The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments. Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.
State of Missouri ex rel. The Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority v. The Honorable Michael D. Burton
St. Louis County
Challenge to order compelling arbitration in dispute over contract provision
The regional authority was represented during arguments by Christopher Bauman of Blitz, Bardgett & Deutsch LC in St. Louis; the Rams were represented by Roger Heidenreich of Dentons US LLP in St. Louis.
In May 1996, the regional convention and sports authority
and the Rams, then a St. Louis football franchise, executed a lease agreement in
which the regional authority would lease property in Earth City and build on it
a football training facility for use by the Rams. In March 2016, the regional
authority filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that a provision in
the lease purportedly granting the Rams an option to purchase the training
facility property is of no force and effect. The next month, the Rams sought a
declaration that the option provision was valid and filed a motion to compel
arbitration of the dispute. The parties dispute whether the lease agreement
requires arbitration of this issue. Following a hearing, the circuit court
entered its judgment compelling arbitration and dismissing the lawsuit. The
regional authority seeks this Court’s writ of mandamus directing the circuit
court to stay arbitration and to reinstate the case.
This case presents two primary questions for the Court regarding whether the circuit court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration. One is whether the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable or whether it lacks mutual consideration. Another is whether, even if the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable, it applies to declaratory judgment actions or whether the language regarding the lease requires litigation of such actions.
SC96225_Rams_brief
SC96225_Regional_Convention_and_Sports_Authority_reply_brief
The Doe Run Resources Corporation v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance and Lexington Insurance Company, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company
St. Louis County
Insurer’s liability for defense costs against lawsuits alleging injuries from metal facility
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance was represented during arguments by Robert Haar of Haar & Woods in St. Louis; Doe Run was represented by Marc Halpern of Abelson Herron Halpern LLP in San Diego, California.
In a series of lawsuits, Peruvian citizens sued The Doe Run Resources Corporation, alleging injuries caused by Doe Run’s operation of a metal production, storage, processing and smelting facility in Peru. Doe Run, in turn, sued its various insurers – including St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company – for defense coverage for these lawsuits. St. Paul denied coverage under its policy’s pollution exclusion, and Doe Run sued St. Paul for reimbursement of its defense costs. In a July 2014 judgment, the circuit court declared: St. Paul’s pollution exclusion is ambiguous and, therefore, does not bar coverage; St. Paul’s policy provides primary rather than excess coverage to Doe Run; and St. Paul is obligated to reimburse Doe Run for defense costs incurred in the Peruvian smelter suits not paid by Doe Run’s other insurers. In April 2015, the circuit court entered its final judgment requiring St. Paul to pay Doe Run approximately $2.1 million in damages, including prejudgment interest, plus nearly $13,000 in costs. St. Paul appeals.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the St. Paul policy’s pollution exclusion clearly and unambiguously bars coverage for the injuries alleged in the Peruvian lawsuits or whether the policy’s wording is broad or generic enough to permit coverage. Another question involves whether, under the St. Paul policy’s “other insurance” provision, St. Paul is the primary, rather than excess, insurer or whether it otherwise is required to defend Doe Run against the Peruvian lawsuits. An additional question involves the scope of unreimbursed defense costs Doe Run can obtain. Related issues include when and by what act Doe Run “tendered” its defense in the Peruvian lawsuits to St. Paul; what defense costs are recoverable under the St. Paul policy and Missouri law; and whether St. Paul had to prove it was prejudiced by any delay in Doe Run tendering the lawsuits to avoid reimbursing pre-tender costs. A further question is whether the circuit court should have awarded Doe Run prejudgment interest or whether the damages awarded remain unliquidated, awaiting Doe Run’s accounting of its defense costs and amounts it received from other insurers.
Several organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association and the American Insurance Association argue the pollution exclusion in St. Paul’s policy plainly and unambiguously bars coverage of industrial pollution claims such as those raised in the Peruvian lawsuits, and Missouri law requires and public policy considerations support enforcing the pollution exclusion to bar coverage. Associated Industries of Missouri argues the policy does not bar coverage and urges the Court to consider expectations of Missouri businesses and insurance policyholders in requiring St. Paul to provide defense coverage. United Policyholders argues an insurer’s duty to defend is broad, exclusions must be express and clear to deny coverage, and the St. Paul policy’s pollution exclusion is too vague and non-specific to be interpreted to exclude coverage.
In May 1996, the regional convention and sports authority and the Rams, then a St. Louis football franchise, executed a lease agreement in which the regional authority would lease property in Earth City and build on it a football training facility for use by the Rams. In March 2016, the regional authority filed a petition seeking a declaratory judgment that a provision in the lease purportedly granting the Rams an option to purchase the training facility property is of no force and effect. The next month, the Rams sought a declaration that the option provision was valid and filed a motion to compel arbitration of the dispute. The parties dispute whether the lease agreement requires arbitration of this issue. Following a hearing, the circuit court entered its judgment compelling arbitration and dismissing the lawsuit. The regional authority seeks this Court’s writ of mandamus directing the circuit court to stay arbitration and to reinstate the case.
This case presents two primary questions for the Court regarding whether the circuit court should have granted the motion to compel arbitration. One is whether the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable or whether it lacks mutual consideration. Another is whether, even if the arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable, it applies to declaratory judgment actions or whether the language regarding the lease requires litigation of such actions.
SC96107_Doe_Run_brief
SC96107_St._Paul_Fire_&_Marine_Insurance_Company_reply_brief
SC96107_CICLA_and_AIA_amici_brief
SC96107_Associated_Industries_of_Missouri_amicus_brief
SC96107_United_Policyholders_amicus_brief
SC96478
State of Missouri v. Travis W. Williams
Cass County
Challenge to admission of propensity evidence in statutory sodomy case
The state charged Travis Williams with three counts of first-degree statutory sodomy against his stepdaughter, two before the girl was 12 years old and one before she was 14 years old. The circuit court conducted a hearing as to the admissibility of the girl’s prior statements, ruling certain statements admissible. During the hearing, the state indicated its intent to present evidence of Williams’ prior conviction for first-degree statutory sodomy pursuant to the recently adopted article I, section 18(c) of the state constitution, which authorizes admission of certain prior criminal acts as “propensity” evidence in prosecuting certain sex crimes against minors. Williams objected, arguing article I, section 18(c) violates other provisions of the state constitution as well as the federal constitution. Ultimately, the circuit court permitted the state to introduce evidence of the factual elements of Williams’ prior conviction. The state also asked the court to find Williams was a persistent or predatory sexual offender. The jury found Williams guilty of all three counts, and the court sentenced him, as a predatory sexual offender, to concurrent sentences of 50 years in prison with the possibility of parole. Williams appeals.
This appeal raises several questions for the Court. One involves whether article I, section 18(c) violates due process and fair jury trial guarantees of the state and federal constitutions. Another involves whether the circuit court’s admission of evidence of Williams’ prior sodomy conviction affected his presumption of innocence or the state’s burden to prove his guilt for the current charges beyond a reasonable doubt or otherwise caused him prejudice.
SC96478_Williams_brief
State of Missouri v. Jordan Lafayette Prince
St. Charles County
Challenge to admission of propensity evidence from juvenile adjudication
The state charged Jordan Prince with first-degree murder, felony child abuse and statutory sodomy, alleging he sodomized and strangled his girlfriend’s four-month-old daughter. After he was charged, but before trial, the state constitution was amended to include article I, section 18(c), authorizing admission of certain prior criminal acts as “propensity” evidence in prosecuting certain sex crimes against minors. Prince filed a pretrial motion to exclude all evidence from his juvenile records as well as his use of pornography, arguing such evidence was neither logically nor legally relevant. He also filed a pretrial motion to exclude all evidence of prior criminal acts. The circuit court overruled his motions and later trial objections, admitting evidence of his use of pornography as well as evidence of his juvenile adjudication for lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, acts defined as felonies under the relevant state law. The jury found Prince guilty as charged, and the circuit court sentenced him to consecutive terms totaling life in prison without the possibility of parole. Prince appeals.
This case presents several questions for the Court. One is whether evidence of Prince’s juvenile adjudication for lewd and lascivious conduct is admissible as “relevant evidence of prior criminal acts” under article I, section 18(c) in the present case. Related issues include whether a juvenile adjudication can be considered a “criminal act” under the constitutional provision and whether Prince was prejudiced by admission of the prior adjudication. Another question involves whether the pornographic evidence was legally and logically relevant or whether its admission affected the jury’s view of the charges or otherwise prejudiced Prince.
Several organizations filed briefs as friends of the Court. The American Civil Liberties Union of Missouri and the MacArthur Justice Center in St. Louis argue article I, section 18(c) is unconstitutional and should not allow for admission in an adult criminal trial of the defendant’s sexual conduct committed as a youth, which it argues undermines the historic goals of the juvenile justice system. The Missouri Association of Prosecuting Attorneys argues article I, section 18(c) should apply to juvenile adjudications because it references all prior criminal acts, whether charged or uncharged, and because public safety policy should protect all child victims.
SC96524_Prince_brief
SC96524_ACLU_of_MO_and_MacArthur_Justice_Center_at_St._Louis_amici_brief
SC96524_Mo_Ass'n_of_Prosecuting_Attys_amicus_brief