Case Summary for May 10, 2001

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Case Summary for May 10, 2001

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Thursday, May 10, 2001

SC83261
Board of Education of the City of St. Louis, et al., v. State of Missouri, et al.
St. Louis City, Cole County
City Board of Education elections

The legislature revised certain statutes governing the method of election for the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis. The City Board and three potential candidates challenged the new statutes. The court declared void subsections 6 and 7 of section 162.601 as unconstitutionally vague. The state, governor, State Board of Education, and Election Commissioners of the City of St. Louis appeal.

They argue the statute can be reasonably construed and is valid. The statute permits the City Board to decide which three of the seven subdistricts shall hold elections (for school board members in April 2001). It requires that only one candidate may be elected from each subdistrict and voters may only vote for candidates in their subdistrict. Its provisions for establishing subdistricts (by statute and by the State Board) are consistent.

The City Board and candidates respond that the statute is too vague. Its failure to identify which three subdistricts were to elect school board members at the April 2001 election makes it void; the City Board does not have the authority to identify the districts. Provisions directly conflict as to who will establish the subdistricts. The statute fails to specify whether any subdistrict may elect only one Board member and fails to specify who can for each candidate. In any event, the Court should not invalidate the April election because the appellants did not contest the election and showed no fraud.

SC83242
William W. Bradley, Jr. v. Betty Lee Bradley
Boone County
Maintenance modification following marital dissolution

In 1981, the husband and wife's 25-year marriage was dissolved, with the husband paying maintenance, child support, and the payments on the wife's home. Following the children's emancipation, the payoff of the home, and wife's disability from working due to health problems from alcohol abuse, the wife requested increased maintenance. The court denied the request, finding no substantial and continuing change of circumstance as required to modify maintenance. The wife appeals.

She argues: (1) Such a change exists in that she was healthy and could work at the time of the dissolution and is now disabled. (2) The court erred in ruling that economic circumstances (end of child support, need for house repairs and new car) were foreseeable at the time of the original order and therefore not a change of circumstances. Considered with her disability, there was a change that precluded her from supplementing her maintenance to provide for her needs.

The husband responds: (1) The change in the wife's health did not make the original maintenance award unreasonable. Her inability to work was controlled by her through voluntary alcohol abuse and was offset by her social security disability income. (2) The children's emancipation, home repairs, and new car were foreseeable at the time of the award so do not justify an increase.

SC83410
Chouteau Auto Mart, Inc. and Northland Acceptance Corp. v. First Bank of Missouri
Clay County
Uniform Fiduciaries Law

Chouteau and Northland's employee/fiduciary was authorized to sign checks for them. Over about three years, she wrote about three million dollars in checks on their accounts to the bank and had them deposited into her personal accounts . The companies sued the bank. They appeal summary judgment for the bank and against them on their claim for breach of the uniform fiduciary law.

The companies argues that section 456.310 does not provide the bank with a defense because it does not address the situation where the bank is the payee of a check in a transaction known by the bank, as payee, to be for the fiduciary's personal benefit. In any event, the checks are not payable to, endorsed to, or otherwise proper for deposit into the fiduciary's account as required by the statute. Also, section 456.270 provides that a check's payee is liable to the principal if the check is drawn and delivered in a transaction known by the bank, as payee, to be for the fiduciary's personal benefit, and the fiduciary breaches her fiduciary obligation.

The bank responds that section 456.310 controls because the fiduciary breached her duty by depositing the checks in her accounts. The bank is not liable under the statute because, in receiving the deposits, the bank did not know the employee was breaching her fiduciary duty. Its actions exhibited no bad faith. Section 456.270 does not apply because the fiduciary did not breach her duty by making the checks payable to the bank, and because the bank's receipt of the checks for deposit in her accounts does not establish that the checks were drawn or delivered in any transaction known to be for the fiduciary's personal benefit. The companies cannot appeal denial of their request for summary judgment because even if it were decided in their favor, it would not permit final disposition pursuant to Rule 84.14.

SC83282
State ex rel. Fireworks Spectacular, Inc., et al. v. The Honorable Michael B. Calvin, etc.
St. Louis City and County
Venue

Scott Hammer sued an Illinois resident in St. Louis City, pursuant to the venue statute that permits bringing suit in any county when all defendants are out-of-state, section 508.010(4). He alleged the person shot off fireworks in St. Louis County that injured him. He then amended the petition to add in-state defendants, the person's co-employees and employer. They challenged venue as none resided in St. Louis City. The court denied their request to transfer venue.

They argue venue should be determined when the case is brought against the (each) defendant. The rule is objective and enforces the defendant's existing rights equally. St. Louis City is improper because no defendant resides there and the action did not accrue there. By fixing venue when Hammer filed against one defendant, Hammer denied the later defendants their rights to have the action brought in a proper venue and to challenge improper venue.

Hammer responds that venue was proper when the suit was brought, which is when venue is determined according to statute, which only the legislature should change. The rule is objective and obviates possible multiple venue challenges and changes.

SC83319
State ex rel. Nixon v. Hon. James Kelly, Associate Circuit Judge, St. Francois County, et al.
St. Louis and St. Francois Counties
Time credit

Paul Haldeman sexually assaulted his stepdaughter in 1987 and 1988. The assaults were initially tried together in St. Louis. He was convicted of one count of sexual assault and sent to prison. After a new trial on the other count, he was convicted and sentenced to a concurrent prison term. The department of corrections refused to credit against his sentence time he had already spent on the earlier conviction. The court granted Haldeman's request for a writ of habeas corpus.

The state seeks to quash the writ, arguing the court erred by using the 1995 version of section 558.031, which permits prison time credit for time spent awaiting trial for a related offense. The version of the statute in effect at the time of the offense controls. Thus, the 1986 version should have applied, which permits credit for time spent awaiting trial on an offense only when the custody is for that offense.

The respondent argues the 1995 version was proper to apply. Under case law, statute, and constitution, Haldeman receives the benefit of the change in the law after the offenses. The 1995 version was in effect when the department of corrections calculated his release date. So Haldeman receives the time credit.

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