Case Summary for January 8, 2014

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Case Summary for January 8, 2014

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, January 8, 2014

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SC93606
In the matter of Lonnie Brockmire, deceased
Cape Girardeau County
Challenge to decedent’s heirs

Listen to the oral argument:

The brother was represented during arguments by Adam E. Hanna of Bradshaw, Steele, Cochrane & Berens LC in Cape Giaradeau, and the granddaughter was repersented by John Loesel of Lichtenegger, Weiss & Fetterhoff in Jackson.

Lonnie Brockmire died July 2011 with no surviving spouse or parents. He was survived by a brother, Ronald Brockmire; a daughter, Sherri Gikovate; and a granddaughter, Bella Gikovate, born November 2007. Sherri was legally adopted by her stepfather January 2008. Bella was born before the time of the adoption. The estate’s personal representatives filed for a partial distribution of $25,000 to Bella but Ronald filed an objection. The probate court overruled the objection and ordered distribution. The brother appeals.

The brother argues the probate court erred by finding that Bella was an heir. He contends the court erroneously applied the law to make its determination. The brother asserts the granddaughter is not a descendant of one of Brockmire’s children because her mother was adopted. They argue that when the granddaughter’s mother was adopted by her stepfather, it severed all relationship to Brockmire. The heirs contend the probate court should not have ordered the $25,000 distribution to the granddaughter because she was not a rightful heir.

The granddaughter responds that the probate court correctly determined that she was an heir. She argues section 472.010, RSMo, allows all lawful lineal descendants to inherit and claims that should include a living biological granddaughter. The granddaughter contends the legislative intent of the intestacy laws is frustrated by preventing a granddaughter from inheriting. She asserts that the statutes regarding adoption do not state that adoption severs a relationship between the adoptee’s existing descendants and their extended family. The granddaughter argues the probate court correctly ordered the $25,000 distribution.

SC93500
In re: David B. Lacks
St. Louis County
Attorney discipline

Listen to the oral argument:

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel was represented during arguments by Region XI Special Representative Cheryl D. Walker of St. Louis, and Lacks was repersented by Alan S. Mandel of Mandel & Mandel LLP in St. Louis.

Clayton attorney - David Lacks - was hired to assist a woman in modifying her divorce agreement. She filed a complaint against him alleging he made inappropriate sexual comments while meeting to discuss her case. The disciplinary hearing panel found Lacks asked his client to perform sexual acts for money as well as questions of a sexual nature. The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to reprimand Lacks’ law license.

Disciplinary counsel and Lacks stipulate (agree) that Lacks violated several rules of professional conduct and his law license should be reprimanded. Counsel contends Lacks violated rule 4-1.7(A)(2) by creating a conflict through expressing sexual interest in a client. Counsel asserts there was a significant risk that Lacks’ representation would be limited by his personal interests in the client. Counsel also asserts Lacks violated rule 4-8.4(d) by making sexually inappropriate comments to his client and asking her to perform sexual acts for money. Counsel contends this conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. Counsel and Lacks agree Lacks was negligent by failing to recognize that his representation could be affected as a result of his interest in his client.

SC93482
In re: Dorothy L. Savory
Jackson County
Attorney discipline

Listen to the oral argument:

The Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel was represented during arguments by Region IV Special Representative Charles W. Gotschall of Kansas City, and Savory was repersented by Robert G. Russell of Kempton and Russell in Sedalia.

Kansas City attorney Dorothy Savory was hired to defend a client against a charge for robbery. At trial, when the judge directed Savory to have her client come to the counsel table, Savory directed his twin brother to sit with her instead. Savory had instructed the actual defendant to remain outside the courtroom. The judge determined Savory had made false representations to the court.

The disciplinary hearing panel found Savory was hired to represent another client in a separate action that was later dismissed without prejudice. Savory advised her client that the case could be refiled within one year; however, she filed the case 16 months later and failed to properly communicate with her client during that time. Savory failed to serve the appropriate parties and the client terminated her representation.

Disciplinary counsel and Savory stipulate (agree) Savory’s law license should be disciplined. They contend Savory violated several rules of professional conduct. Counsel and Savory assert Savory knowingly misled the court and violated rules 4-3.3, 4-8.4(c) and 4-8.4(d), RSMo, by having her client’s twin brother sit in the defendant’s place at trial. They agree Savory violated rules 4-1.1, 4-1.3, 4-1.4 and 4-8.4(d) by failing to provide her clients competent representation, failing to act with reasonable diligence and failing to keep her client informed of the status of their cases. Counsel and Savory agree this Court should suspend Savory’s license, but stay the suspension and grant her two years of probation. They assert suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that violates their duties to the profession and their clients.

SC92720
State of Missouri v. Christopher L. Collings
Newton and Phelps counties
Challenge to death sentence

Listen to the oral argument:

Collings was represented during arguments by Rosemary M. Percival of the public defender's office in Kansas City, and the state was repersented by Richard A. Starnes of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Christopher Collings was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the rape and strangulation of a nine-year old girl. At trial, Collings filed motions to suppress his statements and evidence gained from a search of his property. The trial court overruled Collings’ attempt to admit a videotape of a conversation between himself and the Wheaton chief of police, who was a close friend. The trial court also overruled Collings’ objections to several photographs from the crime scene that the state submitted into evidence and to the state’s closing argument. In finding Collings guilty of first-degree murder and sentencing him to death, the jury determined the murder involved torture; was outrageously vile, horrible and inhuman; and the victim was a potential witness in investigating the rape. Collings appeals.

Collings argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence. He contends several of his rights were violated because he did not confess voluntarily and did not understand his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Collings asserts the trial court abused its discretion and erred by barring his evidence and allowing the state to present its evidence at the suppression hearing because his videotaped conversation with the Wheaton chief of police would have revealed he was pressured to forgo constitutional rights. He argues several of his rights were also violated by the trial court’s refusal to hear his evidence. Collings contends the trial court also erred in overruling his motion for judgment of acquittal and sentencing him to death because the state failed to prove he coolly reflected before the murder, which is an element of first-degree murder. He asserts the trial court should not have admitted evidence gathered at his house because it was unreliable, speculative, misleading evidence and deprived him of rights to a fair trial and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. Collings argues the trial court should not have overruled his request for mistrial because the state’s closing argument incited the jury to decide based on fear and anger instead of objective reason. He contends the court should not have admitted evidence that his father believed in the death penalty. Collings asserts that an admitted jury instruction regarding requirements to establish eligibility for a life sentence improperly relieved the state of its burden of proof. He argues he should not have been convicted of aggravated first-degree murder because the state failed to plead the appropriate facts for aggravated murder. Collings contends the death sentence should be vacated and he should be sentenced to life without parole.

The state responds the trial court did not err in overruling Collings’ motion to suppress evidence. It argues there was sufficient evidence that Collings’ was read his Miranda rights before his voluntary conversation with the Wheaton chief of police. The state also contends the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings at trial because the court considered the excluded evidence. It asserts Collings failed to prove the court improperly excluded influential evidence. The state argues there was sufficient evidence that Collings coolly reflected to support his conviction for first-degree murder. It contends the evidence seized from Collings’ property were properly admitted at trial because he admitted to the crime and to destroying evidence. The state asserts Collings was not prejudiced because the evidence was logically and legally relevant. It argues the trial court did not err in overruling Collings’ motion for mistrial because statements regarding another person’s involvement in the crime were proper. The state contends Collings’ father’s statements regarding the death penalty were proper impeachment evidence that did not prejudice Collings nor violate rules against testimony. It asserts the state was not required to prove aggravating (increases degree of liability) circumstances outweighed the mitigating (reduces degree of liability) circumstances. The state argues aggravated first-degree murder was proper because the state is not required to plead aggravating circumstances in the charging document. It contends Collings’ death conviction is proper because the sentence was properly imposed, the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances, and the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate.