Case Summary for May 3, 2005

Your Missouri Courts - Supreme Court

Home

Case Summary for May 3, 2005

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

ATTACHED TO THE FOLLOWING DOCKETED CASES ARE ELECTRONIC COPIES OF THE BRIEF(S) FILED BY THE PARTY OR PARTIES. THESE ELECTRONIC BRIEFS HAVE BEEN CONVERTED TO PDF BY THE COURT'S STAFF TO ACCOMMODATE VARIOUS WORD PROCESSORS. (If you do not already have the Acrobat reader, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) THE ATTACHMENTS MAY NOT REFLECT ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT, THE COMPLETE ELECTRONIC FILING, OR THE FORMAT OF THE ORGINAL FILING. APPENDICES AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS GENERALLY WILL NOT BE POSTED HERE. (To determine whether or which briefs have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.) POSTING OF THE BRIEFS DOES NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ABOUT THE APPROPRIATENESS OF THE FORMAT OF THE BRIEFS OR THE MERITS OF A CASE. THESE POSTINGS ARE NOT OFFICIAL COURT RECORDS. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Tuesday, May 3, 2005

1:30 p.m. docket
______________________________________________________________________________

SC86450
In re: Derrick R. Williams, Sr.
Cape Girardeau County
Attorney discipline

In October 2001, Derrick Williams, Sr., was granted a conditional license to practice law in Missouri due to concerns about debts he had charged off and items he had in collection. Williams was given three years to bring delinquent financial obligations to current status and was not to default any further on other financial obligations. At the time, Williams agreed to provide the office of chief disciplinary counsel with quarterly reports regarding the status of his financial obligations. Williams, who has been practicing in Cape Girardeau County, failed to provide these quarterly reports for the fourth quarter of 2001 and the second quarter of 2002. He also provided erroneous information in his quarterly reports for the first, third and fourth quarters of 2002, and the second and third quarters of 2003, indicating he had made payments to creditors that he in fact had not made. In addition, the chief disciplinary counsel alleges that Williams, while employed for the law firm of Reynolds and Gold in Cape Girardeau, Missouri, received $500 in payments from three individuals but never deposited these monies into the firm's account. In September 2002, the firm discharged Williams. He told the firm that these three individuals were previous clients of his, even though he previously had been employed by the public defender's office, leading the firm to believe he could not have had any previous private clients. The firm also found letterhead and intake sheets with Williams' personal letterhead but the firm's address and telephone number. Following an August 2004 evidentiary hearing, a regional disciplinary panel found that Williams violated the rules of professional responsibility with regard to the quarterly reports. It also found that the chief disciplinary counsel did not prove Williams had engaged in dishonest, deceitful conduct. The panel recommended that Williams be reprimanded publicly. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to discipline Williams' law license.

The chief disciplinary counsel argues this Court should suspend Williams' license for six months. She contends Williams stipulated that he violated Rule 4-8.1(b), failure to respond to demands for information from a disciplinary authority, and Rule 4-8.4(d), conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in his failure to provide two quarterly financial reports and in providing five erroneous quarterly financial reports. She asserts Williams failed to inform his law firm of alleged "preexisting" clients, used his firm's office address and telephone numbers on pleadings, letters and an intake form without using the firm's name, and represented clients in a personal capacity while a full-time employee of the firm. The chief disciplinary counsel argues Williams knowingly withheld cases and material information from his law firm. She contends this conduct involved dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.

Williams responds that he should not be disciplined regarding the quarterly reports. He argues he paid 13 of his 18 creditors in full and provided all but two of the quarterly reports during the three-year monitoring period. He contends that the chief disciplinary counsel failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the allegations regarding the client monies and his use of the firm's address and telephone number. He asserts the chief disciplinary counsel also failed to prove that he engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. Williams further argues that he has no prior disciplinary history and that his conduct did not harm any clients or the public.

SC86227
In re: Lawrence L. Pratt
St. Louis
Attorney discipline

In September 2001, while he was employed by the state public defender in the eastern district/postconviction office, attorney Lawrence Pratt was assigned to represent David Hammond in a postconviction relief action in St. Louis County. Hammond already had filed a postconviction relief motion on his own, and Pratt was given until October 31, 2001, to file an amended motion for postconviction relief on Hammond's behalf. About a week before, Pratt sought additional time and, essentially, was given until November 7, 2001, to file the amended motion. On December 6, 2001, Pratt sought additional time in which to file an amended motion. The court denied the motion and held an evidentiary hearing on Hammond's original motion on January 4, 2002. At the beginning of the hearing, Pratt sought a 60-day continuance in which to review Hammond's medical records and to have Hammond evaluated by a mental health professional. The court denied the motion, and Pratt did not present any evidence on Hammond's behalf. The court ultimately denied Hammond's request for postconviction relief. The court found that Pratt's failure to file an amended motion for postconviction relief or to otherwise comply with Rule 24.035 resulted from a conscious choice by Pratt to attempt to circumvent the limited times for filing amendments under the rule. In December 2002, the court of appeals found that Pratt legally had abandoned Hammond, reversed the motion court's denial of Hammond's motion for postconviction relief and remanded the case for appointment of new counsel to represent Hammond. The court of appeals noted that Pratt's approach to the case was "ethically questionable" and "puzzling." Following a December 2003 evidentiary hearing, a regional disciplinary panel found that Pratt failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing Hammond and that Pratt failed to meet his Missouri continuing legal education reporting requirements for three years. The panel ultimately recommended that Pratt be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel now asks this Court to discipline Pratt's law license.

The chief disciplinary counsel argues that this Court, at a minimum, should reprimand Pratt, noting that aggravating circumstances could permit the Court to suspend Pratt's license to practice law. She contends Pratt violated Rules 4-1.3 and 4-3.2 by negligently failing to comply with the requirements of Rule 24.035 and the motion court's orders to file an amended postconviction relief motion on Hammond's behalf. She asserts that Pratt violated Rule 4-5.5(c) by not filing an annual report of continuing legal education credit hours and failing to provide any proof that he completed his continuing legal education obligations for three years while continuing to practice law.

Pratt responds that this Court should not discipline him. He argues he did not violate Rules 4-1.3 and 4-3.2 because he did not negligently fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 24.035. He contends he did not violate Rule 4-5.5(c) and asserts that he currently is in full compliance with his continuing legal education requirements.

SC86595
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Albert Bernat v. State of Missouri
St. Charles County
Challenges to sexually violent predator finding and civil commitment

In August 1986, Albert Bernat pled guilty to the forcible rape of an 18-year-old woman in December 1985. Bernat completed phase I of the Missouri sexual offender program while in prison and, on a second attempt, completed phase II of the program in 1992. Upon his parole from prison, Bernat participated in counseling with a licensed therapist to whom he was referred by the board of probation and parole. He remained in therapy until late 1995. That year, Bernat was accused of raping another woman, although a jury acquitted him at trial. Based on the alleged victim's statements, Bernat's parole was revoked, and he was returned to prison. Two days before he was scheduled for release in December 2000, the state moved to commit Bernat involuntarily to secure confinement in the department of mental health's custody as a sexually violent predator. Following a jury trial in October and November 2001, the court declared a mistrial when the jurors were unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Following a June 2003 retrial, the jury found Bernat to be a sexually violent predator, and the court ordered him committed to the department's custody until his mental abnormality has so changed that he is safe to be released. Bernat appeals.

Bernat argues the court plainly erred in permitting the state to call him as a witness in violation of his right to remain silent and of equal protection. He contends section 632.335, RSMo 2000, gives persons the state is seeking to commit civilly under the general commitment statutes the right to remain silent at trial. He asserts that the state did not and cannot show a compelling state interest in treating him differently from other persons situated similarly. Bernat argues the court abused its discretion and violated his due process rights in permitting the state to read into evidence, over his objection, the testimony of a licensed clinical social worker. He contends this witness was not qualified under an amended statute to diagnose or testify regarding the existence of a mental abnormality that would place Bernat within the definition of a sexually violent predator because she is not a psychologist or psychiatrist.

The state responds that equal protection does not grant alleged sexually violent predators an unequivocal right to remain silent in civil commitment hearings, even though there is a statutory right to remain silent in other involuntary civil commitment proceedings. It argues that sexually violent predators are not similarly situated to other civilly committed persons and that the sexual violent predator laws are drawn narrowly to serve a compelling state interest. The state contends that the licensed clinical social worker was qualified to diagnose and testify regarding the existence of mental abnormalities placing Bernat within the definition of a "sexually violent predator." It asserts that the amended statute does not address witnesses testifying at trial. The state further responds that this Court, in In re Johnson, 58 S.W.3d 496 (Mo. banc 2001), determined that licensed social workers legally may evaluate persons and diagnose mental disorders.