Case Summary for March 31, 2004

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Case Summary for March 31, 2004

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Wednesday, March 31, 2004
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SC85517
Lloyd Grass v. State of Missouri
Warren County
Standard for unconditional release

In October 1992, Lloyd Grass was charged with first-degree murder for the stabbing death of his wife. Two years later, the court found Grass not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect and committed him to the department of mental health for treatment. In March 1995, Grass was transferred from a maximum-security unit at Fulton State Hospital to a less-restrictive environment at St. Louis State Hospital. Nine months later, the circuit court granted Grass a conditional release, but the court of appeals reversed. In August 1996, one day after he was granted full unescorted privileges at the St. Louis facility, Grass escaped. He was captured in January 1997 in New York City and was extradited to Missouri. He was convicted of escape from commitment and was sentenced to five years imprisonment in the department of corrections. In 1999, Grass sought unconditional release from the department of mental health, which was denied. In the subsequent years, he filed several motions for release. In April 2000, he again sought unconditional release. In February 2001, the court entered an order requiring the state to reexamine Grass. The next month, when he was paroled from the department of corrections in March 2001, Grass was placed back in department of mental health custody, over his objections. In June 2001, the psychiatrist who originally diagnosed Grass with a brief reactive psychosis reported that Grass no longer was suffering from a mental disease or defect based on his conclusion that Grass was in full remission. In September 2001, the state filed the report of an examination performed by a department of mental health psychologist, who diagnosed Grass with psychotic disorder, not otherwise specified. Three months later, the court proceeded to an evidentiary hearing on Grass' unconditional release request. In February 2002, the court denied Grass' request. It did not include a finding of whether Grass still was mentally ill but did conclude that Grass remains a "social menace." Grass appeals.

Grass argues he is entitled to an examination by an independent expert. He contends the psychologist who provided the September 2001 report is not independent because he had been involved in Grass' case since its inception and because he is director of forensic services for the department, which opposed Grass' release. Grass asserts that the court erred in failing to make findings of facts on the issue of whether Grass is mentally ill. He argues that this error deprives him of due process because the lack of findings materially interferes with appellate review. Grass contends the court's denial of his unconditional release petition deprives him of due process and is against the weight of the evidence because he proved by clear and convincing evidence that he was not dangerous due to mental illness.

The state responds that Grass is not entitled to a second examination. It argues that the department's psychologist performed an independent examination and that Grass waived his objection to the psychologist's testimony when he refused the court's offer of more time so another evaluation could be performed. The state contends Grass is not entitled to a professional who will serve as his advocate but only to an appropriate evaluation by a competent professional who will render opinions based only on that expert's professional training. The state asserts that the trial court found that Grass has a mental illness and that its omission of such a written finding does not preclude appellate review because the record supports the judgment. The state argues that Grass failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he satisfies section 552.040, RSMo, and, therefore, is entitled to an unconditional release. It contends Grass failed to establish that he does not now and, in the future, likely will not have a mental disease or defect that makes him dangerous to himself or others.

SC85845
State ex rel. Shawn C. Brown v. Rhonda F. Shaw, City Clerk, and Rich Chrismer, Director of Elections
St. Charles County
Municipal election challenge

SC85845 and SC85846 have been consolidated for purposes of briefing and argument.

On December 16, 2003, Shawn Brown signed up at the St. Peters city clerk's office to run for mayor. He filled out a single-page document called "Notice of Intention to Run for Elective Office" and signed a declaration of candidacy in which he swore that he met the qualifications for office. One of these qualifications is that a candidate shall not be in arrears for any unpaid city taxes or municipal user fees on the last day to file a declaration of candidacy for the office. Brown did not get a copy of the document to take with him, although he was provided with a receipt for payment of the $75 filing fee. The last day to file a declaration of candidacy was January 20, 2004. At about 4:50 p.m. on January 20, the city clerk, Rhonda Shaw, called Brown to tell him he went into arrears on his city taxes as of January 1 and, therefore, did not qualify to run for office. He called the county collector's office, which confirmed that he had not paid his real property taxes. Brown testified that he thought his mortgage company had paid his taxes from his escrow account. Brown testified that he ultimately learned that his mortgage company takes the position that it has 28 days before and after the due date in which to make the tax payments and that, in his situation, it did not intend to pay his taxes until the end of January. The county collector testified that the 2002 and 2003 tax receipts for Brown's residence were paid by check and that there was no indication in his records that these taxes were paid by a party other than the property owner, such as a lender. Brown paid his delinquent real estate taxes on January 27. On January 30, Brown filed a petition in the circuit court against Shaw for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, although he did not seek to expedite the matter until February 10. The next day, he added Rich Chrismer, the St. Charles County director of elections, as a respondent, and the attorney general subsequently intervened. On February 20, the court entered its judgment granting the attorney general's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denying and dismissing Brown's petition. Brown now seeks a writ of mandamus from this Court to have his name placed on the ballot for the mayoral election.

Brown argues the court erred in holding that section 115.346, RSMo, applied to his mayoral candidacy. He contends this section should not have caused his candidacy to be forfeited because his late payment of real property taxes was without fault or intent on his part and because he is not the taxpayer of record for the tax bill in question. He asserts that the applicable statute is section 79.250, RSMo, and that he complied with the requirements of that provision. Brown argues that section 115.346 violates the free and open elections clause in Missouri's constitution because it restricts access to the ballot regardless of the fault of the candidate. He contends that, under the circumstances of his case, the late payment of taxes on his residence was without his fault. He asserts that section 115.346 also violates equal protection because it does not involve a compelling state interest, does not adopt the least restrictive means and is not tailored narrowly to carry out its interests and is not rationally related to the interests it serves to further.

Shaw responds that this Court lacks jurisdiction because Brown failed to join the circuit judge and the city of St. Peters as respondents. She argues that she and Chrismer are not required to prove that Brown was "at fault" for his untimely payment of city taxes. In the alternative, she contends that if fault is required to enforce section 115.346, RSMo, against Brown, then she and Chrismer established proof of Brown's fault adequately at trial. She asserts that the court properly applied section 115.346 and that Brown is personally responsible for city tax payments. Shaw responds that section 115.346 does not violate the open elections provisions of the state constitution because the section's requirement that a candidate be current on his city tax obligations on the last day to file a declaration of candidacy for municipal office. She argues that the court properly applied the rational basis standard in its constitutional analysis and that neither section 115.346 nor city code section 105.035 violates equal protection. Shaw contends the provisions of section 115.125.2, RSMo, prevent Brown from obtaining relief now because he failed to expedite his legal challenge and never joined the city in the action as a necessary or indispensable party. Shaw further responds that section 71.005, RSMo, and section 105.035 of the city code bar placement of Brown's name on the ballot.

Chrismer responds that he seeks this Court's determination of whether sections 71.005 and 115.346 are constitutional because such a determination is a matter of general importance to the election authorities of the state.

The attorney general notes that he takes no position regarding the applicability of section 115.346 to Brown's circumstance or to fourth-class cities generally. He notes that he also takes no position regarding the question of Brown's status as taxpayer of record. The attorney general responds that the state constitution's guaranty of free and open elections does not prohibit the general assembly from enacting reasonable eligibility requirements for potential candidates for municipal office. He argues that section 115.346 should be given rational basis review. The attorney general contends that, under either this standard or the heightened strict scrutiny standard, section 115.346 is constitutional. He asserts that the statute helps the state achieve three important state goals by enforcing municipalities' tax codes, promoting law-abiding citizens in public office and decreasing public cynicism toward elected officials.

SC85846
Shawn C. Brown v. Rhonda F. Shaw, et al.
St. Charles County
Municipal election challenge

SC85845 and SC85846 have been consolidated for purposes of briefing and argument. See summary above under SC85845.

SC85555
State ex rel. D.C. v. The Honorable Maura McShane, Judge, Twenty-First Judicial Circuit
St. Louis County
Competency of juvenile for certification hearing

In December 2002, a then 17-year-old ninth-grader under the jurisdiction of the St. Louis County family court division was charged with first-degree robbery, first-degree assault, second-degree robbery and stealing a motor vehicle. The juvenile officer moved to certify the juvenile as an adult. Two experts who had conducted psychological examinations of the juvenile testified during a July 2003 hearing. The experts agreed that the juvenile has a full-scale intelligence quotient of 46, placing him in the moderate mental retardation range, and that the juvenile is developmentally delayed. The experts also testified about their conclusions regarding the juvenile's ability to understand the nature of the charges and the certification proceedings. The deputy juvenile officer testified regarding letters that she believed the juvenile wrote while in detention. The court found the juvenile competent to proceed to the certification hearing. The juvenile now seeks relief from this Court.

The juvenile argues there was no substantial evidence to support the court's finding that he is competent to proceed. He contends this finding is based on the court's speculation about a single observed communication between him and his attorney and does not take into consideration his abilities to understand or appreciate the nature of the proceedings. He asserts there is no legal basis for the court to find he is competent to understand the courtroom proceedings, which he argues is a different and separate issue from his ability to communicate meaningfully with his attorney. The juvenile contends the court's finding irreparably harms him because it forces him to proceed in the certification hearing while he is mentally incompetent to do so.

The juvenile officer responds that a writ is not appropriate in this case under Rule 84.22(a) because adequate relief can be afforded through an appeal. The juvenile officer argues the family court division did not abuse its discretion in finding the juvenile competent to proceed because the evidence supported such a finding and because the court was in a position to observe the juvenile directly.

SC85620
State of Missouri v. Jeffrey D. Long
Clay County
Challenge to rape and sodomy convictions

In April 2001, a woman told police she had been sexually assaulted by Jeffrey Long and another man at Long's North Kansas City, Missouri, apartment. A hospital examination of the woman revealed signs of sexual trauma, but the sexual assault kit apparently did not reveal the presence of sperm, seminal fluid or an associated enzyme. Long was charged, as a prior and persistent offender, with forcible rape and forcible sodomy. Following a December 2002 trial, a jury found Long guilty of both offenses. In February 2003, the court sentenced Long to two consecutive 20-year prison sentences. He appeals.

Long argues the court abused its discretion in precluding him from presenting the testimony of certain witnesses, which he contends would have shown that the woman had a history of making false reports, including false sexual allegations, and that he was innocent. Long asserts that the court should have acquitted him of the forcible rape charge because he argues the state failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either he or his co-defendant had sexual intercourse with the woman. He contends the court should not have submitted to the jury the woman's typed statement, which he asserts improperly bolstered her testimony and improperly allowed the jury to give it undue weight. Long argues the court abused its discretion in not disclosing the woman's psychological, psychiatric and medical records because this precluded him from fully exploring her credibility, bias and ability to discern reality in light of the fact that the woman testified that she was mentally disabled. Long contends the court should have permitted him to present witnesses' testimony that the woman engaged in sexually provocative actions when she was drinking alcohol. He further asserts the court should have permitted him to present witnesses' testimony that the woman had made up a story of having broken the neck of someone who had attempted to rape her.

The state responds that the court properly excluded evidence that the woman allegedly had made false accusations. The state contends this would have been an improper attempt to use inadmissible hearsay or evidence barred by the rape shield law to prove the victim's untruthfulness. The state asserts there was sufficient evidence of forced sexual intercourse to support the forcible rape conviction. The state responds that the court properly submitted to the jury the woman's statement to law enforcement because the victim's version of the events already was the central piece of evidence in the case and that such a submission was within the court's discretion. The state argues Long was given the opportunity to review, in the court's chambers, the woman's mental health records as he requested. The state contends that these records were protected by the physician-patient privilege, which the woman did not waive, and that the portions not disclosed contained only inadmissible or irrelevant evidence. The state asserts that evidence of the woman's prior sexual conduct is barred by the rape shield statute and properly was excluded at trial. The state further responds that any evidence of specific acts of the woman's alleged untruthfulness, prior bad acts or propensity to act in a certain way was inadmissible and was properly excluded.

SC85419
State of Missouri v. Richard Strong
St. Louis County
Direct appeal of murder convictions and death sentences

In October 2000, the St. Ann, Missouri, police received a 911 call from an apartment in which Eva Washington lived with her two-year-old daughter, Zeandra, and her three-month-old daughter, Alicia, whose father was Richard Strong. After responding officers got no response from anyone inside the apartment after asking for permission to enter, they saw Strong go around to the apartment's back door. Strong told one officer that Washington and the children were sleeping and told another officer that Washington had gone to work, leaving the children inside. The officers observed Strong sweating profusely, his heart thumping rapidly and something on his hand that looked like blood. After one officer kicked in the apartment door, Strong ran away. When the officers eventually arrested him, Strong said, "I killed them." The officers found Washington and Zeandra in a back bedroom, both with massive, multiple stab and slash knife wounds. They found a butcher knife and the baby, who was alive and uninjured, on the bed. The jury convicted Strong of two counts of first-degree murder and recommended the death penalty on each count. The court sentenced Strong to death, and he appeals.

Strong argues the court should have disallowed the state's peremptory challenges to certain members of the jury pool whom he contends were struck improperly due to race or religious affiliation. He asserts the court should have struck the jury pool because of improper arguments he contends the prosecutor made during jury selection. Strong argues the court should not have sealed Washington's psychiatric records, which he asserts would have supported his defense that she attacked him or her two-year-old daughter and that his attack was precipitated by hers. He argues the court should have excluded a police officer's testimony that Strong appeared nonchalant after running from the apartment because he contends this is impermissible witness opinion as to his guilt. Strong asserts that the court improperly permitted the jury to view, during the guilt phase, certain photographs and a videotape that he argues were cumulative, duplicative and prejudicial and that they encouraged the jury to find him guilty based on raw emotion rather than on the facts. He contends the evidence presented during the guilt phase showed intent but not deliberation and that the court improperly instructed the jury, permitting the jury to convict him of first-degree murder without finding that he deliberated upon the murders. Strong asserts that the court should have declared a mistrial because of improper arguments the prosecutor made during the closing arguments of both the guilt phase and the penalty phase. He argues the court should not have admitted into evidence during the penalty phase statements Washington had made to police that he assaulted her in November 1999 because these statements were hearsay, inadmissible and prejudicial. Strong argues the court should not have allowed the prosecutor to admit certain graphic photographs during the penalty phase because these photographs were prejudicial, largely irrelevant and duplicative and were used largely to engender passion and prejudice. Strong asserts that the court improperly instructed the jury during the penalty phase, permitting the jury to consider evidence of non-statutory aggravating factors and not instructing the jury properly as to the statutory aggravator presented by the state. He argues the court should not have sentenced him to death because the state failed to plead any statutory aggravators in the information. Strong contends this Court must set aside his death sentences because he contends they were imposed under the influence of passion and prejudice and are not supported by the evidence.

The state responds that the prosecutor properly struck the two members of the jury pool because he used race-neutral reasons that Strong did not show to be pretextual. The state argues that statements the prosecutor made during jury selection were proper statements of the law. The state contends the court properly sealed Washington's psychiatric records, which it contends were protected by the physician-patient privilege and immaterial, and that the court permitted Strong to review the records in chamber per his request. The state asserts that the officer's testimony that Strong seemed nonchalant was not improper opinion evidence but rather was a matter-of-fact presentation of the officer's observations of Strong's demeanor when making statements to the police after running from the apartment. The state responds that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting certain graphic photographs and a videotape during the guilt phase of the trial because they were relevant to show the scene of the crime, the identity of the victims, the nature and extent of the wounds, the causes of death, and the condition and location of the bodies. The state argues there was sufficient evidence of deliberation to support the jury's finding that Strong was guilty of first-degree murder. The state contends the prosecutor's arguments during the guilt and penalty phases were proper statements of the law, rebuttals and comments relating to Strong's arguments, pleas to the jurors' common sense, and discussion of admissible evidence. The state asserts that the evidence of unadjudicated prior assaults was admissible in the penalty phase and that Strong did not object to this evidence. The state responds that the crime scene and autopsy photographs were admissible during the penalty phase or were relevant and legitimate for the prosecutor's use during his penalty phase closing argument because they helped prove that Strong acted with depravity of mind. The state argues that the court did not plainly err in submitting the statutory aggravating circumstance instructions to the jury and that there was sufficient evidence presented to allow the jury to find the circumstance existed. The state contends it is not required to plead the statutory aggravating circumstances in the information and that it gave sufficient notice of what circumstances it intended to use. The state further responds that this Court should affirm Strong's death sentences, contending the sentences did not result from passion, prejudice or other arbitrary factor, were supported by the evidence, and are not excessive.