Case Summary for December 7, 2010

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Case Summary for December 7, 2010

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Tuesday, Dec. 7, 2010

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SC90971
State of Missouri v. Matthew Thomas Grayson
Phelps County
Challenge to search and seizure
Listen to the oral argument:

Grayson was represented during arguments by Alexa I. Pearson of the public defender's office in Columbia, and the state was represented by Terrence M. Messonnier of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In March 2008, a sheriff’s deputy received a dispatch that a red Ford pickup truck was being driven by a possible drunken driver. The dispatch identified the driver as Terry Reed and said Reed had an outstanding parole warrant. While looking for the vehicle, the deputy spotted a red Mazda pickup truck. The deputy did not observe any traffic violations but stopped the vehicle. The deputy recognized the driver as Matthew Grayson, who had previous arrests for outstanding warrants. A check of Grayson’s license showed Grayson had an outstanding warrant for marijuana possession. After placing Grayson under arrest, the deputy searched Grayson and discovered a methamphetamine pipe. The deputy placed Grayson in the backseat of the patrol car, where the deputy later discovered a plastic bag containing what was confirmed to be methamphetamine. The trial court overruled Grayson’s motion to suppress evidence of the pipe and methamphetamine and found him guilty of possession of a controlled substance. Grayson appeals.

Grayson argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the pipe and methamphetamine. He contends the trial court violated his rights under both the U.S. and Missouri constitutions because the deputy did not have “reasonable suspicion” to stop or detain him and because the deputy’s discovery of Grayson’s outstanding warrant did not justify the unconstitutional seizure.

The state responds that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence because the arrest was valid. The state argues that, to the extent Grayson’s detention prior to discovery of his outstanding warrant was invalid, the discovery of the warrant operated as an independent justification for Grayson’s further detention. Additionally, the state contends Grayson’s initial detention was not invalid because the deputy believed Grayson was the subject of a dispatch and because Grayson’s continued detention to check for outstanding warrants was permissible.

SC90978
State of Missouri v. Jacob Waldrup Jr.
Clay County
Challenge to search and seizure
Listen to the oral argument:

Waldrup was represented during arguments by S. Kathleen Webber of the public defender's office in Kansas City, and the state was represented by James B. Farnsworth of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In November 2006, Missouri highway patrol troopers conducted a driver’s license checkpoint in Clay County. A blue Chevy Camaro approached the checkpoint between 3:30 and 4 p.m. The troopers saw the Camaro’s front-seat passenger, Jacob Waldrup, “reaching for something for stuffing something” around his feet. After stopping the vehicle, a trooper checked the driver’s information, discovered the license was suspended and issued the driver a citation. Meanwhile, another trooper asked Waldrup to step out of the car and frisked him for weapons. None were found. Waldrup carried no identification but told the troopers his name, date of birth and social security number. The information revealed Waldrup had several outstanding arrest warrants. The troopers arrested Waldrup and subsequently discovered $365 in cash concealed in Waldrup’s sock and a rock of crack cocaine concealed in Waldrup’s shoe. The trial court overruled Grayson’s motion to suppress the physical items seized from him and any testimony regarding that evidence. The jury found Waldrup guilty of possession of cocaine. Waldrup appeals.

Waldrup argues the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the crack cocaine and testimony regarding the discovery, seizure and testing of the crack cocaine. He contends the trial court violated his rights under both the U.S. and Missouri constitutions because, once the troopers issued a ticket to the driver, the purpose of the checkpoint stop had been accomplished, and Waldrup’s continued detention was not justified.

The state responds that the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of the crack cocaine and cocaine-related testimony. The state argues the troopers had “reasonable suspicion” that Waldrup was armed or carrying contraband, a check of Waldrup’s identifying information was reasonable and the discovery of crack cocaine was pursuant to a lawful arrest. The state contends that, even if troopers initially detained Waldrup unlawfully, evidence of the cocaine was admissible because it was discovered after troopers arrested Waldrup on the outstanding warrants.

SC90988
Joseph Williams v. Colonel Jerry Lee and Colonel Ron Replogle
St. Louis County
Challenge to placement on sex offender registry
Listen to the oral argument:

Williams was represented during arguments by Matthew A. Radefeld of Frank, Juengel & Radefeld PC in Clayton, and the law enforcement officials were represented by Deputy Solicitor General Jeremiah J. Morgan of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In February 2000, Joseph Williams pleaded guilty in military court to one count each of carnal knowledge and of sodomy with a child under the age of 16 under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. In May 2002, the St. Louis County police department notified Williams that he was required to register as a sex offender. Williams complied. In January 2009, Williams filed a petition seeking to have his name removed from the sex offender registry and his prior registration records expunged. Officials of the St. Louis County police department and the Missouri Highway Patrol moved to dismiss the petition for failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the law enforcement officials’ motion to dismiss, holding that Williams was required, under federal law, to register in Missouri as a sex offender. Williams appeals.

Williams argues the trial court erred in holding that he must register as a sex offender. Williams contends his crimes do not require registration because they do not fall under the federal definition of “sex offense.” Williams asserts the trial court erred in not ordering his records expunged because the state gained his personal information in violation of his rights under the U.S. and Missouri constitutions and because the continued publication of his personal information violates Williams’s privacy rights.

The law enforcement officials respond that the trial court correctly granted their motion to dismiss. They contend that federal law requires Williams to register as a sex offender and that Williams’ petition failed to allege that he met any exception to the federal law. The officials assert that, because Williams is required to register as a sex offender, any records relating to his registration as a sex offender should not be expunged.

SC90582
Ernest Johnson v. State of Missouri
Boone County
Post-conviction relief in a death penalty case
Listen to the oral argument:

Johnson was represented during arguments by William J. Swift of the public defender's office in Columbia, and the state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In May 1995, a jury found Ernest Johnson guilty of three counts of first-degree murder. The circuit court sentenced Johnson to death. In 2003, this Court reversed Johnson’s death sentence and remanded (sent back) the case for a new penalty phase proceeding because evidence indicated Johnson might be mentally retarded. After the new penalty phase, the jury found Johnson had not proven he was mentally retarded and recommended the death penalty, which the circuit court later imposed. Subsequently, Johnson sought post-conviction relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court overruled Johnson’s motion. Johnson appeals.

Johnson argues the circuit court clearly erred in overruling his post-conviction motion because he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Johnson contends his counsel was ineffective because his counsel: (1) called an “historically unprepared” and unqualified expert witness to testify about mental retardation; (2) failed to present witness testimony that another individual orchestrated the crime; (3) failed to offer mental health records documenting his family history of mental retardation; (4) failed to move to suppress or redact portions of an interview by a mental health professional that included questions about Johnson’s crime; and (5) failed to object to evidence and the state’s closing argument regarding an expert’s opinion that Johnson was not mentally retarded. Further, Johnson asserts the circuit court erred because the rate at which the death penalty is sought and imposed in Boone County is greater than anywhere else in Missouri.

The state responds that the circuit court did not clearly err in finding Johnson failed to prove his counsel was ineffective. The state argues that: (1) the expert witness called by Johnson’s counsel testified favorably to Johnson; (2) Johnson’s counsel’s decision to avoid guilt phase evidence was a reasonable trial strategy, and no credible evidence supported the submission that another individual orchestrated the crime; (3) evidence of family history of mental retardation was inadmissible or, alternatively, Johnson was not prejudiced by the absence of such evidence; (4) Johnson’s counsel had a strategic reason for wanting the jury to view Johnson’s interview with a mental health professional as it tended to show Johnson was mentally retarded, and Johnson’s guilt was no longer an issue; and (5) any objection by Johnson’s counsel to evidence and the state’s closing argument regarding an expert’s opinion that Johnson was not mentally retarded would have been without merit. The state contends Johnson’s claim that capital punishment in Boone County is imposed at a higher rate than in other counties is not cognizable (legally cannot be recognized) in this post-conviction appeal because it differs from the claim raised before the circuit court and should have been raised on direct appeal.