Case Summary for April 2, 2008

Your Missouri Courts - Supreme Court

Home

Case Summary for April 2, 2008

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, April 2, 2008

_______________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC88584
Steven Crenshaw v. State of Missouri
City of St. Louis
Ineffective counsel
Listen to the oral argument:

Crenshaw was represented during argument by Gwenda R. Robinson of the public defender's office in St. Louis, and the state was represented by Joshua N. Corman of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In September 1999, Darwin Beck was shot in the abdomen. In the hospital, he told police Steven Crenshaw shot him. Crenshaw was on parole at the time and was charged with assault in the first degree and armed criminal action. In January 2000, Crenshaw requested a speedy disposition of detainer. The next month he was arraigned and his case was continued to March 2000. In August 2000, the state brought Crenshaw's case to trial. Crenshaw moved to dismiss the indictment because more than 180 days had elapsed from the date of the receipt of his detainer request. The trial court overruled his motion because Crenshaw had delayed the trial from February to March when the public defender's office determined Crenshaw was financially ineligible for services. At trial, Crenshaw testified he was with Tracy Shanklin at his grandmother's house the night Beck was shot. Shanklin did not testify. At the end of trial, Crenshaw again moved to dismiss arguing he did not consent to, nor authorize anyone to consent to, any continuance from February to March 2000. The trial court overruled his motion to dismiss. In December 2000, Crenshaw was convicted and sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 19 years for assault in the first degree and 11 years for armed criminal action. In May 2002, Crenshaw moved for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15 for ineffective assistance of counsel. In January 2003, the motion court overruled his motion. In March 2005, Crenshaw moved to reopen his post-conviction case on the ground of abandonment and, in June 2006, moved to set aside the motion court's judgment for lack of notice. In August 2006, the motion court found post-conviction counsel abandoned Crenshaw by failing to file a timely notice of appeal and granted him until August 2006 to appeal. Crenshaw appeals.

Crenshaw argues his rights to due process of law, to effective assistance of counsel, to present a defense and to a fair trial and a speedy trial were violated. He contends he has a right to reopen his post-conviction proceedings based on his post-conviction counsel's abandonment and failure to timely file a notice of appeal or in providing Crenshaw additional time to file a timely notice of appeal. Crenshaw further argues his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to subpoena and call Shanklin to testify at trial. He contends but for trial counsel's unreasonable failure, there is a probability the outcome of this trial would have been different. Crenshaw asserts his trial counsel was ineffective for moving for a continuance without Crenshaw's consent or knowledge in that Crenshaw properly requested final disposition of the underlying criminal case within the statutory 180 days under the uniform mandatory disposition of detainers law, and but for the trial counsel's continuance of Crenshaw's trial from February to March 2000, the trial court would have been required to dismiss all charges against Crenshaw for lack of jurisdiction.

The state responds this appeal should be dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction because Crenshaw failed to timely file his notice of appeal. It contends he filed his notice of appeal three and one-half years after the motion court overruled his Rule 29.15 motion. The state argues the motion court did not have authority to circumvent the time limits prescribed in Rules 81.04(a) and 30.03, governing the time for filing a notice of appeal, because Crenshaw was not abandoned by post-conviction counsel. The state contends Crenshaw's counsel's did not fail to conform to the degree of skill, care and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney rendering similar services under similar circumstances. The state asserts counsel investigated and spoke with Shanklin on multiple occasions prior to trial and Shanklin assured counsel on multiple occasions that she was willing to testify and would be in court. The state responds Crenshaw is barred from relitigating the issue of whether the trial counsel was ineffective for moving for a continuance without Crenshaw's consent or knowledge because the court of appeals already decided on direct appeal that the continuance was granted for good cause in open court in Crenshaw's presence. It argues issues decided upon direct appeal cannot be relitigated under a theory of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction proceeding. The state contends Crenshaw was not represented by counsel at the time of the continuance in that the public defender refused to represent him and trial counsel did not enter his appearance until months later.

SC88895
Vincent McFadden v. State of Missouri
St. Louis County
Post-conviction motions and "abandonment" of counsel
Listen to the oral argument:

McFadden was represented during argument by Janet M. Thompson of the public defender's office in Columbia, Missouri, and the state was represented by Jayne T. Woods of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Vincent McFadden was convicted of first degree murder and this Court found that the state exercised its peremptory challenges in a racially-discriminatory way. The Court reversed the judgment and sentence and remanded for a new trial in State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648 (Mo. banc 2006). The sole statutory aggravating circumstances found by the jury were two counts of first degree assault, two counts of armed criminal action and one count of unlawful use of a weapon. In February 2005, McFadden was convicted on all counts. He appealed, but the judgment was affirmed and his post-appeal motions were overruled. He was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. McFadden filed a pro se (without legal counsel) Rule 29.15 motion with the circuit court on October 2006, 91 days after the court of appeals issued its mandate. In November 2006, the motion court appointed a public defender to represent McFadden. In January 2007, the state moved to dismiss McFadden's post-conviction motion for failure to comply with the time limits set in Rule 29.15(b). The public defender said it was her fault the motion was late because she turned in the filing for him and she failed to timely file his pro se motion. In February 2007, the motion court dismissed McFadden's pro se Rule 29.15 motion, stating it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because McFadden's motion had been filed too late. McFadden appeals.

McFadden argues his rights to due process, a full and fair hearing in state court, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment were violated. He contends the public defender entered into an attorney-client relationship with him whereby she agreed to file his motion for post-conviction relief in the circuit court, but, despite having received it from McFadden in a timely fashion, she filed it one day late. He contends because he could control the filing of his motion for post-conviction relief but instead relied upon the public defender's advice and counsel, the doctrine of abandonment should operate to allow McFadden the opportunity to pursue his post-conviction remedy in state court.

The state responds McFadden failed to comply with the 90-day time limit set forth in Rule 29.15(b). It argues his pro se motion was filed 91 days after the court of appeals mandate in the direct appeal issued. The state asserts the public defender did not represent McFadden when the pro se motion was filed and the abandonment doctrine does not excuse untimely filing of a pro se motion.

SC89000
In re: James M. Martin
City of St. Louis
Attorney Discipline
Listen to the oral argument:

The disciplinary counsel was represented during argument by Alan D. Pratzel, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, of Jefferson City, and Martin was represented by John Malec of St. Louis.

James Martin was licensed to practice law in Missouri in April 1968. He practiced law in St. Louis. Between October and December 2005, Martin was notified William and Patricia Hawkins and Grace Eckstein filed complaints against him with the chief disciplinary counsel. In June 2007, when he did not respond to any of the complaints, Martin was charged with professional misconduct. The disciplinary hearing panel concluded Martin violated Rule 4-8.1 by not responding to multiple letters requesting information; Rule 4-1.3 (failure to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing client) by failing to represent the Hawkinses and Eckstein with reasonable diligence and promptness in their cases; and Rule 4-1.5(c) (contingent fee contracts shall be in writing) in that his contingency fee contract with Hawkins was not in writing.

In September 1992, Martin served as co-counsel for the Hawkinses and Eckstein for the wrongful death of their sons in a motor vehicle accident. The case was filed in Illinois on a products liability theory against Chrysler Corporation, Shelby Motors and Goodyear Tire. The Hawkinses and Eckstein initially were concerned whether they had a valid case against Chrysler, but Eckstein wanted to pursue the case based on Martin's expert's theory that a manufacturing defect caused the accident. In late 1995 or early 1996, the Illinois court dismissed the case based on forum non-conveniens. Martin refiled in July 1996 in Texas County, Missouri. Shelby made offers of $25,000 to the Hawkinses and Eckstin, but they declined. Martin was concerned about his expert testimony for trial. Shelby and Goodyear were eventually both dismissed as defendants, and in 2001, Chrysler moved for summary judgment. The circuit court overruled the motion, but Martin did not take further steps for the case to go to trial. Four years later, still not having gone to trial, the Hawkinses and Eckstein filed complaints against Martin. Martin concedes he should have told them in 2002 that they did not have a case and that diligence requires a lawyer to advise his clients if he is not willing to take their case to trial, but, he argued, he had a duty to not abandon the clients until the attorney/client relationship had broken down. Martin eventually was granted leave to withdraw from the case in February 2006, while the case was still ongoing. The disciplinary counsel seeks to have Martin's license suspended.

The disciplinary counsel argues Martin failed to respond to disciplinary authorities' multiple requests for information over a 20-month period and did not communicate meaningful with nor act diligently toward his clients about his handling of their case and did not memorialize his contingency fee contract with Hawkins. It asserts this Court should suspend Martin's license for six months and stay the suspension for a one-year period of probation because he knowingly violated duties to the profession and his clients over an extended period of time, he is guilty of multiple rule violations, he has disciplinary history, and he has substantial experience in the practice of law.

Martin responds he should not be disciplined. He contends he was diligent because the Hawkinses and Eckstein repeatedly refused to accept offers from Shelby when they knew there was a likelihood Shelby would be dismissed. Martin argues he worked diligently to contact multiple expert witnesses regarding Chrysler's liability, but could not obtain opinions that would assist in proving defective manufacturing. He asserts the evidence indicates he advised the complainants they could not make a case without another expert witness and that their case was "thin," but that they wanted to proceed. Martin argues expenses were approximately $7,800 and the complainants only paid $4,200, leaving his law firm with a $3,500 deficit. He further responds he kept the Hawkinses and Eckstein aware of the proceedings and maintained contact about his advice for Shelby's offers, the summary judgment motion and needing an expert. Martin argues there is not a fee dispute and there is no question that while the written agreements for contingency fees could not be located, the Hawkinses and Eckstein acted in reliance on a valid and enforceable fee agreement and their actions manifested their asset to the agreement by accepting continuing representation. In response to his failure to respond to disciplinary authorities, Martin contends a combination of personal health issues and difficult trial and pre-trial proceedings prohibited him from responding in a more timely manner and that the letter from the disciplinary counsel appeared to leave open the option of not responding in the first letter. He asserts his license should not be suspended because he did not knowingly violate duties of the profession and did not timely respond to the instant case, however Rule 4-8.1(c) was apparently adopted and effective well after the demands made by disciplinary authorities and, therefore, he did not violate this rule. He contends his firm did not neglect its duties and should not have more forcefully advised complainants in writing of the lack of merit of the case being successful because no reasonably experienced plaintiff's attorney would commit such information to writing as it exposes clients to claims for abuse of power or claims for attorney's fees and costs in a sanction motion under Rule 55.

SC88784
Michael A. Taylor v. State of Missouri
Jackson County
Post-conviction appeal in a death sentence case
Listen to the oral argument:

Taylor was represented during argument by Robert W. Lundt of the public defender's office in St. Louis, and the state was represented by Stephen D. Hawke of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Michael Taylor pleaded guilty to first degree murder, armed criminal action, kidnapping and forcible rape in February 1991. He was sentenced to death, 10 years, 15 years and life with each count to run consecutively. Taylor moved for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035 in August 1991. The circuit court overruled his motion. On appeal in June 1993, this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new penalty hearing, imposition of sentence and entry of new judgment. In January 1994, Taylor moved to withdraw his guilty plea. The circuit court overruled his motion and Taylor was again sentenced to death, 50 years, 15 years and life to run consecutively. Taylor appealed. In December 1994, he moved for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035, challenging his guilty plea and his second sentencing proceeding and sentence of death. In June 1995, the circuit court overruled Taylor's Rule 24.035 motion. This Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief. Taylor then sought habeas corpus in the federal court in July 2000, which denied relief after the state argued he failed to fully litigate his issues in state court. He moved to reopen post-conviction proceedings in the circuit court in September 2005, for ineffective assistance of guilty plea and initial-sentencing counsel. The circuit court overruled his motion in July 2007, finding this Court ordered a remand for sentencing only, affirmed the voluntariness of the guilty please and, thus, did not consider any issue with regard to plea/initial sentencing counsel or the involuntariness of Taylor's plea. Taylor appeals.

Taylor argues he should be allowed to seek post-conviction relief on the grounds of abandonment because he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel and due process of law. He contends his appellate counsel's abandonment caused him to lose on his legitimate claims of ineffective assistance against his initial plea and sentencing counsel. He argues he alleged facts not conclusions that, if proven, entitle him to relief. Taylor contends the facts he alleged raised matters not conclusively refuted by the files and records. He argues the motion court denied his rights to due process, fundamental fairness, counsel and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Taylor contends the motion court erred by refusing to reopen the post-conviction case in light of the equitable principles of promissory and judicial estoppel since the state succeeded in foreclosing Taylor from receiving a review in federal court on the merits. He asserts the state promised to not object on procedural grounds in the second penalty phase but prevailed in federal court by arguing Taylor's claims were barred from consideration based on failure to fully litigate the issues in state court.

The state responds this Court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider the litigation from which Taylor appealed and Taylor is not appealing a "judgment" from the circuit court. It argues the circuit court properly overruled Taylor's Rule 24.035 motion and should decline to reopen the litigation because the circuit court concluded Taylor was not abandoned by his second post-conviction counsel and Taylor does not demonstrate that conclusion is clearly erroneous.