Case Summary for September 7, 2005

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Case Summary for September 7, 2005

These docket summaries, which are prepared by the Court's staff, may not include all issues pending before the Court and do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the merits of a case. They should not be quoted or cited.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building, 207 West High Street, Jefferson City, Missouri, in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, September 7, 2005
______________________________________________________________________________

*Note: The first three cases are companion cases that will be argued and submitted together.

SC86547 *
State ex rel. David Womack v. The Honorable Dennis A. Rolf
Saline County
Whether child involved in chapter 211 case can be adopted pursuant to chapter 453

In November 2001, the juvenile officer filed an action pursuant to chapter 211, RSMo, concerning David Womack's son, J.W., who was born in May 1987. The juvenile division of the circuit court assumed jurisdiction over J.W. and subsequently placed him in the legal and physical custody of the state children's division. In April 2004, while the juvenile action was pending, J.W.'s foster parents, Garth and Diane Bibens, filed a petition to adopt J.W. pursuant to chapter 453, RSMo. Womack sought to dismiss the adoption petition. Following an October 2004 hearing, the juvenile division denied Womack's motion. The Bibenses subsequently amended their petition, seeking both to adopt J.W. and to terminate Womack's parental rights. Womack now seeks a writ of prohibition from this Court.

Womack argues the juvenile division lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the adoption petition filed pursuant to chapter 453 because there currently is pending a juvenile case filed pursuant to chapter 211 concerning the same child. Womack contends section 211.093, RSMo, dictates that judgments and orders entered pursuant to chapters 210 or 211, RSMo, take precedent over orders and judgments entered pursuant to chapter 453. He asserts the fact that his son turned 18 after the juvenile division denied the motion to dismiss does not moot Womack's argument because this issue is one of general interest that will recur and will evade appellate review in future controversies.

The Bibenses respond that Womack's argument is moot. They argue that because J.W. turned 18 in May 2005, he no longer is a minor, and his consent is all that is needed for the adoption. The Bibenses contend that section 211.093 does not prohibit the juvenile division from exercising its jurisdiction under chapter 453. They assert that section 211.093 merely provides that a chapter 211 order has priority over a chapter 453 order but only to the extent the two are inconsistent. The Bibenses note that to construe the statutes otherwise would prevent any child in foster care from being adopted because all children in foster care are there pursuant to an ongoing chapter 211 case.

Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Association argues, as a friend of the Court, that the juvenile division properly denied Womack's motion to dismiss. It contends there are no inconsistencies between the adoption proceeding and the juvenile division's orders entered in the child's chapter 211 case because the juvenile division ordered adoption as the child's permanency plan.

SC86548 *
State ex rel. David Lee Womack v. The Honorable Dennis A. Rolf
Saline County
Whether child involved in chapter 211 case can be adopted pursuant to chapter 453

In November 2001, the juvenile officer filed an action pursuant to chapter 211, RSMo, concerning David Womack's daughter, L.W., who was born in August 1990. The juvenile division of the circuit court assumed jurisdiction over L.W. and subsequently placed her in the legal and physical custody of the state children's division. In June 2004, while the juvenile action was pending, L.W.'s foster mother, Judy Wilckens, filed a petition to adopt L.W. pursuant to chapter 453, RSMo. Womack sought to dismiss the adoption petition. Following an October 2004 hearing, the juvenile division denied Womack's motion. Wilckens subsequently amended her petition, seeking both to adopt L.W. and to terminate Womack's parental rights. Womack now seeks a writ of prohibition from this Court.

Except for the mootness issue, Womack and Wilckens make the same arguments here as were made in SC86547, above. Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Association makes the same friend-of-Court arguments here as it made in SC86547.

SC86549 *
State ex rel. Robert Cooper, Sr. v. The Honorable Dennis A. Rolf
Saline County
Whether child involved in chapter 211 case can be adopted pursuant to chapter 453

In July 1996, the juvenile officer filed an action pursuant to chapter 211, RSMo, concerning Robert Cooper Sr.'s daughter, J.A.C., who was born in April 1989. The juvenile division of the circuit court assumed jurisdiction over J.A.C. and subsequently placed her in the legal and physical custody of the state children's division. In June 2004, while the juvenile action was pending, J.A.C.'s foster mother, Judy Wilckens, filed a petition to adopt J.A.C. pursuant to chapter 453, RSMo. Cooper sought to dismiss the adoption petition. Following an October 2004 hearing, the juvenile division denied Wilckens' motion. Wilckens subsequently amended her petition, seeking both to adopt J.A.C. and to terminate Cooper's parental rights. Cooper now seeks a writ of prohibition from this Court.

Cooper and Wilckens make the same arguments here as were made in SC86548, above. Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Association makes the same friend-of-Court arguments here as it made in SC86547 and SC86548.

SC86784
Ecclesiastes Matthews v. State of Missouri
Marion County
Postconviction relief following drug convictions

The Marion County, Missouri, circuit court is divided geographically into two districts: one in Palmyra and another in Hannibal. The state charged Ecclesiastes Matthews in the circuit court's Hannibal district with two class A felony counts of delivery of a controlled substance near schools. Matthews sought a change of judge and a change of venue. In October 2001, his request for a change of judge was granted. In December 2001, his request for a change of venue was sustained, and the case was transferred to the circuit court's Palmyra district. In January 2002, the state amended the information to charge Matthews with two class B felony counts of sale of a controlled substance, and Matthews was tried before a jury in the circuit court at Palmyra. The state presented evidence that Matthews sold 0.33 gram of cocaine to one confidential informant in December 1999 and 0.6 gram of cocaine base to another confidential informant in May 2000, with both transactions taking place in the same Hannibal lounge. Matthews testified that he did not sell any drugs. The jury found Matthews guilty of both counts, and the court sentenced him as a prior drug offender to consecutive prison terms of 25 years on each count. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed Matthews' convictions and sentences, State v. Matthews, 99 S.W.3d 494 (Mo. App. 2003), and Matthews subsequently sought postconviction relief. In April 2004, the motion court overruled Matthews' motion without a hearing. Matthews appeals.

Matthews argues his trial and appellate counsel failed to challenge the trial court's transfer of venue to another district within the same county. He contends his trial counsel failed to object to the jury pool, which he asserts was unconstitutional and in violation of chapter 494, RSMo, because it was not selected at random from a fair cross-section of the citizens of Marion County. Matthews contends his trial counsel prejudiced him by failing to introduce evidence of possible alternative sources of the cocaine sold to the first confidential informant in December 1999. Matthews further asserts that his trial counsel prejudiced him by failing to introduce and to play for the jury the surveillance tape recordings of the alleged drug transactions.

The state responds that section 508.320, RSMo, specifically permits a change of venue from one district of the Marion County circuit court to the other. The state argues Matthews' counsel were not ineffective for not challenging the trial court's failure to change venue to another county because he did not allege facts showing he was prejudiced and because the record reflects that his jury was fair and unbiased. The state contends that drawing the jurors from the citizens residing only in one district of the Marion County circuit court is not a substantial failure to comply with the constitution and statutes. It notes that Matthews does not contend there is any difference between the citizens of each district other than their geographic location. The state asserts that Matthews failed to allege that other witnesses he claims could have testified about possible alternative sources of the cocaine sold to the first confidential witness were available to testify or would have provided him a defense. The state further responds that Matthews failed to plead facts showing what the jury would have heard on the surveillance tapes and that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to play the tapes.

SC86682
In re: Stanley L. Wiles
Jackson County
Attorney discipline

In December 2002, Kansas City, Missouri, attorney Stanley Wiles settled a personal injury case for James Perrine for about $4,500. Wiles retained nearly $1,760 of the settlement proceeds to pay Perrine's medical providers but did not deposit these monies in his trust account. He did not pay the medical providers' bills until March 2003, after Perrine complained to Wiles that the creditors were bothering him. For each of the four months between December 2002 and March 2003, Wiles' trust account balance fell below the amount he retained from the settlement proceeds. Also in December 2002, Wiles dismissed without prejudice a petition he had filed against a manufacturer on behalf of Ronald Guy so he could secure an expert witness. In July 2003, Guy filed a complaint against Wiles, alleging that Wiles was not keeping him informed about his case. Wiles refiled the petition in December 2003 but did not obtain service against the manufacturer or communicate to Guy about the status of his case. In April 2003, Wiles settled a personal injury case for Jerry Ivy for $4,790. Wiles retained $1,500 from the settlement proceeds to pay a chiropractic clinic to which Ivy owed money for services in connection with the personal injury. A year later, he paid the clinic the full $1,500. In seven of the intervening months, the balance in Wiles' trust account fell below $1,500. Wiles used some of the money from Perrine's and Ivy's settlements to pay for operating expenses and used his attorney's fees to help cover his trust account. The chief disciplinary counsel seeks to discipline Wiles' law license.

The chief disciplinary counsel argues this Court should disbar Wiles. She contends that he knowingly converted client property by using trust funds to pay his own operating expenses and that he knowingly commingled attorney fees with client funds in the trust account in an attempt to protect himself. She asserts Wiles misappropriated client funds, failed to communicate with Guy and failed to pursue Guy's case diligently. The chief disciplinary counsel notes that this Court suspended Wiles' license to practice law in June 2003 and ordered him to serve an extended probationary period through June 2006.

Wiles responds that, while he may be subject to additional discipline, he should not be disbarred. He argues his conduct that the chief disciplinary counsel raises here occurred before May 2004, when the Court extended Wiles' probation for an additional two years. He notes that the chief disciplinary counsel presented his conduct in the Ivy matter to this Court as the basis for his probation violation supporting her request to extend his probation. Wiles contends the chief disciplinary counsel has presented no evidence that he has violated any ethical rule since the Court's May 2004 order extending his probation.

SC86278
Paul T. Goodwin v. State of Missouri
St. Louis County
Postconviction relief in death penalty case

A jury found Paul Goodwin guilty of first-degree murder for the March 1998 beating death of his former neighbor, Joan Crotts. Based on the jury's recommendation, the court sentenced Goodwin to death. This Court affirmed Goodwin's conviction and sentence, State v. Goodwin, 43 S.W.3d 805 (Mo. banc 2001), and Goodwin subsequently sought postconviction relief. The motion court denied relief, and Goodwin appeals.

Goodwin argues the motion court erred in determining that he is not mentally retarded. He contends that because ample evidence called into question his intellectual functioning and adaptive skills, the motion court should have granted a new penalty phase so a jury could make the factual determination of whether Goodwin is mentally retarded. He asserts his counsel should have investigated and presented evidence of mental retardation at trial, which he believes would have resulted in a life sentence. Goodwin argues his counsel unreasonably failed to investigate and present evidence that he was not evicted from his boarding house because of Crotts. He contends this failure prejudiced him because the state argued he killed Crotts out of anger for being evicted. He asserts his counsel failed to investigate and call a witness who would have refuted the state's evidence that Goodwin smashed a rock and threatened Crotts. Goodwin argues his counsel failed to call a forensic pathologist to present evidence that Crott's injuries were consistent with her falling down the stairs and to rebut the state's suggestion that he beat her over her entire body. Goodwin contends his counsel failed to investigate and present evidence through numerous witnesses to rebut the state's suggestion that he deliberated in killing Crotts. He asserts that the witnesses would have testified that he was not capable of detailed planning or foreseeing consequences, that he easily was confused and that he had legitimate reasons for being in the area. Goodwin argues his counsel was ineffective in presenting inconsistent theories in the guilt and penalty phases. He contends he was prejudiced because jurors would not trust the defense for calling experts in the two phases who disagreed as to whether he suffered from a mental disease or defect and whether he could appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Goodwin asserts the prosecutor's closing argument violated his constitutional rights in urging jurors to sentence him to death based not on the evidence but rather on the jurors' fears, passion and prejudice. He further argues that Missouri's lethal injection method of execution is flawed, constituting cruel and unusual punishment.

The state responds that Goodwin failed to present sufficient evidence of his alleged mental retardation as defined in section 565.030.6, RSMo Supp. 2004, and that counsel was not ineffective in failing to present to a jury evidence discovered after Goodwin's trial. The state argues the motion court was the proper fact-finder to resolve the issue of whether Goodwin is mentally retarded. The state contends Goodwin did not allege he ever informed his counsel that the state's evidence of his motive was erroneous or that there were certain witnesses who could contradict the state's theory. The state asserts that the record shows that the testimony of the witness Goodwin wanted to call about his alleged threat to Crotts would have been more damaging than helpful to Goodwin's defense. The state responds that another forensic pathologist's testimony would not have refuted the state expert's ultimate conclusion that Goodwin caused Crotts' death or other evidence that Goodwin committed repeated acts of violence. The state argues the testimony of the witnesses Goodwin wanted his counsel to call to show he did not have the requisite mental state was inadmissible lay opinion, was cumulative to the defense experts' testimony at trial or otherwise would not have given Goodwin a viable defense. The state contends Goodwin's counsel did present a consistent theory that Goodwin was unintelligent, depressed and explosive and had diminished capacity to control his actions. The state asserts that the prosecutor's allegedly improper closing argument is not a cognizable claim in an appeal from a postconviction relief proceeding and that, regardless, Goodwin did not suffer manifest injustice because the prosecutor's closing argument comments were proper. The state further responds that Goodwin's claim that Missouri's administration of lethal injection is unconstitutionally cruel and inhumane lacks merit.