Case Summary for December 14, 2005

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Case Summary for December 14, 2005

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, December 14, 2005
_____________________________________________________________________________________________

SC87069
State of Missouri v. Ronnie Reeder
St. Louis City
Right to present full defense in criminal trial

In July 2002, Ronnie Reeder was indicted on four counts of first-degree statutory rape, three counts of statutory sodomy, one count of first-degree child molestation and one count of third-degree assault for having sexual contact with one of his 13-year-old nieces in November 1999 and another of his 13-year-old nieces in December 2001 and February 2002. In March 2004, Reeder was tried for and found guilty of three counts of first-degree statutory rape and one count of attempted child molestation. The court later sentenced Reeder to a total of 15 years in prison. Reeder appeals.

Reeder argues that the trial court denied his constitutional right to present a full defense. He contends the court restricted his use of prior false allegations made by his nieces to prove their allegations against him lacked credibility. Reeder asserts that his nieces' credibility was key to his conviction. He further argues that his inability to present the valid defense that his nieces' accusations against him were fabricated substantially prejudiced him.

The state responds that the court did not infringe on Reeder's right to present a full defense. The state argues that Reeder was able to present extrinsic evidence that some of the witnesses had made prior false allegations against others. The state contends that Reeder was permitted to cross-examine the witnesses regarding prior false allegations.

SC87074
Jessie Carter v. State of Missouri
Maries County
Timeliness of postconviction relief motion

In September 2000, a jury convicted Jessie Carter of three counts of first-degree murder in connection to his role in the February 1998 murder of Susan Brouk and her two children. The Maries County circuit court subsequently sentenced him to three consecutive life sentences without parole. The court of appeals affirmed Carter's convictions and sentences. State v. Carter, 71 S.W.3d 267 (Mo. App. 2002). In April 2002, on the 84th day after the court of appeals decision became final, Carter filed his motion for postconviction relief, pro se (on his own, without an attorney), in Jackson County instead of Maries County. In June 2002, the Jackson County circuit court sent a letter to Carter stating that it was in receipt of his motion, that he should have filed it in Maries County, and that the Jackson County court had forwarded his motion to the Maries County circuit court. It is unclear whether the Maries County circuit court ever received that motion, but on the 93rd day after the court of appeals decision was final, it received an amended motion that Carter filed with the assistance of court-appointed counsel. The motion court dismissed the motion for not being filed within 90 days after the court of appeals decision became final. Carter appeals.

Carter argues the motion court clearly erred in dismissing his motion for postconviction relief as untimely filed. He contends the record leaves a firm impression that a mistake was made and that his motion was filed timely on July 8, 2002, even though it was filed in Jackson County and not in Maries County. Carter asserts the Maries County circuit court should have treated his motion as though he filed it originally in that county. Carter argues his signature on his amended motion constituted a prompt correction of the missing signature on the original motion.

The state responds that Carter's motion was not filed in a timely manner. It argues that, although Carter timely filed his motion in Jackson County, he failed to sign the motion. The state contends that the lack of a signature nullified the motion and, therefore, that the original motion did not invoke the jurisdiction of the court within the 90-day time limit of Rule 29.15.

SC87081
State of Missouri v. Oscar Barreras Sanchez, a/k/a Antonio Lopez
Saline County
Challenge to search and admission of evidence

A state trooper pulled over the car in which Oscar Sanchez was riding on eastbound Interstate 70 in Saline County, Missouri, for following another vehicle too closely. Because the driver was acting excessively nervous and because she did not know her passenger's last name, the trooper called a corporal for back-up. The passenger – Oscar Sanchez – told the trooper his name was Anthony Lopez. The trooper was suspicious that the identification Sanchez produced might be a fake. The trooper ultimately gave the driver a warning for following too closely and told her she was free to go. Before the driver got back to her car, the trooper then asked her if he could search her vehicle for drugs, weapons, large quantities of money or anything illegal. She refused permission. The trooper subsequently asked the corporal, who had a drug dog in his car, to sniff around the car for drugs.
The dog detected drugs in the trunk, and when the trooper searched the car's trunk and interior, he found marijuana, methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, a loaded gun and ammunition for the gun. The trooper arrested the driver and Sanchez, who later sought to suppress the evidence found during the search. The court overruled his motion, and, following a December 2003 judge-tried hearing, the trial court found him to be a prior and persistent offender and convicted him of first-degree drug trafficking and possession of a controlled substance. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms of 30 years and 15 years, respectively. Sanchez appeals.

Sanchez argues the trial court clearly erred in overruling his motion to suppress and in admitting the evidence found during the search of the car. Sanchez contends the search violated his right to be free from unlawful search and seizure. He asserts there was no reasonable suspicion to support a dog sniff of the car. Sanchez argues that once the trooper told the driver she was free to go, the purpose of the traffic stop was completed. He contends that any search thereafter required new reasonable suspicion that a crime had been committed. Sanchez asserts that the driver's and his continued detention was improper because nothing changed from the time the driver was told she was free to leave and the search of her car.

The state responds that the trial court did not err in overruling Sanchez's motion to suppress and in admitting the evidence found during the search. The state argues the search was not based on an illegal detention. The state contends that objectively reasonable suspicion arose during the investigation of the traffic offense. The state asserts that the trooper's statement that the driver was free to go after giving her a warning for a traffic offense did not prevent him from acting on reasonable suspicion. The state argues that even if the trial court could not rely solely on facts discovered before the purported end of the traffic stop, reversal is not required. The state contends an additional factor justifying reasonable suspicion arose during the subsequent consensual encounter between the driver and the trooper. The state asserts that any infringement on Sanchez's liberty from the sniff of the car by the drug dog was de minimis, or of little concern.

SC87082
Nicholas B. Reed v. Director of Revenue, State of Missouri
Phelps County
Challenge to reinstatement of driver's license

In December 2003, a trooper found Nicholas Reed's vehicle backed off in a ditch and partially on the side of a lane near Rolla, Missouri. The trooper contacted a wrecker to remove the vehicle and was advised that Reed already had contacted the wrecker. The trooper called Reed to the scene, questioned him about how the accident occurred and conducted field sobriety tests. The trooper subsequently cited Reed for careless and imprudent driving, arrested him for driving while intoxicated and gave him a notice that his license was being suspended. Following an administrative hearing, the director of revenue in March 2004 sustained the suspension of Reed's driver's license. He sought review in the circuit court, which ruled in September 2004 that Reed's arrest was not valid under Missouri statutes and ordered that his driver's license be reinstated. The director appeals.

The director argues that the court erred in setting aside the suspension of Reed's driving privilege. She contends the suspension was proper because Reed was arrested lawfully pursuant to section 577.039, RSMo 2000. She asserts that whether Reed was arrested lawfully pursuant to that section is not relevant. The director further argues that the breath test result lawfully was obtained, regardless of whether Reed had been arrested lawfully for driving while intoxicated.

Reed responds that the court properly reinstated his driving privilege. He argues he was not arrested lawfully pursuant to section 577.039. He contends field sobriety tests were administered three hours after the alleged violation occurred, which exceeds the 90-minute time limit. He further contends that the trooper did not have a warrant to arrest him and did not have reasonable grounds to have him picked up and returned to his vehicle. Reed asserts that because the trooper did not follow section 577.039, the evidence of the breath test was inadmissible under the implied consent law of section 577.034.4, RSMo. He argues the trooper did not witness his operation of the vehicle or observe any damage sustained to the vehicle or any other property. Reed contends that a driver's license suspension requires an arrest for committing an alcohol-related offense. Reed further responds that legislative enactments replaced common law foundations for the introduction of evidence.