Case Summary for September 5, 2012

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Case Summary for September 5, 2012

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, Sept. 5, 2012

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SC92532
State of Missouri v. Kirk Jackson
St. Charles County
Validity of cash-only bail bonds
Listen to the oral argument:

Jackson was represented during arguments by Lou Horwitz of Lou Horwitz LLC in St. Peters, and the state was represented by Breck Burgess of the St. Charles County prosecutor's office in St. Charles.

A warrant was issued in March 2012 for Kirk Jackson’s arrest on a charge of invasion of privacy for concealing a video camera and filming a massage therapy client without their consent. The trial court set bail at $75,000 cash only, such that Jackson must post the full amount of the bond to be released from jail. Jackson filed a motion to reduce the bond, which was overruled. He also filed a motion, pursuant to Rule 33.09, RSMo, regarding inadequate or excessive conditions for release, which also was overruled. Jackson appeals.

Jackson argues the trial court erred in setting his bail as cash-only for the arrest warrant. He contends that article I, section 20 of the Missouri Constitution provides that all people are entitled to sufficient sureties and to be bailed unless they are charged with a capital offense in which the death penalty is sought as punishment. Jackson asserts Rule 33.01(a) entitles him to be released before trial because he was charged with a bailable offense. He argues that because he was not charged with a capital offense, cash-only bail violated both the constitution and the rule.

The state argues the trial court did not err because a cash-only bond is not prohibited by the Missouri Constitution. It contends that, in this case, a cash-only bond was a sufficient surety. The state asserts that when a person is charged with 14 felony charges, a cash-only bond is sufficient.

The Missouri Association of Prosecuting Attorneys argues as a friend of the Court, that Jackson’s constitutional right to sufficient sureties is both balanced and limited by a subsequent provision of the constitution granting the court the power to deny or set conditions on bail to ensure the safety of the public. It contends the legislature and courts may authorize additional methods beyond standard bail to ensure the appearance of criminal defendants. The association asserts that to invalidate the cash-only bail option would result in unintended consequences to the entire criminal justice system. It argues the public defender system would experience consequences such as an increase in its workload due to such invalidation.

SC92260
Norman C. Doughty v. Director of Revenue
Vernon County
Revocation of driving privileges
Listen to the oral argument:

Doughty was represented during arguments by Todd Wilhelmus of Caskey, Hopkins & Wilhelmus LLC in Butler, and the state was represented by John Grantham of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Norman Doughty was arrested on April 24, 2011 for driving while intoxicated after failing a field sobriety test and preliminary breath test. Doughty did not provide a sufficient sample for the breathalyzer test. Doughty was notified shortly after his arrest that his driving privileges had been revoked for one year, and he filed a petition for review of the director of revenue’s decision. The director offered into evidence forms including Doughty’s driving history as well as the police report and the alcohol influence report from his arrest. The officer who authored the reports did not testify at trial. The trial court admitted the forms into evidence after considering Doughty’s objection and found the director properly had revoked Doughty’s driving privileges. Doughty appeals.

Doughty argues the trial court erred in admitting forms certifying that he refused to submit to a breath, saliva, blood and/or urine test as an exhibit. He contends the admission of the forms violated his right to due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. Doughty asserts the admission also deprived him of his rights to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. He argues the violation of his due process rights should void the judgment of the trial court.

The director argues the trial court correctly admitted Doughty’s records as exhibits. She contends the trial court correctly found that her decision was supported by evidence. The director asserts the trial court followed statutory procedures and did not violate Doughty’s due process rights. She argues that statutory procedure permitted Doughty to call on the officer who authored the forms for cross-examination, which was sufficient to protect Doughty’s due process rights.

SC92261
David T. Doughty v. Director of Revenue
Vernon County
Revocation of driving privileges
Listen to the oral argument:

Doughty was represented during arguments by Todd Wilhelmus of Caskey, Hopkins & Wilhelmus LLC in Butler, and the state was represented by John Grantham of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

David Doughty was arrested on April 24, 2011 for driving while intoxicated after failing a field sobriety test and preliminary breath test. He refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. Doughty’s driving privileges were revoked for one year, and he filed a petition for review of the director of revenue’s decision. The director offered into evidence forms including Doughty’s driving history as well as the police report and the alcohol influence report from the arrest. The officer who authored the reports did not testify at trial. Doughty acknowledges that he did not subpoena the officer as a witness. The trial court admitted the forms into evidence after considering Doughty’s objection and found the director properly had revoked his driving privileges. Doughty appeals.

Doughty argues the trial court erred in admitting forms certifying that he refused to submit to a breath, saliva, blood and/or urine test as an exhibit. He contends the admission of the forms violated his right to due process under the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10 of the Missouri Constitution. Doughty also asserts the admission deprived him of his rights to confront the witnesses against him and to cross-examine them. He argues the violation of his due process rights should void the judgment of the trial court.

The director argues the trial court correctly admitted Doughty’s records as exhibits. She contends the trial court correctly found that her decision was supported by evidence. The director asserts the trial court followed statutory procedures and did not violate Doughty’s due process rights. She argues that statutory procedure permitted Doughty to call on the officer who authored the forms for cross-examination, which was sufficient to protect Doughty’s due process rights.

SC89429
State of Missouri v. Vincent McFadden
St. Louis County
Death penalty
Listen to the oral argument:

McFadden was represented during arguments by Janet Thompson of the public defender's office in Columbia, and the state was represented by Daniel McPherson of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Vincent McFadden was convicted of first-degree murder and armed criminal action for the March 2006 shooting death of Leslie Addison. During the penalty phase of the trial, the state introduced evidence of his conviction and death sentence in an unrelated case for the shooting death of Todd Franklin. McFadden was sentenced to death for Addison’s murder along with a consecutive sentence of 75 years imprisonment for the armed criminal action conviction. Following his conviction for Addison’s murder, McFadden appealed his conviction for Franklin’s murder. This Court reversed that conviction and sentence due to error in jury selection. McFadden then appealed his conviction for Addison’s murder, claiming his conviction for Franklin’s murder had influenced the jury’s verdict in the case involving Addison’s murder. This Court reversed that conviction and sentence as well and remanded (sent back) the case for retrial. During jury selection in the retrial involving Addison’s murder, three potential jurors stated they would be unable to sign the death verdict if necessary. The state struck all three. Several other potential jurors expressed religious opposition to the death penalty, and the state struck them for cause. Addison’s sister – who also was the mother of McFadden’s child –testified that, the day of her sister’s murder, McFadden had confronted Addison and her and made incriminating statements . The sister identified McFadden as the person who shot Addison that night. The state submitted instruction 21 to the jury, providing statutory aggravating-circumstance evidence regarding McFadden’s prior convictions and whether those prior convictions were serious assaultive convictions. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt all of the statutory aggravating circumstances submitted to it, and the trial court followed the jury’s recommendation in sentencing McFadden to death. McFadden appeals.

McFadden argues the trial court erred in entering the first-degree murder conviction against him and sentencing him to death. He contends that one of the jurors failed to disclose that he had served as a juror at McFadden’s previous trial for assault and armed criminal action, affecting his sentence in the current matter. McFadden asserts instruction 21 prejudiced him in violation of his rights to due process, a properly instructed jury, and freedom for cruel and unusual punishment because it made it appear there were more arguments in support of the death penalty and did not require the jury to determine whether his prior convictions were serious assaultive convictions. He argues the jury’s determination as to this issue would have been required had the court submitted his proffered instruction B to the jury. McFadden contends that the three jurors should not have been struck for their uncertainty that they could sign a death verdict and that all of the jurors struck were denied their right to participate in the trial and to be free from religious discrimination for being opposed to the death penalty on religious grounds. He asserts a potential juror’s inability to sign a verdict is not a statutory disqualification and, therefore, cannot form the basis for a strike for cause. McFadden argues jury instructions 22 and 24 improperly placed the burden of proof on the defense, did not require the state to prove his eligibility for the death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt, did not require the jury to find unanimously that mitigating factors outweigh aggravating ones, let the jury consider aggravating factor evidence not permitted by the constitution and prevented appellate review of this evidence. He contends instructions 22 and 24 also violate his rights to due process, a properly instructed jury, appellate review, reliable sentencing, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. McFadden asserts the trial court erred in overruling his objections to and requests for mistrial based on the state’s arguments during jury selection as well as during both the guilt determination and penalty phases of trial. He argues the state was estopped (legally prohibited) from admitting into evidence testimony that Franklin was killed because of his testimony against two of McFadden’s friends because the jury in a prior trial rejected this evidence, resulting in acquittal regarding that element. McFadden contends the evidence regarding Franklin’s murder evoked an emotional response from the jury considering Addison’s murder and, therefore, was prejudicial. He asserts the death sentence is unconstitutionally excessive and violates his rights to due process, a fair trial before a properly selected jury, reliable sentencing, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. He also asserts the death sentence is disproportionate. McFadden argues the state had an unfair advantage by admitting the sister’s testimony that McFadden was Addison’s killer. He contends the state referenced other crimes irrelevant to the proceeding involving Addison’s murder, prejudicing the jurors against him. McFadden asserts the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objections to the examination and testimony of Addison’s sister and in allowing the prosecuting attorney to influence her testimony. He argues the trial court erred in allowing testimony regarding his identification at the scene of the crime because it was hearsay and McFadden was not allowed access to the sister’s school and medical records to dispute the quality of her eyesight. McFadden contends the state failed to lay a foundation for a recording of a jail telephone call and transcript admitted into evidence and did not establish its authenticity and correctness. He further asserts the recording contained inadmissible hearsay.

The state responds that there is no evidence that a juror failed to disclose information at trial. It contends instruction 21 was proper. The state asserts the trial court properly struck for cause three potential jurors who were unwilling to sign a death verdict and did not violate any juror’s right to freedom from religious discrimination by striking potential jurors whose beliefs conflict with the death penalty. The state argues the court did not err in determining that McFadden’s prior convictions were serious assaultive convictions. The state contends instructions 22 and 24 were proper. It asserts the prosecutor’s statements and arguments were proper. The state argues the evidence referencing the potential motive for the Franklin murder was admitted properly. It also contends the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the Franklin murder was admitted properly. The state asserts the death sentence in this case was proper and is not disproportionate. It argues the sister’s identification of McFadden did not result in plain error during the presentation of evidence or during the state’s argument. The state contends admission of McFadden’s prior statements referencing other crimes was not an error. It asserts the court properly overruled McFadden’s objections to the sister’s examination by the prosecutor and her resulting testimony. The state argues the court properly admitted testimony and overruled McFadden’s motion regarding records the state did not have in its possession. It further contends the recording of the jail telephone call was admitted properly.