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Case Summary for September 10, 2015

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.


Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.



DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Thursday, September 10, 2015
____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC95030
In re: James Marshall Clampitt
Audrain County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC95030.mp3SC95030.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Sam S. Phillips of the chief disciplinary counsel’s office in Jefferson City; Clampitt was represented by Douglas W. Hennon of Carson & Coil PC in Jefferson City.

The chief disciplinary counsel initiated disciplinary proceedings against Clampitt, alleging that Mexico, Missouri, attorney James Clampitt violated Rule 4-8.4(a) by knowingly assisting or inducing his son – also an attorney in the same firm – in the fraudulent use of a credit card and Rule 4-8.4(c) by actively participating in his son’s fraudulent activities. Clampitt’s law firm – which also included Clampitt’s son – had a credit card all the firm’s attorneys used for making online, business-related purchases. Clampitt went online and ordered additional cards in each attorney’s name, including one in his son’s name. In June 2010, the son was involved in an automobile accident in which he hit and killed an individual riding a lawn mower. After a meeting in the firm to discuss the incident, Clampitt and his son advised they would leave and start their own firm. The chief disciplinary counsel alleged that Clampitt, or a subordinate at his direction, subsequently ordered items for the new firm and charged the items to the old firm’s credit card. The son later admitted to one of the other attorneys in the firm that the firm’s card had been used to make purchases for the new firm. The son subsequently was charged with crimes arising both out of the use of the firm credit card as well as the automobile accident. In January 2013, a jury found the son guilty of involuntary manslaughter and leaving the scene of an accident; this Court disbarred the son in May 2013. In December 2013, the son also was found guilty of fraudulent use of a credit card. A disciplinary hearing was held in January 2015. The disciplinary hearing panel issued its decision in March 2015, finding that Clampitt’s conduct relating to the use of the firm credit card violated Rule 4-8.4(a) and (c) and recommended that Clampitt be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel rejects that recommendation and, instead, asks this Court to suspend Clampitt’s law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months.

This case presents two related questions to the Court – whether Clampitt violated Rule 4-8.4(a) by knowingly assisting or inducing his son in fraudulently using the credit card and Rule 4-8.4(c) by engaging in conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.

SC95030_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief.pdfSC95030_Clampitt_brief.pdfSC95030_Clampitt_brief.pdf



SC94842
John P. Strake v. Robinwood West Community Improvement District
St. Louis County
Challenge to applicability of sunshine law penalty provisions to failure to disclose records
Listen to the oral argument: SC94842.mp3SC94842.mp3
Strake was represented during arguments by Anthony E. Rothert of the American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri Foundation in St. Louis; the district was represented by Jon R. Sanner of Brinker & Doyen LLP in St. Louis.

John Strake lives in the Robinwood West Community Improvement District, located in St. Louis County. In November 2012, Strake requested from the district certain records relating to a personal injury lawsuit involving the district and another of the district’s residents, including minutes, votes, legal bills and the settlement agreement related to the lawsuit. The district responded that the records would not be disclosed without a court order, explaining that the settlement agreement contained a confidentiality clause and that the minutes and votes regarding the lawsuit were attorney work product that could not be produced. Strake subsequently sued the district in the circuit court, alleging the district’s failure to disclose the records violated chapter 610, RSMo, commonly called the state’s sunshine law. In January 2014, the circuit court found that, under the sunshine law, the district must disclose the settlement agreement, minutes and votes as well as the amount of all legal bills it paid. The court declined to require the district to pay a civil fine or Strake’s attorney fees, finding the district’s violation of the sunshine law was neither knowing nor purposeful. Strake appeals.

This appeal raises several related question for the Court. First is whether Strake proved the district knowingly or purposely violated the state’s sunshine law by failing to disclose the records Strake requested or whether the district reasonably believed the law authorized nondisclosure of the requested records. If the district did violate the sunshine law, then questions are raised as to whether the violation warrants imposition of a civil penalty against the district and an order requiring the district to pay Strake’s attorney fees and court costs.

The Missouri Press Association filed a brief as a friend of the Court. In it, the association focuses on the facts supporting a finding of a “purposeful” violation of the sunshine law sufficient to warrant imposition of a civil penalty and attorney fees and costs. The association notes that the provision for a “knowing” violation lacks a clear definition.

SC94842_Strake_brief.pdfSC94842_Strake_brief.pdfSC94842_Robinwood_West_Community_Improvement_Dist_brief.pdfSC94842_Robinwood_West_Community_Improvement_Dist_brief.pdf

SC94842_Strake_reply_brief.pdfSC94842_Strake_reply_brief.pdf
SC94842_Missouri_Press_Association_amicus_brief.pdf



SC94924
State of Missouri v. Justin Floyd Eugene Jones
St. Louis County
Sufficiency of evidence supporting convictions for armed criminal action, resisting arrest
Listen to the oral argument: SC94924.mp3SC94924.mp3
Jones was represented during arguments by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Rachel Flaster of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

A woman in St. Louis County came home late one evening in February 2010 and discovered an intruder in her garage. She described him as a man dressed in black holding a gun. She said she slammed the door and ran toward a bedroom, activating her alarm system and calling the police. Her 15-year-old son said the intruder pointed a gun at him, then put him in a chokehold with the gun to the boy’s head. The son said the intruder asked for money and drugs. The son said that, when the intruder’s cell phone rang, the son tried to get the gun away from the intruder and was injured in their struggle. One of the police officers who responded saw a man matching the suspect’s description running about two blocks from the woman’s home. The officer pursued the man, who did not heed the officer’s warning to stop running, and eventually caught the man and arrested him for robbery. Other police officers took the son to a nearby location, where the son identified the man there as the intruder. Officers identified the man as Justin Jones. The state charged Jones – as a prior and persistent offender – with one count of first-degree burglary, two counts of armed criminal action, one count of first-degree attempted robbery, one count of resisting arrest and one count of third-degree assault. Jones’ attorney filed a motion to continue the case, alleging the attorney had been on a prearranged leave of absence and needed more time to investigate Jones’ mental health, locate a witness and have Jones’ cell phone examined by a forensic examiner. The trial court overruled the motion, and the case was tried to a jury in December 2013. The jury found Jones guilty as charged. The court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms totaling 18 years in prison. Jones appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for the Court. One is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jones gained entry into the woman’s garage by, with, or through the use, aid or assistance of a deadly weapon so as to support Jones’ conviction for armed criminal action in association with the burglary offense. Another is whether the evidence was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jones should have known the officer was making an arrest when the officer merely identified himself as a police officer and told Jones to stop running so as to support Jones’ conviction for resisting arrest. Another question is whether the trial court should have allowed Jones’ attorney more time to locate the witness and to have a forensic examination of Jones’ cell phone conducted, given that the attorney entered his appearance three months before trial, was out of the country for more than one month during that period and was preparing for three murder trials while also preparing for Jones’ trial. A related question is whether this evidence that Jones wished to present would have contradicted evidence the state presented.

SC94924_Jones_brief.pdfSC94924_Jones_brief.pdfSC94924_State_brief.pdfSC94924_State_brief.pdfSC94924_Jones_reply_brief.pdfSC94924_Jones_reply_brief.pdf

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