Case Summary for October 1, 2014

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Case Summary for October 1, 2014

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, October 1, 2014

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SC94210
State of Missouri v. Peter D. Hansen
Greene County
Challenge to child abuse conviction

Listen to the oral argument:

SC94210.mp3
Hansen was represented during oral arguments by Ellen H. Flottman of the public defender's office in Columbia; and the state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Peter Hansen was charged with child abuse and inflicting cruel and inhuman punishment on his two minor children. Hansen lived with his wife and children in a church building following eviction from their house. The family practiced a special diet due to religious beliefs. Following a report of possible child abuse, the Division of Children’s Services investigated the family. The investigation revealed that the minors were punished for wrongdoings through either restriction of their diet or isolation in a cubicle or bathroom. Hansen was convicted of the two counts relating to one minor and sentenced to two concurrent (served at the same time) three-year sentences of imprisonment, for which the execution was suspended and he was ordered to serve 100 days shock time in county jail. Hansen filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (dismissal of charges), which the circuit court overruled. Hansen appeals.

Hansen argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal. He contends his conviction for child abuse violates his right to due process because the state provided insufficient evidence to establish that Hansen knowingly inflicted cruel and inhuman punishment. Hansen asserts the state failed to prove his actions were intentional when he limited the minors’ eating. He argues the state also failed to prove his actions were intentional when he restricted the minors to a bathroom for hours at a time, which was cold, without light and too small for at least one of the minors to stretch out.

The state responds the circuit court correctly overruled Hansen’s motion for judgment of acquittal and upheld the conviction. It argues there was sufficient evidence to prove that Hansen’s practice of withholding food from the minors as punishment was cruel and inhuman. The state contends there was also sufficient evidence to prove Hansen inflicted cruel and inhuman punishment by locking the minors in a small, dark and cold bathroom for days at a time. It asserts the evidence was sufficient for a jury to convict Hansen of child abuse under section 568.060, RSMo.

SC94210_Hansen_brief.pdf

SC94210_State_brief.pdf

SC94210_Hansen_reply_brief.pdf

SC94226
State of Missouri v. Brenda Churchill
Monroe County
Challenge to perjury charges

Listen to the oral argument:

SC94226.mp3
Churchill was represented during oral arguments by Amy M. Bartholow of the public defender's office in Columbia; and the state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Brenda Churchill was convicted of perjury for lying to a juvenile court as to the existence of her youngest child. In June 2011 the local juvenile office filed a petition alleging Churchill’s son needed protective care due to allegations of abuse, neglect and/or harm. She told the sheriff and testified to the juvenile court judge, under oath at a protective custody hearing, that she had no children living with her and repeatedly requested counsel for the hearing. Churchill later delivered her son to the Department of Social Services Children’s Division. She was later charged with perjury under section 575.040, RSMo, for lying under oath at the hearing. At trial, Churchill filed a motion to suppress her statements at the hearing claiming she was denied her right to counsel for the hearing. The circuit court overruled her motion to suppress, finding that Churchill was entitled to counsel at the hearing but this did not excuse the act of perjury. Churchill was sentenced to four years imprisonment and filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (dismissal of charges), which the circuit court also overruled. Churchill appeals.

Churchill argues the circuit court erred in overruling her motion for judgment of acquittal. She further contends her statements regarding the existence of her child should not have been admitted as evidence. Churchill asserts that allowing her statements into evidence violated her rights against self-incrimination, to counsel and to due process. She argues she was entitled to counsel for the juvenile hearing and to be advised of her right not to testify. Churchill contends she was compelled to testify, which deprived her of her liberty and her statements should be suppressed (prevent from allowing into evidence). She asserts she should not have been convicted of perjury because there is insufficient evidence to prove her statements could or did affect the outcome of the proceeding. Churchill further argues she retracted her statement that the child did not exist by bringing the child to the juvenile authorities.

The state responds the trial court correctly overruled her motion for judgment of acquittal. It argues the circuit court also correctly refused to suppress Churchill’s statements. The state contends Churchill’s rights to counsel were not violated because that right applies only to criminal proceedings and this was a civil hearing regarding protective custody. It asserts Churchill voluntarily gave incorrect statements at the juvenile hearing, for which she was later charged with perjury. The state argues her statements cannot be suppressed because they are the crime for which she was later prosecuted. It contends she was not forced to share incriminating information about criminal activities and false testimony is never protected. The state asserts Churchill made a false statement regarding the existence of her child, who was the subject of the hearing and was, therefore, a material fact in the hearing. It argues that bringing the child to the authorities two weeks after the hearing did not constitute a retraction of her false statement.

SC94226_Churchill_brief.pdf

SC94226_State_brief.pdf

SC94226_Churchill_reply_brief.pdf

SC94154
State of Missouri v. Claude Dale Brooks
St. Charles County
Challenge to robbery conviction

Listen to the oral argument:

SC94154.mp3
Brooks was represented during oral arguments by Samuel Buffaloe of the public defender's office in Columbia; and the state was represented by Robert (Jeff) Bartholomew of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Claude Brooks was convicted of second-degree robbery for the theft of money from a St. Charles bank. Brooks entered the bank and handed a note demanding money to one of the tellers in the lobby. He left the bank, but was apprehended nearby and charged with the robbery. Following trial, Brooks filed a motion for judgment of acquittal (dismissal of charges) claiming there was insufficient evidence that he used force in the course of the robbery. The circuit court overruled his motion and sentenced him to 25 years imprisonment. Brooks appeals.

Brooks argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal (dismissal of charges). He contends the circuit court violated his right to due process because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of second-degree robbery. Brooks asserts he should not have been convicted and sentenced because the state failed to prove the essential element that he used force to steal money from the bank.

The state responds the circuit court correctly overruled Brooks’ motion for judgment of acquittal. It argues there was sufficient evidence to support a second-degree robbery conviction. The state contends Brooks threatened the use of physical force against the bank teller if she did not give him the money. It asserts that when the bank teller attempted to go to a drawer at the other counter, Brooks raised his voice, slammed his hand on the counter and demanded that she stay at the desk, which was sufficient to suggest the use of force.

SC94154_Brooks_brief.pdf

SC94154_State_brief.pdf

SC94154_Brooks_reply_brief.pdf

SC94172
In re: Samuel E. Trapp
Cole County
Attorney discipline

Listen to the oral argument:

SC94172.mp3
Chief Disciplinary Counsel was represented during oral arguments by Sam S. Phillips of The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel in Jefferson City; and Trapp was represented by private practitioner James D. Barding of in Jefferson City.

Mid-Missouri attorney Samuel Trapp has primary offices in Columbia and Lake Ozark as well as secondary offices in Jefferson City and Kansas City. An investigation of Trapp’s practice by the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s disciplinary hearing panel revealed several alleged violations of the rules of professional conduct. In one count a client filed a complaint with The Missouri Bar fee dispute program claiming that Trapp refused to refund her money. The disciplinary hearing panel found Trapp collected $3,500, which was deposited entirely into his operating account instead of his client trust account, and never provided the client an invoice. In another count, it was determined Trapp drafted paperwork conveying a client’s home to him in exchange for legal fees, but Trapp never adequately explained to his client how the process would occur or what his client should do with the paperwork. The client ultimately retained separate counsel to represent her in working out a payment plan with Trapp and getting the deed for her home back. In other counts the panel found that Trapp failed to timely respond to court requests for information or request a continuance in two proceedings. The panel also determined Trapp failed to timely provide trust account records following several requests from the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The investigation revealed several questionable transactions, including clients receiving payments much lower than their settlement checks and a check made out only to the firm being deposited into the trust account. Trapp claimed he did not maintain settlement sheets for his clients and could not produce documentation to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The disciplinary hearing panel recommended that Trapp’s license be suspended with no reinstatement to apply for at least one year but that the suspension should be stayed and Trapp placed on probation.

Chief Disciplinary Counsel argues that Trapp violated Rule 4-1.4 regarding communication by failing to properly discuss his fees with his client. Disciplinary Counsel contends Trapp also violated Rule 4-1.16(d) regarding the return of fees after termination by failing to return his client’s advance fees. Disciplinary Counsel asserts Trapp violated Rules 4-1.15(c) and 4-1.15(j) regarding client funds by depositing unearned fees into his operating account and failing to deposit disputed funds into his trust account. Disciplinary Counsel argues Trapp violated Rule 4-1.8(a) regarding prohibited attorney-client transactions by taking ownership and interest in his client’s home without advising her to seek independent counsel. Disciplinary Counsel further contends Trapp violated Rule 4-8.1 by failing to respond to to the Disciplinary Counsel during investigations for two different clients. Disciplinary Counsel asserts Trapp commingled client and personal funds and failed to keep adequate records of client and personal funds in violation of Rule 4-1.15 regarding the safekeeping of client property. Disciplinary Counsel asks this court to suspend Trapp’s law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months. Disciplinary Counsel suggests probation should not be granted because Trapp failed to accept assistance to regulate his trust account practices and was defiant to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s requests.

Trapp responds that he did communicate with his client and provided an invoice to her, which confused her, and he only did not take part in fee dispute resolution because he did not want to enter arbitration. He argues he was not aware of an invoice for her $200 filing fee until his client hired separate counsel and that he deposited the disputed funds into his trust account immediately. Trapp concedes that he did enter into an agreement whereby he took interest in a client’s home in exchange for attorney’s fees, but argues that it was not adverse to his client. He also admits he failed to deposit another client’s funds into his trust account. Trapp contends the allegations that he failed to timely respond to court requests are incorrect because he did not accept representation of one of the clients and he filed proper requests for extensions of time as to the other client. He asserts that his trust account was not overdrawn but instead due to a bank error appeared to be overdrawn. Trapp argues that he attempted to timely respond to the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s requests but he obtained legal counsel and due to legal counsel’s illness, Trapp’s record keeping system and a fire at his office it required extended time. He concedes that he placed personal funds in his trust account, client funds in his operating account and failed to maintain adequate records. Trapp contends that an admonition is sufficient as discipline.

SC94172_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief.pdf

SC94172_Trapp_brief.pdf