SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

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Following a jury trial, Terry Watson was convicted of first-degree robbery, resisting arrest and second-degree trafficking and was sentenced to a total of 18 years in prison. He subsequently sought postconviction relief, alleging, in part, his attorney had advised him incorrectly the state would not be able to prove the first-degree robbery charge because there was no weapon and, on the basis of this advice, he turned down the state’s offer of a 10-year sentence if he pleaded guilty. A special public defender later filed an amended motion on his behalf, although he alleges she did not consult with him before doing so and, as a result, did not include additional claims he wished to raise. The circuit court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. Watson appeals.

This appeal raises several questions for this Court. One involves whether Watson’s postconviction counsel was “appointed” so as to be subject to a possible abandonment inquiry and, if so, whether the circuit court should have held a hearing to determine whether counsel abandoned Watson in the postconviction proceeding. Another question is whether the court should have amended its judgment to include claims Watson alleged postconviction counsel omitted or did not allege properly. A further question involves whether Watson pleaded factual allegations sufficient for the circuit court to grant him an evidentiary hearing on his claims.

SC96103_Watson_brief.pdf
SC96103_State_brief.pdf
SC96103_Watson_reply_brief.pdf

Rwoeshan Booker pleaded guilty to first-degree assault and was sentenced to 13 years in prison. He subsequently sought postconviction relief, alleging there was an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea; his plea was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered; and his attorney failed to advise him he had a viable “sudden passion” defense to first-degree assault. The circuit court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. Booker appeals.

This appeal raises two primary questions for this Court – whether Booker pleaded factual allegations sufficient for the circuit court to grant him an evidentiary hearing on his claims, and whether he showed sudden passion was a viable defense to the charge.


SC96184_Booker_brief.pdf
SC96184_State_brief.pdf

SC96184_Booker_reply_brief

 
 

After his brother died from metastatic colon cancer in January 2016, Ronald Fennewald filed a wrongful death action against the brother’s medical providers, alleging they should have advised the brother to have a colonoscopy performed, failed to perform physical examinations appropriate to discover the colon cancer, failed to detect the cancer in a timely fashion and failed to refer the brother to appropriate diagnostic specialists. During discovery, the medical providers sought an order authorizing the release of certain medical records from other providers regarding their care of the brother from the time he was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s lymphoma in August 1987 until his death. Ultimately, the circuit court entered the order as proposed. Fennewald asks this Court for a writ prohibiting the circuit court from enforcing the order.

 

This case raises related questions for the Court – whether the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing its order releasing other providers’ medical records and whether the order invades the physician-patient privilege, is too broad in scope and will result in prejudice.

Two organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys argues the order requires unlimited disclosure of the brother’s medical information, which it argues creates the immediate danger of irreparable damage to litigation, discourages access to the judicial system and is contrary to longstanding state law. The Missouri Organization of Defense Lawyers argues disclosure of a plaintiff’s medical information specifically tailored to the standard of care and theories of causation are consistent with state law and defendants in medical negligence or wrongful death cases must be able to obtain all relevant medical records that may relate to other possible contributing factors to the injury or death.

SC96219_Fennewald_brief.pdf
SC96219_Medical_Providers_brief.pdf
SC96219_Fennewald_reply_brief.pdf
 
SC96219_MATA_amicus_brief.pdf
SC96219_MODL_amicus_brief.pdf
 
 

Nevada attorney Dustin Dunfield entered a plea to felony statutory rape in 1996, was given a two-year suspended imposition of sentence and was placed on probation for two years. In 2007, he applied and was admitted to law school. In his application, he disclosed he had pleaded guilty to a felony in exchange for a suspended imposition of sentence and probation. He also disclosed the plea and sentence in his 2010 application to become a Missouri attorney, which was granted. In February 2014, he swore and affirmed on a candidate declaration form for county prosecutor that he had not been convicted of, found guilty of or pleaded guilty to a felony under Missouri law. Five months later, he moved to set aside his guilty plea in the criminal case and petitioned the circuit court to exempt him or remove his name from the state’s sex offender registry. In August 2014, an opponent in the election challenged Dunfield’s candidacy. Ultimately, the circuit court denied Dunfield the relief he requested as to his criminal case and ordered him to register as a sex offender. In the election challenge, the court ordered Dunfield’s name removed from the ballot, declaring him ineligible as a candidate because he had been found guilty of second-degree statutory rape. The chief disciplinary counsel’s office subsequently began disciplinary proceedings. Dunfield alleges a circuit court subsequently set aside his 1996 plea and the judgment. Following a hearing, a regional disciplinary hearing panel found Dunfield violated Rule 4-8.4 for failing to disclose his felony guilty plea and recommended his law license be suspended for at least six months, his suspension be stayed and he be placed on probation for two years. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation and asks this Court to suspend Dunfield’s law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least one year.

This case presents two questions for this Court – whether Dunfield violated the rules of professional responsibility and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.

SC96255_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief.pdf
SC96255_Dunfield_brief.pdf