Case Summary for October 20, 2010

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Case Summary for October 20, 2010

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Wednesday, Oct. 20, 2010

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SC90738, State of Missouri v. William R. Schroeder
Franklin County
Sufficiency of evidence, constitutional validity challenges in DWI case
Listen to the oral argument:

SC90738.mp3
Schroeder was represented during arguments by Sarah K. Tupper of The Carson Law Firm in Union, and the state was represented by James B. Farnsworth of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In October 2006, William Schroeder pulled over on the shoulder to check for a low tire while driving on Highway AT in Franklin County. A state highway patrol trooper stopped because he saw the vehicle’s high-beam headlights come on and stay on; based on his observations and questioning of Schroeder, including failing field sobriety tests, the trooper arrested Schroeder for driving while intoxicated. Schroeder filed motions to suppress evidence and statements and later filed an amended motion to dismiss one count of the indictment on the ground that the statutory scheme under which he was charged was unconstitutionally void for vagueness on its face and as applied to him. The trial court overruled Schroeder’s motions, and Schroeder waived his right to a jury trial. By agreement, the case was submitted to the trial court based on two documents: Schroeder’s driving record and the trooper’s police report. No additional evidence was presented. In January 2010, Schroeder was convicted of driving while intoxicated as a chronic offender, driving while his license was revoked and failing to dim his headlights. He was sentenced to five years in prison for driving while intoxicated and one year in the county jail, to run concurrently with his prison sentence, for driving while his license was revoked, and was fined $25 for failing to dim his headlights. Schroeder appeals.

Schroeder argues the trial court erred in finding him guilty of failure to dim his headlights because the evidence was insufficient to sustain such a conviction. He contends section 307.070, RSMo, does not require the dimming of headlights per se but instead prohibits a motorist’s use of a light beam aimed so its glaring rays project into the eyes of a nearby driver. He asserts the state failed to prove his headlights glared into the eyes of any driver at any time. Schroeder argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence and statements. He contends his detention and questioning by the trooper violated his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the state and federal constitutions. As such, he asserts, any evidence and statements obtained through this detention and questioning should have been suppressed. Schroeder argues the trial court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss the count of the indictment charging him with driving while intoxicated. He contends the statutory definition of “intoxicated condition” is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it fails to give notice of what conduct is prohibited and lacks explicit standards. He asserts it improperly criminalizes the operation of a motor vehicle in the unquantifiable state of being “under the influence” without requiring that the driver’s ability to operate a motor vehicle is impaired at all.

The state responds that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Schroeder had committed the infraction of failure to dim his headlights. It argues the evidence was sufficient to show that Schroeder was within 300 feet behind the trooper’s vehicle when Schroeder activated his high beams and that the glaring rays from these high beams were aimed so as to project into the trooper’s eyes. The state contends the trial court did not clearly err in overruling Schroeder’s motion to suppress evidence and statements gathered during the trooper’s investigation. It asserts that there was no “stop” by law enforcement as Schroeder already had stopped his car before the trooper turned around and that the trooper’s initial encounter with Schroeder was consensual, and, therefore, that Schroeder never was detained unlawfully. The state responds that the trial court did not err in overruling Schroeder’s motion to dismiss the driving while intoxicated charge because Missouri’s driving while intoxicated statute is not unconstitutionally vague. It argues it is well-settled that the terms “intoxicated condition” and “under the influence,” as used in the Missouri statutes, readily are understandable by a person of ordinary intelligence. The state contends the statutes also are not unconstitutionally vague as applied to the facts of Schroeder’s case.

SC91006, State of Missouri v. Antonio A. Andrews
St. Louis city
Constitutional validity of juvenile certification statute; sufficiency of evidence in murder case
Listen to the oral argument:

SC91006.mp3
Andrews was represented during arguments by Brocca Smith of the public defender's office in St. Louis, and the state was represented by Evan J. Buchheim of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City.

In August 2007, 15-year-old Antonio Andrews and one of his friends fled from police. During the chase, a gunshot was fired, and the officer was killed by one shot to the chest. Police located a .38-caliber revolver near the scene of the shooting. During an interview with police, the friend said Andrews said he was tired of being chased, pulled out the .38, shot twice and threw the gun away. Andrews was arrested and, in December 2007, was certified to stand trial as an adult. During a deposition, the friend denied the veracity of the statement he had given to police and stated he did not see Andrews shoot the officer. The friend said in his deposition that he tried to tell police he had not seen Andrews shoot the officer but that he was afraid because the officers accused him of lying and told him to tell that story or he would go down. During the August 2009 jury trial, the friend testified that he and Andrews ran from the officer but that he did not see who shot the officer. Another friend who testified said he made a videotaped statement to police incriminating Andrews but only because he was handcuffed to a table and was scratched by one of the officers. The jury found Andrews guilty of both first-degree murder and armed criminal action. He was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of probation or parole for the murder conviction and a consecutive 50-year prison sentence for the armed criminal action conviction. Andrews appeals.

Andrews argues the trial court erred in imposing judgment and sentence against him. He argues the juvenile certification statute (section 211.071, RSMo) violates state and federal constitutional rights to due process of law and a fair sentence because it subjects juveniles to a mandatory sentence of permanent incarceration for first-degree murder. He contends this constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because the mandatory sentence does not allow for a particular assessment of the circumstances at the time of sentencing, including the juvenile’s age and maturity. He asserts the statute subjects a juvenile to an enhanced punishment without submitting facts to a jury and requiring those facts to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Andrews argues the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all evidence on the murder charge. He contends the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed first-degree murder because, viewed in the light most favorable to the state, there was insufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find Andrews deliberated or reflected coolly for any length of time before the officer was shot and killed. He asserts this ruling violated his federal and state constitutional rights to due process and a fair and impartial trial. Andrews further argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the presence of uniformed police officers during the jury trial. He contends this denied him an environment of impartiality for his jury trial, thereby violating his state and federal constitutional rights.

The state responds that the trial court did not err in overruling Andrews’ motion to declare the juvenile certification statute unconstitutional. It argues the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Aprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not apply to a juvenile division’s consideration of the criteria outlined in section 211.071 in determining whether to relinquish its jurisdiction and allow a criminal prosecution of the juvenile under the general law. It contends the imposition of the statutorily mandated sentence of life in prison without the possibility of probation or parole on a juvenile convicted of first-degree murder does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The state asserts the trial court did not err in overruling Andrews’ motion for judgment of acquittal on the murder charge because sufficient evidence – through the videotaped statement of one of Andrews’ friends and circumstantial evidence – existed to establish that Andrews deliberated before shooting the officer. The state further responds that the trial court did not err in overruling Andrews’ motion seeking a court order requiring all non-testifying police officers to wear civilian clothes in the courtroom. It argues Andrews failed to make a record establishing either that these circumstances occurred or that Andrews was prejudiced as a result.

SC90912, Craig Dydell v. Dr. Bernard Taylor
Jackson County
Constitutional validity of federal teacher protection act; applicability of act to school superintendent in suit following student-on-student violence
Listen to the oral argument:

SC90912.mp3
Dydell was represented during arguments by George P. Coughlin of Dysart Taylor Lay Cotter & McMonigle PC in Kansas City, and Taylor was represented by Derek T. Teeter of Husch Blackwell Sanders LLP in Kansas City. The United States, which was granted permission to argue as a friend of the Court, was represented by Alisa B. Klein of the department of justice in Washington, D.C.

In January 2004, J.W., a student at Westport Charter School in Kansas City, attempted to bring a knife into the school. His knife was detected by metal detectors, and he was expelled from the school, placed on home-bound detention for one year and ordered to receive mental health treatment. The next month, J.W.’s mother sought to enroll him in the Kansas City school district. As a result, the district became aware of his criminal record and, in accordance with Missouri’s safe schools act, reported his criminal record to the district’s superintendent, Dr. Bernard Taylor. The district subsequently received, with authorization, J.W.’s criminal record and mental health treatment records. In June 2004, the district cleared Whitehead for enrollment in the district, and his juvenile officers recommended that he be placed either in an alternative school or in a day school comprised only of special education students. The district’s special education department eventually placed J.W. in Central High School. No plan was put in place to prevent J.W. from repeating what he had done at Westport Charter School, and neither the staff nor teachers at Central were made aware of his criminal record or mental health condition. In preparing J.W.’s individualized education program (IEP), the special education department staff failed to review or include in the IEP any reference to his criminal record or mental health condition. In the fall of 2005, Craig Dydell began as a new student at Central High School.

In September 2005, a teacher gave J.W. a box-cutter during his drafting class at the school. The teacher had not been informed of his criminal record or his mental health condition. J.W. took the box-cutter home and then brought it back to school the next day. While Dydell was seated in the school cafeteria, J.W. attacked him from behind, using the box-cutter to slice Dydell’s neck. The attack was unprovoked, and Dydell never had met J.W. After the attack, the district acknowledged that J.W. should not have been placed at Central and that his IEP was inadequate. At the time of the attack, a “dangerous student regulation” had been in effect for more than five years. It provided that district teachers and other district staff “with a need to know” would be informed by “school administrators” of any dangerous special education students with “demonstrated or potentially violent behavior” and would be informed by Taylor of “any act committed … by a student in the [d]istrict that is reported to the district by a juvenile officer … or other appropriate law enforcement authority in accordance with state law.” While Taylor was superintendent in 2004 and 2005, however, nothing in the special education department handbook directed the department staff how to handle a special education transfer student who had a criminal or dangerous psychiatric record, and department staff was not provided with directives or guidelines about how to deal with dangerous special education students. While he was superintendent, Taylor was not familiar with the safe schools act and did not ensure the district’s policies and procedures would make sure teachers and case managers working with a potentially dangerous student would be aware of the student’s criminal or psychiatric history. Dydell survived his attack but was unable to return to Central High School to complete his education and continues to suffer from significant headaches, twitching, anxiety, depression, difficulty sleeping and other ailments.

In May 2007, Dydell sued Taylor in state court. Taylor removed the case to federal court, which ultimately sent it back to the state circuit court. In May 2008, Taylor filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court overruled his motion in June 2008. He subsequently sought a writ prohibiting the trial court from proceeding against him on the ground that Missouri’s official immunity doctrine barred the suit. In January 2009, this Court quashed its preliminary writ. In late 2009, Taylor moved for leave to amend his answer to raise for the first time a new defense based on a federal statute known as the Paul D. Coverdell Teacher Protection Act of 2001, codified at 20 U.S.C. section 6731, et seq. In December 2009, the trial court granted Taylor leave to amend his answer and overruled Dydell’s motion to strike the portion of the amended answer containing the Coverdell act defense. In January 2010, Taylor moved for summary judgment under the Coverdell act. Dydell responded the next month, challenging the act’s constitutional validity and arguing the act did not apply to Taylor. In April 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment in Taylor’s favor. Dydell appeals.

Dydell argues the trial court erred in granting Taylor summary judgment under the Coverdell act. He contends the enactment of this act was an unconstitutional exercise of legislative power under the spending and commerce clauses of and the Tenth Amendment of the federal constitution. He asserts that the act directly and unlawfully regulates Missouri courts and litigants such as Dydell, even though they are not recipients of federal education funds, in violation of the spending clause. Dydell argues the act violates the commerce clause because it neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that its subject be connected in any way to interstate commerce. He contends the act violates Missouri sovereignty by compelling Missouri courts to administer a federal immunity program for Missouri teachers and school administrators, in violation of the Tenth Amendment. Dydell further asserts Taylor failed to prove his compliance with 20 U.S.C. section 6736(a)(2) because he did not implement or execute the school district’s dangerous student regulation. He argues the act’s comparative fault and related provisions do not stand alone.

Taylor responds that the trial court properly granted him summary judgment under the Coverdell act. He argues the act is a valid exercise of the legislative power under the spending clause of the federal constitution because it is in pursuit of the general welfare, unambiguously allows the states to make a knowing and free choice to be bound by its terms and clearly is related to a national program of improving school performance and no other constitutional provisions serve as an independent bar to the act. He contends Congress may impose conditions on receiving federal money that go beyond specifying how that money is spent. He asserts that the act is not unconstitutional because if affects Missouri litigants. Taylor responds that Congress may impose conditions on receiving federal funds that operate directly by force of federal law and that conditions imposed on states through their receipt of federal funds may affect individual litigants and deprive them of certain causes of action they otherwise would have under state law. He argues that the act does not set a precedent for Congress to displace all state law and that it does not regulate state courts directly. Taylor contends the act is a legitimate exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause. He asserts that the act does not violate the Tenth Amendment, which he maintains is not an independent bar to congressional spending clause or commerce clause power. He responds that the act does not otherwise interfere with Missouri courts in a way that violates the constitution. Taylor argues the act fully applies on the facts of this case. He contends its requirement of conformity with federal, state and local laws does not apply to the school district’s internal policies. He asserts that Dydell misstates the actual requirements of the policy and that Taylor’s conduct was in conformity with the policy. Taylor responds, alternatively, that the trial court’s judgment should be affirmed because he is protected by official immunity under Missouri common law. He argues he raised this defense as an additional ground for summary judgment. Taylor contends that the absolute defense of official immunity extends to public employees exercising discretionary authority and that Dydell’s claims arise from Taylor’s performance of discretionary duties. Taylor asserts that there is no “public official” element to official immunity; that even if there were a “public official” test, he was a public official because he supervised the school district; and that there is no requirement that a public employee be a statutory employee to receive official immunity. Taylor further responds the safe schools act did not abolish official immunity for teachers and that cases from other jurisdictions explicitly recognize that school administrators are entitled to official immunity from claims resulting from a failure to prevent student-on-student violence.

The Missouri and National school boards associations argue, as friends of the Court, that the trial court did not err in granting Taylor summary judgment under the Coverdell act. The associations contend that the act provides immunity to teachers acting within the act’s parameters and that Taylor is a teacher as defined by the act. The associations assert the act both preempts and supplements state law to provide official immunity to a broad array of professional educators in all states. They argue Missouri, as a recipient of federal educational funds, is subject to the act.

The United States argues, as a friend of the Court, that the trial court did not err in granting Taylor summary judgment under the Coverdell act. It contends the act is a valid exercise of Congress’ spending power under article I of the federal constitution. As such, the government asserts, there is no reason to address Dydell’s alternative contention that the act exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. The United States further argues the act – which imposes valid conditions on the receipt of federal funds pursuant to the Supremacy Clause – does not violate the Tenth Amendment to the federal constitution.

SC91026, In re: George Spencer Miller
Nodaway County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument:

SC91026.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented by Sam S. Phillips of the chief disciplinary counsel's office in Jefferson City, and Miller was represented by Jerold L. Drake, attorney at law in Grant City.

Maryville attorney George Spencer Miller, who has practiced law for 37 years, has received four admonitions since 2006 for six violations of the rules of professional conduct – including those relating to diligence, communication and fees – arising out of his representation of four clients. In February 2009, his license was suspended, pursuant to rule 5.245, for failure to pay Missouri state income taxes. His license was reinstated in March 2009.

In the summer of 2008, a Maryville woman retained Miller to represent her in a debt collection action against Capitol One credit card company. She gave Miller all her paperwork in the case, including her summons to appear in the circuit court in September 2008. Miller told her that he would take care of the case, that she did not need to appear in court and that she would not have to pay the company. Miller did not appear in court on her behalf and did not do anything on her behalf. The court entered a default judgment against her, and Miller did not respond to her subsequent calls to his office. He says he remembers taking the $250 retainer from the woman but does not remember representing her or receiving any messages from her and assumes his secretary failed to open a case file for the woman or pass along her messages. After the chief disciplinary counsel’s office opened an investigation into the woman’s complaint, Miller reimbursed her $250.

In late 2007, Miller agreed to help a man who owns a Nodaway County welding business collect $1,500 from a neighbor to whom the man had sold a storage trailer after several attempts to cash the neighbor’s check failed. The man gave Miller paperwork related to his attempts to collect on the check, and Miller twice told the man he was working on the case. Miller said he told the man to ask the Nodaway County prosecutor to seek restitution in the case because then there would be no legal fees to the man. Miller said he never undertook representation of the man and did not collect any retainer from the man. Ultimately, the man did take his complaint to the prosecutor because Miller had custody of his case materials for several months but had done nothing on the case. The prosecutor eventually filed insufficient funds charges against the neighbor. The man later learned Miller was representing the neighbor on the bad check charge as well as on an unrelated weapons charge. Miller never sought nor discussed any waiver of conflict with the man and never spoke with him about it until after Miller already had undertaken representation of the neighbor and the man confronted him about it. Miller said he did not believe there was a conflict because any plea would require the neighbor to pay restitution to the man.

After listening to all the testimony, a disciplinary hearing panel found that Miller had violated the rules of professional conduct in his representation of the man and woman. It recommended that Miller’s license be suspended. The chief disciplinary counsel asks this Court to discipline Miller’s law license.

The chief disciplinary counsel argues this Court should suspend Miller’s law license for at least one year. He contends Miller violated Rule 4-1.3 by failing to act diligently in the woman’s behalf when he lost her file and failed to appear for her at a key case setting. He asserts Miller violated Rule 4-1.4 by failing to communicate with the woman when he did not report her case status to her and failed to respond to her requests for information. The chief disciplinary counsel argues Miller violated Rules 4-1.7 and/or 4-1.9 by engaging in a conflict of interest between successive clients. He contends Miller represented both the man and the neighbor at times when their interests were materially adverse. He asserts Miller defended the neighbor in a criminal case based on a bad check the neighbor wrote to the man after Miller consulted with and advised the man about possible remedies against the neighbor for the same check. He argues Miller gained confidential information in his consultation with the man that positioned Miller to have to decide whether to use that confidential information against the man during his later representation of the neighbor. The chief disciplinary counsel contends a suspension is necessary to protect the public. He asserts that, during the past four years, Miller has engaged in a pattern of conduct leaving multiple clients without adequate representation and that, despite four previous admonitions and a suspension for failure to pay his state income taxes, Miller has not improved his practice. The chief disciplinary counsel argues this Court’s previous decisions and the American Bar Association sanction standards indicate graduated discipline for repeated misconduct, especially when – as here – an attorney fails to acknowledge his misconduct. He contends this Court should consider probation under Rule 5.225 only if, before the case is submitted, Miller acknowledges the conflict and the chief disciplinary counsel is given an opportunity to recommend probation terms and conditions.

Miller responds that he is responsible for the fact that the woman’s file was lost and, therefore, that he failed to appear at court on her behalf or communicate with her concerning the status of her case. He concedes these actions constitute a violation of Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4. Miller argues he did not violate Rules 4-1.7 or 4-1.9; he contends there was no conflict of interest between successive clients. He asserts that no attorney-client relationship existed between him and the man, that he received no confidential information from the man about the check with insufficient funds, and that there was no adverse interest between the man and the neighbor concerning the check with insufficient funds. Miller responds that this Court should not suspend his law license. He argues his history in the practice of law establishes he has complied with the ethical requirements of the profession with the exception of isolated instances of minor infractions. He contends there is no evidence that he poses any danger to the public. He asserts that the disciplinary hearing panel’s recommendation that he be suspended is only advisory and that the panel improperly considered his prior admonitions. He argues he has acknowledged his violation of the applicable rules in the woman’s case and has relied on his understanding of the applicable law as it related to the man’s case. Miller further responds that this Court should grant him another hearing before another disciplinary hearing panel because the procedure the chief disciplinary counsel’s office followed denied his due process right to a fair and impartial hearing. He contends the chief disciplinary counsel’s office improperly included in the complaint and presentation of evidence prior disciplinary matters that he asserts were irrelevant, immaterial and prejudicial to a fair determination of whether he had violated the rules of professional misconduct in regard to his representation of the man and the woman.