The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.


SC95910
The St. Louis Rams LLC, f/k/a The St. Louis Rams Partnership v. Director of Revenue
St. Louis city
Liability for state sales tax on amounts collected for city entertainment license tax
Listen to the oral argument: SC95910.mp3
The director was represented during arguments by Emily A. Dodge of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City; the Rams were represented by Matthew S. Mock of Baker & McKenzie LLP in Chicago, Illinois.

The St. Louis Rams LLC sold tickets to professional football games played in St. Louis city. A city ordinance imposes a 5-percent entertainment license tax on the gross receipts derived from admission charges to sporting events. The Rams included the entertainment license tax in the price of tickets it sold, collecting the 5-percent tax from each ticket purchaser. For three years, the Rams paid sales tax on all amounts it charged its customers, including the entertainment license tax. For the next three years, the Rams did not collect or remit sales tax for the 5-percent entertainment license tax and reduced by 5 percent the amount of sales it reported. Following an audit, the director of revenue determined the Rams should have collected and remitted sales taxes on the 5-percent entertainment license tax and assessed the Rams nearly $352,000 in sales tax attributable to the 5-percent reduction in sales reported. The Rams sought a refund of more than $401,000 it had remitted to the city for the entertainment license tax for the first three years and challenged the portion of the director’s assessment of unpaid sales tax due to the 5-percent reduction in reported ticket sales for the second three years. The administrative hearing commission concluded the Rams were entitled to the full refund sought, plus interest, and were not liable for sales tax on the 5-percent of sales paid to the city’s entertainment license tax. The director seeks this Court’s review.

This appeal presents one primary question for the Court – whether the amount of the gross ticket sales attributable to the city entertainment license tax is subject to state sales tax. Related issues include whether the plain language of section 144.020.1(2). RSMo, subjects the entire ticket price to state sales tax; whether the amount charged for the entertainment license tax is for “admission;” whether the exception in section 144.010.1(1), RSMo, for federal admission taxes and taxes imposed by sections 144.010 to 144.525, RSMo, encompass the entertainment license tax; and what effect, if any, one of this Court’s prior decisions has on the Rams’ refund claim.

SC95910_Director_of_Revenue_brief
SC95910_St._Louis_Rams_brief
SC95910_Director_of_Revenue_reply_brief




SC96034
Thaddeus Thomas, a Minor, By and Through His Next Friend, Marlin Thomas, and Marlin Thomas and MA Sheryll Joy Thomas, Individually v. Mercy Hospitals East Communities, d/b/a Mercy Hospital-Washington, and Mercy Clinic East Communities
Franklin County
Challenge to bias and rehabilitation of juror
Listen to the oral argument: SC96034.mp3
The Thomases were represented during arguments by Bradley L. Bradshaw, an attorney in Springfield; Mercy was represented by Kenneth W. Bean of Sandberg Phoenix & von Gontard PC in St. Louis.

Joy Thomas called Mercy Clinic East Communities in August 2012 when she did not feel her unborn baby move inside her that day. She was admitted to Mercy Hospital-Washington, where a doctor induced labor and ultimately delivered the baby by Cesarean section. The baby was born with brain damage. The Thomases sued the hospital and clinic (collectively, Mercy), alleging medical negligence, and the case proceeded to trial in March 2015. During jury selection, the Thomases’ attorney said the case involved Mercy and asked if any of the prospective jurors felt they were more in favor of one party than the other. One said her sister had worked for 25 years as a nurse in the burn unit at another Mercy hospital and said she “probably” would be slightly in favor of Mercy. When asked if she would read instructions given by the judge and follow the instructions to the best of her ability, the prospective juror said “yes.” She also said it did not change her experiences or knowledge and understanding of her relationship to Mercy. She said she had heard good and bad things about the hospital from her sister and would do her best to decide the case based on what she heard in the courtroom. The Thomases’ attorney moved to strike the potential juror for cause, noting she said she would do her best but never said she could be fair and impartial. The circuit court overruled the motion to strike, and the woman ultimately served on the jury. Following trial, the jury found in favor of Mercy, and the circuit court entered its judgment accordingly. The Thomases appeal.

This case presents one primary question for the Court – whether the challenged juror demonstrated a disqualifying bias, was not rehabilitated successfully and, therefore, was precluded from serving on the jury under section 494.470, RSMo. Related issues include whether the juror expressed a specific opinion in favor of Mercy; whether rehabilitation requires a clear, unequivocal assurance of impartiality; and whether the juror gave such an assurance.

SC96034_Thomases_brief
SC96034_Mercy_Hospital_and_Mercy_Clinic_brief
SC96034_Thomases_reply_brief



SC95681
In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Aaron Sebastian a/k/a Aaron W. Sebastian, a/k/a Aaron Wade Sebastian
Greene County
Challenge to commitment as sexually violent predator and to constitutional validity of the act governing such a commitment
Listen to the oral argument: SC95681.mp3
Sebastian was represented during arguments by Chelsea R. Mitchell of the public defender’s office in Columbia; the state was represented by Daniel N. McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

Aaron Sebastian pleaded guilty to first-degree attempted statutory sodomy for attempting, in 2011, to put his hand down the pants of a pubescent 11-year-old girl when he was 18 years old. He completed group sex offender therapy while in prison. While in therapy, he reported that, when he was approximately15 years old, he had offended against three girls and that, when he was 17 years old, he had performed oral sex on a 7-year-old girl. In 2015, the state sought a hearing to determine whether Sebastian was a sexually violent predator. Sebastian moved to dismiss the proceedings against him, alleging the sexually violent predator act was unconstitutional. The circuit court overruled his motion, and the case proceeded to a trial by a jury. The state presented testimony from two psychologists – one from the department of corrections and one from the department of mental health. Both testified that he was a pedophile, that his diagnosis constituted a mental abnormality, that he had gone through a sex offender treatment program as a juvenile, and that he was more likely than not to engage in future acts of sexually predatory violence unless confined in a secure facility. Sebastian presented testimony from a forensic psychologist and neuropsychologist who testified Sebastian did not suffer from a mental abnormality and was not more likely than not to commit predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined as a result of a mental abnormality. The circuit court overruled Sebastian’s motion to direct a verdict in his favor and denied his request to require the jury to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury found Sebastian was a sexually violent predator. The circuit court entered judgment accordingly and committed him to the custody of the department of mental health. Sebastian appeals.

This case presents a number of questions for the Court. One involves whether this Court should reconsider two of its prior holdings and analyze the state’s sexually violent predator act using the lower standard of rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny review. Others involve the constitutional validity of the act – whether it results in punitive, lifetime confinement; permits confinement without proof of behavioral impairment or serious difficulty controlling behavior; whether it has adequate substantive and procedural protections; and whether it fails to provide for a least-restrictive environment for treatment. Additional questions include whether the circuit court held the state to the correct burden of proof or should have granted the state’s request for the case to be tried by a jury. Evidentiary questions include whether the state psychologists’ determinations were reliable and whether one violated privilege in disclosing statements Sebastian had made to her; whether the state made a submissible case that Sebastian suffers from a mental abnormality; whether the state provided sufficient evidence that Sebastian poses a future risk sufficient to commit him as a sexually violent predator; and whether the circuit court should have allowed Sebastian to present evidence of his plan should he be released. A related issue involves whether an honor center or community release center constitutes a “secure facility.” A further question involves the propriety of one of the jury instructions.

SC95681_Sebastian_brief
SC95681_State_brief
SC95681_Sebastian_reply_brief



SC95858
State ex rel. Dr. Patrick Goldsworthy, Dr. Aston Goldsworthy, Dr. Patrick Goldsworthy D.C. PC v. The Honorable James F. Kanatzar
Jackson County
Ability to use a “savings statute” more than once to avoid dismissal under the statute of limitations
Listen to the oral argument: SC95858.mp3
The Goldsworthys were represented during arguments by Timothy M. Aylward of Horn Aylward & Bandy LLC in Kansas City; the survivors were represented by Kenneth B. McClain of Humphrey, Farrington & McClain in Independence.

Michael Lang died in December 2009. His surviving children filed a wrongful death lawsuit in December 2010 against Dr. Patrick Goldsworthy, Dr. Aston Goldsworthy and their chiropractic practice (collectively, the Goldsworthys), alleging Lang’s death was caused by their substandard and negligent chiropractic care. The circuit court overruled the survivors’ motion for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial), and when a witness became unavailable for trial, the survivors voluntarily dismissed that lawsuit in March 2013. The survivors refiled their lawsuit in March 2014, relying on a savings provision in section 537.100, RSMo, to do so. The survivors did not file an affidavit of merit, as required by section 538.225, RSMo, and, as a result, the circuit court dismissed the case in December 2015. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal but suggested it may be possible for the survivors to refile their case a second time, though it stated it was not addressing whether the survivors twice could use a savings statute. The survivors filed their suit a third time in December 2015. The Goldsworthys moved to dismiss, arguing the survivors were not entitled to use the savings statute a second time. The circuit court overruled the motion. The Goldsworthys seek this Court’s relief.

This case presents one primary question for the Court – whether the survivors’ claims are barred by the applicable standard of limitations or whether they can use the savings provision of section 537.100 a second time. Related issues include what interpretation of the savings statute is dictated by its language and prior court cases.

SC95858_Goldsworthys_brief
SC95858_surviving_children_brief
SC95858_Goldsworthys_reply_brief
 
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