Case Summary for October 2, 2002

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Case Summary for October 2, 2002

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Wednesday, October 2, 2002

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SC84347
Conseco Finance Servicing Corporation, f/k/a Green Tree Finance Servicing Corp., et al. v. Missouri Department of Revenue
St. Louis County
Constitutionality of abandoned manufactured home statutes

John Wren Jr. and Shannon Wren bought a mobile home, financing their purchase through Conseco Finance Servicing Corp. (formerly known as Green Tree Financial Servicing Corp.), which retained a lien on the home. The Wrens placed their mobile home on properly owned by Lakehurst Investments, a real estate investment property. Lakehurst applied to the Missouri department of revenue for title to the mobile home pursuant to sections 700.525 through 700.541, RSMo. The department sent the Wrens notice of the application at the address at which the mobile home was located. The notice indicated that the home was abandoned and that the Wrens or Conseco had to redeem the home within 30 days to protect their interest. When the past-due rentals were not redeemed, the department issued a title to Lakehurst, free and clear of any liens. Conseco and the Wrens sued, and the court held the statutes violate due process and are unconstitutionally vague. The court permanently enjoined the department from issuing further titles pursuant to those statutes.

The department appeals, arguing sections 70.525 through 700.541, RSMo, are not unconstitutional. It contends the statutes give lienholders notice that an abandoned manufactured home title might be issued so they may take steps to protect their security interests. The department asserts the court erred in declaring the statutes unconstitutional as to owners of manufactured homes because the Wrens had no standing to raise a takings claim on behalf of mobile home owners and because the issue was not alleged properly and, therefore, was not ripe. Regardless, it argues manufactured home owners are given notice and an opportunity to object to a new title being issued. It further contends the statutes are not unconstitutionally vague because they give fair notice of what the statute requires to preserve an interest in a mobile home.

Conseco and the Wrens respond that the statutes are unconstitutional because they extinguish the security interests of lienholders with no provision for meaningful hearing and notice and because they require rentals to be redeemed before the department will stop issuing an abandoned title. They argue the Wrens had standing to raise claims that the statutes are unconstitutional as to mobile home owners because they had a personal stake in the dispute and, therefore, the issue is ripe for determination. Conseco and the Wrens contend the statutes do not give people fair notice that their property is to be taken because the definition of "abandoned" and the remedies therefore are so ambiguous that people are not able to determine their meaning. They further respond that the statutory scheme violates equal protection because poor persons are unable to obtain judicial review if they cannot pay rentals to prevent an abandoned title from being issued.

The Jefferson County Manufactured Housing Association, which filed a brief as an amicus curiae, argues the court erred in holding the statutes unconstitutional. It contends the statute provides for adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and is an effective means to prevent lenders from leaving abandoned manufactured homes in communities without payment or rent.

SC84349
Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C. v. Missouri Department of Revenue
St. Louis County
Constitutionality of abandoned manufactured home statutes

This case is identical to SC84347, except it involves a different financing company as lienholder, Greenpoint Credit, L.L.C., and it does not include mobile home owners as a party. The circuit court held here as it did in SC84349, and the parties, again including Jefferson County Manufactured Housing Association as amicus curiae, make the same arguments here as were made in SC84349.

SC84331
James Washington, Jr. v. State of Missouri
Clay County
Post-conviction relief

James Washington was convicted of first-degree robbery for stealing a compact disc player from Montgomery Wards at Metro North Shopping Mall in North Kansas City in November 1996. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence, and he subsequently sought post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. The court denied the relief requested, and Washington appeals.

Washington argues his trial counsel was ineffective for four reasons. He contends his attorney should have objected to a variance between the charging instrument, which alleged Washington forcibly stole a CD player, and the verdict-directing instruction submitted to the jury, which asked the jury to find that Washington had retained possession of a CD player or video cassette recorder. He asserts his attorney should have requested a continuance so he could obtain Montgomery Wards' surveillance video, which Washington believes would have shown that another person committed the robbery. He argues his trial attorney failed to interview and depose a state's witness before trial and failed to object to the witness' testimony at trial because the witness' identification of Washington resulted solely from two other witnesses pointing out Washington at a pretrial hearing. He contends his trial counsel should have objected during a witness' deposition when the prosecutor showed the witness a single photograph of Washington and asked whether she had seen that man because this identification process was suggestive and could have influenced the outcome of the trial.

The state responds that Washington's trial attorney did not provide ineffective counsel. It argues the difference between the charging document and the verdict director was not a fatal variance because the fact of whether the item stolen was a CD player or a VCR did not prejudice Washington's alibi and misidentification defenses. The state contends Washington failed to show that a reasonable attorney would have asked for a continuance to get the surveillance video, that the court would have granted a continuance had one been requested, or that the video would have aided his defense. It asserts there was no evidence that a motion to suppress the state witness' testimony would have had merit or that the witness' identification was tainted by hearing two other witnesses identify Washington. The state further responds that no error, plain or otherwise, resulted from the other witness' identification of Washington from one photograph during her deposition.

SC83934
State of Missouri v. Marcellus Williams
St. Louis County
Direct appeal of murder conviction and death sentence

In August 1998, when he returned home from work, Felicia Gayle's husband found her dead, lying between the stairs and front door, with a 13-inch butcher knife protruding from her neck. Several items were missing, including Gayle's purse and her husband's laptop computer. An autopsy revealed that Gayle bled to death from stab wounds to her head, neck, chest and abdomen. She sustained 16 stab wounds, seven of which would have been fatal on their own. After her husband offered a $10,000 reward, convicted criminal Henry Cole came forward with information that Marcellus Williams had told him, while they both were in the St. Louis city jail, that Williams had killed Gayle after she caught him robbing her home. Williams' girlfriend, Laura Asara, later told police Williams also had told her he killed a woman who caught him robbing her house. She said Williams threatened to hurt her and her children and mother if she told anyone. At trial, the defense challenged the credibility of both Cole and Asara and argued there was a lack of forensic evidence tying Williams to the crime. The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder, robbery, burglary and two counts of armed criminal action. The jury later found all ten aggravators and recommended the death penalty, and the court imposed it. Williams also received consecutive sentences of life in prison for the robbery conviction, and of 30 years each for the burglary and armed criminal action convictions.

Willams appeals, arguing the prosecutor was racially discriminatory in exercising the state's peremptory challenges to certain venirepersons. He contends the prosecutor failed to tell the jury during voir dire that it legally was required to determine, before it considered whether to impose death, whether the evidence in aggravation actually warranted death. He asserts the court plainly erred in submitting an instruction at the outset of trial regarding juror note-taking because it omitted three paragraphs, required by the Missouri approved instructions, about the juror's duties in taking notes. Williams argues the court should have granted his motion to suppress physical evidence seized from his car and should not have admitted such evidence at trial because the search was based solely on consent from Williams' grandfather, who did not have common authority over the car. He contends he should have been permitted to elicit testimony from the individual to whom he had sold the laptop computer that he received the laptop from Asara, not from Picus' home. He asserts the court plainly erred in failing to prevent the prosecutor from personalizing during closing argument. Williams argues the court should not have permitted the jury, during the penalty phase, to hear testimony and argument and view exhibits showing uncharged crimes Williams committed. He contends the prosecutor improperly argued victim impact of crimes other than those with which Williams was charged and presented victim impact testimony from family members that far exceeded its proper scope. He asserts the court erred in submitting an instruction to the jury that asked them to consider crimes different than those included in the charging instrument. Williams also argues the aggravators included in the instruction were unconstitutionally vague, duplicative or invalid. He contends the court should have permitted him to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating factor that he was merely an accomplice in the murder and that his participation was minor.

The state responds that the court did not clearly err in overruling Williams' Batson objections to the its peremptory strike of certain venirepersons because it offered valid, race-neutral explanations for the strikes and because Williams failed to prove the explanations were pretextual. The state argues the court read to jurors the proper instruction for juror note-taking, containing all the paragraphs about the juror's duties. It contends the prosecutor's general explanation of the process in a first-degree murder case was not improper even though it did not tell jurors the specific steps they would have to take before recommending the death penalty. It asserts the court properly excluded hearsay testimony from the individual to whom Williams sold the laptop. The state responds it properly was allowed to present evidence of Williams' attempted escape from jail while charges in this case were pending. It argues the court properly admitted into evidence items found in the car because its registered owner, Williams' grandfather, gave written consent for the search. The state contends the prosecutor's statements during the guilt-phase closing argument were not improper personalization but rather concerned the credibility of a witness. It asserts it did not err in presenting victim impact testimony during the penalty phase because law permits the state to present evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the testimony offered here was not excessive. The state responds the court did not err in instructing the jury about the aggravating circumstances because the jury only has to find one aggravator to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty and because the state is not required to plead the statutory aggravators in the indictment or information. The state contends the court properly refused to submit the statutory mitigator about whether Williams was an accomplice in the murder because the record does not support a claim that another person committed the murder. The state further argues this Court should affirm Williams' death sentence because the sentence was not imposed under the influence of any arbitrary factor, the evidence supports the jury's findings of aggravating circumstances, and the sentence is not excessive or disproportionate.