Case Summary for January 29, 2004

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Case Summary for January 29, 2004

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DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

Thursday, January 29, 2004
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SC85520
State of Missouri ex rel. Craig L. Leonardi and Craig L. Leonardi, M.D., P.C. v. The Honorable Thea A. Sherry, Judge of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, Missouri
St. Louis County
Right to jury trial where equitable relief is sought

Radiant Research, Inc., contracts with physicians as well as pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies to perform medical evaluations and procedures on participating subjects as described in certain clinical trial protocols. In February 2002, Radiant sued St. Louis County dermatologist Dr. Craig Leonardi for enforcement of certain clinical trial consulting agreements it had with him. Radiant seeks both injunctive relief and damages. In April 2002, Leonardi filed a four-count counterclaim against Radiant, including an action for declaratory judgment that Leonardi voluntarily dismissed in February 2003. In November 2002, the court noticed the matter up for a preliminary injunction hearing to be held in December 2002. In January 2003, the court denied Radiant's motion for a preliminary injunction and refused to enforce an alleged non-compete covenant. At a January 2003 status conference, the parties disagreed regarding the availability of a jury trial. The court set the case for trial in May 2003, during a certified jury week, and ordered the parties to advise the court in advance if they would need a jury panel. In February 2003, Leonardi sought a ruling on the merits of Radiant's equitable claims. The next month, the court heard arguments on the motion as well as on the applicability of the equitable cleanup doctrine and the availability of a jury trial and asked the parties to submit written arguments on the latter two issues. The court held that Radiant's request for a permanent injunction and for damages remained before it and that it retained jurisdiction under the equitable cleanup doctrine. It further found Leonardi was not entitled to a jury trial. He seeks a writ from this Court.

Leonardi argues the constitution entitles him to a jury trial where the court has not found an equitable violation and, therefore, equity has not attached to give the court equitable jurisdiction. He contends the court cannot deny him a jury trial on legal claims. Leonardi asserts that the only equitable claim is a request for injunctive relief and that the court has not granted any equitable relief or otherwise resolved the equitable claims. He argues the equitable cleanup doctrine is inapplicable because the court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction and has not yet granted any equitable relief. Leonardi contends public policy considerations support the proposition that the court should resolve all equitable claims prior to determining whether it has jurisdiction to proceed on the legal issues. He asserts that the general rule precluding the right to a jury trial in an equitable proceeding does not apply when the only equitable claim is a request for injunctive relief and the court has not issued any equitable relief. Leonardi argues that he has not waived his right to a jury trial and that he specifically requested a jury.

Radiant responds that Leonardi is not entitled to an order prohibiting the court from exercising continuing jurisdiction over the entire controversy. It argues the court did not abuse its discretion by asserting continued equitable jurisdiction under State ex rel. Willman v. Sloan, 574 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. banc 1978), because the court acquired equitable jurisdiction when Radiant filed the suit and because Radiant's claim for a permanent injunction still is pending. Radiant contends the equitable cleanup doctrine gives the court continuing jurisdiction over the entire case. It asserts that this doctrine provides for the efficient and economic use of judicial resources, and here the court's continued equitable jurisdiction over incidental legal claims will avoid duplicative and unnecessary efforts. Radiant further responds that Leonardi is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a writ of prohibition. It argues the court did not abuse its discretion or exceed its jurisdiction by refusing to empanel a jury for deciding ancillary legal claims. Radiant contends Leonardi is using the writ process to preclude enforcement of the noncompete provisions of the clinical trial consulting agreements.

SC85403
State ex rel. L. David Ormerod, M.D. v. The Honorable Gene Hamilton, Presiding Judge, Circuit Court of Boone County
Boone County
Venue

Dr. David Ormerod sued the individual members of the University of Missouri board of curators in November 2001 in Jackson County seeking damages for his dismissal from employment with the university. He subsequently amended his petition twice. Ormerod alleged venue was proper in Jackson County because the university has its Kansas City campus located there. After each petition was filed, the curators moved to transfer the case to Boone County, alleging improper venue. In June 2003, the Jackson County court transferred the case to Boone County. Ormerod seeks a writ ordering the case transferred back to Jackson County.

Ormerod argues he is entitled to an order transferring the case back to Jackson County, where venue is proper. He contends section 508.040, RSMo, governing venue over corporations, applies because the board of curators is a corporation within the meaning of that statute. He asserts that venue is proper in Jackson County under section 508.040 because the board of curators has an office or agent for transacting its business there.

The curators argue that section 508.040 applies only to corporations that are not public corporations. They contend that because the university's board of curators is a public corporation, it is not subject to section 508.040. Rather, the curators assert that the applicable venue statute is section 508.010, RSMo, and that, for venue purposes, the curators officially reside in Boone County. The curators argue, therefore, that venue over Ormerod's lawsuit is in Boone County.

SC85534
State ex rel. James Green, M.D., T. Isakson, M.D., and Christina L. Litherland, M.D. v. The Honorable Margaret M. Neill, Presiding Judge, Twenty-Second Judicial Circuit of Missouri
St. Louis City
Venue

Columbia, Missouri, resident Melinda Houston delivered her son, Marcus McElmurray, in January 2000 at University Hospital and Clinics in Columbia. In May 2001, Houston and McElmurray filed suit in St. Louis city against Dr. Kathleen Paulson, an Arkansas resident, for medical malpractice in the delivery. The next day, Houston and McElmurray amended their petition, adding as defendants the University of Missouri board of curators, doing business as University Hospital, and 12 individuals. Nine of these individuals were members of the board of curators and the other three were Dr. James Green, Dr. T. Isakson and Dr. Christina Litherland. Only one of the individual defendants -- curator Malaika Horne -- was a resident of St. Louis city. The defendants moved to transfer venue and argued the curators' joinder was pretensive, as the board and its individual members have sovereign immunity. Before the St. Louis city court could decide the venue issue in Houston and McElmurray's case, this Court issued its decision regarding venue in State ex rel. Linthicum v. Calvin, 57 S.W.3d 855 (Mo. banc 2001). In January 2003, the court entered summary judgment for the university curators and all the individually named curators, finding that suit against them was barred by sovereign immunity. Subsequently, Green, Isakson and Litherland again moved for a transfer of venue. The St. Louis city court denied their motion in May 2003, and the three doctors now seek a writ from this Court.

Green, Isakson and Litherland argue they are entitled to a writ ordering that the St. Louis city court transfer the lawsuit to a proper venue. They argue the alleged medical malpractice occurred at University Hospital in Boone County and that venue in St. Louis city rests solely on the presence of curator Horne. They contend Horne's inclusion as a defendant was pretensive. They assert that, based on the facts Houston and McElmurray knew at the time they sued Horne, there was no factual basis supporting a reasonable legal opinion that a claim could be stated against her.

Houston and McElmurray respond that venue is proper in St. Louis city because they stated a viable claim against Horne. They argue that the board of curators had waived sovereign immunity pursuant to section 537.610, RSMo, when the board adopted a medical malpractice liability insurance plan and procured excess insurance coverage from a private company. They contend that their knowledge regarding this insurance reasonably led them to believe the board of curators had waived sovereign immunity and, therefore, that they could make a viable claim against Horne. Houston and McElmurray respond that, in Langley v. Curators of the University of Missouri, 73 S.W. 3d 808 (Mo. App. 2002), the court of appeals held that this adoption of the insurance plan and excess coverage shows the curators' intent to waive sovereign immunity. Houston and McElmurray further respond that the defendant doctors whose alleged negligence caused the problems during McElmurray's delivery were acting as agents and employees of the curators, including Horne.

SC85564
State of Missouri v. Marvin L. Goff
Clay County
Challenge to stop, search and seizure in stealing case

In the early morning hours of July 24, 2001, a Gladstone, Missouri, police officer saw a car stopped by vending machines near a Wal-Mart door that had been closed about four hours earlier and saw Marvin Goff pulling at the doors while another man got into the car's driver seat. The officer called in a license check on the car. The dispatcher reported back that a person living at the address to which the car was registered had several outstanding warrants. The warrants were not for the car's occupants nor its owner, Goff. By this time, the car had left the Wal-Mart parking lot, and several officers looked for the car elsewhere. Another officer found the car parked across the street by some vending machines near a Hy-Vee store entrance. Ultimately the officer pulled behind the car, turned on his lights and siren, and arrested the driver after he ran his driver's license and discovered he also had an outstanding warrant. The officer patted down Goff, felt a large object in his pants pocket and, with permission, took out a universal key for vending machines. The officer arrested Goff and searched the car, finding $60 primarily in $1 bills and coins, tools and loose vending machine keys. A Hy-Vee manager the next day determined that coins were missing out of one of its three vending machines but could not determine exactly the amount of the money missing. A jury found Goff guilty of stealing. In June 2002 the court sentenced him as a prior and persistent offender to 15 years in prison. Goff appeals.

Goff argues the court clearly erred in not suppressing the evidence seized from him and his car because they were the result of an unconstitutional and unreasonable search and seizure. He contends the officers did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity on which to base a stop of Goff's car. He asserts that a computer check revealed no warrants for Goff or his car and that the police could not rely on a dispatcher's report that someone living at the address to which the car was registered had outstanding warrants. Goff argues the police did not believe Goff was armed or dangerous before patting him down and, therefore, had no valid basis to do so. He contends the court should not have accepted the jury's verdict and sentenced him for stealing because he asserts the state failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have found that the victim suffered a loss. Goff argues there was no evidence that any money had been taken from the vending machine because it was emptied less than 24 hours earlier, there still were dollar bills in it, and there was no way to account for how many sodas might have been purchased from it in the interim. Goff contends the court should have granted his request for a mistrial when an officer testified that Goff "understood the drill, he's been through it before" because this comment improperly told the jury he had prior convictions and could not be cured by an admonition to disregard this testimony.

The state responds that the stop and subsequent search and seizure did not violate the constitution. It argues that because Goff did not raise the validity of the stop, the state was not required to call the dispatcher as a witness to prove the basis of the warrant information. It contends that the facts known to the police officers who did testify established a reasonable suspicion that Goff and the man with him were stealing from vending machines. It asserts the pat-down was proper to ensure neither man was carrying a weapon and that Goff was not manifestly prejudiced from admission of the universal key. The state responds that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the stealing conviction because the evidence showed that Goff and the other man drove up to vending machines in the middle of the night, used their tools and lock picks to break into at least one machine, and took the change from the machine and dumped it into their car. The state argues that the court did not abuse its discretion in not declaring a mistrial because the officer's statement in response to Goff's question was vague, isolated and indefinite. It contends that the court quickly instructed the jury to disregard the statement and that the statement did not have a decisive role in determining Goff's guilt.