Case Summary for November 10, 2011

Your Missouri Courts - Supreme Court

Home

Case Summary for November 10, 2011

THE FOLLOWING DOCKET SUMMARIES ARE PREPARED BY THE COURT'S STAFF FOR THE INTEREST AND CONVENIENCE OF THE READER. THE SUMMARIES MAY NOT INCLUDE ALL ISSUES PENDING BEFORE THE COURT AND DO NOT REFLECT ANY OPINION OF THE COURT ON THE MERITS OF A CASE. COPIES OF ALL BRIEFS FILED WITH THE COURT ARE AVAILABLE AT THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING, COURT EN BANC DIVISION. SUMMARIES ARE UNOFFICIAL AND SHOULD NOT BE QUOTED OR CITED.

Attached to the following docketed cases are electronic copies of briefs filed by the parties. These electronic briefs have been converted to PDF to accommodate various word processors. If you do not already have Acrobat reader, which is necessary to open the PDFs, you may obtain it free at the Adobe website. (A set of free tools that allow visually disabled users to read documents in Adobe PDF format is available from access.adobe.com.) These briefs do not reflect any opinion of the Court about the appropriateness of the format of the briefs or the merits of the case, nor are they official court records. Copies of all briefs filed with the Court are available at the Supreme Court Building in the court en banc division.

The attachments below may not reflect all briefs filed with the Court, the complete filing or the format of the original filing. Appendices and other attachments generally will not be posted here. To see what documents have been filed in a particular case, visit Case.net.

DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9 a.m. Thursday, Nov. 10, 2011

____________________________________________________________________________________________________

SC91631
State ex rel. Collector of Winchester, Missouri and City of Winchester, Missouri v. The Honorable Michael T. Jamison
St. Louis County
Challenge to dismissal of class action

Listen to the oral argument:

The municipalities were represented during arguments by John W. Hoffman of Korein Tillery LLC in St. Louis, and Charter Fiberlink-Missouri Inc. was represented by Robert P. Berry of Berry & Maxson LLC in St. Louis. Judge Jodie Capshaw Asel, a circuit judge from the 13th Judicial Circuit (Boone and Callaway counties), sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge George W. Draper III.

Winchester and several other Missouri municipalities attempted to collect business-license taxes from Charter Fiberlink-Missouri LLC for several types of gross receipts for telecommunications services such as exchange, interchange and special access, interconnection facilities. The municipalities sued Charter and sought certification of a class action. Charter moved to dismiss the class claims pursuant to section 71.675.1, RSMo, which states that no city or town shall file any legal action in a court in Missouri as a representative member of a class to enforce or collect any business license tax imposed on a telecommunications company. Following arguments, the trial court granted Charter’s motion and dismissed the municipalities’ class claims in February 2011. The municipalities seek this Court’s writ (order) prohibiting the trial court from dismissing their class claims.

The municipalities argue that the trial court erred in dismissing their class claims against Charter pursuant to section 71.675.1. They contend that Rule 52.08, which allows any action to be brought as a class action, conflicts with the newly created section 71.675, RSMo, which prohibits municipalities from bringing class actions against the telecommunications industry, creating a violation of the municipalities’ procedural rights under article 5 of the Missouri Constitution. They further assert that section 71.675 violates the state constitutional prohibition of article 3, section 40 against local or special laws by making distinctions between naturally related taxpayers, utilities and political subdivisions. The municipalities argue that by prohibiting cities and towns from suing telecommunications companies to collect taxes, the fairness and uniformity of the judicial process itself is affected.

Charter responds that the trial court correctly dismissed the municipalities’ class action against them, because section 71.675 required any action of this type to be dismissed. It argues that all laws passed by the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and that the municipalities here failed to rebut that presumption. Charter contends that the municipalities failed to show that section 71.675 is unconstitutional. Charter asserts that Rule 52.08 and section 71.675 do not conflict because Rule 52.08 is procedural and §71.675 is substantive. It contends that section 71.675 has a rational relationship to a legislative purpose because the unique relationship between utilities like Charter and municipalities does not allow for one municipality to represent another in a class action. Charter further asserts that this is a matter for the legislature and not this Court.

SC91849
State of Missouri v. Ines Letica
St. Louis city
Challenge to conviction
Listen to the oral argument:

Letica was represented during arguments by Steven V. Stenger of Klar, Izsak & Stenger LLC in St. Louis, and the state was represented by Timothy A. Blackwell of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City. Judge Jodie Capshaw Asel, a circuit judge from the 13th Judicial Circuit (Boone and Callaway Counties), sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge George W. Draper III.

Ines Letica was indicted on one count of first-degree assault and one count of armed criminal action for an attack on another man, who alleged that Letica attacked him outside of a bar with a knife, stabbing him several times. Letica alleges that the man was the initial aggressor and pushed him down a set of stairs before grabbing him by the throat and pulling a knife on him. Letica’s initial trial was declared a mistrial in part because of improper questions the prosecutor asked during jury selection. The second trial also resulted in a mistrial after the jury. Letica was denied on a motion to dismiss based on the improper jury questioning at the first trial. At the third jury trial, the court overruled Letica’s challenges to the state’s peremptory striking (removal) of five black females from the jury pool but sustained the state’s challenge to Letica’s preemptory strike of a white female. The jury found Letica guilty, and he was sentenced to a total of 30 years in prison. Letica appeals.

Letica argues that the trial court erred in upholding the state’s challenge to his preemptory strike of a potential juror. He contends that the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and for acquittal not withstanding the verdict for insufficient evidence, violating his due process rights. Letica asserts that the prosecutor’s behavior during the first trial’s jury selection process and the duration of the second trial was improper, violating his right to a fair trial. Letica argues that the court violated his due process rights in admitting photographs of the victim’s alleged injuries and post-medical procedures because they were inflammatory and prejudicial to his case. Letica further contends that sentencing him to one year in prison for each of the victim’s stab wounds was an abuse of the court’s discretion.

The state argues that the trial court properly upheld its challenge to Letica’s preemptory strike of a potential juror. It contends that Letica still had a trial by a panel of qualified and impartial jurors, who found him guilty. The state asserts that the court correctly denied Letica’s motions. It argues that a mistrial was declared in the first trial to remedy any misconduct during jury selection, that no misconduct occurred in the second trial and that there was sufficient evidence in the third trial to support the conviction. The state argues that the photographs were not admitted improperly as they were used to show the victim’s injuries and any scars from the surgeries were explained to the jury. Finally, the state contends that Letica’s sentence was within the statutory level of punishment and was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.

SC91850
State of Missouri v. Tyler G. McNeely
Cape Girardeau County
Challenge to order sustaining motion to suppress evidence

Listen to the oral argument:

McNeely was represented during arguments by Stephen C. Wilson of Wilson & Mann LLC in Cape Girardeau, and the state was represented by John N. Koester Jr. of of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City. Judge Jodie Capshaw Asel, a circuit judge from the 13th Judicial Circuit (Boone and Callaway Counties), sat in this case by special designation in place of Judge George W. Draper III.

Tyler McNeely was arrested in October 2010 for driving while intoxicated (DWI). Shortly thereafter, a blood sample was taken from McNeely, without his consent, after he refused to submit to a breath test. Before trial, McNeely moved to suppress the results of the blood sample. The trial court sustained the motion. The state appeals.

The state argues that the trial court erred in suppressing the blood sample. It contends that nonconsensual and warrantless blood withdrawals from persons suspected of DWI have been allowed under the Fourth Amendment as a valid search and seizure. The state asserts that the United States Supreme Court has extended the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment to non-consensual blood samples. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (1966) The state argues the exigent circumstances exception should apply here and nullify a warrant requirement because of the way alcohol in the blood stream diminishes over time. It contends that recent amendments to the state’s implied consent law eliminate any state law barriers to such blood samples by removing the language that officers could not take a sample where the driver refused to consent.

McNeely responds that the trial court correctly suppressed the blood sample. He argues that the nonconsensual and warrantless blood withdrawal was an unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment. McNeely contends that the Supreme Court’s extension of the exigent circumstances exception of the Fourth Amendment to a DWI case should be read narrowly and that the facts in his case do not reflect the routine arrest procedure. He asserts that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream itself does not create an emergency situation sufficient to justify the blood withdrawal. McNeely further responds that the recent change to Missouri law cannot be read as diminishing a person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment. He argues that a warrant should have been obtained, and that the evidence reflects that one could have.

The American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Kansas and Western Missouri and the Amercian Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri argue, as friends of the Court, that blood draws are a search and should not be administered without consent or a warrant unless an exception to the warrant requirement is present. They contend that the court erred in ruling that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream is an exigent circumstance that creates an exception to the warrant requirement. The ACLUs assert that advances in technology have nullified the necessity of having a per se rule for exigent circumstances. They argue that warrants now can be obtained faster and that technology allows scientists to determine blood-alcohol level at the time of an incident, making warrantless blood draws unnecessary. Finally, they contend that the facts here show that there was ample time to obtain a warrant and that no emergency circumstances existed.

The Missouri Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers argues, as a friend of the Court, that the warrantless blood draw conducted on McNeely was a search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. It contends that the state must be required to prove emergency circumstances to forgo the warrant requirement and that to take away that requirement is a violation of the right to a fair trial. Finally, the association asserts that the state must be required to prove emergency circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

The attorney general argues, as a friend of the Court, that the trial court erred in suppressing the evidence. He contends that warrantless blood draws should be allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable within the Fourth Amendment. He asserts that the courts long have recognized the imminent destruction of evidence as justification for warrantless searches. The attorney general further argues that officers should not be required to make determinations in the field such as whether someone readily is available to sign a warrant.

SC91742
Legends Bank and John Klebba v State of Missouri, et al.
Cole County
Constitutional validity of campaign finance bill

Listen to the oral argument:

The state was represented during arguments by Ronald R. Holliger of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, and Legends Bank and Klebba were represented by Charles W. Hatfield of Stinson Morrison Hecker LLP in Jefferson City.

Legends Bank is a state-chartered bank that contributes to political action committees. John Klebba is a resident and taxpayer of Missouri. Joining the State is the Missouri Ethics Commission charged with enforcing Missouri laws on campaign finance, lobbying and ethics.

Senate Bill 844 originally was filed in 2010 as a bill to add a section to chapter 37, RSMo, regarding contracts for purchasing, printing and services for statewide elected officials. An amendment added a provision to allow each state legislator a key to the capitol dome. The House of Representatives added provisions regarding ethics, elections, and construction projects and bidding. After the Senate rejected the changes, a conference committee proposed a version of the bill including provisions for officials’ contracts, keys to the capitol dome, ethics requirements and campaign finance restrictions and prohibited political action committees from accepting money from entities like Legends Bank, a state-chartered bank that contributes to such committees. The legislature adopted this version. Legends and a resident taxpayer sued, challenging the bill’s constitutional validity. The trial court found that the bill did not pertain to the single subject of ethics and struck all provisions not relating to ethics. The state appeals.

The state argues that the trial court erred in declaring SB 844 unconstitutional. It contends that the court misinterpreted and misapplied the law in finding that the bill’s provisions for competitive bidding did not relate to the subject of the bill. It asserts that the court erred in striking the ethics provision because that was the subject in the bill’s title. The state argues that if the court determines SB 844 contains more than one subject, then the provisions regarding competitive bidding and the keys to the capitol dome should be struck (removed).

Legends and the taxpayer argue that the trial court properly entered summary judgment that SB 844 unconstitutionally applied to multiple subjects. They contend that the bill included provisions regarding procurement, keys to the capitol dome, finance and ethics. They assert that the bill originally was intended to apply only to procurement but that later amendments added the multiple subjects. Legends and the taxpayers argue that the court properly struck (removed) the provisions regarding the capitol dome keys and ethics from the bill because those subjects were not included in the original intent of the bill. They contend that to the extent the court finds any provision of the bill unconstitutional, then the court’s only remedy should be to strike the entire bill. Legends and the taxpayers assert that severing portions of a bill is unconstitutional.