Case Summary for October 13, 2004

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Case Summary for October 13, 2004

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Wednesday, October 13, 2004
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SC86137
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Wilbur Schottel v. State of Missouri
Clay County
Validity of sexually violent predator statute

In 1995, at the age of 63, Wilbur Schottel was arrested for molesting five girls between the ages of 8 and 13 years old. In September 1995, he pleaded guilty to one count of sodomy, and he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In June 2000, Schottel stipulated that he is a sexually violent predator, and he was confined in a secure department of mental health facility. In February 2002, Schottel filed a petition for release from confinement pursuant to section 632.489, RSMo 2000. The probate division denied his petition without a probable cause hearing pursuant to section 632.504, RSMo 2000. While that matter was on appeal, he filed a second petition for release, which the probate division denied after a probable cause hearing, rendering the appeal moot. In October 2002, Schottel filed a third petition for release. At the beginning of his June 2003 probable cause hearing, Schottel verbally moved the probate division to declare unconstitutional section 632.498, RSMo2000. He argued it required him to demonstrate that he will not engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if discharged before allowing him to proceed to a jury trial where the ultimate question of release from confinement could be decided. The probate division denied the motion and subsequently denied Schottel's petition for release. He appeals.

Schottel argues section 632.498 is unconstitutional as it denies due process. He contends the procedure for release provided in the statute imposes a higher, and potentially impossible, level of evidence that a person committed as a sexually violent predator must meet before being released from involuntary commitment. Schottel asserts that the burden imposed on the state to confine the person involuntarily or to continue his commitment is lower. He argues this burden requires only that the state prove that the person is more likely than not to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined or is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged. He contends that because this statute cannot be severed from the rest of the sexually violent predator statutes, all of sections 632.480 to 632.510 also are unconstitutionally invalid. Schottel asserts that the probate division violated his due process rights by denying his petition for release without a trial on the merits. He argues he made a sufficient showing in his petition that probable cause existed to believe that his mental abnormality has changed to the extent he safely may be released into the community. He contends this showing also was sufficient to warrant a trial on the merits.

The state responds that Schottel failed to preserve his constitutional claim for review by not raising it at the earliest opportunity, either in his first petition for release or during the appeal of the denial of that petition. The state argues that, if this Court considers this argument, Schottel cannot overcome the presumption that section 632.498 is constitutional. It contends there are not two different standards relating to risk. Rather, it asserts that the plain meaning of the statute is clear, that to be or remain committed as a sexually violent predator, there must be a finding that the person is more likely than not to commit future acts of sexual violence. The state responds that the probate division properly denied Schottel's petition for release without a trial on the merits. The state argues that the evidence presented did not establish that probable cause existed to believe Schottel's mental abnormality had changed so that he is safe to be at large.

SC85990
State of Missouri v. Phillip Belton
Jackson County
Challenge to manslaughter and armed criminal action convictions

In December 1999, Phillip Belton came into Donald Adkins' house in Kansas City, Missouri, where others were getting high. Belton later showed off a gun and waved it around. Other guests at the party apparently thought it was not loaded. Ultimately, the gun went off and hit Adkins, who died of a single gunshot wound to the head. The state charged Belton with second-degree murder and armed criminal action, subsequently charging him as a prior and persistent offender as well. Following a trial, the jury found Belton guilty of the lesser-included charge of first-degree involuntary manslaughter and armed criminal action. In August 2002, the court sentenced Belton to consecutive terms of five years' imprisonment on each count. He appeals.

Belton argues the court violated his right to due process in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence, in submitting the verdict-directing instruction for armed criminal action, and in entering judgment and sentence against him on both convictions. He contends the state did not present sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he recklessly caused Adkins' death by shooting him. He asserts that one witness testified only as to events four to five minutes before the shooting and that there was no evidence presented as to what happened at the time the gun discharged. Belton argues that, pursuant to section 562.021, RSMo, the mental state of recklessness does not support a charge of armed criminal action. He contends that that offense requires a mental state of either purposeful or knowing conduct and that the jury specifically found that he acted recklessly, rather than knowingly, in shooting Adkins.

The state responds that the court properly denied Belton's motion for judgment of acquittal and in entering judgment and sentence on his convictions. It argues there was sufficient evidence to support both convictions. It contends the evidence showed that Belton acted either knowingly or recklessly in shooting the victim with a deadly weapon, thereby causing his death. The state responds that the court properly submitted the armed criminal action verdict director. The state argues that armed criminal action can be predicated on a reckless crime.

SC85834
M.P. v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services

consolidated with

SC85835
A.W. v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services

consolidated with

SC85836
C.S. v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services

consolidated with

SC85837
F.A. v. Missouri Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services
Cole and Shelby counties
Constitutional challenge to child abuse and neglect act

In June 2001, two calls were placed to the division of family services' (now children's division) hotline reporting various allegations of abuse or neglect by four workers at Heartland Christian Academy: M.P.; A.W.; F.A. and C.S., who also is the founder of Heartland. The division investigated the reports from the calls in part by conducting interviews, reviewing reports of other interviews and obtaining photographs and documents. Following the investigation, the division investigator made a finding of probable cause to believe that the workers had physically abused two girls at Heartland (although the investigator later testified that the findings against F.A., M.P. and A.W. should be of neglect rather than abuse). In July 2001, the division entered the probable cause findings into its central registry. Pursuant to section 210.152.2, RSMo, the division notified the workers of the probable cause determinations through an August 2001 letter. The workers requested an administrative review before the child abuse and neglect review board pursuant to section 210.152.3, RSMo. Following a July 2002 hearing, the board in August 2002 upheld the division's findings. The workers filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court, which conducted a two-day evidentiary trial in October 2003. In January 2004, the court overturned the probable cause findings against the workers and held the entirety of chapter 210 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The division appeals.

The division argues the court erred in holding that chapter 210 violates due process. It contends the chapter does not burden any protected substantive liberty or property interest. It asserts that, even if the chapter creates a stigma on an individual, the chapter places no burden on the individual's right to seek or maintain employment. The division further asserts that there is no right to adopt children or become foster parents. The division argues the court erred in declaring the chapter unconstitutional under the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. It contends that any person impacted under the chapter is afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard. It asserts that any administrative finding of probable cause to suspect abuse or neglect is preceded by an investigation, is followed by multiple levels of administrative hearings, and culminates in a full trial de novo on the merits. The division argues a statutory provision is not unconstitutionally vague if it conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The division contends that section 210.101 provides a clear definition of "abuse." It asserts that the chapter also does not violate the open courts provision of the state constitution. The division argues the chapter does not present any bar or limitation to recovery for a recognized right. It contends those who challenge the registry do not claim personal injuries for which they have suffered any bar or impediment and have not presented any evidence of such injuries. The division asserts that the court erred in ordering the division of family services to pay costs because there is no statutory authority to award costs against the state in this situation.

The workers respond that the central registry scheme contained within the chapter unconstitutionally denies due process. They argue it causes stigma, which is an injury to reputation, and also places a burden on employment, adoption and foster parenting without first providing procedural due process, including pre-deprivation process. The workers contend they have a constitutionally protected interest when the government goes beyond mere defamation and that the central registry scheme goes well beyond mere defamation. They assert that the risk of error under the existing procedures is enormous and that additional procedural safeguards would benefit everyone, including the state. The workers argue the existing process does not require adherence to the rules of evidence, a neutral decision maker, and uses a "probable cause" standard rather than a "preponderance of the evidence" standard. They contend that the court's judgment does not impair law enforcement or child protection. The workers respond that the division waived its right to appeal the court's void for vagueness finding because it was based on the unconstitutionality of the chapter as applied to them, but the division has not appealed the court's reversals of the probable cause findings against them. They assert that the court properly declared that the pre-trial review requirement of the chapter violates the open courts guaranty in the state constitution because they were seeking redress for personal injuries. The workers do not contest that their costs should not have been taxed against the state.

SC85951
State of Missouri ex rel. Carol Russell Fischer, Director of Revenue v. Joe R. Brooks
Jackson County
Dispute over state income tax return law

In June 2003, the director filed a petition for delinquent Missouri individual income tax against Brooks. The petition sought taxes due for the years 1992 through 1996. The next month, Brooks sought a change of judge. In September 2003, Brooks appeared by special appearance to challenge the director's jurisdiction to bring the action against him. The court overruled the challenge the next month. During the next several months, Brooks submitted requests for production of documents, for a list of witnesses, for admissions and interrogatories. The director responded, but Brooks did not believe the responses were meaningful. In February 2004, Brooks then served a subpoena on the director to appear and produce documents at a trial scheduled for six days later. Brooks moved to enforce the discovery at the beginning of the trial, at which the director did not personally appear or present evidence. Following the trial, the court entered judgment in the director's favor. Brooks appeals.

Brooks argues the court erred in overruling his jurisdictional challenge. He contends the director failed to produce evidence or other proof of the regulation specifying the place to file the return and pay the tax prescribed by the director under section 143.511, RSMo, to support her jurisdiction to take action against him. He asserts the director never promulgated such a regulation. Brooks argues the court erred in entering judgment in the director's favor. He contends the director provided no evidence or other proof establishing that he failed to file a return or pay the tax at a place specified by the director within the provisions of section 143.511.

The director responds that this Court does not have jurisdiction because the case does not actually involve the construction of a state revenue law. She argues Brooks failed to preserve his argument regarding the tax law by protesting the tax through a timely administrative appeal. She contends the "shall" language in section 143.511 is directive, not mandatory. The director responds that even if the language for establishing a time and place for filing state tax returns was mandatory, Brooks was not excused from filing his returns. She asserts that 12 C.S.R. 10-1.010(4), which broadly proscribes the place for submitting any and all documents, including state income tax returns, to the state department of revenue.