DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI
9:30 a.m. Wednesday, May 24, 2017
SC96076
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of William Hopkins a/k/a William G. Hopkins
Marion County
Challenge to department of mental health commitment as a sexually violent predator
Listen to the oral argument: SC96076.mp3
Hopkins was represented during arguments by Chelsea Mitchell of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Gregory Goodwin of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
As a minor, William “Greg” Hopkins spent time in treatment for having sexual contact with a young child. He also was accused of having sexual contact with another young child and viewing child pornography. After the state charged him with having sexual contact with three other young children in 2007, when he was 18 years old, he was convicted of domestic assault and first-degree child molestation and was sentenced to prison. While in prison, he completed the state’s sex offender treatment program. Before he was released from prison, the state alleged Hopkins was a sexually violent predator and filed a petition to have him committed as such to the department of mental health. Before trial, Hopkins filed motions to dismiss the proceedings against him, alleging constitutional deficiencies in the state’s sexually violent predator act. The circuit court overruled his motions, and the case was tried – over Hopkins’ objection – to a jury. During trial, the state presented testimony from two psychologists and the licensed clinical social worker who provided group therapy to Hopkins as part of his sex offender treatment program. Ultimately, the jury found Hopkins to be a sexually violent predator. The circuit court entered its judgment accordingly in February 2016 and committed Hopkins to the custody of the department of mental health. Hopkins appeals.
This appeal presents a number of questions for this Court. One involves what standard this Court should use in reviewing the state’s sexually violent predator act – strict scrutiny review, as it previously has done, or rational basis review, as the state asserts it should do. Another question involves whether the sexually violent predator act violates the ex post facto clause, the double jeopardy clause, the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the state and federal constitutions. An additional question involves whether the circuit court should have used the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt or of clear and convincing evidence when instructing the jury how to determine if the state proved Hopkins is a sexually violent predator. Other questions involve whether the sexually violent predator act requires the state to prove a defendant has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Hopkins’ commitment as a sexually violent predator. A further question involves whether due process requires the sexually violent predator act to offer treatment in the least restrictive environment and, if so, whether the proper remedy is to vacate the commitment order or to change the treatment environment. Additional questions involve whether the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting testimony from the therapist or the department of corrections psychologist or should have excluded Hopkins’ statements to these providers. Further questions involve whether any error occurred in permitting one juror to serve or in the instructions provided to the jury.
SC96076_Hopkins_brief
SC96076_State_brief
SC96076_Hopkins_reply_brief
SC96221
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Joshua Bushong a/k/a Joshua D. Bushong, a/k/a Joshua David Bushong v. State of Missouri
Lincoln County
Challenge to department of mental health commitment as a sexually violent predator
Listen to the oral argument: SC96221.mp3
Bushong was represented during arguments by Chelsea Mitchell of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Christine Lesicko of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Joshua Bushong pleaded guilty in 2006 to possessing child pornography. Two years later, a child disclosed that Bushong had begun having sexual contact with her in approximately 2002. He pleaded guilty to first-degree child molestation and was sentenced to prison. While in prison, Bushong completed the state’s sex offender treatment program. He was paroled in 2011, but his parole was revoked after using child pornography again. Prior to the conclusion of Bushong’s sentence, the state filed a petition seeking to commit Bushong, as a sexually violent predator, to the department of mental health. At the March 2016 trial, testimony was presented from two psychologists, one from the department of mental health and one from the Iowa department of corrections. Bushong also testified. The jury found Bushong was a sexually violent predator. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly and committed him to the custody of the department of mental health. Bushong appeals.
This appeal presents multiple questions for the Court. One involves what standard this Court should use in reviewing the state’s sexually violent predator act – strict scrutiny review, as it previously has done, or rational basis review, as the state asserts it should do. Another question involves whether the sexually violent predator act is punitive in nature or otherwise violates the state and federal constitutions’ rights to due process, a fair trial, equal protection, to counsel, against self-incrimination or to be free from double jeopardy. An additional question is whether the circuit court should have used the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt or of clear and convincing evidence when instructing the jury how to determine if the state proved Bushong is a sexually violent predator. Other questions involve whether the sexually violent predator act requires the state to prove a defendant has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Bushong’s commitment as a sexually violent predator. An additional question involves whether the circuit court should have permitted testimony from two psychologists or should have excluded Bushong’s statements to these providers. A further question is whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury.
SC96221_Bushong_brief_filed_in_ED
SC96221_State_brief
SC96221_Bushong_reply_brief
SC96244
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of: Martin Reddig, a/k/a Martin E. Reddig, a/k/a Martin Edward Reddig v. State of Missouri
Camden County
Challenge to department of mental health commitment as a sexually violent predator
Listen to the oral argument: SC96244.mp3
Reddig was represented during arguments by Chelsea Mitchell of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Daniel McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.
Martin Reddig pleaded guilty to first-degree child molestation for having sexual contact with several young girls, and he was sentenced to prison. He admitted he previously had broken into multiple homes to rape a child or adult, but he was not prosecuted for these offenses. He also admitted having sexual contact with young girls. While in prison, Reddig completed the state’s sex offender treatment program. He was released on parole in 2013, after which he used child pornography despite receiving outpatient sex offender treatment. Ultimately, his treatment was terminated and his parole was revoked. Before Reddig’s sentence ended, the state, in June 2015, filed a petition seeking to commit Reddig, as a sexually violent predator, to the department of mental health. During an April 2016 trial, testimony was presented from two department of mental health psychologists. Reddig also testified. The jury found Reddig was a sexually violent predator. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly and committed him to the custody of the department of mental health. Reddig appeals.
This appeal presents multiple questions for this Court. One involves what standard this Court should use in reviewing the state’s sexually violent predator act – strict scrutiny review, as it previously has done, or rational basis review, as the state asserts it should do. Another question involves whether the sexually violent predator act is punitive in nature or otherwise violates Reddig’s state and federal constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, equal protection, to counsel, against self-incrimination or to be free from double jeopardy. An additional question involves whether due process requires the sexually violent predator act to offer treatment in the least restrictive environment. Other questions involve whether the sexually violent predator act requires the state to prove a defendant has serious difficulty controlling his or her behavior and whether there was sufficient evidence to support Reddig’s commitment as a sexually violent predator. Another question involves whether the circuit court should have excluded the testimony of a psychologist who evaluated Reddig or whether his statements to the provider should have been excluded. Further questions involve whether, after the jury was empaneled, the circuit court should have questioned one of the jurors further or replaced her with an alternate and whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury.
SC96244_Reddig_brief_filed_in_SD
SC96244_State_brief
SC96244_Reddig_reply_brief
SC96179
Mary Hanson and David Hanson v. Margaret Carroll and Bridget Carroll
St. Louis city
Challenge to dismissal of grandparent petition for custody of child subject to guardianship
Listen to the oral argument: SC96179.mp3
The paternal grandparents were represented during arguments by Lawrence Gillespie of Gillespie, Hetlage & Coughlin LLC in Clayton; the co-guardians were represented by David Slaby of Paule, Camazine & Blumenthal PC in St. Louis.
In December 2009, a circuit court named two women as co-guardians of a child. They are the child’s great grandmother and maternal great aunt. In March 2015, the child’s paternal grandparents – who were not parties in the guardianship action and were not addressed by its judgment – filed a petition seeking visitation with and joint legal and physical custody of the child. The guardians moved to dismiss the paternal grandparents’ petition. In its August 2015 judgment, the circuit court determined the paternal grandparents had not stated a claim on which relief could be granted and dismissed their petition with prejudice (preventing it from being refiled). The paternal grandparents appeal.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the grandparents stated a claim under a state statute and one of this Court’s prior opinions, whether allowing grandparent rights would impinge on the rights of the parents and whether any court other than the circuit court that granted the guardianship can exercise jurisdiction over the child. Another question involves whether the dismissal with prejudice misapplied the law.
SC96179_Hansons_brief
SC96179_Carrolls_brief
SC96179_Hansons_reply_brief
SC96212
Barbara Bartlett, et al. v. Missouri Department of Insurance and John Huff
Cole County
Challenge to state payments to insurance examiners
Listen to the oral argument: SC96212.mp3
The insurance examiners were represented during arguments by Anthony DeWitt of Bartimus, Frickleton and Robertson PC in Jefferson City; the department of insurance was represented by James McAdams, the department’s deputy commissioner and general counsel, of Jefferson City.
Section 374.115, RSMo, provides that insurance examiners appointed or employed by the state’s department of insurance shall be compensated according to the applicable levels established and published by the national association of insurance commissioners. Barbara Bartlett and Shawn Hernandez conducted insurance financial examinations for the state’s department of insurance, financial institutions and professional registration until they left employment in March 2012. Eight months later, they filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the department to pay them in accordance with the national association’s salary levels. The department disputes their salary calculations and questions how the national association’s listed rates are to be applied. In March 2015, both sides sought summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial). The circuit court denied the insurance examiners’ request for a writ of mandamus and granted summary judgment to the department. Bartlett and Hernandez appeal.
This appeal presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether the insurance examiners’ claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Related issues include whether sovereign immunity bars lawsuits other than those involving tort claims for damages and whether the insurance examiners’ claim was for equitable relief in the nature of enforcing a contractual debt. Another question involves whether the insurance examiners established they had a clear, unequivocal and specific right to relief under the statute. Related issues include the relationship, if any, between the right to relief and the amount of restitution owed and whether competent and sufficient evidence existed to determine what remedy, if any, was due.
SC96212_insurance_examiners_brief
SC96212_Dep't_of_Insurance_Financial_Institutions_and_Professional_Registration_brief
SC96212_insurance_examiners_reply_brief