1999 desegregation settlement agreement. Clayton asserts that section 167.131 does not mandate that it admit Turner's children under section 167.131 and that, under section 167.151, the decision of whether to admit a non-resident student is up to the district's "discretion."

The transitional school district responds that SB781's student transfer provisions conflict with section 167.131 and that, because the bill is the more recent and more specific statute, it must be given precedence. The transitional school district argues Turner's constitutional argument rests on the false premise that the Missouri Constitution requires that children attend state-accredited public school districts. It further responds that section 167.131 does not apply to Turner and the St. Louis Public school district because section 167.131 is ambiguous and the evidence shows that it never was intended to apply to situations in which entire school districts lost their state accreditation pursuant to new legislation.

SC90022
MC Development Company, LLC v. Central R-3 School District of St. Francois County, Farmington R-7 School District of St. Francois County, Damon Black, Assessor of St. Francois County
St. Francois County
Proper school district for land
Listen to the oral argument:

Farmington R-7 was represented during argument by Clinton Roberts of Roberts & Kinsky, L.L.C. in Farmington, and Central R-3 was represented by Tom Mickes of Mikes Goldman O'Toole, LLC in St. Louis.

In 1966, the Farmington R-7 and Central R-3 school districts merged with other school districts and created new boundaries for the respective districts. In April 2005, MC Development Company LLC sought a declaratory judgment that property it purchased in St. Francois County was in the Farmington R-7 district and not within the Central R-3 district. Farmington R-7 filed a cross-claim against Central R-3 seeking a declaratory judgment as to the location of the boundary line between the two school districts, that Farmington R-7 is entitled to all taxes from the company's property and that all students residing on the company's land are entitled to attend school in Farmington. Based on the county assessor's map, the company's land was in the Central R-3 territory and had been since 1950. The former superintendent of Farmington R-7 testified at trial that the school district created a map as part of its records at the time of reorganization to depict the boundary change in 1967 and that the map illustrated that the company's land was included in the Farmington R-7 territory. Neither school district, nor the department of education and secondary education, could locate the original reorganization documents of the school districts. In November 2007, the trial court deferred to the assessor's records and determined the company's land was part of the Central R-3 school district. The company and Farmington R-7 appeal.

The company argues the trial court misapplied the law in declaring its land is part of the Central R-3 school district. It contends that school districts statutorily and constitutionally are required to be composed of contiguous territories and that the authority to determine school boundaries lies with the school districts and the voters. The company asserts the historical evidence from Farmington R-7 and testimony from its former superintendent establish the company's land is within Farmington's boundaries and is not a noncontiguous pocket of Central R-3's territory. It argues that because the school district, not the assessor, is to maintain the district's map, more weight should be given to the district's records.

Farmington R-7 argues the trial court violated article 9, section 1(b) of the Missouri Constitution in declaring the company's property part of the Central R-3 because in doing so, the trial court created a district with non-contiguous territory. It asserts the trial court's decision was against the weight of evidence and violated section 162.841, RSMo, because it relied on the assessor's records as opposed to the district's own records of its boundaries.

Central R-3 responds that the company's land is wholly within its territorial boundaries. It contends that there is no requirement that all school districts must have contiguous territory and that other Missouri school districts are noncontiguous. Central R-3 asserts the company and Farmington R-7 both failed to preserve their claims on appeal that the school districts constitutionally and statutorily are mandated to be contiguous because this is a new legal theory not presented before the trial court. Central R-3 responds that its last boundary change was made pursuant to section 162.431, RSMo, which permits non-contiguous school districts. It argues that the suit below is barred by laches (to avoid unfairness that can result from the prosecution of old claims) and that voters determined the legal boundaries of Central R-3.