The materials below are provided solely for the interest and convenience of the reader, are not official Court records, and should not be quoted or cited as such. Once cases are docketed, the briefs filed by the parties typically are posted within a day or so. Summaries of the cases are prepared by the Court’s communications counsel and typically are posted the week before arguments. Audio files and information about attorneys who argued typically are posted within a day or so after arguments.  Further information about the cases may be available through Case.net.

SC95918

Kathryn J. Landewee v. John E. Landewee
Cape Girardau County
Challenge to division of marital property
Listen to the oral argument: SC95918.mp3
The wife was represented during arguments by Laura Clubb of The Clubb Law Firm LLC in Cape Girardeau; the husband was represented by John P. Heisserer of Rice, Spaeth, Summers & Heisserer LC in Cape Girardeau.

A husband and wife were divorced in December 2014. During their nearly 23 years of marriage, the couple acquired certain property and debts. These included a floral business the wife’s family established in Cape Girardeau in 1920, a home physically connected to the business, the land on which the business and home sit, and vehicles and debts associated with the business. Other marital property included personal vehicles, retirement accounts and life insurance policies. Marital debts included credit card debts. The husband had two retirement accounts, including a LAGERS (local government employees retirement benefit) plan and a non-LAGERS plan. A LAGERS plan is a defined-benefit plan in which participants, upon reaching a certain age, receive monthly benefits from a pool account, in contrast with a defined-contribution plan in which benefits are drawn from a separate account to which the participant made contributions over time. At trial, both parties presented evidence of the value of the husband’s LAGERS plan and his expected monthly benefit and expert testimony explaining how those values and benefits were calculated. They also presented evidence of certain statutory factors, including the parties’ economic circumstance, their contributions to the marital property, the value of each spouse’s nonmarital property and the parties’ conduct during the marriage. In dividing the property and debts, the circuit court awarded the wife the business, home, land and business debts; her retirement account; and all marital debts except the husband’s automobile loan. The circuit court awarded the husband his non-LAGERS retirement plan and ordered the wife to pay the husband an equalization payment of more than $196,000. The circuit court deferred division of the marital portion of the husband’s LAGERS retirement plan for at least nine years. The wife appeals.

This appeal presents several questions for the Court. One involves whether the circuit court properly and equitably divided the couple’s marital property. Related issues include whether the court properly: deferred allocation of a portion of the husband’s pension benefit to the wife; considered the statutory factors in dividing the property; and ordered the wife to pay the husband more than $196,000. A second question involves whether the circuit court’s assignment of a present value of zero dollars to the husband’s pension was supported by substantial evidence or was against the weight of the evidence.
 
SC95918_Wife_reply_brief
SC95918_Husband_brief
SC95918_Wife_reply_brief
 


SC95909
Daniel McKay v. State of Missouri
St. Charles County
Challenge to dismissal of pro se motion for postconviction relief
Listen to the oral argument: SC95909.mp3
McKay was represented during arguments by Lisa M. Stroup of the public defender’s office in St. Louis; the state was represented by Evan Buchheim of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City.

In May 2010, the St. Charles County prosecutor’s office charged Daniel McKay with two counts of selling a controlled substance and one count of unlawfully possessing a concealable firearm. At the time, he was on probation for a case in Pike County. He was arrested in July 2010 for violating his probation, his probation was revoked and he was sent to prison. While incarcerated, he failed to appear in court for the St. Charles County charges, and the circuit court issued a warrant for his arrest. McKay attempted to file an action under the state’s uniform mandatory disposition of detainers act, but the department of corrections would not forward his action because the arrest warrant mistakenly stated it was for a probation violation and not for pending charges. McKay then moved to dismiss the charges against him because the state had failed to try him within 180 days of his request for disposition of detainers. The department of corrections ultimately realized the arrest warrant was for new charges and, in January 2012, filed McKay’s request for final disposition of detainers with the St. Charles County circuit court and prosecutor’s office. Following a March 2012 jury trial, McKay was convicted as charged and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. He appealed. The appeals court affirmed the judgment in part and remanded (sent back) part of the case for the circuit court to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to whether McKay’s constitutional right to a speedy trial under the uniform detainers act had been violated and, if so, whether this resulted in prejudice to him. He subsequently filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. On remand, the circuit court determined that, although McKay’s right to a speedy trial had been violated, the state had proven no prejudice resulted. The appeals court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment, and McKay filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief. The circuit court dismissed his motion, finding it included arguments he should have raised in his first motion for postconviction relief. McKay appeals.

This appeal presents one question for this Court – whether the circuit court denied McKay’s due process rights in dismissing his motion for postconviction relief. A related issue is whether his motion was considered successive or whether the evidentiary hearing on remand and second appeal intervened. Other related issues involve whether his motion was directed to his claims regarding the hearing on remand and whether the circuit court prematurely dismissed his case.

SC95909_McKay_brief
SC95909_State_brief



SC95771
Keith Jackson v. Dennis J. Barton III
St. Louis County
Challenge to dismissal of lawsuit against debt collector
Listen to the oral argument: SC95771.mp3
Jackson was represented during arguments by Bryan E. Brody of Brody & Cornwell in St. Louis; Barton, of The Barton Law Group LLC in Chesterfield, represented himself.

Keith Jackson received certain dental treatments from LifeSmile Dental Care between June 2011 and April 2012. In September 2013, attorney Dennis Barton III sued Jackson on behalf of LifeSmile, seeking to recover approximately $460 in unpaid dental bills plus interest, attorney fees and court costs. Jackson responded that he did not sign the form contract on which the debt collection suit relied and that he did not owe the purported balance to LifeSmile. The case was set for trial in 2014. Jackson appeared by counsel at trial to defend against the suit. Barton did not appear, and the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Barton subsequently sent Jackson a written demand for payment of approximately $550 and then asked the circuit court to reinstate his debt collection suit. In January 2015, Jackson sued Barton, alleging violations of the federal fair debt collection practices act and the state merchandising practices act. In August 2015, the circuit court entered its judgment granting Barton’s motion to dismiss the suit with prejudice (precluding Jackson from refiling his suit). Jackson appeals.

This case presents several questions for this Court. One involves whether Jackson’s claim under the federal act was barred by the one-year statute of limitations or whether Barton committed multiple discrete collection actions within the year before Jackson filed his petition. Related issues include when a “violation occurs” under the federal act; when a debt collector has the “last opportunity to comply” with the federal act; and what effect, if any, there was on the statute of limitations when Barton did not appear for trial on his original debt collection suit, subsequently mailed Jackson the letter demanding payment or then sought to reinstate the underlying debt collection suit. Another question involves whether the circuit court should have dismissed Jackson’s petition with prejudice. Related issues involve whether Barton’s motion to dismiss was treated as a motion for summary judgment (judgment on the court filings, without a trial) and whether Jackson pleaded sufficient facts in his first amended petition to justify tolling (pausing) the statute of limitations until his damages fully were capable of being ascertained. An additional question involves whether Jackson stated a claim under the state act. Related issues involve whether a debt collector’s activities are “in connection with” the sale of the original service that created the debt obligation and whether debt collectors are excluded from the state act.

SC95771_Jackson_brief
SC95771_Barton_brief
SC95771_Jackson_reply_brief

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