Case Summary for April 7, 2009

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Case Summary for April 7, 2009

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, April 7, 2009

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SC89727
John Doe I, et al. v. Major James Keathley, Thomas Phillips and James Kanatzar
Jackson County
Constitutional validity of sex offender statute
Listen to the oral argument:

The state was represented during argument by Deputy Solicitor General Jeremiah Morgan of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, and the plaintiffs were represented by Arthur Benson of Arthur Benson & Associates in Kansas City.

In 1994, Missouri enacted a sexual offender registration act requiring those convicted of, found guilty of or who have pleaded guilty to committing certain sex offenses since July 1979 to register as sex offenders. This act was amended in August 2000 to include misdemeanors. In December 2006, a number of individuals challenged the requirement that they register as sex offenders in Missouri. Of these individuals, some were convicted of felony sex offenses in other states or in military courts before the January 1995 effective date of Missouri's registration act and later moved to Missouri, while others pleaded guilty to misdemeanor sex offenses in Missouri before August 2000. They alleged the registration requirements were unconstitutionally retrospective as applied to them, and they sought declaratory and injunctive relief that registration would be inconsistent with Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. banc 2006) (barring application of the sex offender registration act to individuals convicted of sex offenses before the act's January 1995 effective date), and Doe v. Blunt, 225 S.W.3d 421 (Mo. banc 2007) (barring the retrospective application of the registration requirement to offenders whose crimes were not included in the registration requirement at the time they pleaded guilty or were convicted). All parties moved for summary judgment. In June 2008, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of 10 of the offenders. The state appeals.

The state argues that requiring registration of persons with offenses before 1995 in other jurisdictions is not inconsistent with Missouri's prohibition on retrospective laws. It contends those who move to Missouri voluntarily accept the state's registration obligation by moving here and, if they must register here because they were required to register in another jurisdiction, their registration obligation in Missouri is merely a continuation of a preexisting obligation. The state further argues the plaintiff offenders are required to register in Missouri pursuant to the federal sex offender law requiring convicted sex offenders to register in the state where they reside. The state asserts federal law preempts Missouri's bar on retrospective laws and does not provide exceptions for sex offenders to register based on state constitutional provisions.

The plaintiff offenders respond that individuals who, before 1995, were convicted of or pleaded guilty to sex offenses in other states constitutionally could not be required to register as sex offenders under Missouri's sex offender registration act. They contend that applying the registration requirement to them would constitute an unconstitutional retrospective application of the act in violation of the Missouri Constitution and Doe v. Phillips. The plaintiffs argue they also cannot be required to register in Missouri as sex offenders under the federal sex offender registration and notification act because of Missouri's prohibition on retrospective laws. They further respond that while some of them were required to register in other states where they lived before moving to this state, Missouri has different conditions and obligations including the duration of the registration requirement. They assert there is insufficient evidence that Congress intended the federal law to supersede state constitutional provisions and, because the federal and state laws do not conflict, federal law does not supersede Missouri's law.

SC89568
Jay Wolfe Imports Missouri, Inc. v. Director of Revenue
Jackson County
Apportionment of income tax
Listen to the oral argument:

The company was represented during argument by Bruce Davison of Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP of Kansas City, and the director was represented by Solicitor General James Layton of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

Jay Wolfe Imports Missouri sells motor vehicles in Kansas City to customers from Missouri and surrounding states. The company, which is subject to Missouri income tax, elected to use the single-factor apportionment method to compute its tax liability for its 2002, 2003 and 2004 state income tax returns. Using this method, the company classified receipts from sales to customers providing out-of-state addresses as sales partly within Missouri and partly outside of Missouri. It computed the remainder of its receipts from vehicle sales as sales wholly within Missouri. The director of revenue audited the company's tax returns from 2002 to 2004 and determined the company should have classified all its vehicle sales as wholly within Missouri under the single-factor apportionment method. In December 2006, the director assessed the company corporate income tax, plus interest, for the three tax years. On review the administrative hearing commission in August 2008 found the company liable for Missouri corporate income tax assessed by the director for the company's 2002, 2003 and 2004 tax years, plus interest. The company appeals.

The company argues it is entitled to apportion its income. It contends the commission incorrectly determined a taxpayer must establish that it is a multistate business having either employees or facilities outside of Missouri or employing capital outside the state. The company contends the commission failed to apply the plain meaning of section 143.451.2, RSMo 2006, and did not properly apply the single-factor apportionment method from that section to the facts of this case.

The director responds because the company's sales of tangible property took place wholly within Missouri, there was no income to be apportioned. It contends the company produced no income by sales transactions that included shipping tangible personal property from one state to another, had no sales "partly within this state and partly without this state" for purposes of section 143.451.2 and could not benefit from single-factor apportionment.

SC89849
In re: Larry D. Coleman
Jackson County
Attorney Discipline
Listen to the oral argument:

The disciplinary counsel was represented during argument by Shannon Briesacher of the chief disciplinary counsel in Jefferson City, and Coleman, of Raytown, represented himself.

Larry Coleman practices law in Kansas City. From June 2001 to September 2006, he represented a client in three civil actions. The client paid Coleman between $30,000 and $50,000 in hourly fees. The client and Coleman then entered into a contingency agreement that would give Coleman one-third of any recovery in addition to previous payments made. The agreement also purported to give Coleman the exclusive right to settle all of the client's cases. Coleman subsequently accepted a settlement agreement in one of the lawsuits without the client's express consent. When she complained, Coleman moved for the court to enforce the agreement against the client. The court entered judgment in the client's favor, and Coleman moved to withdraw from representation without sending the client a copy of his motion or providing her information about her rights and obligations. Ultimately, the client's case was dismissed following her failure to obtain new counsel and Coleman moved to withdraw as counsel for her two other cases. In July 2007, the client filed a complaint against Coleman with the office of chief disciplinary counsel. The disciplinary counsel alleged Coleman failed to abide by his client's decision and accepted the settlement agreement against her express wishes in violation of Rules 4-1.2(a) and 4-8.4(d). The disciplinary counsel further alleged Coleman regularly commingled personal and client funds in his trust account in violation of Rule 4-1.15. A disciplinary hearing panel found that Coleman acted against his client's express wishes but that he did not comingling funds. The panel recommended that Coleman be reprimanded publicly. The disciplinary counsel asks this Court to discipline Coleman's license.

The disciplinary counsel argues this Court should suspend Coleman's license with no leave to reapply for one year. He contends Coleman violated the following rules of professional conduct: 4-1.2 (failure to abide by client's decision) when he accepted a settlement agreement without consent of his client and then moved the court to enforce the agreement against his client; 4-1.5 (excessive fee) when Coleman converted an hourly fee agreement to a contingent agreement after his client paid him more than $30,000 in fees without giving the client credit for fees paid; 4-1.7 (conflict of interest) by entering into a contingency agreement with his client that purported to give him the exclusive right to settle all of her cases and subsequently took adverse action against his client in court; 4-1.16 (failure to protect client's interests at termination) when he failed to notify his client that he had withdrawn from her case and failed to provide her information as to her rights and obligations; 4-1.15 (safekeeping property) by regularly commingling personal and client funds; and 4-8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) when Coleman caused harm to the system and his clients by violating multiple rules of professional conduct. The disciplinary counsel asserts suspension is appropriate when, as here, a lawyer knowingly takes action against the interests of his client, improperly handles client funds, and engages in conduct that violates duties owed to clients and the profession.

Coleman responds that he did not settle his client's case without her consent. He argues there was never a settlement because his client refused to execute the settlement documents. He further responds he was denied due process of law because the disciplinary counsel relies on cases and authority from states other than Missouri.