Case Summaries for April 19, 2017

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The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


DOCKET SUMMARIES
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI

9:30 a.m. Wednesday, April 19, 2017


SC95885
Linda Mantia v. Missouri Department of Transportation and Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund
St. Louis County
Challenge to workers’ compensation award
Listen to the oral argument: SC95885.mp3
The department was represented during arguments by Jeffrey Wright of Leahy, Wright & Associates LLC in St. Louis; Mantia was represented by Jeffrey Swaney of The Swaney Law Firm in St. Louis; and the treasurer was represented by Joye Hudson of the attorney general’s office in St. Louis.

Linda Mantia sought workers’ compensation benefits, claiming an occupational disease caused by multiple alleged exposures to stressful events while working as an urban metro maintenance supervisor for the department of transportation. At a hearing before an administrative law judge, she testified she had been present at the scenes of more than 1,000 road accidents from 1987 through 2007 and described 14 particular fatalities, including those in which victims had been burned, decapitated or impaled. She testified these incidents caused her to become “cold and indifferent” and to “laugh and joke” about the incidents, leading her to seek medical care after February 2008 and to file a claim for workers’ compensation benefits in October 2008. Mantia testified that she felt depressed and anxious and was having panic attacks and nightmares. Her primary care physician diagnosed her with major depressive disorder; her psychiatrist diagnosed her with a form of bipolar disorder, prescribed her medication and referred her to therapy; and her clinical psychologist diagnosed her with post-traumatic stress disorder and a form of major depressive disorder. In late 2010, the psychologist opined Mantia was “not psychologically able to work” and indicated she was 90- to 95-percent permanently partially disabled. A psychiatrist who evaluated Mantia on behalf of the department in June 2012 diagnosed her with depressive disorder and a form of personality disorder but opined she was able to work and determined she was 2.5-percent permanently partially disabled. The administrative law judge denied Mantia compensation, but on review, the labor and industrial relations commission in April 2015 reversed that decision, finding Mantia was entitled to benefits. It determined the second injury fund had no liability for benefits but ordered the transportation department to pay Mantia 200 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits and future medical care. The department appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for this Court – whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the commission’s conclusions that Mantia suffered a compensable occupational mental disease arising out of work-related stress, suffered a 50-percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole, or is entitled to future medical care under the applicable law.

SC95885_MoDOT_brief
SC95885_Mantia_brief
SC95885_Treasurer_brief
SC95885_MoDOT_reply_brief


SC96041
Ulysses White (Deceased); Patricia White v. ConAgra Packaged Foods LLC
Saline County
Challenge to denial of workers’ compensation death benefits
Listen to the oral argument: SC96041.mp3
White was represented during arguments by Todd Werts of Lear Werts LLP in Columbia; ConAgra and Old Republic were represented by Douglas Greenwald of McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips PA in Kansas City, Kansas.

Ulysses George White worked for ConAgra Packaged Foods LLC in Marshall for 24 years. For the last several years, he worked as a machinist in a machine shed that has no air conditioning. Around midday in late June 2012, White was found dead at his workstation. The autopsy noted White had suffered from emphysema and heart conditions including severe coronary artery disease and listed the cause of death as “cardiac arrhythmia resulting from severe coronary artery disease.” White’s widow sought death benefits under the state’s workers’ compensation act. At a hearing before an administrative law judge, the widow presented evidence from a cardiologist who opined White died from cardiac arrest after cardiac ischemia (lack of adequate blood flow to the heart) caused White’s heart to fibrillate (very rapid irregular contracting of the heart muscle) and flat line. The cardiologist opined White’s work activities, combined with an unusually hot work environment, his long-sleeved uniform and a still-healing foot injury caused his heart to demand more blood than could be supplied. A cardiologist retained by ConAgra opined White died of sudden cardiac death resulting from an underlying severe coronary artery disease and hypertensive heart disease caused by traditional risk factors. The ConAgra expert opined heat was not the prevailing factor nor even a significant contributing factor in White’s death. The administrative law judge found the widow failed to carry her burden of proof that White suffered a work-related accident or occupational disease. On review, the labor and industrial relations commission in January 2016 denied the widow compensation. A commission majority found White’s death was an “unexpected traumatic event,” then analyzed the issue of medical causation by considering whether that event was the “prevailing factor” in White’s death. In so doing, the commission declined to consider White’s work schedule prior to his death and found the claimant’s expert cardiologist was not sufficiently informed about the circumstances surrounding White’s death to be credible as to its medical cause. A dissenting commissioner found the widow had carried her burden of proof and argued her claim should have been found compensable. The widow appeals the commission’s decision denying her compensation.

This appeal presents two questions for the Court. One involves whether the commission properly applied the “prevailing factor” burden of proof rather than the “preponderance of the evidence” standard to the question of whether White’s cardiac ischemia was an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment and caused the fibrillation that led to his death. Another question involves whether the commission should have considered testimony from lay witnesses about the number of hours White worked in the days before his death. A further question involves whether substantial competent evidence supports the commission’s findings.

SC96041_White_brief
SC96041_ConAgra_and_Old_Republic_brief
SC96041_White_reply_brief


SC96110
In re: Theodore R. Hoefle
Cass County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC96110.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Sam Phillips of the chief disciplinary counsel’s office in Jefferson City; Hoefle was represented by Robert Russell of Kempton and Russell in Sedalia.

Attorney Theodore Hoefle practiced in his firm’s offices in Belton and Harrisonville. In October 2013, he notified police the Belton office had been burglarized. He reported an iPad, certain computer equipment and a briefcase had been stolen. He had purchased the iPad earlier in the year, and the firm reimbursed him for it. Although he had lost the iPad the week before, he said he reported it as stolen because he believed he had left it on a filing cabinet in the Belton office. He told his partners he had tried, unsuccessfully, to find the iPad. He later apparently took the iPad out of “lost mode” and disabled its “find” feature, which he said he did to help locate the device should it be used. The firm filed an insurance claim for the missing iPad. Hoefle subsequently bought another iPad for which the firm reimbursed him. The next summer, the firm noticed recurrent computer problems, and one of the partners determined many of Hoefle’s files were being deleted. The firm terminated Hoefle’s employment and asked him to return firm property. He returned to the firm the iPad he had reported stolen, which he said he had found in his vehicle, but not the replacement iPad for which he had been reimbursed. The firm filed a complaint with the chief disciplinary counsel’s office. Following a hearing, a regional disciplinary hearing panel concluded Hoefle violated Rule 4-8.4 by failing to reveal the original iPad was not stolen and failing to advise he found it, even though he knew his firm had submitted an insurance claim for the device, and by failing, after he was terminated, to return to the firm the two iPads for which the firm had reimbursed him. Hoefle disputes that he acted out of dishonesty. Hoefle agrees with the hearing panel’s recommendation that he be reprimanded. The chief disciplinary counsel rejected the recommendation and asks this Court to suspend Hoefle’s law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months.

This case presents two related questions for this Court – whether Hoefle violated the rules of professional responsibility and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.

SC96110_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC96110_Hoefle_brief


SC96112
In re: Richard Tillman Nichols
Henry County
Attorney discipline
Listen to the oral argument: SC96112.mp3
The chief disciplinary counsel was represented during arguments by Melody Nashan of the chief disciplinary counsel’s office in Jefferson City; Nichols was represented by David Johnson of The Heartland Group A Law Practice LLC in Kansas City.

Following an investigation of alleged misconduct by Clinton attorney Richard Tillman Nichols, the chief disciplinary counsel filed a multi-count information against him. Common to all counts are allegations that Nichols failed to communicate appropriately with his clients. Four counts further allege misconduct with respect to Nichols’ representation of clients in a property-line dispute, a real estate lawsuit, domestic violence allegations and criminal matters. Five other counts further allege Nichols failed to file necessary paperwork allowing his bankruptcy clients’ debts to be discharged, resulting in the cases being closed or dismissed without the debts being discharged and the clients’ creditors seeking to collect on those debts. Following a hearing, a regional disciplinary hearing panel ultimately found Nichols violated multiple rules of professional responsibility and violated most of those rules multiple times. Nichols accepts these findings. In mitigation of his actions, Nichols alleges he has a mental disorder. Following an independent mental health examination, a doctor concluded Nichols has a mental disorder that caused or had a relationship to his professional misconduct. The doctor opined he has the ability to manage his impairment through treatment, although he has not been consistent in taking prescribed medication in the past, and recommended he see a psychiatrist. The disciplinary hearing panel recommended that Nichols’ law license be suspended with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least six months. Both the chief disciplinary counsel and Nichols rejected that recommendation. The chief disciplinary counsel asks this Court to suspend Nichols’ license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for at least two years. Nichols argues for a three-year stayed suspension with probation conditions ensuring mental health treatment and monitoring.

This case presents two related questions for this Court – whether Nichols violated the rules of professional responsibility and, if so, what discipline, if any, is appropriate.
 
SC96112_Chief_Disciplinary_Counsel_brief
SC96112_Nichols_brief


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